

agreements



# Documentation on the VIET-NAM AGREEMENT

- **Address by President Nixon**  
(January 23, 1973)
- **News Conference of Dr. Kissinger**  
(January 24, 1973)
- **Texts of Agreement and Protocols** - 17.11

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## Agreement Concluded on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam

*Following are texts of an address to the Nation made by President Nixon on television and radio on January 23, a news conference held at the White House on January 24 by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and related protocols released by the White House January 24.*

### ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NIXON, JANUARY 23

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 29

Good evening. I have asked for this radio and television time tonight for the purpose of announcing that we today have concluded an agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia.

The following statement is being issued at this moment in Washington and Hanoi:

"At 12:30 Paris time today, January 23, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was initialed by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United States, and Special Advisor Le Duc Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

"The agreement will be formally signed by the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973, at the International Conference Center in Paris.

"The cease-fire will take effect at 2400 Greenwich Mean Time, January 27, 1973. The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the hope that this agreement will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of

lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia."

That concludes the formal statement.

Throughout the years of negotiations, we have insisted on peace with honor. In my addresses to the Nation from this room of January 25 and May 8, I set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace with honor.<sup>1</sup>

In the settlement that has now been agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met. A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m. this Saturday, January 27, Washington time. Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are missing in action.

During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam.

The people of South Viet-Nam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future without outside interference.

By joint agreement, the full text of the agreement and the protocols to carry it out will be issued tomorrow.

Throughout these negotiations we have been in the closest consultation with President Thieu and other representatives of the Republic of Viet-Nam. This settlement meets the goals and has the full support of President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, as well as that of our other allies who are affected.

The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Viet-

<sup>1</sup> For texts, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1972, p. 181, and May 29, 1972, p. 747.



Nam as the sole legitimate government of South Viet-Nam.

We shall continue to aid South Viet-Nam within the terms of the agreement, and we shall support efforts by the people of South Viet-Nam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves.

We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that heals, and a peace that not only ends the war in Southeast Asia but contributes to the prospects of peace in the whole world.

This will mean that the terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us, and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

As this long and very difficult war ends, I would like to address a few special words to each of those who have been parties in the conflict.

First, to the people and Government of South Viet-Nam: By your courage, by your sacrifice, you have won the precious right to determine your own future, and you have developed the strength to defend that right. We look forward to working with you in the future, friends in peace as we have been allies in war.

To the leaders of North Viet-Nam: As we have ended the war through negotiations, let us now build a peace of reconciliation. For our part, we are prepared to make a major effort to help achieve that goal; but just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, so, too, will it be needed to build and strengthen the peace.

To the other major powers that have been involved, even indirectly: Now is the time for mutual restraint so that the peace we have achieved can last.

And finally, to all of you who are listening, the American people: Your steadfastness in supporting our insistence on peace with honor has made peace with honor pos-

sible. I know that you would not have wanted that peace jeopardized. With our secret negotiations at the sensitive stage they were in during this recent period, for me to have discussed publicly our efforts to secure peace would not only have violated our understanding with North Viet-Nam; it would have seriously harmed and possibly destroyed the chances for peace. Therefore, I know that you now can understand why during these past several weeks I have not made any public statements about those efforts.

The important thing was not to talk about peace, but to get peace and to get the right kind of peace. This we have done.

Now that we have achieved an honorable agreement, let us be proud that America did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war, or that would have ended the war for us but would have continued the war for the 50 million people of Indochina. Let us be proud of the 2½ million young Americans who served in Viet-Nam, who served with honor and distinction in one of the most selfless enterprises in the history of nations. And let us be proud of those who sacrificed, who gave their lives so that the people of South Viet-Nam might live in freedom and so that the world might live in peace.

In particular, I would like to say a word to some of the bravest people I have ever met—the wives, the children, the families, of our prisoners of war and the missing in action. When others called on us to settle on any terms, you had the courage to stand for the right kind of peace so that those who died and those who suffered would not have died and suffered in vain and so that where this generation knew war the next generation would know peace. Nothing means more to me at this moment than the fact that your long vigil is coming to an end.

Just yesterday, a great American who once occupied this office died. In his life President Johnson endured the vilification of those who sought to portray him as a man of war. But there was nothing he cared

about more deeply than achieving a lasting peace in the world.

I remember the last time I talked with him. It was just the day after New Year's. He spoke then of his concern with bringing peace, with making it the right kind of peace, and I was grateful that he once again expressed his support for my efforts to gain such a peace. No one would have welcomed this peace more than he.

And I know he would join me in asking for those who died and for those who live: Let us consecrate this moment by resolving together to make the peace we have achieved a peace that will last.

Thank you and good evening.

#### **DR. KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE, JANUARY 24**

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 29

Ladies and gentlemen: The President last evening presented the outlines of the agreement, and by common agreement between us and the North Vietnamese we have today released the texts. And I am here to explain, to go over briefly, what these texts contain and how we got there, what we have tried to achieve in recent months, and where we expect to go from here.

Let me begin by going through the agreement, which you have read.

The agreement, as you know, is in nine chapters. The first affirms the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam, agreements which established two zones divided by a military demarcation line.

Chapter II deals with the cease-fire. The cease-fire will go into effect at 7 o'clock, Washington time, on Saturday night. The principal provisions of chapter II deal with permitted acts during the cease-fire and with what the obligations of the various parties are with respect to the cease-fire.

Chapter II also deals with the withdrawal of American and all other foreign forces from Viet-Nam within a period of 60 days.

And it specifies the forces that have to be withdrawn. These are, in effect, all military personnel and all civilian personnel dealing with combat operations. We are permitted to retain economic advisers, and civilian technicians serving in certain of the military branches.

Chapter II further deals with the provisions for resupply and for the introduction of outside forces. There is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any military force into South Viet-Nam from outside of South Viet-Nam, which is to say that whatever forces may be in South Viet-Nam from outside South Viet-Nam, specifically North Vietnamese forces, cannot receive reinforcements, replacements, or any other form of augmentation by any means whatsoever. With respect to military equipment, both sides are permitted to replace all existing military equipment on a one-to-one basis under international supervision and control.

There will be established, as I will explain when I discuss the protocols, for each side three legitimate points of entry through which all replacement equipment has to move. These legitimate points of entry will be under international supervision.

#### **Release of Prisoners**

Chapter III deals with the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians, as well as with the question of civilian detainees within South Viet-Nam.

This, as you know, throughout the negotiations presented enormous difficulties for us. We insisted throughout that the question of American prisoners of war and of American civilians captured throughout Indochina should be separated from the issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel detained, partly because of the enormous difficulty of classifying the Vietnamese civilian personnel by categories of who was detained for reasons of the civil war and who was detained for criminal activities, and secondly, because it was foreseeable that negotiations about the release of civilian detainees would be complex and difficult and because we did not want to have the issue of American per-



sonnel mixed up with the issues of civilian personnel in South Viet-Nam.

This turned out to be one of the thorniest issues, that was settled at some point and kept reappearing throughout the negotiations. It was one of the difficulties we had during the December negotiations.

As you can see from the agreement, the return of American military personnel and captured civilians is separated in terms of obligation, and in terms of the time frame, from the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel.

The return of American personnel and the accounting of missing in action is unconditional and will take place within the same time frame as the American withdrawal.

The issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel will be negotiated between the two Vietnamese parties over a period of three months, and as the agreement says, they will do their utmost to resolve this question within the three-month period.

So I repeat, the issue is separated, both in terms of obligation and in terms of the relevant time frame, from the return of American prisoners, which is unconditional.

We expect that American prisoners will be released at intervals of two weeks or 15 days in roughly equal installments. We have been told that no American prisoners are held in Cambodia. American prisoners held in Laos and North Viet-Nam will be returned to us in Hanoi. They will be received by American medical evacuation teams and flown on American airplanes from Hanoi to places of our own choice, probably Vientiane.

There will be international supervision of both this provision and of the provision for the missing in action. And all American prisoners will, of course, be released, within 60 days of the signing of the agreement. The signing will take place on January 27 in two installments, the significance of which I will explain to you when I have run through the provisions of the agreement and the associated protocols.

#### **Self-Determination for South Viet-Nam**

Chapter IV of the agreement deals with the right of the South Vietnamese people to

self-determination. Its first provision contains a joint statement by the United States and North Viet-Nam in which those two countries jointly recognize the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, in which those two countries jointly affirm that the South Vietnamese people shall decide for themselves the political system that they shall choose and jointly affirm that no foreign country shall impose any political tendency on the South Vietnamese people.

The other principal provisions of the agreement are that in implementing the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, the two South Vietnamese parties will decide, will agree among each other, on free elections, for offices to be decided by the two parties, at a time to be decided by the two parties. These elections will be supervised and organized first by an institution which has the title of National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, whose members will be equally appointed by the two sides, which will operate on the principle of unanimity, and which will come into being after negotiation between the two parties, who are obligated by this agreement to do their utmost to bring this institution into being within 90 days.

Leaving aside the technical jargon, the significance of this part of the agreement is that the United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose any political solution on the people of South Viet-Nam. The United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose a coalition government or a disguised coalition government on the people of South Viet-Nam.

If you examine the provisions of this chapter, you will see, first, that the existing government in Saigon can remain in office; secondly, that the political future of South Viet-Nam depends on agreement between the South Vietnamese parties, and not on an agreement that the United States has imposed on these parties; thirdly, that the nature of this political evolution, the timing of this political evolution, is left to the South Vietnamese parties, and that the organ that is created to see to it that the elections that

are organized will be conducted properly is one in which each of the South Vietnamese parties has a veto.

The other significant provision of this agreement is the requirement that the South Vietnamese parties will bring about a reduction of their armed forces and that the forces being reduced will be demobilized.

#### **The Issue of the Demilitarized Zone**

The next chapter deals with the reunification of Viet-Nam and the relationship between North and South Viet-Nam. In the many negotiations that I have conducted over recent weeks, not the least arduous was the negotiation conducted with the ladies and gentlemen of the press, who constantly raised issues with respect to sovereignty, the existence of South Viet-Nam as a political entity, and other matters of this kind.

I will return to this issue at the end when I sum up the agreement, but it is obvious that there is no dispute in the agreement between the parties that there is an entity called South Viet-Nam and that the future unity of Viet-Nam, as it comes about, will be decided by negotiation between North and South Viet-Nam; that it will not be achieved by military force; indeed, that the use of military force with respect to bringing about unification, or any other form of coercion, is impermissible according to the terms of this agreement.

Secondly, there are specific provisions in this chapter with respect to the demilitarized zone (DMZ). There is a repetition of the agreement of 1954 which makes the demarcation line along the 17th parallel provisional, which means pending reunification. There is a specific provision that both North and South Viet-Nam shall respect the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line, and there is another provision that indicates that among the subjects that can be negotiated will be modalities of civilian movement across the demarcation line, which makes it clear that military movement across the demilitarized zone is in all circumstances prohibited.

Now, this may be an appropriate point to explain what our position has been with

respect to the DMZ. There has been a great deal of discussion about the issue of sovereignty and about the issue of legitimacy—which is to say, which government is in control of South Viet-Nam—and finally, about why we laid such great stress on the issue of the demilitarized zone.

We had to place stress on the issue of the demilitarized zone because the provisions of the agreement with respect to infiltration, with respect to replacement, with respect to any of the military provisions, would have made no sense whatsoever if there was not some demarcation line that defined where South Viet-Nam began. If we had accepted the proposition that would have in effect eroded the demilitarized zone, then the provisions of the agreement with respect to restrictions about the introduction of men and materiel into South Viet-Nam would have been unilateral restrictions applying only to the United States and only to our allies. Therefore, if there was to be any meaning to the separation of military and political issues, if there was to be any permanence to the military provisions that had been negotiated, then it was essential that there was a definition of where the obligations of this agreement began. As you can see from the text of the agreement, the principles that we defended were essentially achieved.

Chapter VI deals with the international machinery, and we will discuss that when I talk about the associated protocols of the agreement.

#### **Laos and Cambodia**

Chapter VII deals with Laos and Cambodia. Now, the problem of Laos and Cambodia has two parts. One part concerns those obligations which can be undertaken by the parties signing the agreement—that is to say, the three Vietnamese parties and the United States—those measures that they can take which affect the situation in Laos and Cambodia. A second part of the situation in Laos has to concern the nature of the civil conflict that is taking place within Laos and Cambodia and the solution of which, of course, must involve as well the two Laotian



parties and the innumerable Cambodian factions.

Let me talk about the provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and Cambodia and our firm expectations as to the future in Laos and Cambodia.

The provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and Cambodia reaffirm, as an obligation to all the parties, the provisions of the 1954 agreement on Cambodia and of the 1962 agreement on Laos, which affirm the neutrality and right to self-determination of those two countries. They are therefore consistent with our basic position with respect also to South Viet-Nam.

In terms of the immediate conflict, the provisions of the agreement specifically prohibit the use of Laos and Cambodia for military and any other operations against any of the signatories of the Paris agreement or against any other country. In other words, there is a flat prohibition against the use of base areas in Laos and Cambodia.

There is a flat prohibition against the use of Laos and Cambodia for infiltration into Viet-Nam or, for that matter, into any other country.

Finally, there is a requirement that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia, and it is clearly understood that North Vietnamese troops are considered foreign with respect to Laos and Cambodia.

Now, as to the conflict within these countries which could not be formally settled in an agreement which is not signed by the parties of that conflict, let me make this statement, without elaborating it: It is our firm expectation that within a short period of time there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos which in turn will lead to a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laos and, of course, to the end of the use of Laos as a corridor of infiltration.

Secondly, the situation in Cambodia, as those of you who have studied it will know, is somewhat more complex because there are several parties headquartered in different countries. Therefore, we can say about Cambodia that it is our expectation that a de facto cease-fire will come into being over

a period of time relevant to the execution of this agreement.

Our side will take the appropriate measures to indicate that it will not attempt to change the situation by force. We have reason to believe that our position is clearly understood by all concerned parties, and I will not go beyond this in my statement.

#### **Relationship of the U.S. to North Viet-Nam**

Chapter VIII deals with the relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

As I have said in my briefings on October 26 and on December 16 and as the President affirmed on many occasions, the last time in his speech last evening, the United States is seeking a peace that heals.<sup>2</sup> We have had many armistices in Indochina. We want a peace that will last.

And therefore it is our firm intention in our relationship to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to move from hostility to normalization, and from normalization to conciliation and cooperation. And we believe that under conditions of peace we can contribute throughout Indochina to a realization of the humane aspirations of all the people of Indochina. And we will, in that spirit, perform our traditional role of helping people realize these aspirations in peace.

Chapter IX of the agreement is the usual implementing provision.

So much for the agreement.

#### **Provisions of Protocols to the Agreement**

Now let me say a word about the protocols. There are four protocols or implementing instruments to the agreement: on the return of American prisoners, on the implementation and institution of an International Control Commission, on the regulations with respect to the cease-fire and the implementation and institution of a Joint Military Commission among the concerned parties, and a

<sup>2</sup> For Dr. Kissinger's news conferences of Oct. 26 and Dec. 16, 1972, see BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1972, p. 549, and Jan. 8, 1973, p. 33.

protocol about the deactivation and removal of mines.

I have given you the relevant provisions of the protocol concerning the return of prisoners. They will be returned at periodic intervals in Hanoi to American authorities and not to American private groups. They will be picked up by American airplanes, except for prisoners held in the southern part of South Viet-Nam, which will be released at designated points in the South, again to American authorities.

We will receive on Saturday, the day of the signing of the agreement, a list of all American prisoners held throughout Indochina. And both parties—that is to say, all parties—have an obligation to assist each other in obtaining information about the prisoners, missing in action, and about the location of graves of American personnel throughout Indochina.

The International Commission has the right to visit the last place of detention of the prisoners, as well as the place from which they are released.

Now to the International Control Commission. You will remember that one of the reasons for the impasse in December was the difficulty of agreeing with the North Vietnamese about the size of the International Commission, its function, or the location of its teams.

On this occasion, there is no point in rehashing all the differences. It is, however, useful to point out that at that time the proposal of the North Vietnamese was that the International Control Commission have a membership of 250, no organic logistics or communication, dependent entirely for its authority to move on the party it was supposed to be investigating; and over half of its personnel were supposed to be located in Saigon, which is not the place where most of the infiltration that we were concerned with was likely to take place.

We have distributed to you an outline of the basic structure of this Commission.<sup>3</sup> Briefly stated, its total number is 1,160,

<sup>3</sup> Not printed here.

drawn from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. It has a headquarters in Saigon. It has seven regional teams, 26 teams based in localities throughout Viet-Nam which were chosen either because forces were in contact there or because we estimated that these were the areas where the violations of the cease-fire were most probable.

There are 12 teams at border-crossing points. There are seven teams that are set aside for points of entry, which have yet to be chosen, for the replacement of military equipment. That is for article 7 of the agreement. There will be three on each side, and there will be no legitimate point of entry into South Viet-Nam other than those three points. The other border and coastal teams are there simply to make certain that no other entry occurs, and any other entry is by definition illegal. There has to be no other demonstration except the fact that it occurred.

This leaves one team free for use, in particular, at the discretion of the Commission. And of course the seven teams that are being used for the return of the prisoners can be used at the discretion of the Commission after the prisoners are returned.

There is one reinforced team located at the demilitarized zone, and its responsibility extends along the entire demilitarized zone. It is in fact a team and a half. It is 50 percent larger than a normal border team and it represents one of the many compromises that were made, between our insistence on two teams and their insistence on one team. By a brilliant stroke, we settled on a team and a half. [Laughter.]

With respect to the operation of the International Commission, it is supposed to operate on the principle of unanimity, which is to say that its reports, if they are Commission reports, have to have the approval of all four members. However, each member is permitted to submit his own opinion, so that as a practical matter any member of the Commission can make a finding of a violation and submit a report, in the first instance to the parties.



The International Commission will report for the time being to the four parties to the agreement. An international conference will take place, we expect, at the foreign ministers level within a month of signing the agreement.

That international conference will establish a relationship between the International Commission and itself, or any other international body that is mutually agreed upon, so that the International Commission is not only reporting to the parties that it is investigating. But for the time being, until the international conference has met, there was no other practical group to which the International Commission could report.

In addition to this international group, there are two other institutions that are supposed to supervise the cease-fire. There is, first of all, an institution called the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, which is composed of ourselves and the three Vietnamese parties, which is located in the same place as the International Commission, charged with roughly the same functions, but as a practical matter, it is supposed to conduct the preliminary investigations, its disagreements are automatically referred to the International Commission, and moreover, any party can request the International Commission to conduct an investigation regardless of what the Four-Party Commission does and regardless of whether the Four-Party Commission has completed its investigation or not.

After the United States has completed its withdrawal, the Four-Party Military Commission will be transformed into a Two-Party Commission composed of the two South Vietnamese parties. The total number of supervisory personnel, therefore, will be in the neighborhood of 4,500 during the period that the Four-Party Commission is in existence, and in the neighborhood of about 3,000 after the Four-Party Commission ceases operating and the Two-Party Commission comes into being.

Finally, there is a protocol concerning the removal and deactivation of mines, which is self-explanatory and simply explains—

discusses the relationship between our efforts and the efforts of the DRV concerning the removal and deactivation of mines, which is one of the obligations we have undertaken in the agreement.

#### Procedure for Signing Documents

Now let me point out one other problem. On Saturday, January 27, the Secretary of State, on behalf of the United States, will sign the agreement bringing the cease-fire and all the other provisions of the agreement and the protocols into force. He will sign in the morning a document involving four parties, and in the afternoon a document between us and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. These documents are identical, except that the preamble differs in both cases.

The reason for this somewhat convoluted procedure is that while the agreement provides that the two South Vietnamese parties should settle their disputes in an atmosphere of national reconciliation and concord, I think it is safe to say that they have not yet quite reached that point, indeed, that they have not yet been prepared to recognize each other's existence.

This being the case, it was necessary to devise one document in which neither of the South Vietnamese parties was mentioned by name, and therefore no other party could be mentioned by name, on the principle of equality. So the four-party document, the document that will have four signatures, can be read with great care and you will not know until you get to the signature page whom exactly it applies to. It refers only to the parties participating in the Paris Conference, which are, of course, well known to the parties participating in the Paris Conference. [Laughter.]

It will be signed on two separate pages. The United States and the GVN are signing on one page, and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and its ally are signing on a separate page. And this procedure has aged us all by several years. [Laughter.]

Then there is another document, which will

be signed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in the afternoon. That document, in its operative provisions, is word for word the same as the document which will be signed in the morning and which contains the obligations to which the two South Vietnamese parties are obligated.

It differs from that document only in the preamble and in its concluding paragraph. In the preamble it says the United States, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and the DRV, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and the rest is the same, and then the concluding paragraph has the same adaptation. That document, of course, is not signed by either Saigon or its opponent, and therefore their obligations are derived from the four-party document.

I do not want to take any time in going into the abstruse legalisms. I simply wanted to explain to you why there were two different signature ceremonies and why, when we handed out the text of the agreement, we appended to the document which contains the legal obligations which apply to everybody—namely, the four parties—why we appended another section that contained a different preamble and a different implementing paragraph which is going to be signed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

This will be true with respect to the agreement and three of the protocols. The fourth protocol, regarding the removal of mines, applies only to the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and therefore we are in the happy position of having to sign only one document.

#### **Negotiating Process and Achievements**

Now then, let me summarize for you how we got to this point and some of the aspects of the agreement that we consider significant, and then I will answer your questions.

As you know, when I met with this group on December 16, we had to report that the

negotiations in Paris seemed to have reached a stalemate. We had not agreed at that time, although we didn't say so, on the—we could not find a formula to take into account the conflicting views with respect to signing. There were disagreements with respect to the DMZ and with the associated aspects of what identity South Viet-Nam was to have in the agreement.

There was a total deadlock with respect to the protocols, which I summed up in the December 16 press conference. The North Vietnamese approach to international control and ours were so totally at variance that it seemed impossible at that point to come to any satisfactory conclusion. And there began to be even some concern that the separation which we thought we had achieved in October between the release of our prisoners and the question of civilian prisoners in South Viet-Nam was breaking down.

When we reassembled on January 8, we did not do so in the most cordial atmosphere that I remember. However, by the morning of January 9 it became apparent that both sides were determined to make a serious effort to break the deadlock in negotiations. And we adopted a mode of procedure by which issues in the agreement and issues of principle with respect to the protocols were discussed at meetings between Special Advisor Le Duc Tho and myself while concurrently an American team headed by Ambassador Sullivan [William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] and a Vietnamese team headed by Vice Minister Thach [Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs] would work on the implementation of the principles as they applied to the protocols.

For example, the Special Advisor and I might agree on the principle of border control posts and their number, but then the problem of how to locate them, according to what criteria, and with what mode of operation presented enormous difficulties.

Let me on this occasion also point out that these negotiations required the closest cooperation throughout our government, be-



tween the White House and the State Department, between all the elements of our team, and that therefore the usual speculation of who did what to whom is really extraordinarily misplaced.

Without a cooperative effort by everybody, we could not have achieved what we have presented last night and this morning.

The Special Advisor and I then spent the week first on working out the unresolved issues in the agreement and then the unresolved issues with respect to the protocols and, finally, the surrounding circumstances of schedules and procedures.

Ambassador Sullivan remained behind to draft the implementing provisions of the agreements that had been achieved during the week. The Special Advisor and I remained in close contact.

So by the time we met again yesterday, the issues that remained were very few, indeed, were settled relatively rapidly. And I may on this occasion also point out that while the North Vietnamese are the most difficult people to negotiate with that I have ever encountered when they do not want to settle, they are also the most effective that I have dealt with when they finally decide to settle—so that we have gone through peaks and valleys in these negotiations of extraordinary intensity.

Now then, let me sum up where this agreement has left us—first with respect to what we said we would try to achieve, then with respect to some of its significance, and finally, with respect to the future.

First, when I met this group on October 26 and delivered myself of some epigrammatic phrases, we obviously did not want to give a complete checklist and we did not want to release the agreement as it then stood, because it did not seem to us desirable to provide a checklist against which both sides would then have to measure success and failure in terms of their prestige.

At that time, too, we did not say that it had always been foreseen that there would be another three or four days of negotiation after this tentative agreement had been reached. The reason why we asked for an-

other negotiation was because it seemed to us at that point that for a variety of reasons, which I explained then and again on December 16, those issues could not be settled within the time frame that the North Vietnamese expected.

It is now a matter of history, and it is therefore not essential to go into a debate of on what we based this judgment. But that was the reason why the agreement was not signed on October 31, and not any of the speculations that have been so much in print and on television.

Now, what did we say on October 26 we wanted to achieve? We said, first of all, that we wanted to make sure that the control machinery would be in place at the time of the cease-fire. We did this because we had information that there were plans by the other side to mount a major offensive to coincide with the signing of the cease-fire agreement.

This objective has been achieved by the fact that the protocols will be signed on the same day as the agreement, by the fact that the International Control Commission and the Four-Party Military Commission will meet within 24 hours of the agreement going into effect, or no later than Monday morning, Saigon time, that the regional teams of the International Control Commission will be in place 48 hours thereafter, and that all other teams will be in place within 15 and a maximum of 30 days after that.

Second, we said that we wanted to compress the time interval between the cease-fires we expected in Laos and Cambodia and the cease-fire in Viet-Nam.

For reasons which I have explained to you, we cannot be as specific about the cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia as we can about the agreements that are being signed on Saturday, but we can say with confidence that the formal cease-fire in Laos will go into effect in a considerably shorter period of time than was envisaged in October, and since the cease-fire in Cambodia depends to some extent on developments in Laos, we expect the same to be true there.

We said that certain linguistic ambiguities should be removed. The linguistic ambiguities were produced by the somewhat extraordinary negotiating procedure whereby a change in the English text did not always produce a correlative change in the Vietnamese text. All the linguistic ambiguities to which we referred in October have in fact been removed. At that time I mentioned only one, and therefore I am free to recall it.

I pointed out that the U.S. position had consistently been a rejection of the imposition of a coalition government on the people of South Viet-Nam. I said then that the National Council of Reconciliation was not a coalition government, nor was it conceived as a coalition government.

The Vietnamese language text, however, permitted an interpretation of the words "administrative structure" as applied to the National Council of Reconciliation which would have lent itself to the interpretation that it came close or was identical with a coalition government.

You will find that in the text of this agreement the words "administrative structure" no longer exist and therefore this particular—shall we say—ambiguity has been removed.

I pointed out in October that we had to find a procedure for signing which would be acceptable to all the parties for whom obligations were involved. This has been achieved.

I pointed out on October 26 that we would seek greater precision with respect to certain obligations particularly, without spelling them out, as they applied to the demilitarized zone and to the obligations with respect to Laos and Cambodia. That, too, has been achieved.

And I pointed out in December that we were looking for some means, some expression, which would make clear that the two parts of Viet-Nam would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force.

This is now explicitly provided, and we have achieved formulations in which in a number of the paragraphs, such as article 14, 18(e), and 20, there are specific refer-

ences to the sovereignty of South Viet-Nam.

There are specific references, moreover, to the same thing in article 6 and article 11 of the ICCS [International Commission of Control and Supervision] protocol. There are specific references to the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination.

And therefore we believe that we have achieved the substantial adaptations that we asked for on October 26. We did not increase our demands after October 26, and we substantially achieved the clarifications which we sought.

Now then, it is obvious that a war that has lasted for 10 years will have many elements that cannot be completely satisfactory to all the parties concerned. And in the two periods where the North Vietnamese were working with dedication and seriousness on a conclusion, the period in October and the period after we resumed talks on January 8, it was always clear that a lasting peace could come about only if neither side sought to achieve everything that it had wanted; indeed, that stability depended on the relative satisfaction and therefore on the relative dissatisfaction of all of the parties concerned. And therefore it is also clear that whether this agreement brings a lasting peace or not depends not only on its provisions but also on the spirit in which it is implemented.

It will be our challenge in the future to move the controversies that could not be stilled by any one document from the level of military conflict to the level of positive human aspirations, and to absorb the enormous talents and dedication of the people of Indochina in tasks of construction, rather than in tasks of destruction.

We will make a major effort to move to create a framework where we hope in a short time the animosities and the hatred and the suffering of this period will be seen as aspects of the past and where the debates concern differences of opinion as to how to achieve positive goals.

Of course the hatreds will not rapidly disappear, and of course people who have fought for 25 years will not easily give up their objectives, but also people who have



suffered for 25 years may at last come to know that they can achieve their real satisfaction by other and less brutal means.

The President said yesterday that we have to remain vigilant, and so we shall, but we shall also dedicate ourselves to positive efforts. And as for us at home, it should be clear by now that no one in this war has had a monopoly of anguish and that no one in these debates has had a monopoly of moral insight. And now that at last we have achieved an agreement in which the United States did not prescribe the political future to its allies, an agreement which should preserve the dignity and the self-respect of all of the parties, together with healing the wounds in Indochina we can begin to heal the wounds in America.

I will be glad to answer any questions.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, what, if any, supervision do you envisage over the Ho Chi Minh Trail by an international agency?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* We expect that the International Control Commission that exists in Laos will be reinstated. We have also provided for the establishment of border teams, as you can see from the maps, at all the terminal points of the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Viet-Nam. And therefore, we believe that there will be international supervision of the provisions, both within Laos and within South Viet-Nam.

Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News].

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, one of the major problems has been the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South. Could you tell us, first, so far as you know, how many of these troops are there in the South now, and do you have any understanding or assurance that these troops will be withdrawn?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* Our estimate of the number of North Vietnamese troops in the South is approximately 145,000. Now, I want to say a number of things with respect to this.

First, nothing in the agreement establishes the right of North Vietnamese troops to be in the South.

Secondly, the North Vietnamese have

never claimed that they have a right to have troops in the South, and while opinions may differ about the exact accuracy of that statement, from a legal point of view it is important because it maintains the distinction that we, too, maintain.

Thirdly, if this agreement is implemented, the North Vietnamese troops in the South should, over a period of time, be subject to considerable reduction. First, there is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any outside forces for any reason whatsoever, so that the normal attrition of personnel cannot be made up by the reinfiltration of outside forces. I am talking now about the provisions of the agreement. Secondly, there is a flat prohibition against the presence of foreign forces in Laos and Cambodia and therefore a flat prohibition against the use of the normal infiltration corridors. Thirdly, as the agreement makes clear, military movement of any kind across the demilitarized zone is prohibited, both in the clause requiring respect for the demilitarized zone, which by definition excludes military personnel, and second, in the clause that says only modalities of civilian movement can be discussed, not of any other movement between North and South Viet-Nam. Fourth, there is a provision requiring the reduction and demobilization of forces on both sides, the major part of which on the South Vietnamese (Communist) side is believed, by all knowledgeable observers, to have arrived from outside of South Viet-Nam.

Therefore it is our judgment that there is no way that North Viet-Nam can live up to that agreement without there being a reduction of the North Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam, without this being explicitly stated.

Of course, it is not inconceivable that the agreement will not in all respects be lived up to. In that case, adding another clause that will not be lived up to, specifically requiring it, would not change the situation.

It is our judgment and our expectation—it is our expectation that the agreement will be lived up to, and therefore we believe that the problem of these forces will be

taken care of by the evolution of events in South Viet-Nam.

Peter [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, can I try to get a clarification of just that point? Several times, I think, you have said it is understood that North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia are considered foreign troops.*

*Dr. Kissinger:* That is right.

*Q. Are they so considered?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* I said it once, Peter.

*Q. You said it in answer to Marvin's question, but is it so considered in South Viet-Nam? Is North Viet-Nam a foreign entity in South Viet-Nam according to this agreement?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* This is one of the points on which the bitterest feeling rages and with which it is best not to deal in a formal and legalistic manner.

As I have pointed out, in this agreement there are repeated references to the identity of South Viet-Nam, to the fact that the South Vietnamese people's right of self-determination is recognized both by the DRV and by the United States, to the fact that North and South Viet-Nam shall settle their disputes peacefully and through negotiation, and other provisions of a similar kind.

Therefore it is clear there is no legal way by which North Viet-Nam can use military force against South Viet-Nam.

Now, whether that is due to the fact that there are two zones temporarily divided by a provisional demarcation line or because North Viet-Nam is a foreign country with relation to South Viet-Nam—that is an issue which we have avoided making explicit in the agreement and in which ambiguity has its merits. From the point of view of the international position and from the point of view of the obligations of the agreement, there is no legal way by which North Viet-Nam can use military force vis-a-vis South Viet-Nam to achieve its objectives.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, on that subject, by what means was the United States able to con-*

*vince President Thieu to accept the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* First of all, it is not easy to achieve through negotiations what has not been achieved on the battlefield, and if you look at the settlements that have been made in the postwar period, the lines of demarcation have almost always followed the lines of actual control.

Secondly, we have taken the position throughout that the agreement cannot be analyzed in terms of any one of its provisions, but it has to be seen in its totality and in terms of the evolution that it starts.

Thirdly, we have not asked President Thieu, nor has he accepted, the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam as a legal right, nor do we accept that as a legal right.

We have, since October 1970, proposed a cease-fire-in-place. A cease-fire-in-place always has to be between the forces that exist. The alternative of continued war also would have maintained the forces in the country.

Under these conditions, they are cut off from the possibility of renewed infiltration. They are prevented from undertaking military action. Their resupply is severely restricted.

And President Thieu, after examining the totality of the agreement, came to the conclusion that it achieved the essential objectives of South Viet-Nam, of permitting his people to bring about self-determination and of not posing a security risk that he could not handle with the forces that we have equipped and trained.

Mr. Horner [Garnett D. Horner, Washington Star-News].

*Q. Because of a news report from Paris this morning that actually there were some 15 or 20 protocols, of which only four are being made public, were there any secret protocols agreed to?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* The only protocols that exist are the protocols that have been made public.

*Q. What about understandings?*



*Dr. Kissinger:* There are, with respect to certain phrases, read into the record certain statements as to what they mean, but these have been explained in these briefings and made clear.

There are no secret understandings.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, it has been widely speculated that the 12-day saturation bombing of the North was the key to achieving the agreement that you found acceptable. Was it, and if not, what was?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* I was asked in October whether the bombing or mining of May 8 brought about the breakthrough in October, and I said then that I did not want to speculate on North Vietnamese motives. I have too much trouble analyzing our own.

I will give the same answer to your question, but I will say that there was a deadlock which was described in the middle of December, and there was a rapid movement when negotiations resumed on the technical level on January 3 (January 2) and on the substantive level on January 8. These facts have to be analyzed by each person for himself.

I want to make one point with respect to the question about understandings. It is obvious that when I speak with some confidence about certain developments that happen with respect to Laos and other places, that this must be based on exchanges that have taken place, but for obvious reasons I cannot go further into them.

The formal obligations of the parties have all been revealed, and there are no secret formal obligations.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, the dollar amount put on the amount to which the United States is committed in rebuilding—this construction you referred to in North Viet-Nam or reparations or whatever it is to be—is there any dollar amount suggested?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* We will discuss the issue of economic reconstruction of all of Indochina, including North Viet-Nam, only after the signature of the agreements and after the implementation is well advanced. And the definition of any particular sum will have to await the discussions which will take place after the agreements are in force.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, is there any understanding with the Soviet Union or with Communist China that they will take part in an international conference or will help toward the preservation of this framework of the agreement?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* Formal invitations to the international conference have not yet been extended. But we expect both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to participate in the international conference which will take place within 30 days of the signature of the agreement.

We have reason to believe that both of these countries will participate in this conference.

Now, with respect to their willingness to help this agreement become viable, it is, of course, clear that peace in Indochina requires the self-restraint of all of the major countries and especially of those countries which on all sides have supplied the wherewithal for this conflict.

We, on our part, are prepared to exercise such restraint; we believe that the other countries, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, can make a very major contribution to peace in Indochina by exercising similar restraint.

*Q. If a peace treaty is violated and if the ICC proves ineffective, will the United States ever again send troops into Viet-Nam?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* I don't want to speculate on hypothetical situations that we don't expect to arise.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, what agreement or understanding is there on the role that will be played by the so-called neutralist or third-force groups in Viet-Nam in the National Council of Reconciliation?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* We have taken the position throughout that the future political evolution of South Viet-Nam should be left, to the greatest extent possible, to the South Vietnamese themselves and should not be predetermined by the United States.

Therefore, there is no understanding in any detail on the role of any particular force

in South Viet-Nam. The United States has always taken the view that it favored free elections, but on the whole, the essence of this agreement is to leave the political evolution of South Viet-Nam to negotiation among the various South Vietnamese parties or factions.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, about a year ago, President Nixon outlined a peace proposal which included a provision for President Thieu to resign prior to elections. Is there any similar provision in this agreement?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* That proposal was in a somewhat different context. In any event, there is no such provision in this agreement and this, again, is a matter that will have to be decided by the Vietnamese parties within the context of whatever negotiation they have, but there is no requirement of any kind like this in the agreement.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, when do you expect the first American planes to arrive in Hanoi to pick up the prisoners?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* Our expectation is that the withdrawals, as well as the release of prisoners, will take place in roughly equal increments of 15 days over the 60-day period, so within 15 days of January 27. That is the outside time. It could be faster.

*Q. I wanted to know the earliest time.*

*Dr. Kissinger:* I can't give any earlier time than within 15 days.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have addressed yourself to this general area before, but the question keeps coming up. Would you just review for us briefly how you feel that the agreement that you have reached differs from one that could have been reached, say, four years ago?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* Four years ago the North Vietnamese totally refused to separate political and military issues. Four years ago the North Vietnamese insisted that as a condition to negotiations the existing governmental structure in South Viet-Nam would have to be disbanded, and only after this governmental structure had been disbanded and a different one had been installed would they even discuss, much less implement, any of the other provisions of the agreement.

Therefore, until October 8 of this year, all of the various schemes that were constantly being discussed foundered on the one root factor of the situation—that the North Vietnamese, until October 8 of this year, demanded that a political victory be handed to them as a precondition for a discussion of all military questions. But in that case, all military questions would have become totally irrelevant because there was no longer the political structure to which they could apply.

It was not until October 8 this year that the North Vietnamese ever agreed to separate these two aspects of the problem, and as soon as this was done, we moved rapidly.

Then, there was the second phase, which I have described, which included the changes that were made between October and January, which produced this agreement.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, earlier you said that as of December 16 there were various disagreements which you then listed, and the first one was the question of the demilitarized zone and associated aspects over what identity South Viet-Nam should have under the agreement. Can you elaborate on this, and most particularly, can you elaborate on it from the standpoint of whether you are referring here to President Thieu's objections?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* I have made clear what exactly was involved. We have here several separate issues. One, is there such a thing as a South Viet-Nam, even temporarily, until unification? Secondly, who is the legitimate ruler of South Viet-Nam? This is what the civil war has been all about. Thirdly, what is the demarcation line that separates North Viet-Nam from South Viet-Nam?

Now, we believe that the agreement defines adequately the demarcation line. It defines adequately what the identity is to which we refer. It leaves open to negotiation among the parties the political evolution of South Viet-Nam and therefore the definition of what ultimately will be considered by all South Vietnamese the legitimate ruler.

The President made clear yesterday that as far as the United States is concerned, we recognize President Thieu. This is a situation



that has existed in other countries. And these were the three principal issues involved, of which two have international significance and were settled within the agreement, and the third has significance in terms of the political evolution of South Viet-Nam, and that has been left to the self-determination of the South Vietnamese people.

As to the question of President Thieu's objections, comments, and so forth, we said on October 26 that obviously in a war fought in South Viet-Nam, in a war that has had hundreds of thousands of casualties of South Vietnamese, enormous devastation within South Viet-Nam, it stands to reason that the views of our allies will have to be considered. There is nothing wrong or immoral for them to have such views.

Secondly, their perception of the risks has to be different from our perception of the risks. We are 12,000 miles away. If we make a mistake in our assessment of the situation, it will be painful. If they make a mistake in the assessment of the situation, it can be fatal. And therefore, they have had a somewhat less flexible attitude. Where we in some respects have at some points been content with more ambiguous formulations, they were not.

Nevertheless, it is also obvious to any reader of the Saigon press and of their official communications that we did not accept all of their comments and that we carried out precisely what the President had said and what was said at the various press conferences in which I presented the U.S. Government view; namely, that we would make the final determination as to when the American participation in the war should end.

Those parts of their comments that we thought were reasonable we made our own; those that we did not, we did not. And once we had achieved an agreement with the North Vietnamese that we considered fair and just and honorable, we presented it with great energy and conviction in Saigon.

*Q. This is what I am asking you, doctor. You say you made some of his points your points. What did he get in January that he didn't have in October?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* I do not want to discuss what he got. I pointed out the list of objectives we set ourselves in October and what was achieved. I pointed out the changes that were achieved between October and January. We believe them to be substantial, and I do not want to make a checklist of saying which originated in Saigon or which originated in Washington.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, did you personally feel strengthened in the negotiations as a result of the saturation bombing?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* The term "saturation bombing" has certain connotations. We carried out what was considered to be necessary at the time in order to make clear that the United States could not stand for an indefinite delay in the negotiations.

My role in the negotiations was to present the American point of view. I can only say that we resumed the negotiations on January 8 and the breakthrough occurred on January 9, and I will let those facts speak for themselves.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is now the extent and the nature of the American commitment to South Viet-Nam?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* The United States, as the President said, will continue economic aid to South Viet-Nam. It will continue that military aid which is permitted by the agreement. The United States is prepared to gear that military aid to the actions of other countries and not to treat it as an end in itself.

And the United States expects all countries to live up to the provisions of the agreement.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, you say, "The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacements of armaments, munitions and war materials which have been destroyed." Why do we have to put any more materials in there? Why should they be in there, and will these materials come from the United States or what countries?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* Let's separate two things: what is permitted by the agreement and what we shall do. What is permitted by the

agreement is that military equipment that, as you read, is destroyed, worn out, used up, or damaged can be replaced.

The reason for that provision is that if for any reason the war should start at any level, it would be an unfair restriction on our South Vietnamese allies to prohibit them from replacing their weapons if their enemies are able to do so.

The degree, therefore, to which these weapons have to be replaced will depend on the degree to which there is military activity. If there is no military activity in South Viet-Nam, then the number of weapons that are destroyed, damaged, or worn out will of course be substantially less than in other circumstances.

Secondly, what will be the U.S. position? This depends on the overall situation. If there is no military activity, if other countries do not introduce massive military equipment into Viet-Nam, we do not consider it an end in itself to give military aid. But we believe that it would be unfair and wrong for one country to be armed by its allies while the other one has no right to do so. This is what will govern our actions.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is the plan for the rather sizable U.S. military force offshore in warships off South Viet-Nam and also B-52 bases in Thailand? Will these forces be reduced, and is there an understanding with the North Vietnamese that you have not mentioned to us here that would reduce those forces?*

*Dr. Kissinger:* There is no restriction on American military forces that is not mentioned in the agreement. One would expect, as time goes on, that the deployment of our naval forces will take account of the new situation.

As you know, we have kept many of our forces on station for longer than the normal period of time, and we have had more carriers in the area than before, but this is not required by the agreement and this is simply a projection of what might happen.

The same is true with respect to Thailand. There are no restrictions on our forces in

Thailand. It has always been part of the Nixon doctrine that the deployment of our forces would be related to the degree of the danger and has not an abstract quality of its own.

So that as a general rule one can say that in the initial phases of the agreement, before one knows how it will be implemented, the deployment will be more geared to the war situation, and as the agreement is being implemented, the conditions of peace will have a major impact on it. But this is simply a projection of our normal policy and is not an outgrowth required by the agreement.

*The press: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.*

## TEXTS OF AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOLS

### Text of Agreement

White House press release dated January 24

#### AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:

#### Chapter I

##### THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL RIGHTS

#### Article 1

The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

#### Chapter II

##### CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES—WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

#### Article 2

A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end



the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this Article shall be durable and without limit of time.

#### Article 3

The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and to ensure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam shall remain in-place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in-place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.

(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:

—All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the sea shall be prohibited;

—All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.

#### Article 4

The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

#### Article 5

Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

#### Article 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement.

#### Article 7

From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the

formation of the government provided for in Articles 9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

### Chapter III

#### THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

#### Article 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

### Chapter IV

#### THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

#### Article 9

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:

(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-



determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries.

(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.

#### Article 10

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict.

#### Article 11

Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

—achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;

—ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise.

#### Article 12

(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The Council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and ensurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9 (b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South

Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.

#### Article 13

The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

#### Article 14

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9 (b).

### Chapter V

#### THE REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

#### Article 15

The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam.

Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(c) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to reestablishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(d) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers, and military personnel on



their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

#### Chapter VI

#### THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

##### Article 16

(a) The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;

—Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article;

—Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam;

—Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a);

—Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a);

—Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties;

—Article 8 (b), regarding the mutual assistance of the parties in getting information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this Agreement and end its activities in sixty days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) and the completion of the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity, and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

##### Article 17

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese

parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

—Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;

—Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

—Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article;

—Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

—Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) After the signing of this Agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

##### Article 18

(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately.

(b) Until the International Conference provided for in Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement:

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;

—Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article;

—Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all the parties in South Vietnam;

—Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a);

—Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a);

—Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying



out its tasks. The four parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their operation.

(c) Until the International Conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement:

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

—Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;

—Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

—Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this Article;

—Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

—Article 9 (b), regarding the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam;

—Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operation.

(d) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be composed of representatives of four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The chairmanship of this Commission will rotate among the members for specific periods to be determined by the Commission.

(e) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

(f) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity.

(g) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes into force in Vietnam. As regards the provisions in Article 18 (b) concerning the four parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities when the Commission's tasks of control and supervision regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. As regards the provisions in Article 18 (c) concerning the two South Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end

its activities on the request of the government formed after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9 (b).

(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, means of activity, and expenditures of the International Commission of Control and Supervision. The relationship between the International Commission and the International Conference will be agreed upon by the International Commission and the International Conference.

#### Article 19

The parties agree on the convening of an International Conference within thirty days of the signing of this Agreement to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina.

The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam, will propose to the following parties that they participate in this International Conference: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the four countries of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, together with the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam.

### Chapter VII

#### REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS

#### Article 20

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indo-



chinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

**Chapter VIII**

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM**

**Article 21**

The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

**Article 22**

The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam, and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

**Chapter IX**

**OTHER PROVISIONS**

**Article 23**

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. All the parties concerned shall strictly implement this Agreement and its Protocols.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the United States of America	For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
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WILLIAM P. ROGERS  
*Secretary of State*

TRAN VAN LAM  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
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NGUYEN DUY TRINH  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*

NGUYEN THI BINH  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*

**AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM**

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:

[Text of Agreement Chapters I-VIII Same As Above]

**Chapter IX**

**OTHER PROVISIONS**

**Article 23**

The Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Agreement and the protocols to it shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America	For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
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WILLIAM P. ROGERS  
*Secretary of State*

NGUYEN DUY TRINH  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*

**Protocol on Prisoners and Detainees**

White House press release dated January 24

**PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.**

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians, and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel, Have agreed as follows:

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS

*Article 1*

The parties signatory to the Agreement shall return the captured military personnel of the parties mentioned in Article 8 (a) of the Agreement as follows:

—all captured military personnel of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) of the Agreement shall be returned to United States authorities;

—all captured Vietnamese military personnel, whether belonging to regular or irregular armed forces, shall be returned to the two South Vietnamese parties; they shall be returned to that South Vietnamese party under whose command they served.

*Article 2*

All captured civilians who are nationals of the United States or of any other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) of the Agreement shall be returned to United States authorities. All other captured foreign civilians shall be returned to the authorities of their country of nationality by any one of the parties willing and able to do so.

*Article 3*

The parties shall today exchange complete lists of captured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol.

*Article 4*

(a) The return of all captured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of the Agreement at a rate no slower than the rate of withdrawal from South Vietnam of United States forces and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 5 of the Agreement.

(b) Persons who are seriously ill, wounded or maimed, old persons and women shall be returned first. The remainder shall be returned either by returning all from one detention place after another or in order of their dates of capture, beginning with those who have been held the longest.

*Article 5*

The return and reception of the persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be carried out at places convenient to the concerned parties. Places of return shall be agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. The parties shall ensure the safety of personnel engaged in the return and reception of those persons.

*Article 6*

Each party shall return all captured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol without delay and shall facilitate their return and reception. The detaining parties shall not deny or delay their return for any reason, including the fact that captured persons may, on any grounds, have been prosecuted or sentenced.

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

*Article 7*

(a) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954, which reads as follows:

"The term 'civilian internees' is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities."

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord with a view to ending hatred and enmity in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

(c) Within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, the two South Vietnamese parties shall exchange lists of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained by each party and lists of the places at which they are held.

TREATMENT OF CAPTURED PERSONS DURING DETENTION

*Article 8*

(a) All captured military personnel of the parties and captured foreign civilians of the parties shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice.

They shall be protected against all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity. These persons shall not be forced to join the armed forces of the detaining party.

They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shelter, and the medical attention required for their state of health. They shall be allowed to exchange post cards and letters with their families and receive parcels.

(b) All Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice.

They shall be protected against all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any



form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, and outrages against personal dignity. The detaining parties shall not deny or delay their return for any reason, including the fact that captured persons may, on any grounds, have been prosecuted or sentenced. These persons shall not be forced to join the armed forces of the detaining party.

They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shelter, and the medical attention required for their state of health. They shall be allowed to exchange post cards and letters with their families and receive parcels.

#### *Article 9*

(a) To contribute to improving the living conditions of the captured military personnel of the parties and foreign civilians of the parties, the parties shall, within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all places where captured military personnel and foreign civilians are held.

(b) To contribute to improving the living conditions of the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel, the two South Vietnamese parties shall, within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all places where the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel are held.

#### WITH REGARD TO DEAD AND MISSING PERSONS

#### *Article 10*

(a) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall ensure joint action by the parties in implementing Article 8 (b) of the Agreement. When the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities, a Four-Party Joint Military team shall be maintained to carry on this task.

(b) With regard to Vietnamese civilian personnel dead or missing in South Vietnam, the two South Vietnamese parties shall help each other to obtain information about missing persons, determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead, in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, in keeping with the people's aspirations.

#### OTHER PROVISIONS

#### *Article 11*

(a) The Four-Party and Two-Party Joint Military Commissions will have the responsibility of determining immediately the modalities of implementing the provisions of this Protocol consistent with their respective responsibilities under Articles 16 (a) and 17 (a) of the Agreement. In case the Joint Military Commissions, when carrying out their tasks, cannot reach agreement on a matter pertaining to the return of captured personnel they shall refer to the International Commission for its assistance.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission

shall form, in addition to the teams established by the Protocol concerning the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions, a sub-commission on captured persons and, as required, joint military teams on captured persons to assist the Commission in its tasks.

(c) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form a provisional sub-commission and provisional joint military teams to carry out its tasks concerning captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel.

(d) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall send joint military teams to observe the return of the persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol at each place in Vietnam where such persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall send joint military teams to observe the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained at each place in South Vietnam where such persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return.

#### *Article 12*

In implementation of Articles 18 (b) and 18 (c) of the Agreement, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall have the responsibility to control and supervise the observance of Articles 1 through 7 of this Protocol through observation of the return of captured military personnel, foreign civilians and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel at each place in Vietnam where these persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return, the examination of lists, and the investigation of violations of the provisions of the above-mentioned Articles.

#### *Article 13*

Within five days after signature of this Protocol, each party shall publish the text of the Protocol and communicate it to all the captured persons covered by the Protocol and being detained by that party.

#### *Article 14*

This Protocol shall come into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the United States of America	For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
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WILLIAM P. ROGERS  
*Secretary of State*

TRAN VAN LAM  
*Minister for Foreign  
Affairs*

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	For the Provisional Rev- olutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
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NGUYEN DUY TRINH  
*Minister for Foreign  
Affairs*

NGUYEN THI BINH  
*Minister for Foreign  
Affairs*

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians, and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel,

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of Protocol Articles 1-13 same as above]

*Article 14*

The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the Return of Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians and Captured and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Protocol shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-

Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America	For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
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WILLIAM P. ROGERS  
*Secretary of State*

NGUYEN DUY TRINH  
*Minister for Foreign  
Affairs*

**Protocol on the International Commission of Control and Supervision**

White House press release dated January 24

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the formation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision,

Have agreed as follows:

*Article 1*

The implementation of the Agreement is the responsibility of the parties signatory to the Agreement.

The functions of the International Commission are to control and supervise the implementation of the provisions mentioned in Article 18 of the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission shall:

(a) Follow the implementation of the above-mentioned provisions of the Agreement through communication with the parties and on-the-spot observation at the places where this is required;

(b) Investigate violations of the provisions which fall under the control and supervision of the Commission;

(c) When necessary, cooperate with the Joint Military Commissions in deterring and detecting violations of the above-mentioned provisions.

*Article 2*

The International Commission shall investigate violations of the provisions described in Article 18 of the Agreement on the request of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, or of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, or of any party, or with respect to Article 9 (b) of the Agreement on general elections, of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, or in any case where the International Commission has other adequate grounds for considering that there has been a violation of those provisions. It is understood



that, in carrying out this task, the International Commission shall function with the concerned parties' assistance and cooperation as required.

*Article 3*

(a) When the International Commission finds that there is a serious violation in the implementation of the Agreement or a threat to peace against which the Commission can find no appropriate measure, the Commission shall report this to the four parties to the Agreement so that they can hold consultations to find a solution.

(b) In accordance with Article 18 (f) of the Agreement, the International Commission's reports shall be made with the unanimous agreement of the representatives of all the four members. In case no unanimity is reached, the Commission shall forward the different views to the four parties in accordance with Article 18 (b) of the Agreement, or to the two South Vietnamese parties in accordance with Article 18 (c) of the Agreement, but these shall not be considered as reports of the Commission.

*Article 4*

(a) The headquarters of the International Commission shall be at Saigon.

(b) There shall be seven regional teams located in the regions shown on the annexed map and based at the following places:

<i>Regions</i>	<i>Places</i>
I	Hue
II	Danang
III	Pleiku
IV	Phan Thiet
V	Bien Hoa
VI	My Tho
VII	Can Tho

The International Commission shall designate three teams for the region of Saigon-Gia Dinh.

(c) There shall be twenty-six teams operating in the areas shown on the annexed map and based at the following places in South Vietnam:

*Region I*

Quang Tri  
Phu Bai

*Region II*

Hoi An  
Tam Ky  
Chu Lai

*Region III*

Kontum  
Hau Bon  
Phu Cat  
Tuy An  
Ninh Hoa  
Ban Me Thuot

*Region IV*

Da Lat

Bao Loc  
Phan Rang

*Region V*

An Loc  
Xuan Loc  
Ben Cat  
Cu Chi  
Tan An

*Region VI*

Moc Hoa  
Giong Trom

*Region VII*

Tri Ton  
Vinh Long  
Vi Thanh  
Khanh Hung  
Quan Long

(d) There shall be twelve teams located as shown on the annexed map and based at the following places:

Gio Linh (to cover the area south of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line)

Lao Bao  
Ben Het  
Duc Co  
Chu Lai  
Qui Nhon  
Nha Trang  
Vung Tau  
Xa Mat  
Bien Hoa Airfield  
Hong Ngu  
Can Tho


(e) There shall be seven teams, six of which shall be available for assignment to the points of entry which are not listed in paragraph (d) above and which the two South Vietnamese parties choose as points for legitimate entry to South Vietnam for replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement. Any team or teams not needed for the above-mentioned assignment shall be available for other tasks, in keeping with the Commission's responsibility for control and supervision.

(f) There shall be seven teams to control and supervise the return of captured and detained personnel of the parties.

*Article 5*

(a) To carry out its tasks concerning the return of the captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties as stipulated by Article 8 (a) of the Agreement, the International Commission shall, during the time of such return, send one control and supervision team to each place in Vietnam where the captured persons are being returned, and to the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return.







(b) To carry out its tasks concerning the return of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam mentioned in Article 8 (c) of the Agreement, the International Commission shall, during the time of such return, send one control and supervision team to each place in South Vietnam where the above-mentioned captured and detained persons are being returned, and to the last detention places from which these persons shall be taken to the places of return.

#### Article 6

To carry out its tasks regarding Article 9 (b) of the Agreement on the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam, the International Commission shall organize additional teams, when necessary. The International Commission shall discuss this question in advance with the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. If additional teams are necessary for this purpose, they shall be formed thirty days before the general elections.

#### Article 7

The International Commission shall continually keep under review its size, and shall reduce the number of its teams, its representatives or other personnel, or both, when those teams, representatives or personnel have accomplished the tasks assigned to them and are not required for other tasks. At the same time, the expenditures of the International Commission shall be reduced correspondingly.

#### Article 8

Each member of the International Commission shall make available at all times the following numbers of qualified personnel:

- (a) One senior representative and twenty-six others for the headquarters staff.
- (b) Five for each of the seven regional teams.
- (c) Two for each of the other international control teams, except for the teams at Gio Linh and Vung Tau, each of which shall have three.
- (d) One hundred sixteen for the purpose of providing support to the Commission Headquarters and its teams.

#### Article 9

- (a) The International Commission, and each of its teams, shall act as a single body comprising representatives of all four members.
- (b) Each member has the responsibility to ensure the presence of its representatives at all levels of the International Commission. In case a representative is absent, the member concerned shall immediately designate a replacement.

#### Article 10

- (a) The parties shall afford full cooperation, assistance, and protection to the International Commission.
- (b) The parties shall at all times maintain reg-

ular and continuous liaison with the International Commission. During the existence of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, the delegations of the parties to that Commission shall also perform liaison functions with the International Commission. After the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities, such liaison shall be maintained through the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, liaison missions, or other adequate means.

(c) The International Commission and the Joint Military Commissions shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions.

(d) Wherever a team is stationed or operating, the concerned party shall designate a liaison officer to the team to cooperate with and assist it in carrying out without hindrance its task of control and supervision. When a team is carrying out an investigation, a liaison officer from each concerned party shall have the opportunity to accompany it, provided the investigation is not thereby delayed.

(e) Each party shall give the International Commission reasonable advance notice of all proposed actions concerning those provisions of the Agreement that are to be controlled and supervised by the International Commission.

(f) The International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned.

#### Article 11

In supervising the holding of the free and democratic general elections described in Articles 9 (b) and 12 (b) of the Agreement in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon between the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and the International Commission, the latter shall receive full cooperation and assistance from the National Council.

#### Article 12

The International Commission and its personnel who have the nationality of a member state shall, while carrying out their tasks, enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents.

#### Article 13

The International Commission may use the means of communication and transport necessary to perform its functions. Each South Vietnamese party shall make available for rent to the International Commission appropriate office and accommodation facilities and shall assist it in obtaining such facilities. The International Commission may receive from the parties, on mutually agreeable terms, the

necessary means of communication and transport and may purchase from any source necessary equipment and services not obtained from the parties. The International Commission shall possess these means.

*Article 14*

The expenses for the activities of the International Commission shall be borne by the parties and the members of the International Commission in accordance with the provisions of this Article:-

(a) Each member country of the International Commission shall pay the salaries and allowances of its personnel.

(b) All other expenses incurred by the International Commission shall be met from a fund to which each of the four parties shall contribute twenty-three percent (23%) and to which each member of the International Commission shall contribute two percent (2%).

(c) Within thirty days of the date of entry into force of this Protocol, each of the four parties shall provide the International Commission with an initial sum equivalent to four million, five hundred thousand (4,500,000) French francs in convertible currency, which sum shall be credited against the amounts due from that party under the first budget.

(d) The International Commission shall prepare its own budgets. After the International Commission approves a budget, it shall transmit it to all parties signatory to the Agreement for their approval. Only after the budgets have been approved by the four parties to the Agreement shall they be obliged to make their contributions. However, in case the parties to the Agreement do not agree on a new budget, the International Commission shall temporarily base its expenditures on the previous budget, except for the extraordinary, one-time expenditures for installation or for the acquisition of equipment, and the parties shall continue to make their contributions on that basis until a new budget is approved.

*Article 15*

(a) The headquarters shall be operational and in place within twenty-four hours after the cease-fire.

(b) The regional teams shall be operational and in place, and three teams for supervision and control of the return of the captured and detained personnel shall be operational and ready for dispatch within forty-eight hours after the cease-fire.

(c) Other teams shall be operational and in place within fifteen to thirty days after the cease-fire.

*Article 16*

Meetings shall be convened at the call of the Chairman. The International Commission shall adopt other working procedures appropriate for the effective discharge of its functions and consistent with respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

*Article 17*

The Members of the International Commission may accept the obligations of this Protocol by sending notes of acceptance to the four parties signatory to the Agreement. Should a member of the International Commission decide to withdraw from the International Commission, it may do so by giving three months notice by means of notes to the four parties to the Agreement, in which case those four parties shall consult among themselves for the purpose of agreeing upon a replacement member.

*Article 18*

This Protocol shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the United States of America

WILLIAM P. ROGERS  
*Secretary of State*

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam

TRAN VAN LAM  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

NGUYEN DUY TRINH  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam

NGUYEN THI BINH  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the formation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision,

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of Protocol Articles 1-17 same as above.]



*Article 18*

The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Protocol shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America

WILLIAM P. ROGERS  
*Secretary of State*

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

NGUYEN DUY TRINH  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*

**Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam and the Joint Military Commissions**

White House press release dated January 24

**PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS**

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam,

In implementation of the first paragraph of Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and Article 17 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date which provide for the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint Military Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military Commission,

Have agreed as follows:

**CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

*Article 1*

The High Commands of the parties in South Vietnam shall issue prompt and timely orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their command to completely end hostilities throughout South Vietnam, at the exact time stipulated in Article 2 of the Agreement and ensure

that these armed forces and armed police comply with these orders and respect the cease-fire.

*Article 2*

(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and until regulations are issued by the Joint Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall remain in place; that is, in order to ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major redeployments or movements that would extend each party's area of control or would result in contact between opposing armed forces and clashes which might take place.

(b) All regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police of the parties in South Vietnam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts:

(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by opposing armed forces and flights by bomber and fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and maintenance;

(2) Armed attacks against any person, either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device;

(3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on the sea and in the air;

(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and

(5) All acts endangering lives or public or private property.

*Article 3*

(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall not hamper or restrict:

(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work, and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Vietnam;

(2) The use by each party in areas under its control of military support elements, such as engineer and transportation units, in repair and construction of public facilities and the transportation and supplying of the population;

(3) Normal military proficiency training conducted by the parties in the areas under their respective control with due regard for public safety.

(b) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately agree on corridors, routes, and other regulations governing the movement of military transport aircraft, military transport vehicles, and military transport vessels of all types of one party going through areas under the control of other parties.

*Article 4*

In order to avert conflict and ensure normal conditions for those armed forces which are in direct contact, and pending regulation by the Joint Military Commissions, the commanders of the opposing

armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet as soon as the cease-fire comes into force with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary measures to avert conflict and to ensure supply and medical care for these armed forces.

#### Article 5

(a) Within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, each party shall do its utmost to complete the removal or deactivation of all demolition objects, mine-fields, traps, obstacles or other dangerous objects placed previously, so as not to hamper the population's movement and work, in the first place on waterways, roads and railroads in South Vietnam. Those mines which cannot be removed or deactivated within that time shall be clearly marked and must be removed or deactivated as soon as possible.

(b) Emplacement of mines is prohibited, except as a defensive measure around the edges of military installations in places where they do not hamper the population's movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and railroads. Mines and other obstacles already in place at the edges of military installations may remain in place if they are in places where they do not hamper the population's movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and railroads.

#### Article 6

Civilian police and civilian security personnel of the parties in South Vietnam, who are responsible for the maintenance of law and order, shall strictly respect the prohibitions set forth in Article 2 of this Protocol. As required by their responsibilities, normally they shall be authorized to carry pistols, but when required by unusual circumstances, they shall be allowed to carry other small individual arms.

#### Article 7

(a) The entry into South Vietnam of replacement armaments, munitions, and war material permitted under Article 7 of the Agreement shall take place under the supervision and control of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision and through such points of entry only as are designated by the two South Vietnamese parties. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree on these points of entry within fifteen days after the entry into force of the cease-fire. The two South Vietnamese parties may select as many as six points of entry which are not included in the list of places where teams of the International Commission of Control and Supervision are to be based contained in Article 4 (d) of the Protocol concerning the International Commission. At the same time, the two South Vietnamese parties may also select points of entry from the list of places set forth in Article 4 (d) of that Protocol.

(b) Each of the designated points of entry shall be available only for that South Vietnamese party which is in control of that point. The two South Vietnamese parties shall have an equal number of points of entry.

#### Article 8

(a) In implementation of Article 5 of the Agreement, the United States and the other foreign countries referred to in Article 5 of the Agreement shall take with them all their armaments, munitions, and war material. Transfers of such items which would leave them in South Vietnam shall not be made subsequent to the entry into force of the Agreement except for transfers of communications, transport, and other non-combat material to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission or the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(b) Within five days after the entry into force of the cease-fire, the United States shall inform the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision of the general plans for timing of complete troop withdrawals which shall take place in four phases of fifteen days each. It is anticipated that the numbers of troops withdrawn in each phase are not likely to be widely different, although it is not feasible to ensure equal numbers. The approximate numbers to be withdrawn in each phase shall be given to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision sufficiently in advance of actual withdrawals so that they can properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto.

#### Article 9

(a) In implementation of Article 6 of the Agreement, the United States and the other foreign countries referred to in that Article shall dismantle and remove from South Vietnam or destroy all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article, including weapons, mines, and other military equipment at these bases, for the purpose of making them unusable for military purposes.

(b) The United States shall supply the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision with necessary information on plans for base dismantlement so that those Commissions can properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto.

### THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS

#### Article 10

(a) The implementation of the Agreement is the responsibility of the parties signatory to the Agreement.

The Four-Party Joint Military Commission has the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the Agreement by serving as a chan-



nel of communication among the parties, by drawing up plans and fixing the modalities to carry out, coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation of the provisions mentioned in Article 16 of the Agreement, and by negotiating and settling all matters concerning the implementation of those provisions.

(b) The concrete tasks of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission are:

(1) To coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation of the above-mentioned provisions of the Agreement by the four parties;

(2) To deter and detect violations, to deal with cases of violation, and to settle conflicts and matters of contention between the parties relating to the above-mentioned provisions;

(3) To dispatch without delay one or more joint teams, as required by specific cases, to any part of South Vietnam, to investigate alleged violations of the Agreement and to assist the parties in finding measures to prevent recurrence of similar cases;

(4) To engage in observation at the places where this is necessary in the exercise of its functions;

(5) To perform such additional tasks as it may, by unanimous decision, determine.

*Article 11*

(a) There shall be a Central Joint Military Commission located in Saigon. Each party shall designate immediately a military delegation of fifty-nine persons to represent it on the Central Commission. The senior officer designated by each party shall be a general officer, or equivalent.

(b) There shall be seven Regional Joint Military Commissions located in the regions shown on the annexed map and based at the following places:

<i>Regions</i>	<i>Places</i>
I	Hue
II	Danang
III	Pleiku
IV	Phan Thiet
V	Bien Hoa
VI	My Tho
VII	Can Tho

Each party shall designate a military delegation of sixteen persons to represent it on each Regional Commission. The senior officer designated by each party shall be an officer from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel, or equivalent.

(c) There shall be a joint military team operating in each of the areas shown on the annexed map and based at each of the following places in South Vietnam:

<i>Region I</i>	
Quang Tri	
Phu Bai	
<i>Region II</i>	
Hoi An	
Tam Ky	
Chu Lai	

*Region III*

Kontum  
Hau Bon  
Phu Cat  
Tuy An  
Ninh Hoa  
Ban Me Thuot

*Region IV*

Da Lat  
Bao Loc  
Phan Rang

*Region V*

An Loc  
Xuan Loc  
Ben Cat  
Cu Chi  
Tan An

*Region VI*

Moc Hoa  
Giong Trom

*Region VII*

Tri Ton  
Vinh Long  
Vi Thanh  
Khanh Hung  
Quan Long

Each party shall provide four qualified persons for each joint military team. The senior person designated by each party shall be an officer from the rank of Major to Lieutenant Colonel, or equivalent.


(d) The Regional Joint Military Commissions shall assist the Central Joint Military Commission in performing its tasks and shall supervise the operations of the joint military teams. The region of Saigon-Gia Dinh is placed under the responsibility of the Central Commission which shall designate joint military teams to operate in this region.

(e) Each party shall be authorized to provide support and guard personnel for its delegations to the Central Joint Military Commission and Regional Joint Military Commissions, and for its members of the joint military teams. The total number of support and guard personnel for each party shall not exceed five hundred and fifty.

(f) The Central Joint Military Commission may establish such joint sub-commissions, joint staffs and joint military teams as circumstances may require. The Central Commission shall determine the numbers of personnel required for any additional sub-commissions, staffs or teams it establishes, provided that each party shall designate one-fourth of the number of personnel required and that the total number of personnel for the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, to include its staffs, teams, and support personnel, shall not exceed three thousand three hundred.

(g) The delegations of the two South Vietnamese







parties may, by agreement, establish provisional sub-commissions and joint military teams to carry out the tasks specifically assigned to them by Article 17 of the Agreement. With respect to Article 7 of the Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall establish joint military teams at the points of entry into South Vietnam used for replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which are designated in accordance with Article 7 of this Protocol. From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form a provisional sub-commission and provisional joint military teams to carry out its tasks concerning captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel. Where necessary for the above purposes, the two South Vietnamese parties may agree to assign personnel additional to those assigned to the two South Vietnamese delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

#### Article 12

(a) In accordance with Article 17 of the Agreement which stipulates that the two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate their respective representatives to form the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, twenty-four hours after the cease-fire comes into force, the two designated South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall meet in Saigon so as to reach an agreement as soon as possible on organization and operation of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, as well as the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

(b) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall simultaneously assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels, in addition to their functions as delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

(c) If, at the time the Four-Party Joint Military Commission ceases its operation in accordance with Article 16 of the Agreement, agreement has not been reached on organization of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, the delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties serving with the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall continue temporarily to work together as a provisional two-party joint military commission and to assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels until the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational.

#### Article 13

In application of the principle of unanimity, the

Joint Military Commissions shall have no chairmen, and meetings shall be convened at the request of any representative. The Joint Military Commissions shall adopt working procedures appropriate for the effective discharge of their functions and responsibilities.

#### Article 14

The Joint Military Commissions and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions. Each Joint Military Commission shall inform the International Commission about the implementation of those provisions of the Agreement for which that Joint Military Commission has responsibility and which are within the competence of the International Commission. Each Joint Military Commission may request the International Commission to carry out specific observation activities.

#### Article 15

The Central Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating twenty-four hours after the cease-fire comes into force. The Regional Four-Party Joint Military Commissions shall begin operating forty-eight hours after the cease-fire comes into force. The joint military teams based at the places listed in Article 11 (c) of this Protocol shall begin operating no later than fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into force. The delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties shall simultaneously begin to assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission as provided in Article 12 of this Protocol.

#### Article 16

(a) The parties shall provide full protection and all necessary assistance and cooperation to the Joint Military Commissions at all levels, in the discharge of their tasks.

(b) The Joint Military Commissions and their personnel, while carrying out their tasks, shall enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents.

(c) The personnel of the Joint Military Commissions may carry pistols and wear special insignia decided upon by each Central Joint Military Commission. The personnel of each party while guarding Commission installations or equipment may be authorized to carry other individual small arms, as determined by each Central Joint Military Commission.

#### Article 17

(a) The delegation of each party to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall have its own offices, communication, logistics and transportation means, including aircraft when necessary.

(b) Each party, in its areas of control shall provide appropriate office and accommodation facilities to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission

and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels.

(c) The parties shall endeavor to provide to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, by means of loan, lease, or gift, the common means of operation, including equipment for communication, supply, and transport, including aircraft when necessary. The Joint Military Commissions may purchase from any source necessary facilities, equipment, and services which are not supplied by the parties. The Joint Military Commissions shall possess and use these facilities and this equipment.

(d) The facilities and the equipment for common use mentioned above shall be returned to the parties when the Joint Military Commissions have ended their activities.

*Article 18*

The common expenses of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall be borne equally by the four parties, and the common expenses of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission in South Vietnam shall be borne equally by these two parties.

*Article 19*

This Protocol shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the United States of America	For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
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WILLIAM P. ROGERS  
*Secretary of State*

TRAN VAN LAM  
*Minister for Foreign  
Affairs*

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	For the Provisional Rev- olutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
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NGUYEN DUY TRINH  
*Minister for Foreign  
Affairs*

NGUYEN THI BINH  
*Minister for Foreign  
Affairs*

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

In implementation of the first paragraph of Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and Article 17 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date which provide for the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint Military Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military Commission,

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of Protocol Articles 1-18 same as above]

*Article 19*

The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the Cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Protocol shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America	For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
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WILLIAM P. ROGERS  
*Secretary of State*

NGUYEN DUY TRINH  
*Minister for Foreign  
Affairs*

**Protocol on Mine Clearing in North Viet-Nam**

White House press release dated January 24

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE REMOVAL, PERMANENT DEACTIVATION, OR DESTRUCTION OF MINES IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS, PORTS, HARBORS, AND WATERWAYS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

The Government of the United States of America, The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

In implementation of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date,

Have agreed as follows:



*Article 1*

The United States shall clear all the mines it has placed in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This mine clearing operation shall be accomplished by rendering the mines harmless through removal, permanent deactivation, or destruction.

*Article 2*

With a view to ensuring lasting safety for the movement of people and watercraft and the protection of important installations, mines shall, on the request of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, be removed or destroyed in the indicated areas; and whenever their removal or destruction is impossible, mines shall be permanently deactivated and their emplacement clearly marked.

*Article 3*

The mine clearing operation shall begin at twenty-four hundred (2400) hours GMT on January 27, 1973. The representatives of the two parties shall consult immediately on relevant factors and agree upon the earliest possible target date for the completion of the work.

*Article 4*

The mine clearing operation shall be conducted in accordance with priorities and timing agreed upon by the two parties. For this purpose, representatives of the two parties shall meet at an early date to reach agreement on a program and a plan of implementation. To this end:

(a) The United States shall provide its plan for mine clearing operations, including maps of the minefields and information concerning the types, numbers and properties of the mines;

(b) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall provide all available maps and hydrographic charts and indicate the mined places and all other potential hazards to the mine clearing operations that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is aware of;

(c) The two parties shall agree on the timing of implementation of each segment of the plan and provide timely notice to the public at least forty-eight hours in advance of the beginning of mine clearing operations for that segment.

*Article 5*

The United States shall be responsible for the mine clearance on inland waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall, to the full extent of its

capabilities, actively participate in the mine clearance with the means of surveying, removal and destruction and technical advice supplied by the United States.

*Article 6*

With a view to ensuring the safe movement of people and watercraft on waterways and at sea, the United States shall in the mine clearing process supply timely information about the progress of mine clearing in each area, and about the remaining mines to be destroyed. The United States shall issue a communique when the operations have been concluded.

*Article 7*

In conducting mine clearing operations, the U.S. personnel engaged in these operations shall respect the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and shall engage in no activities inconsistent with the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and this Protocol. The U.S. personnel engaged in the mine clearing operations shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the duration of the mine clearing operations.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall ensure the safety of the U.S. personnel for the duration of their mine clearing activities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and shall provide this personnel with all possible assistance and the means needed in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that have been agreed upon by the two parties.

*Article 8*

This Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by the two parties.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America	For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
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WILLIAM P. ROGERS  
*Secretary of State*

NGUYEN DUY TRINH  
*Minister for Foreign  
Affairs*

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Regarding Laos and Cambodia

The following is understood between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

Message in the Name of the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, October 21, 1972, in Reply to the Message of the President of the United States Dated October 20, 1972:

Once more, in order to show its good will, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam wishes to make clear its viewpoint regarding the unilateral statements mentioned by the United States in its message of October 20, 1972 as follows:

(a) Concerning the understandings on the part of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as mentioned during the private meetings in September and October of the current year, the DRV side will carry out, without any change, what it has declared to the U.S. side. But it should be made clear that the questions of Laos and Cambodia must be settled in accordance with the sovereignty of these two countries. Both the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the United States have the obligations to respect the sovereignty of Cambodia and Laos pledged by the two parties in Article 15 Article 20 of the agreement on Vietnam, which has been agreed upon.

However, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam side will do its utmost to come to an agreement with its allies, with a view of finding a satisfactory solution to the questions with which the United States is concerned. The DRV side is of the view that certainly the ending of the war in Vietnam will positively contribute to rapidly restoring peace in Laos and Cambodia.

(b) With respect to Laos, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States have agreed on the following:

"On the basis of respect for the principles of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States welcome the current negotiations between the two concerned Lao parties, and will actively contribute toward rapidly bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion,

-2-

so as to make possible a ceasefire in Laos within one month after the 'Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam' comes into force.

"After the ceasefire in Laos, the foreign countries in Laos will arrange the modalities of the implementing Article 15 b) [~~Article 20 b)~~] of the 'Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.'"

The Lao Patriotic Front has informed the DRV side that it is ready to agree with the other side on a ceasefire in Laos within one month of October 31, 1972 or within a shorter period of time, and that the Americans captured in Laos will be promptly released, before December 30, 1972.

(c) After the war in Vietnam is ended, the DRV side will actively contribute to restoring peace in Cambodia. The DRV side has been clearly informed that there is no American captive in Cambodia.

(d) The DRV side declares that Article 15 b) [~~Article 20 b)~~] -- providing that foreign countries shall stop all military activities in Laos and Cambodia, completely withdraw from and refrain from re-introducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material -- is applied to all foreign armed forces, including those of the United States, Thailand and the Vietnamese parties, etc.

Message from the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Dated October 22, 1972:

The President notes with appreciation the message from the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which satisfies all his points with respect to Laos and Cambodia as well as U.S. prisoners.



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Additional Understandings

1. In the private meeting of January 10, 1973, between the U.S. and the DRV, it was agreed, after consultation with the concerned Lao parties, that the period of one month following the signature of the Agreement, specified in the above exchange of messages with respect to a ceasefire in Laos, will be reduced to a period of no more than fifteen days. In the private meeting of January 9, 1973, it was furthermore agreed that all U.S. military and civilian prisoners detained in Laos shall be released no later than sixty days following the signature of the Agreement.

2. Because of the rearrangement and renumbering of the articles of the Agreement, as agreed to between the U.S. and DRV on November 21, 1972, Article 15 referred to in the above-quoted exchange of messages is now Article 20 of the Agreement.

On the Phrase "of the parties" in  
Article 8 a) and b) of the Agreement

It is understood between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the phrase "of the parties" in Article 8(a) and (b) of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam covers all personnel of the parties and from any other country.



Cessation of United States Reconnaissance Activities  
Against the Territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

With respect to reconnaissance activities, the US side confirms that with the coming into effect of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, reconnaissance activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will cease completely and indefinitely.

Aircraft Carriers

In view of the prolonged hostilities which are now being brought to a close in Vietnam and in order to contribute to the relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the U.S. side states its firm intention to station its aircraft carriers at least three hundred nautical miles from the coast of North Vietnam after the withdrawal of its armed forces from South Vietnam. This statement does not, of course, affect transit.



The Return of Vietnamese Civilian Personnel  
Captured and Detained in South Vietnam

The U. S. side reaffirms the statement of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States, on October 17, 1972, that the United States will use its maximum influence to secure the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam. In the spirit of national reconciliation and concord between the two South Vietnamese parties, the U. S. will exert this influence to promote the return of the greater part of such detainees within sixty days of the signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and the return of all such detainees within ninety days, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

Withdrawal of United States Civilian Personnel  
Working in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam

The United States affirms that it will withdraw from South Vietnam all its civilian personnel working in the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam and not reintroduce them. The numbers of the above-mentioned civilian personnel will be reduced gradually. Their withdrawal will be completed within 12 months of the signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, and the majority of them will be withdrawn within 10 months of the signing of the Agreement. Pending their withdrawal from South Vietnam, none of the above-mentioned civilian personnel will participate in military operations or operational military training.



As agreed  
1/23/72

Relationship Between the International Commission of  
Control & Supervision and the International Conference

Nothing in the Protocol to The Agreement on Ending  
the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the  
International Commission of Control and Supervision shall  
prejudice Articles 13 (b), 13 (c) and 13 (h) of the  
Agreement with respect to arrangements the International  
Conference is to make for the relationship between the  
International Commission and the International Conference.

UNANIMITY

It is understood between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the word "unanimity" in Articles 12 (a), 16 (b), and 18 (f) of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and in the protocols to the Agreement means "unanimous decision".



Cambodia

The United States reiterates its view, as expressed by the President in his message of October 20, 1972, and by Dr. Kissinger in the private meetings of October 11, 1972, and January 10, 1973, that if, pending a settlement in Cambodia, offensive military activities are undertaken there which would jeopardize the existing situation, such operations would be contrary to the spirit of Article 20 (b) of the Agreement and to the assumptions on which the Agreement is based.

# DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 5, 1973

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## TEXT OF THE ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIET-NAM

The Government of the United States of America;  
The Government of the French Republic;  
The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the  
Republic of South Viet-Nam;  
The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic;  
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia;  
The Government of the Polish People's Republic;  
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam;  
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland;  
The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam;  
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;  
The Government of Canada; and  
The Government of the People's Republic of China;  
In the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

With a view to acknowledging the signed Agreements; guaranteeing the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Viet-Nam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; and contributing to and guaranteeing peace in Indochina;

Have agreed on the following provisions, and undertake to respect and implement them;

### Article 1

The Parties to this Act solemnly acknowledge, express their approval of, and support the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, and



the four Protocols to the Agreement signed on the same date (hereinafter referred to respectively as the Agreement and the Protocols).

Article 2

The Agreement responds to the aspirations and fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, *i.e.*, the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, to the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination, and to the earnest desire for peace shared by all countries in the world. The Agreement constitutes a major contribution to peace, self-determination, national independence, and the improvement of relations among countries. The Agreement and the Protocols should be strictly respected and scrupulously implemented.

Article 3

The Parties to this Act solemnly acknowledge the commitments by the parties to the Agreement and the Protocols to strictly respect and scrupulously implement the Agreement and the Protocols.

Article 4

The Parties to this Act solemnly recognize and strictly respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, *i.e.*, the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, as well as the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. The Parties to this Act shall strictly respect the Agreement and the Protocols by refraining from any action at variance with their provisions.

Article 5

For the sake of a durable peace in Viet-Nam, the Parties to this Act call on all countries to strictly respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, *i.e.*, the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam and the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination and to strictly respect the Agreement and the Protocols by refraining from any action at variance with their provisions.

Article 6

(a) The four parties to the Agreement or the two South Vietnamese parties may, either individually or through joint action, inform the other Parties to this Act about the implementation of the Agreement and the Protocols. Since the reports and views submitted by the International Commission of Control and Supervision concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of those provisions of the Agreement and the Protocols which are within the tasks of the Commission will be sent to either the four parties signatory to the Agreement or to the two South Vietnamese parties, those parties shall be responsible, either individually or through joint action, for forwarding them promptly to the other Parties to this Act.

(b) The four parties to the Agreement or the two South Vietnamese parties shall also, either individually or through joint action, forward this information and these reports and views to the other participant in the International Conference on Viet-Nam for his information.

(a) In the event of a violation of the Agreement or the Protocols which threatens the peace, the independence, sovereignty, unity, or territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, or the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination, the parties signatory to the Agreement and the Protocols shall, either individually or jointly, consult with the other Parties to this Act with a view to determining necessary remedial measures.

(b) The International Conference on Viet-Nam shall be reconvened upon a joint request by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam on behalf of the parties signatory to the Agreement or upon a request by six or more of the Parties to this Act.

Article 8

With a view to contributing to and guaranteeing peace in Indochina, the Parties to this Act acknowledge the commitment of the parties to the Agreement to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos as stipulated in the Agreement, agree also to respect them and to refrain from any action at variance with them, and call on other countries to do the same.

Article 9

This Act shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all twelve Parties and shall be strictly implemented by all the Parties. Signature of this Act does not constitute recognition of any Party in any case in which it has not previously been accorded.

Done in twelve copies in Paris this second day of March, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in English, French, Russian, Vietnamese, and Chinese. All texts are equally authentic.

For the Government of the  
United States of America

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

The Secretary of State

For the Government of  
the French Republic

MAURICE SCHUMANN

The Minister for  
Foreign Affairs

For the Provisional Revolutionary  
Government of the  
Republic of South Viet-Nam

NGUYEN THI BINH

The Minister for  
Foreign Affairs

For the Government of the  
Hungarian People's Republic

JANOS PETER

The Minister for  
Foreign Affairs



For the Government of the  
Republic of Indonesia

The Minister for  
Foreign Affairs

ADAM MALIK

For the Government of the  
Polish People's Republic

The Minister for  
Foreign Affairs

STEFAN OLSZOWSKI

For the Government of the  
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam

The Minister for  
Foreign Affairs

NGUYEN DUY TRINH

For the Government of the  
United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland

The Secretary of State  
for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs

ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME

For the Government of the  
Republic of Viet-Nam

The Minister for  
Foreign Affairs

TRAN VAN LAM

For the Government of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Minister for  
Foreign Affairs

ANDREI A. GROMYKO

For the Government of  
Canada

The Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

MITCHELL SHARP

For the Government of the  
People's Republic of China

The Minister for  
Foreign Affairs

CHI PENG-FEI