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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DIA review(s) completed.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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August 10, 1972
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MORI C03323059

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: *PM* Phil Odeen/Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Supplemental Memorandum on SALT

OSD review completed

This memo discusses the SALT papers which were late in receipt, i. e., Qualitative Limits, Bombers, and Reductions. Additionally, there is an intelligence issue which you should know about.

Qualitative Missile Limitations (Tab G)

This paper covers a wide selection of qualitative restrictions:

- Limits on the development of new or modified ICBMs/SLBMs involving a ban or limits on flight testing.
- Limits which constrain the types and numbers of RVs including a ban on production, deployment and testing; a ban on testing and deployment of land-based MIRVs; limits on the types of missiles which can be MIRVed.
- Limits on guidance/accuracy improvements.
- Limits on missile modernization.
- Limits on the size of SLBMs.

Finally, there is a large section on qualitative limits on Hard-Site Defense inserted by OSD to demonstrate how we could have HSD in SALT without worrying about population defense.

This paper is far from complete. The verification sections are almost totally missing and are to be provided separately by CIA. They are not yet completed. We have had only limited time to

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digest the contents of this paper and, therefore, will touch only the key issues.

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1. Flight Test Limits

-- A total ban on flight testing of new or modified ICBMs and SLBMs would obviously stop progress on boosters, RVs, MIRVs, etc. Such a ban would also limit us, e. g., prevent our continuing with Trident. The draft paper does not yet include the verification section, a key aspect of qualitative limits, [redacted]

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A total ban is probably unrealistic and unacceptable to either side since it would close off all missile development. You may want to make clear that we are not interested in such a ban.

-- Quota limits on flight tests (e. g., 10-20 per year) might delay developmental programs and be somewhat more realistic. It is difficult to assess the degree that any program would be slowed. Any appreciable level of testing (e. g., 40-50 tests) can be demonstrated as providing opportunity for making qualitative progress although requiring changes in current test practices. It is argued, however, that reduced confidence at low test levels would make a first-strike questionable. The U. S. conducts about 100 tests in developing and fielding a new ballistic missile -- there are about 20 tests/year thereafter for reliability. [redacted]

We probably want to keep some test constraints in play, but only those that could be verified and have some defineable strategic objectives.

2. MIRV Limits

The paper is generally quite negative on MIRV limits. It argues that:

-- A MIRV ban preserves Minuteman in the short run, but not over time as accuracy improves. This is an over-simplification and, at least, ignores that a near one-for-one trade may not be a bad arrangement since numbers of missiles are limited under SALT.

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-- A MIRV ban makes us more sensitive to Soviet ABM cheating, i. e., SAM upgrade. While true, the fear of SAM upgrade is far less than in 1969 before we had available an arsenal of MIRVs which could be redeployed in response to Soviet cheating.

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The Measures Considered:

a) Ban on Production, Deployment and Testing of all MIRVs.

The key to negotiating such a ban is Soviet acceptance of a ban on testing and the consequent continuing U. S. advantage. From our point of view there is the issue of whether we can have confidence in a test ban and whether we can accept a ban on unverifiable activities such as production and deployment.

Timing could be a key factor in our approach to MIRV bans:

-- Some would argue that if we are to have confidence in any ban, then it must become effective before the Soviets do any significant testing; otherwise the Soviets could go into production and deployment without knowledge. OSD will probably argue this point and press for trying to stop the Soviets in the next round of SALT.

-- Others argue that it is already too late to ban MIRVs, since the Soviets fully intend to acquire them, and the new missiles are designed for MIRVs.

-- A variation of this argument, however, is that we would be able to more effectively design a verifiable ban, if we had some notion of what the Soviet MIRV (not their MRV) actually was.

-- This last argument ties into with what may be the only realistic alternative: to concentrate on banning MIRVs beyond the first generation.

The paper does not discuss this aspect, but at the meeting you should emphasize that this (the 2nd generation case) is one of the more realistic alternatives.

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b) Ban on Flight-Test and Deployment of land-based MIRVs.

The issues are generally the same as a total ban. The issue is whether we can distinguish between land and sea based warhead testing.

c) Limits on missiles which can be MIRVed, e.g., SS-9s.

At the meeting you should explore the verification issue in detail making clear that future papers must explain and justify claims for verification.

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3. Limits on Guidance/Accuracy

We believe that accuracy limits are unlikely to be useful measures. At the meeting you may seek to drop these limits.

4. Limits On Modernization

These limits include:

- A limit on rate of modernization or replacement;
- A ban on changing the external configuration of deployed missiles and launchers;
- A commitment not to seek to achieve a counterforce capability.

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A general pledge by both sides not to develop a counterforce capability, however, might be a useful outcome in SALT. Given the unlikely prospect of Soviet agreement to qualitative constraints this might be an important general undertaking -- it might even be a useful outcome from the Soviet visit next year.

We think the general commitment not to seek a counterforce capability might be important and useful and the idea should be kept in play.

Bombers (Tab E)

The bomber reductions paper is a cut and paste piece of work which does not warrant your time -- much more work is needed.

The key issue is likely to be if bombers are included in an agreement, how do we keep bomber armaments (e. g., stand-off missiles) out of the agreement?

We had an understanding in SALT I not to negotiate bomber armaments, but the Soviets are likely to make a major point of bomber armaments since we are so far advanced in this field. If so our approach would likely be to insist that air defenses must be limited if bomber armaments are. Depending on how we handle FBS we might insist on limits on air defense in any case.

There are other issues, some of which were resolved earlier in SALT but which must be reviewed:

-- How do we define heavy bombers -- are the Backfire or F-111 included?

-- Do we limit bombers within overall totals or as a separate category?

-- Do we want qualitative limits on bombers?

-- Could we reduce bombers?

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Reductions (Tab F)

The interagency paper suggests four conceptual approaches:

1. Token Reductions. For example, we could reduce 54 Titans, 174 B-52s of older models and 148 B-52s in storage. The Soviets could reduce 209 SS-7/8s (foregoing a trade for Y-class) and 100 G/H class SLBMs. The resultant strategic totals would be:

	<u>U. S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>
SLBM	656	740
ICBM	1,000	1,400
Bomber	<u>300</u>	<u>150</u>
	1,956	2,290

This accomplishes little but maybe the Soviets will forego their 950 SLBMs.

2. Reductions to Preserve Minuteman. While reductions alone will not preserve Minuteman forever they do extend the period of relative invulnerability. The key, however, is to reduce SS-9s -- we could trade Minuteman for SS-9s and improve survivability (although SS-11 improvements will eventually threaten the force).

We could also trade bombers for Soviet missiles and if we did not degrade the alert force, do so with negligible affects on strategic capabilities.

3. Reductions to Diminish Reliance on Minuteman. This approach simply keeps enough Minuteman (300 or so) to provide a hedge and complicate the attackers problem. It is suggested that reduction of this force would decrease the possibility of Soviet first strike in a crisis. What return we would ask from the Soviets in return for such a reduction is not clear in the paper.

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4. Reductions to a Minimum Force Level. Suggests phase-out of Minuteman and low levels of other forces. This would be a minimal deterrent posture designed primarily around the sole mission of destruction of Soviet population.

This paper still needs a good deal of work. It largely examines various rationales for reducing U. S. forces but lacks suggested trades and analysis of strategic effects.

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The Intelligence Issue

In reviewing the range of threats which might be used for a review of survivability we found that CIA is dramatically changing the Soviet threat and is pushing this position in the NIE debates. In essence, expectations on Soviet MIRVs and accuracy have leapt forward by several years

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[Redacted]

It is not clear whether this estimate is well founded or whether it reflects CIA's concerns that they once again fall behind the development of the Soviet threat.

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[Redacted]

Major elements of the Washington bureaucracy including DIA differ strongly with the CIA estimates.

If CIA is correct and if our estimates change dramatically we are going to have a difficult time convincing Scoop Jackson that he has not been badly deceived. It is important that CIA tentative estimates be held close until the issue is finally resolved.

Carl Duckett is prepared to brief on the revised estimate at the Verification Panel meeting. You should open the meeting by asking for this briefing.

We recommend that you caution all concerned to be discreet until this issue is resolved in preparing the NIE. In this connection you might also strongly encourage CIA to advance the publication of NIE 11-8 which is scheduled for this fall.

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