

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The military balance among the three contending nationalist groups in Angola has recently shifted in favor of Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), thanks to an influx of arms from the USSR via Congo.

2. Neto is strong among urban dwellers and among the Kimbundu tribes which surround Luanda. He has exploited his newly found weapons superiority to press his military advantage around the capital. He is pushing Roberto's forces back into their tribal lands and is strong enough militarily to defeat, if he chose, the Savimbi forces around Luanda who are relatively unarmed.

3. The lightly armed forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto do not seem able to cope with the better armed MPLA. The FNLA has serious leadership weaknesses at the middle level and, based as it is on the Bakongo tribes of northern Angola, faces difficulty in building a following throughout Angola.

4. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi is based on the STAT

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numerically large Ovimbundu tribes. UNITA enjoys a large following in eastern and southern Angola. Its leadership appears dynamic. Savimbi is recruiting new forces but does not now have sufficient arms for the men he has in training.


5. Given the tribal and political makeup of Angola, we believe that even a large influx of arms to Roberto and Savimbi would probably not enable them to eliminate the MPLA as a political force. Without some help to Roberto and Savimbi, however, there is a strong possibility that the MPLA might seize control of the capital and its surrounding region. Without gaining control of the whole country, the MPLA could claim "victory" and set itself up as a central government even though it would then face protracted civil war.

6. If we cannot with any assurance expect to be able to provide Roberto with the means to vanquish the MPLA, we could through help to Roberto and to Savimbi adjust the balance so as to prevent a Neto "victory." This could lead to some form of coalition in which a Savimbi-Roberto alliance would have a strong position. Such an outcome would reduce thereafter the prospects of

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civil war and prevent the emergence of an MPLA-authoritarian one-party regime with close ties to the Communist world.



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
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III. OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS

1. Our primary objective is to prevent a Neto takeover and the establishment of an MPLA-controlled state with close Communist ties.

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2. We also share the interest of Savimbi and Roberto in avoiding a protracted civil war in Angola, even if it means that the MPLA remains the third party of a three-party government. Up to now, together Savimbi and Roberto enjoy support not only from Mobutu and Kaunda but other of the non-radical leaders of Africa as well. Savimbi also appeals to some elements in the new Portuguese regime. These are potential resources which could be brought into play toward the establishment of a government in which they occupied prominent roles.

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