No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-246-5-3-0

DECLASSIFIED TIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES

in modified form

MSC Tetter Plastiz


U.S. CONCESSIONS THIS SUMMER

As a practical matter you will note that in addition, to substantive concessions we have followed the outline of your seven points and drawn on the language of your formulations to the maximum extent possible as a sign of our good will and serious intent.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

- 1. Withdrawals (their points 1 and 6)
- -- We've agreed to fix a date for our and allied withdrawals as part of a negotiated settlement.
- -- We've agreed to a period of nine months from the date a final agreement is signed.
- -- We've said that if the other aspects of a settlement are settled we would consider slight adjustment in the timetable.
- -- We've said that we would be willing to fix the number, locations, and duration of the small residual force of technical and logistic personnel.
- -- We've agreed that the question of the armed forces of Indochina should be settled among the Indo-chinese parties themselves.

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- 2. Prisoners of War (their point 2)
- -- We've agreed that the completion of the release of prisoners in Indochina should be at the same time as the completion of withdrawals (instead of immediately or two months previous).
- 3. Political Issue (their point 3)
- -- We've agreed to include political as well as military issues in a negotiated settlement.
- -- We've declared that the South Vietnamese should determine their own political future free from outside interference.
- -- We've agreed to make a series of declarations
 that would give force to that pledge and have a
 major political impact in South Vietnam.
 - and remain neutral in the South Vietnamese election; abide by the outcome of the elections or any other political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese; and define our military and economic assistance relationship with any government in South Vietnam, including setting limits on military aid as part of an overall limit on outside military



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aid for both North and South Vietnam. (See also points 5 and 6).

- -- We've said we are willing to listen to any new formulations they might have
- 4. Reparations/Economic Aid (their point 4)
- ident that he is prepared, upon signature of agreement in principle, to recommend to Congress a \$7.5 billion aid program for Indochina, of which \$2 to \$2.5 billion would be for North Vietnam. Over two-thirds of the funds would be outright grants, the remainder would be in very long term, very low interest rate loans. Even that is adjustable.
- 5. Indochina/Geneva Accords (their points 5 and 6)
- -- We've agreed that the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements should be respected, that there be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries, and that the Indochinese people be left to settle their own affairs.
- -- We've agreed that the problems of the Indochinese countries be settled on the basis of mutual respect



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for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference [verbatim the first sentence of their point 6].

- -- We've agreed that South Vietnam should adopt a foreign policy of neutrality [drawn from Madame Binh's points 4B and 5].
- -- We've agreed that reunification should be left to North and South Vietnam [drawn from Madame Binh's 4A].
- 6. Ceasefire (their point 7)
- -- We've agreed that there should be a general ceasefire throughout Indochina as part of an overall settlement (instead of an immediate ceasefire before a settlement). Of course, we continue to prefer an immediate ceasefire.

[NOTE: On international supervision and international guarantee, their points 8 and 9, they have really accepted our points and we have not really made any concessions.]

