

Enforcing the Agreement

U. S. -GVN Communique (San Clemente), April 3, 1973:

"Both Presidents, while acknowledging that progress was being made toward military and political settlements in South Vietnam, nevertheless viewed with great concern infiltrations of men and weapons in sizeable numbers from North Vietnam into South Vietnam in violation of the Agreement on Ending the War, and considered that actions which would threaten the basis of the Agreement would call for appropriately vigorous reactions. They expressed their conviction that all the provisions of the Agreement, including in particular those concerning military forces and military supplies, must be faithfully implemented if the cease-fire is to be preserved and the prospects for a peaceful settlement are to be assured. President Nixon stated in this connection that the United States views violations of any provision of the Agreement with great and continuing concern."

President's Foreign Policy Report, May 3, 1973:

"We hope that the contending factions will now prefer to pursue their objectives through peaceful means and political competition rather than through the brutal and costly methods of the past. This choice is up to them. We shall be vigilant concerning violations of the Agreement."

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"We expect our friends to observe the Agreement just as we will not tolerate violations by the North Vietnamese or its allies."

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"We have told Hanoi, privately and publicly, that we will not tolerate violations of the Agreement."

President Nixon's News Conference of March 15, 1973:

"I will only suggest this: that we have informed the North Vietnamese of our concern about this infiltration and of what we believe it to be, a violation of the cease-fire, the cease-fire and the peace agreement. Our concern has also been expressed to other interested parties. And I would only suggest that based on my actions over the past four years, that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such expressions of concern, when they are made, with regard to a violation. That is all I will say about it."

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4. Nixon Address to the Nation, January 23, 1973:

-- "We shall continue to aid South Vietnam within the terms of the agreement and we shall support efforts by the people of South Vietnam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves. . . . We look forward to working with you in the future, friends in peace as we have been allies in war."

5. U. S. -GVN Communique, (San Clemente), April 3, 1973:

-- "...this vigilance will require the continued political, economic, and military strength of the governments and nations menaced by any renewal of this aggressive threat. Because of their limited resources, the nations of the region will require external assistance to preserve the necessary social and economic stability for peaceful development."

-- "President Nixon reaffirmed his wholehearted support for the endeavors of postwar rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the Republic of Vietnam."

-- "The President [Nixon] noted that the assumption by the Republic of Vietnam of the full manpower requirements for its own defense was fully in keeping with [the Nixon] Doctrine. He affirmed that the United States, for its part, expected to continue, in accordance with its Constitutional processes, to supply the Republic of Vietnam with the material means for its defense consistent with the Agreement on Ending the War."

6. Secretary Kissinger's Letter to Senator Kennedy, March 25, 1974:

-- "As a signator of the Paris Agreement, the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the cease-fire possible and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. With these commitments in mind, we continue to provide to the Republic of Viet-Nam the means necessary for its self-defense and for its economic viability."

-- "We have... committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally."