No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/04: LOC-HAK-259-4-68-6

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SECRET SENSITIVE 291014Z APR 74

IMMEDIATE
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER - GENEVA 048

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
HAKTO 04
PLEASE PASS URGENTLY TO DINITZ FOR PRIME MINISTER

25X1

QUOTE

DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER:

I AM WRITING TO YOU, NOT AS SECRETARY OF STATE BUT AS A FRIEND, AS WE APPROACH WHAT CAN BE THE MOST DECISIVE TWO WEEKS IN THE LONG SEARCH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE PURSUED TOGETHER FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I AM WRITING BECAUSE I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY THE MOOD I SENSE DEVELOPING IN ISRAEL.

GIVEN YOUR COUNTRY'S MEMORIES OF THE PAST TWENTY FIVE YEARS AND THE EXPERIENCES YOU HAVE RECENTLY GONE THROUGH, THE CONCERNS THAT ARE REFLECTED IN THE PUBLIC MOOD OF ISRAEL TODAY, AS I SENSE IT, ARE NOT UNNATURAL. I DO NOT WANT TO DWELL ON THE RECENT SITUATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT I KNOW THAT OUR VOTE HAS ADDED TO YOUR CONCERNS, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE ISRAEL ATTACHES TO THE UNITED STATES POSITION AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO UNFRIENDLY OR INDIFFERENT ELEMENTS IN THE COUNCIL.

MORI/CDF C03344670

YOU ARE AWARE OF THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH WE LABORED IN THE RECENT COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS. EVEN WITHOUT THESE, HOWEVER, THE RESOLUTION -- WHILE BY NO MEANS BALANCED AS WE WOULD HAVE WISHED -- CAME CLOSER TO BALANCE THAN ANY BEFORE IT IN RECENT YEARS. WE WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION WE DID IF THIS HAD NOT BEEN OUR HONEST OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT. IN ADDITION, WE MADE SEVERAL STRONG UNILATERAL STATEMENTS UNDERLINING OUR POSITION IN CONDEMNATION OF THE ATROCITY AT QIRYAT SHMONA.

State Dept. review

IT IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT, MADAME PRIME MINISTER, THAT
YOU NOT LET YOURSELF BE PERSUADED, AND THAT YOU DO ALL IN
YOUR POWER TO KEEP THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL FROM FEARING THAT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH
I KNOW ARE VERY MUCH ON YOUR MIND, MEAN IN ANY WAY THAT
ISRAEL STANDS ALONE OR WILL STAND ALONE. SO LONG AS I HAVE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, THIS ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
WILL NOT HAPPEN.

WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER FOR FIVE YEARS, AND YOU MUST KNOW
THAT I WOULD NEVER DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE ISRAEL'S
SECURITY. I BELIEVE THAT OUR DIPLOMACY, BOLSTERED BY YOUR
WISE GUIDANCE OF ISRAELI POLICY, HAS BROUGHT US AN IMPORTANT
WAY ALONG A PATH THAT WILL ASSURE ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND, INDEED,
ITS LONG-TERM SURVIVAL. WE ARE CONDUCTING OUR DIPLOMACY IN
CIRCUMSTANCES OF EXTREME DIFFICULTY, COMPLEXITY AND PLUIDITY.
IF IT IS IN YOUR INTERESTS AND OURS, AS I BELIEVE IT IS, TO
REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO PROMOTE
STABILITY, WE MUSHT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE TO CONDUCT
OUR DIPLOMACY AND PURSUE THE CONSTANT OBJECTIVES YOU AND
WE SHARE WITH THE FLEXIBILITY THE TACTICAL SITUATION REQUIRES.
CERTAINLY OUR ACTIONS WERE AFFECTED BY OUR NEED TO ENLIST
MODERATE ARAB SUPPORT THIS WEEK - A JUDGMENT FMINENTLY IN
ISRAEL'S I NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/04: LOC-HAK-259-4-68-6

MY M¢ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/04: LOC-HAK-259-4-68-6 TO SAY, AS URGENTLY AS I CAN, HOW TRAGIC IT WOULD BE IF THE UNDERSTANDABLE ANXIETIES ARISING FROM A PARTICULAR TACTICAL SITUATION -- WHETHER IT BE THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE OR ANY OTHER -- WERE TO LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MOMENTOUS AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY. THERE HAS NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE, IF IT IS IN OUR POWER TO PREVENT IT.

BUT IF OUR PRESENT DIPLOMACY FAILS IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD AHEAD, IT WILL BE BEYOND OUR POWER TO PREVENT A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES, A REUTRN OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO UNMANAGEABLE INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, A RESTORATION OF SOVIET DOMINANCE IN THE AREA, AND EXTREME JEOPARDY TO THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN SO PAINFULLY ACHIEVED IN RECENT MONTHS. IN THE FACE OF CERTAIN EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE HOSTILITY AND A US DOMESTIC OPINION INFLUENCED BY ANOTHER ENERGY CRISIS THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE THE GRAVEST SINCE ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE.

WE MUST NOT PERMIT PREOCCUPATION WITH ANXIETIES OF THE MOMENT TO OBSCURE THE REALTY THAT WHAT IS AT STAKE IS THE FUTURE OF ISRAEL'S PLACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE BOTH HAVE AN OBLIGATION, MADAME PRIME MINISTER, TO KEEP THAT SUPREME OBJECTIVE IN THE CENTER OF OUR THOUGHTS AND TO WORK TO PRODUCE CONDITIONS THAT WILL MAKE ITS ACHIEVEMENT POSSIBLE.

I WILL WANT TO GO INTO ALL THIS IN DEPTH WITH YOU WHEN WE MEET, AND CANNOT URGE TOO STRONGLY THAT NO DECISIONS BE TAKEN MEANWHILE THAT WOULD FORECLOSE ANY OF THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH LIE BEFORE US.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER.

UNQUOTE. S E C R E T SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/04 : LOC-HAK-259-4-68-6

SECRET/SENSITIVE

HAKTO 4

TO:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

PLEASE PASS TO DINITZ FOR PRIME MINISTER

## QUOTE

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I am writing to you, not as Secretary of State but as a friend, as we approach what can be the most decisive two weeks in the long search our two countries have pursued together for peace in the Middle East. I am writing because I am deeply troubled by the mood I sense develpting in Israel.

Given your country's memories of the past twenty five years and the experiences you have recently gone through, the concerns that are reflected in the public mood of Israel today, as I sense it, are not unnatural. I do not want to dwell on the recent situation in the Security Council but I know that our vote has added to your concerns, because of the importance Israel attaches to the United States position as a counterweight to unfriendly or indifferent elements in the Council.

You are aware of the special circumstances under which we labored in the recent Council deliberations. Even without these, however, the resolution -- while by no means balanced as we would have wished -- came closer to balance than any before it SECRET/SENSITIVE

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in recent years. We would not have taken the position we did if this had not been our honest objective judgment. In addition, we made several strong unilateral statements underlining our position in condemnation of the atrocity at Qiryat Shmona.

It is terribly important, Madame Prime Minister, that
you not let yourself be persuaded, and that you do all in
your power to keep the people of Israel from fearing that the
Security Council vote and other recent developments, which
I know are very much on your mind, mean in any way that Israel
stands alone or will stand alone. So long as I have responsibility
for the conduct of American foreign policy, this will not
happen.

We have worked together for five years, and you must know that I would never do anything that would jeopardize Israel's security. I believe that our diplomacy, bolstered by your wise guidance of Israeli policy, has brought us an important way along a path that will assure Israel's security and, indeed, its long-term survival. We are conducting our diplomacy in circumstances of extreme difficulty, complexity and fluidity. If it is in your interests and ours, as I believe it is, to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East, we must have the opportunity to continue to conduct our diplomacy and pursue the constant objectives you and we share with the flexibility the tactical situation requires. Culturely our actions mere affilled by our need I entirely any actions mere affilled by our need I entirely any actions mere affilled by our need I entirely any actions mere

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

My major purpose in writing you this personal letter is to say, as urgently as I can, how tragic it would be if the understandable anxieties arising from a particular tactical situation -- whether it be the Security Council vote or any other -- were to lead to the conclusion that there had been a momentous and fundamental change in U.S. policy. There has not been and will not be, if it is in our power to prevent it.

But if our present diplomacy fails in the critical period ahead, it will be beyond our power to prevent a resumption of hostilities, a return of diplomatic efforts to unmanageable international forums, a restoration of Soviet dominance in the area, and extreme jeopardy to the progress that has been so painfully achieved in recent months.

We must not permit preoccupation with anxieties of the moment to obscure the reality that what is at stake is the future of Israel's place in the Middle East. We both have an obligation, Madame Prime Minister, to keep that supreme objective in the center of our thoughts and to work to produce conditions that will make its achievement possible.

I will want to go into all this in depth with you when we meet, and cannot urge too strongly that no decisions be taken meanwhile that would foreclose any of the opportunities which

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lie before us.

Warm personal regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

UNQUOTE

Drafter:

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/04: LOC-HAK-259-4-68-6

SECRET/SENSITIVE

HAKTO \_\_\_\_

TO:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

I MINOVIATE

FROM:

SECRETARY KISSINGAR

PLEASE PASS\/TO DINITZ FOR PRIME MINISTER

ULGENTLY

QUOTE

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You are aware of the special circumstances under which we labored in the recent Council deliberations. Even without these, however, the resolution -- while by no means balanced as we would have wished -- came closer to balance than any before it SECRET/SENSITIVE

-2-

in recent years. We would not have taken the position we did if this had not been our honest objective judgment. In addition, we made several strong unilateral statements underlining our position in condemnation of the atrocity at Qiryat Shmona.

It is terribly important, Madame Prime Minister, that you not let yourself be persuaded, and that you do all in your power to keep the people of Israel from fearing that the Security Council vote and other recent developments, which I know are very much on your mind, mean in any way that Israel stands alone or will stand alone. So long as I have responsibility for the conduct of American foreign policy, this will not happen.

We have worked together for five years, and you must know that I would never do anything that would jeopardize Israel's security. I believe that our diplomacy, bolstered by your wise guidance of Israeli policy, has brought us an important way along a path that will assure Israel's security and, indeed, its long-term survival. We are conducting our diplomacy in circumstances of extreme difficulty, complexity and fluidity. If it is in your interests and ours, as I believe it is, to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East and to promote stability, we must have the opportunity to continue to conduct

-3-

our diplomacy and pursue the constant objectives you and we share with the flexibility the tactical situation requires. Certainly our actions were affected by our need to enlist moderate Arab support this week - a judgment eminently in / Israel's interest.

My major purpose in writing you this personal letter is to say, as urgently as I can, how tragic it would be if the understandable anxieties arising from a particular tactical situation -- whether it be the Security Council vote or any other -- were to lead to the conclusion that there had been a momentous and fundamental change in U.S. policy. There has not been and will not be, if it is in our power to prevent it.

But if our present diplomacy fails in the critical period ahead, it will be beyond our power to prevent a resumption of hostilities, a return of diplomatic efforts to unmanageable international forums, a restoration of Soviet dominance in the area, and extreme jeopardy to the progress that has been so painfully achieved in recent months. In the face of certain European and Japanese hostility and a US domestic opinion influenced by another energy crisis the consequences would be the gravest since Israeli independence.

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We must not permit preoccupation with anxieties of the moment to obscure the reality that what is at stake is the future of Israel's place in the Middle East. We both have an obligation, Madame Prime Minister, to keep that supreme objective in the center of our thoughts and to work to produce conditions that will make its achievement possible.

I will want to go into all this in depth with you when we meet, and cannot urge too strongly that no decisions be taken meanwhile that would foreclose any of the opportunities which lie before us.

Warm personal regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

UNQUOTE

Drafter: Atherton

Clearance: Sisco