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Z 121640Z JAN 74 ZYH ZFF-1&4  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM TOHAK26

TO AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM

S E C R E T WH40083

TOHAK26 ZFF-1&4

25X1

TO: LARRY EAGLEBURGER FOR SEC. KISSINGER

TO: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: W. R. SMYSER

JOHN A. FROEBE, JR.

SUBJECT: CABLE CLEARANCE ON KOREAN EMERGENCY MEASURES

THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS ASKED US TO CLEAR A CABLE ADVISING OUR EMBASSY IN SEOUL ON WHAT TO TELL THE KOREANS ABOUT THEIR RECENT IMPOSITION OF EMERGENCY MEASURES.

THE CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY SNEIDER, HABIB AND INGERSOLL.

THE CABLE TRIES TO HAVE THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS. IT SAYS THAT THIS IS A KOREAN PROBLEM, BUT THAT WE SHOULD OFFER ADVICE (AT LEAST IN THIS CASE) EVEN IF IT DOES NO GOOD. IF THERE IS AN UPHEAVAL, WE CAN USE IT TO ARGUE THAT WE DID WHAT WE COULD TO MODERATE THE GOVERNMENT'S STAND (THOUGH NOT THE OPPOSITION'S). THE EMBASSY CAN USE IT TO SUIT WHATEVER IT MAY WISH TO DO AT ANY MOMENT, WHETHER ITS ADVICE IS GOOD OR BAD, HELPFUL OR UNHELPFUL.

YOU MAY WISH TO TAKE THIS COURSE, FOR ALL THE REASONS WHICH ARE OBVIOUS TO YOU.

HOWEVER, IF I UNDERSTAND THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND THE PRESIDENT'S AS WELL AS YOUR OWN WISHES, IT IS OUR INTENT TO WITHDRAW OURSELVES FROM THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES EVEN WHEN WE THINK WE KNOW BETTER AND EVEN WHEN THAT ABSTENTION IS PAINFUL IN ITS IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES. NOR CAN WE BE SURE THAT PARK IS REALLY MISHANDLING THE SITUATION. HE HAS SO FAR HIMSELF TRIED TO BE MODERATE.

WE HAVE, THEREFORE, MADE SOME CUTS IN THE STATE CABLE WHICH LEAVES US WITH A LEANER, LESS SPECULATIVE, BUT LESS AMBIVALENT DRAFT. OUR RECOMMENDED CHANGES ARE INDICATED ON THE STATE DRAFT BY BRACKETS.

(TEXT FOLLOWS:)

1. EMBASSY HAS SEEN DEPARTMENTAL GUIDELINES (REFS B AND C) WHICH INDICATE LINE WE INTEND TO TAKE PUBLICLY REGARDING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA. IN SUM, WE ARE MAKING CLEAR THAT WE WERE

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State Dept. review completed

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

SECFILE

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NOT CONSULTED BEFOREHAND, IN FACT WERE INFORMED ONLY JUST BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT, AND THAT WE SEE NO USEFUL PURPOSE BEING SERVED BY PUBLIC COMMENT. WE SEE NO NEED TO ADD THAT WE WERE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THESE ACTIONS INASMUCH AS WE BELIEVE THAT CAN BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. TO ADD SUCH COMMENT WOULD ONLY INVITE QUESTIONS.

2. WHILE WE HOPE TO LIMIT OUR PUBLIC POSTURE TO THE ABOVE FOR THE TIME BEING, WE WILL (MAY) NEED TO REVIEW THIS POSITION IF THERE IS DETERIORATION OF INTERNAL STABILITY IMPACTING ADVERSELY ON BROADER SECURITY MATTERS AFFECTING THE PENINSULA, OR IN THE EVENT OF WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE OF BLOODSHED.

3. DELETE: (PRIVATELY, WE INTEND TO COUNSEL MODERATION FOR REASONS SUGGESTED PARA 10(B) REF A. WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH COUNSEL WILL BE ANY MORE EFFECTIVE NOW THAN IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST. IT SEEMS CLEAR TO US THAT THE PROCESS NOW UNFOLDING IN THE ROK RELATES BASICALLY TO THE RIGHTS OF KOREANS TO A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR CHOOSING.) END DELETION. IN THIS DEVELOPMENT, THE U.S. CAN HAVE ONLY AN OUTSIDER'S ROLE UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR GREATER INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHICH WE DECIDELY ARE NOT.

DELETE: (4. WE RECOGNIZE THE CALCULATED RISKS INHERENT IN OUR POSITION. IF PARK INCREASES AUTHORITARIAN ROLE, WE BELIEVE THE THREAT TO SURVIVAL OF GOVERNMENT WILL ALSO INCREASE. HE MAY HAVE WAITED TOO LONG BEFORE ADDRESSING PUBLIC CONCERNS, AND ANY COMPROMISE WITH THE OPPOSITION OF RELAXATION MAY NOW BRING THE SAME RESULT. THAT IS SOMETHING KOREANS WILL NEED TO WORK OUT THEMSELVES.) END DELETION.

SEND STATE DRAFT

SEND REVISED DRAFT

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