

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 131650Z MAY 74



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HAKTO 84 IMMEDIATE

MAY 13, 1974

TO: AMBASSADOR EILTS

FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

1. FYI: VIA THIS CHANNEL, PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR JUDGMENT. JOE SISCO AND I HAVE THE IMPRESSION IT IS MARWAN, MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE, WHO IS STILL PRESSING VERY HARD FOR THE KUWAIT-SHEIKDOM STOPS. IS THIS CORRECT? DO YOU HAVE ANY FEEL AS TO DEGREE TO WHICH SADAT MAY FEEL HIS OWN PRESTIGE IS HEAVILY INVOLVED? DO BOTH FAHMY AND MARWAN FEEL THE SAME ABOUT THIS? END FYI

2. WE, OF COURSE, REALIZE A TRIP TO ABOVE STOPS WOULD BE HELPFUL. BUT GIVEN THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS THE ONLY POSSIBILITY WE CAN CONSIDER IS A ONE DAY VISIT TO THE AREA IN WHICH WE WOULD DO 2-HOUR STOPOVERS IN EACH AIRPORT. OUR FIRST OVERRIDING PRIORITY DURING MY CURRENT TRIP IS TO SPEND ALL THE TIME NECESSARY ON THE IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS. IF WE GET AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE LINE OF DISENGAGEMENT, WE WILL NEED THE REMAINDER OF THE WEEK TO WORK ON OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT. AFTER ALL, IT IS OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT OR FAIL TO DO SO WHICH WILL HAVE THE DECISIVE IMPACT ON OUR POSITION IN THE AREA. PLEASE EXPLAIN TO MARWAN HOW CRITICAL IT IS THAT I CONCENTRATE ON THE TWO PARTIES CONCERNED AND THE IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THERE IS ALSO THE SECURITY SITUATION TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ON A TRIP TO THE GULF. WHILE WE ARE GETTING A FURTHER UPDATE, ALL OF OUR SECURITY SERVICES HAVE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED AGAINST THE TRIP. DOES MARWAN HAVE INFORMATION TO THE CONTRARY? (IN ORDER FOR ME TO MAKE A TIMELY DECISION I NEED HIS ASSESSMENT WITHING THE NEXT 24 HOURS.)

4. FYI: I AM TRANSMITTING TO YOU THE LETTERS WE HAVE ALREADY SENT TO THE RULERS. YOU ARE FREE TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO SADAT IF YOU BELIEVE IT HELPS. ALSO WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND ANOTHER BATCH AND MAKE ANY POINTS WHICH MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO EGYPTIANS. AS OF RIGHT NOW, WE ARE NOT DISPOSED TO CHANGE OUR DECISION. END FYI.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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State Dept. review completed

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HAKTO 84

IMMEDIATE

13 MAY 64 18 50z

May 13 1974

TO: AMBASSADOR EILTS
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

Immediate

1. FYI: Via this channel, please give me your judgment. Joe Sisco and I have the impression it is Marwan, more than anyone else, who is still pressing very hard ^{for} the Kuwait-Sheikdom stops. Is this correct? Do you have any feel as to degree ^{to} which Sadat may feel his own prestige is heavily involved? Do both Fahmy and Marwan feel the same about this? END FYI


2. We, of course, realize a trip to above stops would be helpful. But given the following considerations the only possibility we can consider is a one day visit to the area in which we would do 2-hour stopovers in each airport. Our first overriding priority ^{during my current trip} is to spend all the time necessary on the immediate negotiations. If we get agreement between the two sides on the line of disengagement, we will need the remainder of the week to work on other elements of the agreement. After all, it is our ability to achieve agreement or fail to do so which will have the decisive impact on our position in the area. Please explain to Marwan how critical it is that I concentrate on the two parties concerned and the immediate negotiations.

^{to take into account on a trip to the Gulf}
3. There is also the security situation. While we are getting a further update, all of our security services have strongly recommended against

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the trip. Does Marwan have information to the contrary? (In order for me to make a timely decision I need his assessment within the next 24 hours.)



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4. FYI. I am transmitting to you the letters we have already sent to the Rulers. You are free to make them available to Sadat if you believe it helps. Also we would be prepared to send another batch and make any points which might be helpful to Egyptians. As of right now, we are not disposed to change our decision.
END FYI.

JSSCLO

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