



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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COMMUNIQUE SIGNED AT PARIS ON IMPLEMENTATION
OF VIET-NAM AGREEMENT 45

THE UNITED STATES WITH EUROPE
Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 54

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ENERGY
Address by Under Secretary Casey 59

FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROGRESSIVE LATIN AMERICA
Address by Assistant Secretary Kubisch 68

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

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Communique Signed at Paris on Implementation of Viet-Nam Agreement

Following is the transcript of a news conference held at Paris on June 13 by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, together with the texts of joint communiques signed at Paris that day by the four parties to the January 27 Viet-Nam agreement and by the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.¹

DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE

White House press release dated June 13

Dr. Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I want to thank those of you who have been following me around in these many sessions in November, December, January, February, and now, for your patience, sometimes for risking your necks. I regret I haven't been able to be more communicative at the end of each session, but these negotiations are somewhat complex and involve many parties.

I understand that there has already been a previous briefing which went to the details, but let me say very briefly what we consider to be the significance of this communique, what is in the communique, and then I will take your questions.

As you know, during the course of March and April the United States became quite concerned about the manner in which the cease-fire agreement was being implemented.

¹ For texts of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam and protocols signed at Paris on Jan. 27, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169.

We were specifically concerned about the following points:

—One, the inadequate implementation of the cease-fire.

—Secondly, the continued infiltration into South Viet-Nam and the continued utilization of Laos and Cambodia as corridors for that infiltration.

—Three, we were concerned about the inadequate accounting for the missing in action.

—Fourth, we were concerned about the violations of the demilitarized zone.

—Fifth, we were concerned about the inadequate cooperation with the International Control Commission and the slow staffing of the Two-Party Military Commission.

—Sixth, we were concerned about the violations of article 20 requiring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia.

Needless to say, the other side had its list of complaints, and in these circumstances we proposed that Mr. Le Duc Tho and I meet again to review the implementation of the agreements that had been so painfully negotiated last fall.

There was a preliminary meeting between Ambassador Sullivan [William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] and Vice Minister [for Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co] Thach, and then on May 17 Le Duc Tho and I met again and reached some preliminary conclusions. We were in daily contact with the Government of South Viet-Nam through its delegation here and through our Embassy in Saigon. We then sent Ambassador Sullivan to

Saigon for further consultations. I returned here. The negotiations continued. There was a slight interruption last Saturday, and we reached a final conclusion today.

As far as the content of the joint communique is concerned, we believe that we have achieved a satisfactory conclusion of the points that were of principal concern to the United States.

There is, as you know, to be issued a new order on the cease-fire, which is to go into effect roughly 36 hours from now, which we hope and expect will be implemented fully.

Second, there is a clear repetition of the prohibitions against the infiltration of personnel and materiel into South Viet-Nam, except as replacements under article 7 of the original agreement and according to procedures agreed to by the two parties with reference to respect for the demilitarized zone and to the prohibition of transiting the demilitarized zone except in accordance with the replacement provisions of the agreement.

Under the provisions for missing in action, all sides have pledged that they would make major efforts to help each other to account for the missing in action throughout Indochina, and this is a matter which is of great concern to the United States.

The Two-Party Military Commission is to be fully staffed, and special assurances have been given in paragraph 12 about cooperation with the International Control Commission by all the parties to grant them reasonable freedom of movement.

With respect to Laos and Cambodia, the communique says that the provisions of article 20 are to be scrupulously observed, and there have been long discussions about the whole complex of issues raised by Laos and Cambodia. However, since the final results depend on the sovereign decision of other parties, we will not discuss this subject here, and we will leave it to the results and to events to testify to progress.

The other subject which has been discussed and which I have left separately is that of political evolution in South Viet-

Nam. As you know, the United States has always taken the view that the political evolution of South Viet-Nam is to be decided by the South Vietnamese.

Therefore the United States has always believed—and that is reflected in the communique—that the political future of South Viet-Nam should be determined by a process of free and democratic general elections. The other provisions regarding political evolution reaffirm what is said in chapter IV of the cease-fire agreement.

Now, we have today signed the communique, ladies and gentlemen; and the history of Indochina is replete with agreements and joint declarations. I am not naive enough to pretend to you that the mere fact of having again agreed to certain words in itself guarantees peace; but I will also say that since all parties have worked so seriously for the last three weeks, we have every hope that they will match this effort with performance and therefore there is fresh hope, and we hope a new spirit, in the implementation of the agreement, which in itself is maintained.

What was signed today is an amplification and a consolidation of the original agreement. It is not a new agreement. Now, the people of Indochina, and especially the peoples of Viet-Nam, have suffered conflicts for a generation, and our greatest ambition has been to end their suffering and to restore peace, and it is our hope that by what has been done today a significant step has been taken in the consolidation of peace in Viet-Nam and in Indochina.

Now I will be glad to answer your questions. For my own education, will you identify yourselves.

Q. What were the changes in the communique in the last few days that made it acceptable to the South Vietnamese Government?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it is useful to go through all the details of the negotiation and to provide a scorecard. In any negotiation there are sometimes impasses reached that afterward are rather complex to explain.

I will be glad to explain one difficulty that existed which was perhaps not of monumental substantive significance but which was extremely time consuming and which concerned the formal signing of the communique.

The United States began by proposing that it should be a two-party communique between Hanoi and the United States as a recommendation to the South Vietnamese parties. The North Vietnamese proposed that it should be a two-party communique signed with the concurrence of the South Vietnamese parties. The South Vietnamese proposed that it should be a four-party communique.

We accepted a four-party communique, at which point Saigon proposed that it should be a two-party communique with recommendations to the two South Vietnamese parties, which in turn induced Hanoi to accept the four-party communique. We then, as a compromise, accepted Hanoi's proposal of a two-party communique with the concurrence of the South Vietnamese parties.

So there was one fleeting moment where Saigon had our position, we had Hanoi's position, and Hanoi had Saigon's position. So you must not believe that every time that a great deal of time is spent, it always concerns final issues of war and peace. This was one of the issues that took some time, but I will not discuss every issue that arose.

Q. Lou Cioffi, ABC News. Besides the fact that the other parties did negotiate seriously, what else makes you think that they are now willing to work together seriously for a political solution in Indochina and not a military one?

Dr. Kissinger: I think, Mr. Cioffi, that the whole evolution of the Indochina tragedy and of the Vietnamese war has been a slow realization by all the parties that they could not impose a military solution on each other.

This has been a very painful process for all concerned, because I think it is safe to say that the art of compromise is not the most highly developed quality in Viet-Nam.

I believe that the realities of the situation, both before the cease-fire agreement and, I think it is fair to say, since the cease-fire agreement, may have brought home to the parties concerned the necessity of, first, peaceful coexistence and eventually some political solution.

I repeat, I did not say that this was guaranteed. It is undoubtedly a process which will have its ups and downs. But we are entering this new phase with the intention of contributing what we can to easing the situation and promoting the peace.

Q. The communique today deals with the two sides' military leaders getting together to agree on what areas are controlled. If since the January agreement of the 27th they have not been able to agree even on an agenda in the political discussions, why is there reason to believe they will be able to agree on what areas the military control?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, of course, events will show very quickly whether they will be able to agree. One of the reasons why the Two-Party Military Commission has not worked as efficiently as was originally hoped was because of the difficulty of agreeing on location and immunity; and that problem has been substantially resolved by this agreement, or should have been substantially resolved by this agreement.

With respect to areas controlled and modalities of stationing, it is our view that this is determined by the military presence, and on that basis both sides, after a clear cease-fire is achieved, should be able empirically to determine where the forces are located and on that basis delimit the zones of military control.

One reason it has not worked previously is because the cease-fire was not fully observed. To the extent that this new cease-fire order—which will go into effect at 4 o'clock Greenwich mean time on the 15th—to the extent that that is observed, the delimitation of areas of control should be substantially eased.

Q. Do you feel now that with the signing of the document you have more or less ended your work in the Indochina area or that you will still have a lot of difficulties, especially concerning Cambodia?

Dr. Kissinger: The remaining issues in Indochina will still require significant diplomatic efforts, and we expect to continue them. Of course, we remain committed to the strict implementation of the agreement, and we will maintain our interest in it. I hope to be able to reduce my own participation in this process in order to preserve my emotional stability. [Laughter.]

Q. If the question that was just asked had to do with American aerial military operations in Cambodia, that is what I was going to ask also. If it was not, what I would like to ask is, is there anything in this agreement, this communique, which substantially commits the United States to cease such operations?

Dr. Kissinger: There is nothing in this communique that commits the United States to cease such operations. It is our hope, and we will make major efforts in that direction, to continue the diplomacy that will produce a cease-fire in Cambodia.

Q. Jim Browning, Westinghouse Broadcasting. Can I ask you what there is in the communique that was released today, besides the good will and seriousness of the people who negotiated it, that will make it work better than the agreement that was negotiated on January 27?

Dr. Kissinger: There is nothing in any communique that makes a communique work. A communique works because the parties concerned intend to implement it, and therefore all a communique can do, or an agreement can do, is to prescribe what the obligations of the various parties are.

To the extent that this communique prescribes the specific obligations and reaffirms

them, it can contribute to the consolidation of peace. But it is never words alone that produce peace; it is the combination of words, the intention, and the consequences of performance.

Q. I am with Economic Review, Dr. Kissinger. I find in the communique one new point, and that is that your government has agreed to conclude the first phase of the talks on the Joint Economic Commission with the North Vietnamese within 15 days after the signing of the accord. If I understand the American negotiation process correctly, I was under the impression that in fact the negotiations on the joint economic aid were to some extent meant to be a guarantee that North Viet-Nam does apply the accords.

Have you managed to obtain some understanding or some guarantees from the North Vietnamese, apart from what we have found in the communique, that they will apply the accords—because I am rather surprised by this concession, if we can call it that?

Dr. Kissinger: The Joint Economic Commission had substantially completed its work at the point when we suspended negotiations. So that the schedule which is indicated in the communique is inherent in the resumption of negotiations.

The United States has always made clear that the final implementation of the economic clauses of the agreement has to be seen as part and parcel of the total implementation of the agreement.

Of course, many of you know that even after the Joint Economic Commission completes its work, its results will first have to be submitted to the Congress and, secondly, will have to be approved by the Congress, which is not an automatic process.

So, there will be sufficient time in which to assess the implementation of the agreement. This administration has left no doubt that its support for the program in the various forums is related to the overall implementation of the agreement.

Q. May I ask you a question off the subject of the immediate subject of the Viet-Nam communique?

Dr. Kissinger: Preferably not.

Q. Preferably not, but I may?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you can ask it, and then I will determine whether I will answer it.

Q. I wondered if you would be prepared to say why you went to see Mr. Chi P'eng-fei today, and at whose initiative, and what you talked about.

Dr. Kissinger: The Foreign Minister of China is an old friend whom I have seen repeatedly in Peking, and since we found ourselves in the same town, a courtesy visit was arranged. It lasted 50 minutes, but you have to allow time for translation. [Laughter.]

Q. I am with the Los Angeles Times. I would like to ask, Dr. Kissinger, what kind of an estimate you have over the last few months in connection with the cease-fire violations, the extent to which they are intentional or accidental; that is to say, controlled or uncontrolled, on the other side, naturally.

Dr. Kissinger: In a situation, as in Viet-Nam, where many of the forces are mingled together in very close contact, an implementation of the cease-fire is of course extremely difficult. The first thing to remember is that the level of violence since January 27 has dropped very markedly and is at the lowest level that it has been in a decade.

I would say that there are daily reports of major and minor violations. I think it is safe to say that, of the minor violations, a significant percentage is produced by the proximity of the forces and not necessarily by a deliberate design.

In the case of the major violations, which have averaged around 15 a day, I think it is safe to say that a significant majority are produced by the deliberate decision, often of local commanders, but in any case by deliberate decisions.

Q. Scott Sullivan, Newsweek. Both the Saigon government and I believe the American Government have said they were very eager to tie down a date for free and democratic elections in South Viet-Nam. On the surface of the communique, there doesn't seem to be any such tying down or linking. Are you satisfied that significant progress has been made in that particular direction?

Dr. Kissinger: We have two separate problems. One is the desirability of the dates for general elections and the suitability of a four-party document to tie such a date down. Last fall, when we negotiated this agreement, the Saigon government very properly took the view that it would be inappropriate for the United States or for an international document to prescribe the specific date for elections, and we spent many days on that issue because it was at that time that the North Vietnamese wanted to tie down the date and it was we who, following the recommendations of the Saigon government, did not do so.

In these circumstances, it is impossible for the United States to insist now on what it refused in December. Nevertheless, we have always taken the view that the political future of South Viet-Nam should be left to the South Vietnamese and that free and democratic general elections should be a central element in determining that future.

Individually, we support the South Vietnamese proposal that a time should be fixed for that election. We think it is a reasonable proposal. But in the light of the negotiating history, it was not appropriate to introduce into a communique which is supposed to bring about the implementation of the agreement a clause which was not part of the original agreement and which was not part of the original agreement at the request of the South Vietnamese Government.

But nevertheless, as far as the internal negotiations are concerned, we think the South Vietnamese demand is reasonable, and we hope it will be accepted.

Q. John Harris, Hearst Papers. If this agreement doesn't work out, do you envisage negotiating a third agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: It is a prospect I cannot face today. [Laughter.] When we sign an agreement, we hope that it will be implemented, and whatever difficulties arise should be principally discussed between the Vietnamese parties, and I don't want to address now the question of what happens if there should be violations before we have even concluded the two-party signature.

We have negotiated this in good faith, after a long war and a great deal of suffering, with the hope that at last the parties concerned will draw the conclusion from the overwhelming reality in Viet-Nam that nobody can have his way by force.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

TEXTS OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Four-Party Joint Communique

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The Parties signatory to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, signed on January 27, 1973,

Considering that strict respect and scrupulous implementation of all provisions of the Agreement and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet-Nam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia,

Have agreed on the following points (in the sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement):

1. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement, the United States shall cease immediately, completely, and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement and with the Protocol on Mine Clearance:

(a) The United States shall resume mine clearance operations within five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique and shall successfully complete those operations within thirty days thereafter.

(b) The United States shall supply to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam means which are agreed to be adequate and sufficient for sweeping mines in rivers.

(c) The United States shall announce when the

mine clearance in each main channel is completed and issue a final announcement when all the operations are completed.

3. In implementation of Article 2 of the Agreement, at 1200 hours, G.M.T., June 14, 1973, the High Commands of the two South Vietnamese parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their command, to strictly observe the cease-fire throughout South Viet-Nam beginning at 0400 hours, G.M.T., June 15, 1973, and scrupulously implement the Agreement and its Protocols.

4. The two South Vietnamese parties shall strictly implement Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam which read as follows:

"Article 2

(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and until regulations are issued by the Joint Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall remain in place; that is, in order to ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major redeployments or movements that would extend each party's area of control or would result in contact between opposing armed forces and clashes which might take place.

(b) All regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts:

(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by opposing armed forces and flights by bomber and fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and maintenance;

(2) Armed attacks against any person, either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device;

(3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on the sea and in the air;

(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and

(5) All acts endangering lives or public or private property.

Article 3

(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall not hamper or restrict:

(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work, and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Viet-Nam;

(2) The use by each party in areas under its control of military support elements, such as engineer and transportation units, in repair

and construction of public facilities and the transportation and supplying of the population;

(3) Normal military proficiency training conducted by the parties in the areas under their respective control with due regard for public safety.

(b) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately agree on corridors, routes, and other regulations governing the movement of military transport aircraft, military transport vehicles, and military transport vessels of all types of one party going through areas under the control of other parties."

5. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall immediately carry out its task pursuant to Article 3(b) of the Agreement to determine the areas controlled by each of the two South Vietnamese parties and the modalities of stationing. This task shall be completed as soon as possible. The Commission shall also immediately discuss the movements necessary to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire entered into force on January 28, 1973.

6. Twenty-four hours after the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3 enters into force, the commanders of the opposing armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet to carry out the provisions of Article 4 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary measures to avert conflict and to ensure supply and medical care for these armed forces.

7. In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement:

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel, into South Viet-Nam.

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of armaments, munitions, and war material into South Viet-Nam. However, the two South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material, as authorized by Article 7 of the Agreement, through designated points of entry and subject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

In conformity with Article 15(b) of the Agreement regarding the respect of the Demilitarized Zone, military equipment may transit the Demilitarized Zone only if introduced into South Viet-Nam as replacements pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement and through a designated point of entry.

(c) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall discuss the modalities for the supervision of the replacements of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the three

points of entry already agreed upon for each party. Within fifteen days of the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the two South Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement three additional points of entry for each party in the area controlled by that party.

8. In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement:

(a) Any captured personnel covered by Article 8(a) of the Agreement who have not yet been returned shall be returned without delay, and in any event within no more than thirty days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué.

(b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese civilian personnel covered by Article 8(c) of the Agreement and Article 7 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be returned as soon as possible. The two South Vietnamese parties shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué.

(c) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured and detained personnel covered by that Protocol shall be treated humanely at all times. The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately implement Article 9 of that Protocol and, within fifteen days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué, allow National Red Cross Societies they have agreed upon to visit all places where these personnel are held.

(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall cooperate in obtaining information about missing persons and in determining the location of and in taking care of the graves of the dead.

(e) In conformity with Article 8(b) of the Agreement, the parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action. For this purpose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and Hanoi.

9. The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:

"Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

—achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;

—ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom

of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise."

10. Consistent with the principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination stated in Chapter IV of the Agreement:

(a) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord consisting of three equal segments shall be formed as soon as possible, in conformity with Article 12 of the Agreement.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet-Nam as soon as possible, and shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique.

(c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree through consultations on the institutions for which the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9(b) of the Agreement will be held.

(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 13 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:

"The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible."

11. In implementation of Article 17 of the Agreement:

(a) All the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam shall immediately be implemented with respect to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. That Commission shall also immediately be accorded the eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and the headquarters of the Regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and other places in South Viet-Nam as required for the operations of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall also be made between Saigon and Loc Ninh.

(b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be located in Saigon

proper or at a place agreed upon by the two South Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The locations of the headquarters of the Regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and of the teams of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be determined by that Commission within fifteen days after the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3. These locations may be changed at any time as determined by the Commission. The locations, except for teams at the points of entry, shall be selected from among those towns specified in Article 11(b) and (c) of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam and those places where an area controlled by one South Vietnamese party adjoins an area controlled by the other, or at any other place agreed upon by the Commission.

(c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned in paragraph 11(a) are accorded by both South Vietnamese parties, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be fully staffed and its regional commissions and teams fully deployed within fifteen days after their locations have been determined.

(d) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions.

12. In conformity with Article 18 of the Agreement and Article 10 of the Protocol on the International Commission of Control and Supervision, the International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned. The two South Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary instructions to their personnel and take all other necessary measures to ensure the safety of such movement.

13. Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cambodia and Laos, shall be scrupulously implemented.

14. In conformity with Article 21 of the Agreement, the United States-Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam Joint Economic Commission shall resume its meetings four days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique and shall complete the first phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter.

Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly respect and scrupulously implement all the provisions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, and this Joint Communique, the undersigned representatives of the parties signatory to the Paris Agreement have decided to issue this Joint Communique to record and publish the points on which they have agreed.

Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the United States of America:

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Assistant to the President of the United States of America

For the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam:

NGUYEN LUU VIEN
Representative of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam:

LE DUC THO
Representative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam:

NGUYEN VAN HIEU
Minister of State of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam

Two-Party Joint Communique

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

From May 17 to May 23, from June 6 to June 9, and on June 12 and June 13, 1973, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Mr. Le Duc Tho, on behalf of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, reviewed the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam and its Protocols and discussed urgent measures to ensure the correct and strict implementation of the Agreement and its Protocols.

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam,

Considering that strict respect and scrupulous implementation of all provisions of the Paris Agreement and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet-Nam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia,

Have agreed on the following points (in the sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement):

[Texts of paragraphs 1-14 as above]

Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly respect and scrupulously implement all the provisions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, this Joint Communique, and a Joint Communique in the same terms signed by representatives of the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam, the representative of the United States of America, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and the representative of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Mr. Le Duc Tho, have decided to issue this Joint Communique to record and publish the points on which they have agreed.

Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973.

For the Government of the United States of America:

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Assistant to the President of the United States of America

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam:

LE DUC THO
Representative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam

The United States With Europe

Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush¹

The United States is embarked upon one of the most exciting periods of foreign relations in its history. Today, we are building the relationships that will determine the course of American foreign relations and, to no small degree, of world politics and economics for the remainder of the century. Some believe that the United States is entering a new period of isolationism. This is not true. Nor should it be true.

What is taking place is a search for new forms of involvement, new forms of engagement, new forms of cooperation with the rest of the international community. President Nixon is trying, as he has said, to "forge a network of relationships and of interdependencies that restrain aggression and that take the profit out of war."² This interdependence can provide the framework for the "generation of peace" the President seeks.

Our changed relationships with the Soviet Union and with China were among the most dramatic accomplishments of President Nixon's first term. Cooperation has increasingly come to replace confrontation. General Secretary Brezhnev's impending visit to this country highlights the kind of change that has come about. With Moscow and with Peking we are demonstrating that adversaries need not be antagonists. At the same time, we are determined not to involve ourselves in any way in the quarrel between Moscow and Peking.

¹ Made before the Los Angeles, Calif., World Affairs Council on June 14 (press release 206).

² For an excerpt from President Nixon's address to the Nation on Nov. 2, 1972, see *BULLETIN* of Nov. 20, 1972, p. 605.

The new relationships with our former antagonists, and the end of the war in Vietnam, have enabled us to turn our energy and our imagination toward reshaping and reinforcing our ties to our closest allies elsewhere in the world. Today, I would like to focus on our relations with western Europe—an area with which we are intimately tied by history, by interest, and by friendship.

Twenty-five years ago fear, crisis, and economic ruin marked the European Continent. The United States alone among major industrial countries escaped the devastation of the war—and it held undisputed primacy in nuclear weapons.

Today Europe has recovered economically and politically. The gross national product of the nine members of the European Community is 78 percent of that of the United States. Europe as a whole is now the United States principal trading partner; the European Community alone absorbs about one-fourth of our exports. It is also a major commercial rival. The European Community provides 22.1 percent of the world's exports and consumes 17.7 percent of its imports. The United States, by comparison, supplies 12.4 percent of the world's exports and 12.5 percent of its imports.

Economic recovery has been paralleled by political revival. The Europeans have a natural desire to play an equal role in the decisions that affect them. U.S. leadership is necessarily being replaced by U.S. participation with our allies in common decisions.

The tensions across Europe have been greatly reduced. The continent no longer lives in constant fear. At the same time the United States is no longer the sole possessor of a