

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

TOHAK- 77

July 31, 1975

TO: BREMER/RODMAN FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: BUD McFARLANE *RM*

Bob Oakley asked that the attached message be passed to you.

Warm regards.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MORI/CDF Pages 2-5 per
C03208576

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CODEWORD ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


INFORMATION
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WITH TOP SECRET CODEWORD ATTACHMENT

July 31, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY 



1 - In the events surrounding the UNEF renewal exercise, as well as in the Egyptian performance at the Jidda Conference, there have been signs of increasing nervousness and impatience by Sadat (and other Arabs)

with the slow pace of negotiations, Israeli toughness on various aspects

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of the negotiations, and with Israeli public statements. The Egyptians did not really consult with us before taking the UNEF action, although we had been warned at an earlier date. Nor did they really oppose the Israeli suspension move at Jidda, after telling us they would. The combination of recent Israeli negotiating positions, public statements and private demarches to Western European governments can be expected to aggravate seriously Egyptian nervousness and impatience. It may also further diminish their willingness to be frank with us.

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3 - The Israelis are already quite nervous over what they believe to be Egyptian buildups on the East Bank and on the West Bank close to the Canal, following on the increased alert connected with UNEF renewal.

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

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They are naturally suspicious of a repetition of the surprise of

October 1973 and determined not to allow a repeat.

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We should never forget that in mid-1973 while Sadat ran out the diplomatic string he was preparing for the military action of October. Despite the relative military weakness of the Egyptian army and the miserable Egyptian economic situation, both of which argue against war, he is basically a man of great pride capable of acting decisively in what we would consider an irrational way. (Ambassador Eilts will presumably be able to provide an up-to-date assessment of Sadat's present mood and you all will no doubt review with him the chances of renewed hostilities.) We should also not forget the presence within the Israeli leadership, as well as the Likud, of a body of thought which would opt for a preemptive strike rather than run any risk of again being surprised militarily.

Sam Hoskinson and I have been concerned for several days over the possibility that Sadat's patience in diplomacy might run out before too long and that he would begin to prepare actively for the military alternative. As a result CIA already has underway an intensive study of all intelligence indications related to this possibility

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The CIA assessment should be ready tomorrow.

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