No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/04: LOC-HAK-258-6-45-0 SECRET

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TO USLO PEKING

S E C R E T SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WH37340

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TOHAK100

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS

TO JON HOWE FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

DFLIVER TO JON HOWE IN SEALED ENVELOPE.

NOVEMBER 11, 1973

SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FOLLOWING IS A MESSAGE TO YOU FROM MINISTER YAMANI:

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"THE DIL PICTURE IS NOT AS DIM AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED. I AM PERSONALLY HOPEFUL THAT SOMETHING CAN BE DONE -- BOTH HERE IN SAUDI ARABIA TO CHANGE THE ATTITUDES OF SENIOR OFFICIALS AND ALSO LATTER WITH THE ARAB DIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES. I REALIZE THAT IT IS NOT EASY AT THE PRESENT TIME FOR YOU OR ANY OTHER OFFICIAL IN THE UNITED STATES TO GIVE A PUBLIC STATEMENT FAVORABLE TO THE ARABS. HOWEVER, SOMETHING IN THIS LINE WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO DUR EFFORTS. IN THIS RESPECT I AM REFERING TO A STATEMENT REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND, SPECIFICALLY, WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES."

MORI c03341539

* *WHSR COMMENT * *

SEC FILES

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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE **** INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

SECRET

****** COPV DOS review completed

- 2. DR. YAMANI STATED THAT THE MESSAGE ABOVE CONTAINED THE COMPLETE DRAL MESSAGE WHICH HE WISHED PASSED TO DR. KISSINGER. IN A DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED HOWEVER, HE MADE A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL COMMENTS. HE STATED THAT A MEETING TO WHICH HE WAS GOING SHORTLY WITH THE KING HAD BEEN CALLLED TO ATTEMPT TO DST. WITH THE KING'S APPROVAL TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS WHICH WOULD EASE SOMEWHAT THE SUADI EMBARGO AND DIL REDUCTION. HE SAID THAT A COMPLETE REVERSAL OF STEPS ALREADY TAKEN WAS DUT OF THE QUESTION, BUT THAT IT *IGHT BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE SOME STEPS WHICH WOULD MODIFY THE POSITION. IF SUCCESSFUL IN HIS EFFORTS WITH THE KING, YAMANI THEN PLANS TO CALL A MEETING OF THE DRGANIZATION OF ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (DAPEC) TO INVESTIGATE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO EASE THE SITUATION.
- 3. YAMANI SAID THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEM FACING HIM WAS THE FACT THAT THE KING WAS SO TERRIBLY ANGRY AT THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO GET HIS APPROVAL TO PROCEED. AS HE HAS DONE WITH OTHERS EARLIER, YAMANI ALMOST PLAINTIVELY LAMENTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD FAILED TO GET THE SAUDI MESSAGE GIVEN REPEATEDLY OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS OR A YEAR REGARDING SAUDI ACTIONS IF THE U. S. DID NOT CHANGE ITS PRO-ISRAELI POLICIES. HE AGAIN SAID THAT A COMPLETE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO WAS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO PAY THE PRICE OF HER SUPPORT TO HER ISRAELI FRIENDS.

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