

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

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APPLY

September 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER  
FROM: 25X1 JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE  
SUBJECT: Pham Van Dong's National Day Speech

At your request, [redacted]  
September 1 National Day speech (Tab A), which concludes that the  
speech indicates areas of possible flexibility and potential for move-  
ment in the North Vietnamese negotiating position. The following are  
the salient conclusions. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2)  
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Comment: We do not share [redacted] that Dong's speech indicated an<sup>25X1</sup> new flexibility or potential for movement in Hanoi's negotiating position. As we previously pointed out in our own analysis of the speech (Tab B), Dong's speech contained unusually broad demands for complete U.S. abandonment of South Vietnam. Not only did he expand the "point one" military stipulations with the demand that we must "completely dismantle all U.S. military commitment to the Saigon administration," but called for "the cessation of all U.S. involvement in South Vietnam," a demand which could scarcely be more sweeping in scope. Moreover, Dong stated that the U.S. must "agree to the establishment of a three-segment coalition government." We cannot recall when the other side has been this specific in

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publicly demanding our agreement to a coalition. (It is, incidentally, interesting that Dong referred only to a coalition and not to the more innocuous sounding "government of national concord" normally used.) Up until now, the Communists have not been this explicit and have more vaguely called upon us to stop supporting Thieu and cease our "interference" in South Vietnam's affairs. 25X1

25X1 It is difficult to see where [redacted] Dong's statement that an "all-inclusive" solution must "be as proposed" in the seven points, especially when read in its context. (See Tab B for text)

[redacted] that Dong says nothing about ending U. S. economic and political aid but it omits any reference to Dong's call for the "cessation of all involvement in South Vietnam." On the other hand, the original "seven points, clearly left open the possibility of future U. S. economic assistance -- on Communist terms.

25X1 We do not see any special significance in Dong's omitting references to Thieu's resignation or holding elections. A coalition by definition excludes Thieu, and Dong would not on this occasion spell out all the details of Hanoi's negotiating position. Thus any omissions on his part do not necessarily suggest "flexibility." [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] Dong indicates that U. S. agreement in principle to a coalition might, along with U. S. withdrawal, be sufficient. This does not seem to be borne out by Dong's unusually precise demand that the U. S. agree to the establishment of a coalition government. Moreover, it is not quite clear what [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Dong's statement that "a genuine and stable peace can be... only the result of victory" and that "all illusions and all compromises on this crucial question will be very dangerous as has been proved by so many examples found in various parts of the world." This statement, albeit hortative and at least partly aimed at Moscow and Peking, does not exactly reflect a spirit of flexibility. In fact, Saigon's analysis (Tab C) focussed on this part of the speech as further evidence of Hanoi's determination to resist pressure from Moscow and Peking to accept an unsatisfactory peace settlement. Saigon apparently saw no signs of flexibility in Dong's speech.

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