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# Nitze Concerned On Arms Accord

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Paul H. Nitze expressed concern yesterday that President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger may negotiate a strategic arms limitation agreement in Moscow that could bring them toward an accord but that may not be in the long-range interest of the United States.

He also suggested that the weakening of U.S. leadership as a result of the Watergate scandal would encourage the Russians to believe that they can, with patience, achieve their goal of placing limits on strategic arms that would shift the balance to their advantage.

Nitze, who resigned from the U.S. delegation to the strategic arms limitation talks on June 11, has, after a period of hesitation, started speaking out against the trend of administration policy. He issued a symposium address yesterday at the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament.

Rep. Charles Wilson (D-Calif.) urged the committee to make a statement that the administration might make short-term agreements at the expense of the long term. In an implied reference to Kissinger, who has taken the negotiations largely into his own hands since the NALT delegation was recalled from Geneva in April, Wilson said: "Negotiation cannot be totally orchestrated by any one individual."

In the question period, Wilson asked Nitze: "Is it possible that we may have reached a point where this has become a personal matter for these other people, and Kissinger is so concerned that they have something personal to prove to us that they are not thinking of the U.S. government? Do you see that as a possibility or a danger?" "I see it as a possibility," Nitze replied, apparently restraining himself.

Nitze has advocated a possible SALT agreement in a "single integrated document," rather than a series of separate agreements. He said he understood to be seeking at this time an agreement that would put limits on individual weapons only, since he feels that is the measure attainable.

Nitze's testimony brought to the surface the debate within the administration over how to deal with limitations on only one strategic arms. Mr. Nixon, with his chief advisers split on the issue of what would be negotiable in Moscow and what would be acceptable from the Soviet side.

The "Soviet approach," according to Nitze, is to deal with each element of the problem piecemeal, pulling down one piece after another in a manner favorable to Soviet interests and away from U.S. interests—diplomatic, propaganda and through a ban on strategic capabilities. He said that the United States is unlikely to achieve any major really what agreement. Among the issues, they consider already settled are the intermediate range and offensive weapons.

Nitze has previously expressed anxiety that the so-called "interim agreement" would be a mere tactical device to gain time for the Russians to develop their SS-20 missile force. He said that the United States is unlikely to achieve any major really what agreement. Among the issues, they consider already settled are the intermediate range and offensive weapons.

"Soviet officials," he said, "have indicated the view that what they call the 'interim agreement' which in Communist terminology includes the elimination of forces based on the equation, including psychological, political, economic and military factors, is moving in their favor and that, even though we may today believe that their proposals are one-sided and inequitable, eventually reality will bring us to an accord at least the substance of them."

The Soviet position at the SALT talks, Nitze said, "was heavily one-sided." He said: "It would carry over into a permanent agreement the approximately 40 per cent Soviet advantage in the number of offensive nuclear missile launchers and preserve the Soviet advantage in missile launching dimensions provided by the interim agreement."

"It would negate U.S. offsetting advantages in ABYV (the multiple launch capable intermediate range ballistic missile) and heavy bomber capability."

Furthermore, it called for the withdrawal of nuclear capable systems deployed in defense of U.S. allies and comparable Soviet territory and the relocation of the Soviet bases. "These are the so-called 'forward-based' systems."

"It would ban the deployment of new U.S. systems such as Trident and B-1, but would not ban the deployment of the new variants of Soviet offensive systems now under active development or deployment. It also would be of no benefit to the United States."

Nitze, who has a reputation for presenting a tough line with the Soviets, suggested that the Russian proposal "was undoubtedly an extreme position, with extensive built-in trading room." But he said the question now was how to bring the Russians around to acceptance of a permanent agreement that would not put the United States in an inferior strategic position.

As a possible exception he suggested a number of options. He said that equal trading down by the Russians would be necessary to obtain the "essential equivalence" of forces. If a partial agreement were considered necessary to the United States, Nitze said the United States would possibly be able to undertake that matter.

He said "this would cut off the further testing or deployment of large Soviet ABYV missiles but would not ban the testing or deployment of a large ABYV follow-on missile to the SS-20 missile."

In an agreement, Nitze said, "both sides" would be required to study the proposals and through a ban on strategic capabilities. He said that the United States is unlikely to achieve any major really what agreement. Among the issues, they consider already settled are the intermediate range and offensive weapons.

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