

TOTAL EMBARGO UNTIL  
11:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME

May 26, 1972

REFER TO DOE

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY  
(Moscow, U.S.S.R.)

-----  
DOS REVIEWED 27-Dec-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE  
OF

REFER TO DOS

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND  
AMBASSADOR GERARD C. SMITH, DIRECTOR  
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
SPASO HOUSE

10:05 P.M.

DOE Reviewed 13 Sep 11: No objection to declassification

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, we have only a very short period here. Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Smith are here to provide you with some general details about the agreement which will be signed tonight at about 11:00 o'clock at the Kremlin. It will be signed at the same location in which the other agreements have been signed between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The material that we are giving you now, the Fact Sheet and also the comments that Dr. Kissinger will make, will be embargoed totally until 11:00 o'clock, or at the time of the signing ceremony. I believe the signing ceremony will be carried on television into the Press Center so that you will be able to observe it at that time.

As we mentioned to you in the briefing earlier today, immediately following the signing ceremony, within 20 or 30 minutes after the signing ceremony, we will have available to you at the Press Center copies of the agreement, and representatives from both delegations will be there to take your questions and to discuss the agreement with you at that time.

The purpose for this briefing is simply to give you a general outline as to how the agreement developed. As you see, Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Smith are here now, so I will give you Dr. Kissinger. This is on the record.

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, I thought that the most useful thing I could do was to give you a general background of these negotiations and of the President's view of the treaty, and Ambassador Smith, of course who has conducted the negotiations and brought them to this conclusion is in the best position to go through the details of the agreement.

First of all, let me say on behalf of the President that he certainly will take occasion to express personally that the reason we are here is the dedication and work of the delegation in Helsinki which has been led by Ambassador Smith. He has come here straight from the airport. He has been working on the final work of this agreement since 5:00 o'clock this morning. This concludes a rather hectic week for everybody who has been connected directly or indirectly with these negotiations.

more

Let me make a few general observations before I turn this over to Ambassador Smith.

Nothing that this Administration has done has seemed to it more important for the future of the world than to make an important first step in the limitation of strategic arms.

All of us have been profoundly convinced that to arrest the arms race is one of the over-riding concerns of this period. Now it is a subject of enormous technical complexity, and for the two great nuclear powers to make a beginning in putting their armaments under some restraint required political decisions and an enormous amount of technical work.

It is a process that has continued for many years. It started with extensive technical studies in Washington. It went through two and one half years of negotiations alternating between Helsinki and Vienna. It has been brought to a conclusion because both governments decided that in an agreement of this kind the stakes were larger than the simple technical issues; that what was at stake was a major step toward international stability, confidence among nations, and a turn in the pattern of post-war relationships.

This is why at various crucial moments in these negotiations there had been direct contacts between the President and Soviet leaders, which led by mutual agreement to breakthroughs -- the first on May 20 of 1971, in which there was an agreement that broke the deadlock that had developed between the Soviet insistence that an agreement cover antiballistic missile systems only, and our view that an agreement involved as well the offensive weapons.

The compromise was that the initial treaty would deal with ABM's, and that this would be accompanied by a freeze on certain categories of offensive weapons. The next deadlock developed over the issue of what offensive weapons should be included, whether it should be confined to intercontinental ballistic missiles or whether submarine-launched ballistic missile systems should also be involved. The answer -- this deadlock was broken at the end of April and in large part by direct contact between the Soviet leaders and the President and it has finally resulted in the present agreement which Ambassador Smith has just brought back from Helsinki and which will be signed at 11:00.

Ambassador Smith is in the best position to explain the provisions of this agreement, but I wanted to make a few general observations about its significance and how it should be looked at.

The first point to make is that in an agreement that involves the central armaments on both sides, it is foolish or shortsighted to approach the negotiations from the point of view of gaining a unilateral advantage. Neither nation will possibly put its security and its survival at the hazard of its opponent and no agreement that brings disadvantage to either side can possibly last and can possibly bring about anything other than a new circle of insecurity. Therefore, the temptation that is ever present when agreements of this kind are analyzed as to who won is exceptionally inappropriate.

more

We have approached these negotiations from the very beginning with the attitude that a wise proposal is one that is conceived by each side to be in the mutual interest and we believe that if this agreement does what we hope it will, that the future will record that both sides won.

Secondly, let me make a few observations with respect to the freeze of offensive weapons which has perhaps some of the more complicated provisions and the anticipation of which has aroused some anticipatory comments in the United States.

First, the freeze concerns only two categories of offensive weapons; that is to say, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. It does not include the number of warheads, nor does it include bombers, nor does it include, obviously, other systems based elsewhere than at sea or in the territory of each country.

Secondly, in assessing the significance of the freeze, it is not useful to analyze whether the freeze reflects a gap between the forces that are being frozen.

In the two categories that are being frozen, that is to say ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the facts are these: The Soviet Union has more intercontinental ballistic missiles than the United States. The Soviet Union has been building intercontinental ballistic missiles; the United States has not and has no such program at the moment.

The Soviet Union has been building submarine launched ballistic missiles at the rate of eight submarines a year. The United States has at this moment no submarines under construction.

Therefore, the question to ask in assessing the freeze is not what situation it perpetuates, but what situation it prevents. The question is where we would be without the freeze. And if you project the existing building programs of the Soviet Union into the future, as against the absence of building programs over the period of the freeze in either of the categories that are being frozen, you will get a more correct clue to why we believe that there is a good agreement and why we believe that it has made a significant contribution to arresting the arms race.

The weapons are frozen, as we pointed out, in categories in which we have no ongoing programs. Now, having said this, however, I am not implying that we gained a unilateral advantage because it is perhaps true that in the ABM field we had the more dynamic program which is being arrested as a result of these developments.

more

-4-

What I am saying is that this agreement has been made through a long process of negotiations; that this week, while our delegation was working around the clock in Helsinki, the President met with the Soviet leaders extensively and some members of the American delegation had extensive talks with Deputy Prime Minister Smirnoff and Foreign Minister Gromyko to resolve those issues that required a primarily political decision.

The reason it was possible to achieve such an agreement is because we are confident it will be seen to be in the common interest of both countries and in the common interest of humanity. That is what I wanted to say on behalf of the President.

I would like again to express our appreciation to Ambassador Smith, who has borne up under great strain and who has details of the agreement before him.

I will let him comment on those and then both of us will be available to answer questions.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I understand I am going to have an opportunity later to go into greater detail with you all about the specific provisions of the treaty and the interim agreement, so perhaps at this time I should limit myself to trying to make some general observations and then later on try to answer your questions and even later on than that go into any specific provisions that are of special interest.

First, let me say perhaps the obvious, that these documents are the product of long, careful, complex and exhaustive negotiations. As a matter of fact, we were not finished with the last detail after we got on the airplane this evening in Helsinki. We flew back. I invited some of the Soviet delegation, including the Chief Delegation Minister, Semenov, to join us and we continued to work on our way here to Moscow. So this is about the freshest treaty that I have ever talked about.

I think that in sum, these documents, when you look at them carefully, will demonstrate a solid, concrete, yet first step in the problem of controlling strategic arms. They are not the end of the road by any means, but I think that they are a very solid step forward.

You know we have an obligation that sometimes people forget under the Nonproliferation Treaty of some years ago to get on with trying to limit strategic arms and get on with disarmament. I think as a general proposition these documents will show that we are not lax in that respect. We are conscious of our responsibilities.

more

-5-

Now, as Henry said, there are two basic documents here, the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement which, in effect, is a negotiating freeze arrangement to hold the situation, to permit us to hopefully negotiate a treaty to match in the offensive field the treaty that we have succeeded in negotiating in the defensive field.

In the defensive field, I would urge you to look very carefully at the language of Article I which looks very general but to my mind is a most significant step forward in relations between two great powers.

In effect, it says that neither side is going to try to defend its nationwide territory. This is an admission of tremendous psychological significance, I believe, recognition that the deterrent forces of both sides are not going to be challenged.

When you think of the concerns that we have had for the last 25 years about first-strike and counter-force, it seems to me a general recognition by both countries that they are not going to field a nationwide system of first importance, political, psychological and militarily.

In addition to that, the countries are going to agree not to lay the base for such a nationwide system. That got us into all sorts of radar problems which some of you people perhaps felt we took too long in solving, but much of the time we have spent was in trying to wrestle with this radar problem to prevent the possibility of a nationwide system arising.

In addition to that, the two nations have made commitments not to even try for a thick or regional defense in one part of the country except as specifically permitted under the agreement; that is, to defend one's capital or to defend a relatively small number of ICBM silos.

So, although Article I looks like sort of a general statement, to my mind it is one of the most significant articles in the whole agreement.

Now, Article II defines what we are talking about and has a very important bearing on the whole question of what we call future ABM systems. This treaty has as a most significant aspect that it not only limits the present situation, but has a choking off effect on future systems which, under the terms of the treaty as we have reached understandings, futures will not be deployable unless this treaty is amended.

more

-6-

Article III is the heart of the treaty and deserves a great deal of study. I think we spent more time trying to wrestle with Article III than any other part of the treaty.

I will go into details later if you like, but it says both sides can have two sites with no more than 100 launchers at each site, with radar sharply limited; one site for the defensive capital and one for the ICBM's. The Soviets will agree to deploy the ICBM site well away from the capital site, so the possibility for a base of a nationwide system is very poor.

In addition to the numbers, we have had to work out problems involving test ranges, numbers of test launchers, the question of modernization, the question of how you verify this treaty, and one of the significant conclusions that we have reached is that this treaty can safely be verified by national means of verification, that is, without on-site inspection. This is largely a limitation on numbers of relatively large objects which we are confident can be monitored, if you will, without on-site inspection.

As a matter of fact, if I had my "druthers" and could have on-site inspection instead of our present national means, there would be no question in my mind that we would be much better off with national means of verification.

In addition to that, we will have commitments from the Soviets not to interfere with those national means of verification and not to take measures to conceal their operation so as to prevent the workings of national means of verification. I think you ladies and gentlemen can realize the psychological significance of a nation making such a commitment as that.

We are going to set up a joint consultative commission which will, in effect, act as a surveying agent that will watch over the operation of the agreement, to which ambiguous situations can be referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the possible amendments to see how this treaty is working, and to make sure that it stays viable over the years.

This treaty will have indefinite duration, but if it doesn't work, if our supreme interests are jeopardized, there is a provision that on short notice either side can escape from the binding obligations under the treaty.

Turn, now, for a minute to the offensive side. As Henry said, what we are trying to do is to set up a useful device that will hold

more

-7-

the situation while we negotiate, hopefully, a matching treaty; that is, to match the treaty in the ABM defense field. I think that the measures that we have succeeded in spelling out in this interim agreement with the Russians will do just that. There will be a commitment on their part not to build any more of these ICBMs that have concerned us over the years. That commitment will extend to not building such things as SS-9s, and there will be provisions that if the sides want to increase their submarine missiles, which, if you can say so, are a more benign form of weapons system than ICBMs, they may do so, but only at the price of a substantial reduction program in other weapons systems.

Keep this in mind when you think about the possibility of increasing SLBMs. It is not for free. It is at a very substantial price in terms of reductions of other weapons systems. Reductions have never before been successfully negotiated, so I think this ought to be considered a great accomplishment.

I think I had better stop at that, since I am going to have a chance to go into specifics. I understand that there are to be some questions at this point.

Q Mr. Smith, could you answer just a couple of basic things? On the question of the radar, could you give us an estimate of what percentage of the national territory will be protected by the ABM radar on each side?

Secondly, on the offensive side, the submarines, there are no figures in the Fact Sheet, and the phrasing there seems to be a little ambiguous. Could you give us what you consider to be, in terms of numbers, the current levels of submarines on each side?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: On the question of radar, I cannot give you a precise percentage. The radar coverage, of course, is not the essential consideration. No re-entry vehicle was ever killed by a radar. It takes a lot of interceptors, in addition to radar, to do a defensive job. The radar coverage, however, will be minute, and especially in the case of radar around ICBM fields, where there will be quantitative limitations as well as qualitative limitations, so only a relatively few radars will be permitted in these ICBM fields.

We are quite confident that a radar base for a nationwide or thick regional defense is not possible under the terms of this treaty.

more

-8-

Now, in terms of numbers of submarines, I would like to reserve that until I can go into it more specifically.

Q On the limitation of two ABM sites, we are building two now in the Far West. Does that mean we abandon one of those around those ICBM silos and build another one around Washington?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: If we exercise our rights under the treaty, we will build a system around Washington. Our obligation under the treaty will be to have not more than one which we had designated as Grand Forks. So under the treaty the Malmstrom construction would be stopped.

Q Do the Russians complete their construction of submarines presently under construction? They have 17 operation and 25 presumably at some stage of construction. Will they be allowed to complete those before the freeze becomes effective?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Under the interim arrangement, they will be permitted to finish construction of submarines, yes. I would like to go into the whole submarine question in greater detail later.

Q Would you clear up the withdrawal rights from the treaty "... if supreme interests are jeopardized and on six-month's notice"? Is that "and/or" or must both conditions be prevalent, a supreme interest endangered, does this then require six month's notice of withdrawal?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: That is correct. That is the same condition as in previous arms control treaties, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Q Does this Commission decide whether or not supreme interests are involved?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No. That is a unilateral decision for both countries.

Q Doesn't this allow them to protect all of their ICBMs while we protect only some of ours?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No. This will permit them to protect a smaller percentage of their ICBMs than ours, since they have substantially more than we have.

more



Q If after five years there is no comprehensive offensive agreement, does the interim agreement lapse?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: If the five years is past and the negotiations look fruitless, I would think we would not want to continue it. If the negotiations look as if they might still bear fruit, if both sides agree to extend the five-year arrangement, that is certainly in our field of vision.

Q The basic story is going to go out of this session. I think we have to get figures on submarines and other estimates, otherwise the story will go out in a gobbled way.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: This treaty will have no effect on warhead numbers. The United States and the Soviet Union will be free to mount as many warheads as they want. As you know, the United States has a very substantial advantage, and I do not see in the time period of this freeze that there is any prospect of its losing it.

Q What about the submarines, the question of figures? Is this figure of 42 Y Class submarines an accurate one that they will be allowed to complete, and we with 41?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I don't know about this figure of 42 submarines. I have seen all sorts of speculations about Soviet submarines, but it is perfectly clear that under this agreement if the Soviets want to pay the price of scrapping a substantial number of other important strategic weapons systems they can build additional submarines.

Q What submarines do they have under construction now? I think you are evading the point on the number of submarines they will be frozen at under this Treaty.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I am purposely evading the point because that it an intelligence estimate that I am not in a position to give out.

Q How many old submarines, the old submarines with three obsolete launchers on them, would they be able to convert?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I would have to answer that the same way. I am not in a position to describe the breakdown of the Soviet fleet between old and new submarines.

more

-10-

Q You are leaving open the possibility of a very large Soviet superiority in the SLBM field.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I am leaving open the possibility that you are facing an indefinite period of time. We don't know how long it will last. If we negotiate a treaty within a year, then the Soviet submarine level, if they elect to follow this route, will be one thing. If it is two years, it will be another. There is no doubt that under this arrangement they could, at a high price, increase their submarine fleet.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the question is whether the Soviets will be able to complete their construction of Y Class submarines and modernize their older submarines to become new Y Class submarines and if they do all of this and pay the price, as you said, of retiring the SS-7 and SS-8 missiles, what is the advantage to them, to retire the missiles, for example, and keep these submarines, do they have a significant advantage if they do that?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I cannot tell you what the factors making facilities at force planning are. All I can do is explain the provisions of these treaties. Now, what the Soviets will do with the rights under this arrangement is something that we can not know.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have time for just one more question. We are running short of time. Dr. Kissinger has one comment to make.

Q We have had only ten minutes of questions.

MR. ZIEGLER: The entire delegation and Dr. Kissinger will be available at the press center later tonight.

DR. KISSINGER: Since I am not quite as constrained or don't feel as constrained as Ambassador Smith, lest we build up a profound atmosphere of mystery about the submarine issue, I will straighten it out as best I can.

The base number of Soviet submarines is in dispute. It has been in dispute in our intelligence estimate exactly how much it is, though our intelligence estimates are in the range that was suggested.

Q 41 to 43?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not going to go beyond what I have said. It is in that general range.

The Soviet estimate of their program is slightly more exhaustive. They, of course, have the advantage that they know what it is precisely. (Laughter.)

more

-11-

Now the provisions of the agreement, as I understand it, are that the Soviet Union can convert land-based missiles of a category of which we estimate that they have 210, plus 30-odd missiles on older nuclear submarines, into submarines or submarine-based launchers.

This, then, would give them a figure of submarines and Launchers substantially about the level that is now estimated as being under construction. This level has a upper ceiling.

Now, there are two things to be said: One, they can reach this level only at the sacrifice of existing weapon systems and, therefore, it would represent the first reduction of one category of weapons. Second, in the absence of this agreement, the Soviet Union was building submarines at the rate of eight or nine a year in any event, and their decision to build these submarines at that rate seems to have been fixed for some time.

Therefore, the ceiling on submarines has to be seen in terms of two factors: Factor one, where would the Soviet Union be without that ceiling? And without that ceiling the Soviet Union would be some 50 percent higher over the period of time if it exercised its full capacity of production. Second, in order to reach that ceiling, the Soviet Union will have to trade in heavy land-based missiles and/or submarine-based missiles of older types. So that in addition to arresting the momentum of the submarine construction program, there is also a reduction of weapons that would under other circumstances not have been reduced.

The next question that can be asked then: Well, perhaps the best way to deal with this Soviet submarine program would have been to build more submarines of our own.

I think those of you who followed defense matters know that the United States has no plan at this moment -- and for that matter had no plan before this agreement -- to build submarines over the five-year period of the freeze that this agreement was lasting. So we have to remember that we were prepared to live with a condition without an agreement that was significantly worse than it is with the agreement and; secondly, that the freeze is purchased by the reduction of several hundred -- if the Soviets exercise all their rights -- land-based missiles and another category of sea-based missiles.

more

-12-

This is the context in which the submarine decision has to be seen.

Q On a point of fact, Henry, didn't the Defense Secretary announce a program for 10 ULMS or Trident Missiles?

DR. KISSINGER: None of those will become operational until after the period of the freeze.

Q Could I make a plea to you and Ron as well? It has taken 30 months to get this treaty. The Senate of the United States wants to know what is in it. There is an argument about it. We have been out of our hotel an hour and a half. We get ten minutes of questions and tomorrow it is going to be our fault for screwing it up and creating political trouble. Can somebody else pass up the champagne and let's keep this going?

MR. ZIEGLER: I suppose you are asking by passing up the champagne that Henry not go to the signing. That has to be his decision. Ambassador Smith must go to the signing. I will offer you this alternative, recognizing the fact that you have been here an hour and a half, and recognizing the fact that we have to have the material to put together to provide you which, as Ambassador Smith said, was put together as quickly as we can. The option is to have the briefing, as we have scheduled, at the press center immediately after the signing.

Q You know what kind of a brawl that will be.

MR. ZIEGLER: We would be willing to return here to take your questions if that is what you would like.

Q Will we have to go through the Russian commentary on this one.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is exactly the dilemma.

Q I have one question that I know would clear up my confusion and maybe some others' confusion. Does the treaty permit the Soviets to complete their present submarine construction without penalty?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

Q Will these Tridents replace old Polaris Submarines in that case?

more

-13-

DR. KISSINGER: No ULMS submarines will be operational until after the freeze is over. There will be provisions in the Treaty for when an existing weapon has to be scrapped in terms of the constructions of the follow-on program. If, in the development of ULMS such a point should be reached before the end of the freeze and if the treaty has not been extended by agreement, then of course those scrapping provisions would go into effect. Otherwise the ULMS would be a follow-on system to the existing one.

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me offer this proposal to you: The signing takes place at 11:00 o'clock. At that time the fact that the SALT agreement is being signed is indeed a fact. There is a briefing scheduled at about 11:20 at the Press Center, a joint briefing between the United States and the Soviet Union. That will be short. We will arrange to make that short. Following that, and giving those who are on deadline -- and I don't believe anyone has any serious problem at that point -- that is the point when we will return to this location, following the joint briefing which we are committed to at the International Press Center. So, if that gets underway at about 11:30, it will be over by about 12:00. We will return here at about 12:30. We will take your questions. Dr. Kissinger will be here and we will proceed.

Q Can't we do it at the hotel?

MR. ZIEGLER: If there is a change, gentlemen, if there is a change in the location, if we can find a place at the hotel, we will arrange for it.

THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.

END (AT 10:55 P.M. Moscow Time)

MAY 26, 1972

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
(Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

---

THE WHITE HOUSE

FACT SHEET

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION  
AGREEMENT

The Current Agreements

The ABM Treaty

- Limits each side to one ABM site for defense of their national capital (Moscow and Washington) and one site for each side for the defense of an ICBM field.
- There will be a total of 200 ABM interceptors permitted each side, 100 at each site.
- Radars will be limited to Modern ABM Radar Complexes (called MARCs) six for each side within a circle of 150 km radius around the national capitals; (MARCs are a circle of 3 km diameter, in which radars can be deployed; in practice they can accommodate about one large radar or a few smaller ones).
- For the ICBM defense fields there will be a total of twenty radars permitted; two of them can be about the size of the two larger radars deployed at Grand Forks; the other eighteen radars will be much smaller.
- The Soviet ICBM protection site will be at least 1300 km from Moscow. Our comparable site will be at Grand Forks, North Dakota.
- Other large non-ABM radars that may be built in the future will be restricted to space tracking or early warning and limited in size so as not to create a clandestine ABM potential.
- The treaty will be of unlimited duration with withdrawal rights if supreme interests are jeopardized, and on six months notice.

The Interim Offensive Agreement

- Limits ICBMs to those under construction or deployed at the time of signing the treaty or July 1. (This will mean about 1618 ICBMs for the USSR and 1054 for us.) The USSR will field about 300 large SS-9s, but they will be prohibited from converting other ICBM silos to accommodate the large SS-9 types. Other silos can be modified, but not to a significant degree. Modernization is permitted.
- Construction of submarine launched ballistic missiles on all nuclear submarines will be frozen at current levels. The further construction of SLBMs on either side, can only be accomplished by dismantling of an equal number of older land based ICBMs or older submarine launchers.

MORE

-2-

- The Interim Agreement will run for five years (compared to the original Soviet proposal of 18 months), and both sides are committed to negotiating a permanent and more comprehensive agreement.
- Both sides will abide by the obligations of the agreement once it is signed, though formal implementation will await ratification of the ABM treaty.

# # #

May 26, 1972

TREATY  
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode:

more



(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) under construction;
- (c) undergoing testing;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
- (e) mothballed.

### Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites. (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

### Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

### Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

more

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

- (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and
- (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

more

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

more

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA

RICHARD NIXON  
President of the United States  
of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

LEONID I. BREZHNEV  
General Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the CPSU

# # # #

May 26, 1972

INTERIM AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
AND  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE  
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Article 11

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Article 111

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

more

- 2 -

Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

Article VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

Article VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.
2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

LEONID I. BREZHNEV  
General Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the CPSU

FOR THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA

RICHARD NIXON  
The President of the United States

# # # #

May 26, 1972

PROTOCOL

TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT  
TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched  
ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines,  
and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement,  
for the period during which that Agreement remains in force:

The US may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on sub-  
marines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines.  
The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers  
on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-  
mentioned levels, in the U. S. - over 656 ballistic missile launchers on  
nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U. S. S. R. - over 740 ballistic  
missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and  
under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal  
numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to  
1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type,  
will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U. S.  
and the U. S. S. R.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

FOR THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA  
RICHARD NIXON

The President of the United  
States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
LEONID I. BREZHNEV

The General Secretary of the  
Central Committee of the CPSU

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY--NOT PUBLIC RELEASE

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS AND  
NATIONAL SECURITY

Introduction and Summary

The President signed (in Moscow) historic documents -- (1) a Treaty limiting ABM systems; and (2) an interim agreement limiting the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers for five years.

These agreements are tangible evidence that both sides are prepared to move toward an era of negotiations.

They are based on a realistic assessment of the strategic situation:

-- The total number of delivery systems -- missiles and bombers -- is roughly equal.

-- The Soviets however, had been moving forward rapidly with new ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles at a rate of 250 a year for the last five years.

-- We have offensive systems in development with which eventually we could counter this Soviet momentum, but we had planned no deployment for the five years of the freeze.

-- The Soviets have a vigorous ABM development program suggesting further deployment was in the offing.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY--NOT PUBLIC RELEASE



Despite these considerations, our strategic posture is sound because of our lead in MIRV and weapons technology and our wide range of retaliatory forces (bombers, land and sea based missiles). But, the rapid growth in numbers of launchers for Soviet systems coupled with improved Soviet technology could threaten in time to undercut our deterrent. Because of our technological advantages, adding more missiles appears to be the route the Soviets could most easily take to match or surpass the capability of our forces.

We can, of course, maintain a strong strategic posture without SALT agreements; however, this could face the nation with the prospect of a sharp upturn in strategic competition and heightening of tensions with the USSR. SALT presented an opportunity to maintain a sound strategic posture, and to achieve a more stable strategic relationship with the USSR.

The agreements reached achieve this objective.

-- The ABM Treaty prohibits widespread ABM defenses that might be a temptation to a first-strike strategy, if the attacker believed this could be protected from our retaliatory forces.

-- The Offensive Agreement freezes for five years the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers, thus brakes the momentum of the two major Soviet offensive deployment programs.

We have accepted limits on deploying the full 12-site Safeguard system. By using our bargaining leverage carefully, we have not only blocked a heavy Soviet ABM defense, we have curbed the most dynamic Soviet offensive deployment as well. However, the agreements permit the U.S. to continue those on-going offensive programs which will ensure the future effectiveness of our retaliatory deterrent.

Thus, the ABM Treaty and the Offensive Agreement contribute to maintaining a stable strategic balance and thereby reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. This is in the interests of all countries.

The ABM Treaty will be submitted to the Senate for its advise and consent. The Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons will be submitted to both Houses for approval by joint resolution.

The two agreements are an important beginning but there are still elements in Soviet strategic forces that could eventually threaten our security. The agreements provide a degree of confidence for further negotiations to bring these elements under control. The negotiations will resume at an early date.

### ABM TREATY

#### Background

ABM defenses of cities can reduce an opponent's retaliatory capabilities. If this reduction is great enough, he would have to deploy more offensive retaliatory capabilities to offset the opposing ABM defense. Such interaction can be a produce highly destabilizing and potentially dangerous situation.

We were uncertain about Soviet ABM deployment plans. They had an ABM system around Moscow and an aggressive ABM research and development program. In view of Soviet interests in strategic defense --

as expressed by Kosygin at the Blassboro Summit and as evidenced by their extensive air defense system, we were concerned that the Soviets might deploy a comparable ABM defense for major Soviet cities. Such a defense would have seriously jeopardized U.S. retaliatory capabilities, and totally nullified the small British and French forces.

The U. S. Safeguard program was aimed at defense of a portion of the Minuteman ICBM force, defense of strategic bombers, defense of our command center in Washington and later a thin defense against a small attack. In his annual reviews of this program, the President made clear that the extent of U. S. ABM deployment would depend on progress in constraining Soviet strategic offensive capabilities through SALT.

Early in SALT both sides agreed that nation wide ABMs should be banned. However, we believed the precise levels and nature permitted ABM systems could not be resolved in isolation from offensive limitations. If offensive limits were quite comprehensive, we would be prepared to ban ABMs; if not, we wanted some protection of our ICBMs and the option to protect Washington. When the USSR finally accepts a freeze on the overall number of their strategic offensive missile launchers, we will be willing to work out an equal arrangement on ABM that takes both sides' objectives into account.

#### The Main Provisions of the ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty limits each side to:

-- A defense of its national capital, with 100 ABM interceptors.

-- A defense of a location containing ICBMs, with 100 ABM interceptors. It was agreed that these ICBM defenses will be located at least 1300 kilometers from the respective national capitals thus preventing territorial defense.

The ABM Treaty contains additional provisions to prohibit acquisition of a suitable radar base for an extensive defense of cities and acquisition of ABM capabilities by indirect means, e. g., by converting air defense missiles to ABMs.

The ABM provisions limit defenses of industry and population to very low levels by:

-- Limiting interceptors to relatively small numbers;

-- Limiting the radar base for the national capital defense to a relatively low number of modern ABM radar complexes;

-- In the case of defense of ICBMs, locating the defenses in relatively unpopulated areas;

-- Banning the conversion of non-ABM components to ABM use and banning deployment of very large sophisticated non-ABM radars which could provide the radar base for an extensive ABM defense of cities.

The ABM Treaty, by limiting ABM defenses of industry population, will make a major contribution to assuring the deterrent capabilities of the strategic offensive forces of the two sides, thus reducing substantially incentives for further offensive deployments.

U. S. Interests

The Treaty will have the following effects of major impact which will enhance U.S. security:

-- The Treaty prohibits extensive ABM defenses of Soviet cities.

This provides added assurance that our retaliatory forces will be able to penetrate to their targets now and in the future, thus enhancing the U. S. deterrent posture.

-- The Treaty permits a light defense of Washington, D. C. and the surrounding area in which are located critical elements of our national command and control systems. Such a defense can protect Washington and a large portion of the eastern U.S. against accidental, unauthorized or small attacks.

-- The Treaty permits a defense of some ICBMs and an adequate radar base as a hedge for thickening of ICBM defense in case the agreement breaks down, thus providing insurance for our deterrent against the possibility of threatening Soviet strategic offensive developments.

-- This combination of defenses will give us a protected warning, assessment, and command and control capability which will allow the President to make considered and controlled responses to less than all-out nuclear attacks.

Effects of the ABM Treaty on Safeguard

Safeguard was intended to defend some of our ICBMs, to provide added assurance that our bombers could survive a surprise attack, to defend our national capital, and to defend the U. S. against a light attack such as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) could mount in the 1980s.

The ABM Treaty permits part of the ICBM defense along with development of a base for a more effective defense for ICBMs--Site Defense--a system the development of which has already been started as a hedge against threats to Minuteman survivability.

Bomber survivability depends primarily on launching the bombers, which can be recalled, in response to tactical warning of ballistic missile attack. Improvements in our warning systems, rebasing of our bombers, and improvements in bomber reaction time give us confidence in bomber survivability.

Effects of the ABM Treaty on Safeguard

Safeguard was intended to defend some of our ICBMs, to provide added assurance that our bombers could survive a surprise attack, to defend our national capital, and to defend the U.S. against a light attack.

The ABM Treaty permits part of the ICBM defense including the option of a sufficient radar base for a more effective defense for ICBMs ( -- Site Defense -- a system under development) if we later conclude that is necessary.

Bomber survivability depends primarily on launching the bombers,

which can be recalled, in response to tactical warning of ballistic missile attack. Improvements in our warning systems, rebasing of our bombers, and improvements in bomber reaction time give us confidence in bomber survivability.

Defense of our national command authority, Washington, D.C., planned under Safeguard is permitted under the ABM Treaty.

In short, the Administration decided that, on balance, our net security interests would be advanced by agreeing not to proceed with Safeguard in return for corresponding limits on Soviet ABMs and clear limits on Soviet strategic offensive forces.

## THE INTERIM OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT

### Background

Our policy of strategic sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to deter an attack on or coercion of the United States and its allies. The relationship between U. S. and USSR strategic forces must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be underestimated. The strategic capabilities of both sides have become so large and diversified that our programs need not be driven by fear of minor numerical imbalances. However, the Soviet Union cannot be permitted to establish a significant advantage in the overall numbers and effectiveness of strategic offensive forces.

The current U. S. levels of offensive missiles were reached by 1967. During the early 1960s, the United States decided to stop the deployment of strategic offensive forces at those levels and turned to further survivability improvements within these levels through such programs as Multiple Independently Retargetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) (which increase the effectiveness of surviving forces), silo hardening, bomber dispersal and improvements in command and control survivability. This Administration initiated two programs for modernizing our forces and which would be effective against very advanced Soviet threats -- the B-1 manned bomber and the Trident SLBM system.

Soviet deployment of strategic offensive forces lagged significantly



behind that of the United States until the late 1960s, when their deployment of ICBMs accelerated and their deployment of SLBMs in Y-class nuclear-powered submarines (similar to our Polaris submarines) took a similar sharp turn upward. By 1970, they were deploying ICBMs at the rate of about 250 per year and SLBMs at the rate of about eight submarines (128 launchers) per year.

Of particular concern was the Soviet deployment of the SS-9 missile with its large payload with a potential to destroy Minuteman silos. We were uncertain about Soviet plans for SS-9 force levels, accuracy, and MIRVs, but the Soviet technical potential for increased threats to Minuteman survivability was evident. Consequently, the United States initiated programs to protect Minuteman silos and set as a principal SALT objective curbing the threat posed by a continued increase in the number of modern heavy ICBMs like the SS-9.

Moreover, the momentum of Soviet missile deployments was such that they could have 90% more strategic missile launchers than the U.S. by 1977. Thus, halting the momentum of this deployment was an important U.S. SALT objective.

#### Provisions of the Interim Offensive Agreement

The Interim Offensive Agreement on strategic offensive forces provides the following:

-- The total number of strategic offensive missile launchers frozen

approximately at levels currently operational and under construction.

-- Fixed ICBM launchers (both hardened silos and soft launch pads) are limited to those operational and under construction as of July 1, 1972.

-- Heavy ICBM launchers are limited to those operational and under construction as of July 1, 1972. Replacement of light missiles with heavy missiles is prohibited, as is replacement of old (pre-1964) heavy missiles with modern heavy missiles. Modernization and replacement is allowed, but there can be no significant increase in the dimensions of ICBM silos which means no increase beyond 10-15%.

-- Modern SLBM launchers or any SLBM launchers on nuclear submarines are limited to those operational and under construction as of May 26, 1972, except that the agreement allows either side the freedom to change the mix of SLBMs and ICBMs: to build additional launchers for SLBMs if they tear down an equal number of SLBM launchers on old nuclear-submarines and old heavy ICBM launchers. However, there is a ceiling on this freedom to mix. The Soviets can only have 950 SLBM launchers and 62 modern submarines; the U.S. 710 SLBM launchers and 44 submarines. If the Soviets place modern SLBMs on their old diesel submarines this must count against their total of 950.

-- The duration of the interim offensive agreement is five years.

-- Bombers are not limited.

-- Neither side has deployed mobile ICBMs. During the negotiations the U.S. made clear that it would consider deployment of such

systems during the freeze to be inconsistent with the purpose of the agreement. There are no indications that the Soviets plan such deployments.

### U.S. Interests

The agreement will freeze the total number of Soviet and U.S. strategic missile launchers at approximate present levels for five years. This achieves one of our prime objectives in SALT -- braking the momentum of the Soviet offensive missile launchers program, especially by stopping the number of modern large missiles such as the SS-9 at about 300.

The freeze will not affect U.S. planned programs. We did not plan to deploy additional launchers in the next five years. Under the agreement, the Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV programs can continue. Development of the Trident SLBM system can continue both because its purpose is replacement and in any event because operational deployment of this system would not occur within the five year duration of the Interim Offensive Agreement.

Thus, the agreement does not limit us from continuing current and on-going offensive programs, but it stops the Soviets from increasing the numerical gap in missile launchers. In number of warheads, the U. S. will continue its wide lead.

The Soviets have been deploying new ballistic missile launching submarines at a rapid rate. They now have operational and under

construction about as many Y-class submarines as we have Polaris and Poseidon submarines. Without some limit, they could have 80 Y-class submarines -- or more -- in five years.

-- If the Soviets deploy new SLBMs up to the limit under the agreement, they will have to retire at least 240 missile launchers -- at least 30 of which could be on nuclear subs.

-- In any case, the Soviets will be limited to a maximum of 62 modern SLBM submarines and 950 SLBM launchers.

Thus, one key aspect of the interim offensive agreement is to make the Soviets choose between (1) destroying most if not all of their 200 old large SS-7 and SS-8 missile launchers; and (2) foregoing deployment of an equal number of SLBM launchers.

We could also build additional submarines.

-- Under the agreements, we could, if we choose, retire our 54 Titan missiles and deploy an equal number of Poseidon launchers in new submarines, resulting in a larger net increase in warheads than the Soviets could achieve by deploying 20 more of their current Y-class submarines and their SLBMs.

-- Our Trident SLBM program is still in early development. We will be in position to go forward rapidly with Trident deployment in five years if we need to.

In achieving the Interim Offensive Agreement we have not diminished our nuclear support which is essential to the defense of our allies in Europe and Asia despite strong Soviet efforts to reduce our forward based nuclear aircraft as the price for limits on strategic offensive systems.

#### Verification

Early in SALT, the Soviet Union made clear that it would not agree to on-site inspection for verification of a strategic arms agreement. This objection to on-site inspection, of course, limited the range of verifiable possibilities for these agreements. This was one reason it was not possible to negotiate a ban on MIRV as an initial step in SALT.

The ABM Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement were tailored to be verifiable by national means. We have a wide variety of sophisticated and effective technical sensors. Our means are fully capable of verifying the agreements. The agreements make clear that neither side will interfere with these means nor take deliberate concealment measures. These technical means will enable us to rapidly detect violations and the hedges on our strategic programs enable us to take the necessary counter actions to protect our security in the event of a violation.

#### Duration and Withdrawal

The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration; it contains a clause which permits either party to withdraw if its supreme interests are, in its view, jeopardized. Thus, for example, if unforeseen developments

threaten the sufficiency of U.S. retaliatory forces, the U.S. could withdraw from the Treaty.

The Interim Agreement, is of limited duration -- five years. This permits ample time for negotiating a more complete follow-on SALT Agreement. Both sides are committed by the ABM Treaty to such negotiations.

#### Strategic Bombers

Strategic bombers were not included in the agreement. We have about 450 B-52 bombers compared to the Soviets' approximately 140 heavy bombers. About 280 of our B-52s will be equipped to carry up to 20 stand-off missiles (SRAM). This will greatly multiply the striking forces of our bomber component. We believe that the U.S. will retain a sizeable advantage in bombers.

#### A Net Assessment

The agreements make an important contribution to slowing the strategic arms race. This is in the interest of both sides.

US - USSR Forces

	1972		1977	
	US	USSR	US	USSR
<u>Forces Limited By Agreements</u>				
ABM Interceptors	0	64	200/302	1000
ICBMs	1054	1618	1054/1000	2253
SLBMs	<u>656</u>	<u>650-740<sup>1/</sup></u>	<u>656/710</u>	<u>1054</u>
Total Offensive Launchers	1710	2268-2358	1710	3307
<u>Strategic Systems Not Limited by the Agreement</u>				
Heavy Bombers	<u>457</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>488</u>	<u>130</u>
Total Offensive Forces	2167	2408-2498	2158	3437
<u>Independent Warheads (Operational)</u>				
Missile	3428	1970	5890	6500 <sup>2/</sup>
Heavy Bomber	<u>2460</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>3800</u>	<u>250</u>
Total Warheads	5888	2220	9690	3700 <sup>2/</sup> 250

FOOTNOTES

- 1/ The smaller number reflects the U.S. estimate of the minimum number of launchers on integral submarine hulls under construction on May 26, 1972. From the Soviet viewpoint, more submarine hulls for SLEMs could be considered as "under construction" because major subsystems are being built for hulls and yet being assembled on integral units. The number 740 was negotiated as a firm baseline which circumvents the difficulty in defining the construction process.
- 2/ Soviets do not yet have MIRVs. Soviet warhead totals for 1977 represent rough estimates of possible totals. Potential Soviet missile warhead total based on reasonable assumptions of intensive effort by Soviets. SALT Soviet missile warhead total represents our best judgement of what Soviets might do under SALT. Assumption of all-out MIRV conversion effort by Soviets could add 1500-1900 more warheads to Soviet SALT total by 1977 but only at expense of placing most heavy missile forces under conversion, and hence out of operation during most of period of agreement. This is considered highly unlikely. Moreover, U.S. could also increase force loadings on programmed delivery systems in face of such maximum effort.



The chart shows that the SALT agreements make a major contribution in protecting our security and in moderating many of the dangers we would otherwise face over the next several years. Specifically, without these agreements the Soviets could have about 3300 strategic offensive missile launchers by 1977. We plan to have no additional missile launchers operational by that time. Thus, the disparity in launchers would grow even larger without the SALT Agreements.

However, we estimate that we will maintain our current substantial lead in strategic warheads for at least the next five years. This lead might even be increased. Since the number of targets we can attack is directly related to the number of warheads in our forces, warheads are a better measure of relative strategic strength than launchers. Thus, we have, and plan to maintain, a clear sufficiency in our strategic posture -- MIRV, force efficiency and system quality.

It is also important to recognize that the effectiveness of our force in its retaliatory role is fully maintained. The confidence we have in our deterrent will be enhanced by prohibiting wide spread ABM which would undermine our retaliatory capability. The damage we can inflict in retaliation will be undiminished under the SALT agreement. This is the key-stone of our deterrent capability.

The differences between ABM interceptor levels projected without SALT and levels limited by SALT illustrate one dimension of the extent to which the ABM treaty will contribute to stabilization of the strategic arms race. A second important dimension, not illustrated, is the extent to which the ABM treaty will reduce uncertainty about future ABM levels, thus decreasing the need for extensive hedges against high ABM interceptor levels.

The chart also shows that some competition can continue -- particularly in qualitative improvements which are reflected in the number of independent warheads. Even these developments are constrained on the Soviet side by limiting the number of strategic missile launchers, and in particular limiting the number of launchers for modern heavy missiles. In the absence of the Interim Agreement the USSR could conceivably overtake us in independent missile warheads without compensating U.S. actions. With this Agreement we are confident we shall retain our lead.

In time, however, qualitative developments could adversely affect the strategic balance by threatening the survivability of land based ICBMs. During the negotiations we repeatedly made clear our concern over the possibility of threats to the survivability of our Minuteman ICBMs. The Soviets are aware that an effort by them to develop and deploy such capabilities could undermine the basis of agreement. There are several options we have to maintain the viability of our force in any event. This could range

from increasing force loadings and alert rates on operational forces to withdrawal from the agreements and the deployment of additional offensive and defensive forces. In order to avoid the possibility of such developments both sides will have incentives to find ways in the follow-on negotiations to control this potential area of competition.

Yet if in addition to qualitative developments, Soviet deployments of additional missile launchers also continued and their ABM program went forward as well, the strategic balance could require early compensating U.S. action. This is why the SALT agreements are in our interest.

-- We have constrained the cycle of action and reaction and enhanced the stability of the strategic balance.

-- We have curbed the momentum of the Soviet build-up.

-- We have even greater confidence that our offensive weapons can penetrate to Soviet targets since a nationwide Soviet ABM is prohibited.

-- We have bought time and created a good basis for further negotiations.

-- We avoid the need for major new programs yet we can continue with the prudent measures to protect our position five years from now:

- (1) The Trident submarine will be ready for deployment
- (2) The C-4 SLBM will be available
- (3) Site Defense ABM development can be completed
- (4) B-1 development will be complete

Thus, we have the programs needed to encourage the Soviets to live up to the agreement and negotiate seriously for more comprehensive follow-on SALT agreements, and to protect our security if they do not.

We enter these agreements with confidence.

-- That our security will be enhanced;

-- That we can verify the agreements;

-- That we have curbed the strategic arms race and built a framework that can aid further agreement not only on strategic arms, but on other outstanding issues affecting world peace.

Question: Doesn't the permitted 15% increase in silo size permit the Soviets to put in an even larger SS-9-type missile, threatening the survivability of our land-based forces?

Answer: It does, but it is questionable how much of an added threat over the already potent throwweight and MIRV capability of the existing SS-9 this would represent. That threat exists now and that is precisely why we have to go forward with our own permitted strategic programs while at the same time attempting in SALT II to contain or reduce this threat.

But there is also a technical point. It is not a foregone conclusion that the permitted silo size increase would be used for a larger missile. It could well be used for purposes of hardening. That, incidentally, is equally permissible for us.

Question: It is now clear that the Soviets refused to define a "heavy" missile. Doesn't this undermine the agreement not to convert light into heavy missiles? Aren't we in a position where, while we have made a unilateral statement, we may not have totally conclusive intelligence and therefore would find it very difficult to invoke the supreme national interest clause?

Answer: First, there is the important restriction on silo enlargement. That, in our judgment, makes it physically impossible to change an SS-11 or SS-13 silo into an SS-9-type silo.

Second, if despite this physical obstacle the Soviets should somehow contrive a way to circumvent the agreement it would clearly be a violation. Now, our intelligence would before long disclose this -- that is, if missiles we define as heavy ("greater than the largest light missile") were to appear in light-missile silos. The Soviets would have to assume that we would soon discover what they were up to. So they would have to make the calculated decision that for the marginal advantage they could obtain from cheating in this fashion they should jeopardize the whole agreement if not indeed the whole relationship that has been evolving between us.

Finally, any such deployment even if somehow begun clandestinely, cannot be completed overnight. We would have warning, and

-2-

above all, if Administration budget requests for strategic forces are approved we would have significant hedges against such a Soviet course. (R&D on hard site defense, MM hardening, Trident.)

Question: Basically, doesn't SALT simply stop programs that each side was ready to stop anyway and will its effect not simply be to divert energies into a technological arms race? In fact, hadn't the Russians stopped new ICBM deployments for over a year so that we really gained nothing?

Answer: This has to be answered in several parts.

As regards ABMs, we were prepared to stop Safeguard which we had planned to build. We did this in the expectation that in the next five years there will be a comprehensive offensive agreement; failing that, as you know, we would consider our national interests in jeopardy which in turn would be a basis for withdrawing from the ABM agreement.

We do not know what plans the Soviets had for ABM expansion; we do know they have an active R&D program and one would have to assume that the ABM treaty does inhibit whatever deployment plans were associated with this program.

On the offensive side, it is quite correct that we had no building programs applicable to the next five years. On the Soviet side, ICBM deployments did in fact level off and stop over the past year but we cannot know whether this was a final decision. Now of course deployments have to stop for the next five years.



-2-

But on SLBMs, the evidence was substantial that the Soviets were maintaining momentum, including the fact that they were putting in new building ways. We cannot of course tell for certain how many more boats the Soviets wanted to add -- or what proportion of the new construction capacity was to be used for modernization. But there now clearly is an upper limit which is well below their capabilities for the next five years. And to reach that limit the Soviets have to retire older SLBMs and ICBMs. We do not know whether they always intended such retirement. (Those who worry about the Soviet ICBM "superiority" of 1618 to 1054, incidentally, always count the SS-7s and SS-8s and the megatonnage they carry. It is not entirely intellectually consistent to assert now that these missiles have to be retired, that they are old and useless.)

So the first part of the answer is that on the offensive side we did indeed stop nothing we had not already stopped; but on the Soviet side, whatever the plans, there are now clear limitations.

Does this increase the technological arms race? Part of the answer to this is that in any limited agreement between adversaries there is bound to be continuing competition in the areas that

-3-

are not constrained. On the other hand, it cannot be argued that this agreement creates new incentives or impetus for such competition. It is already well underway, though we would expect with some restraint on both sides and with a serious effort in SALT II to achieve agreed restraints. What SALT I does is at least to restrain one important component of competition -- the continuing accumulation of gross numbers of weapons.

Let me make one fundamental point. When two essentially equal powers negotiate, neither one is going to be forced to stop actions it is not prepared to stop. What happens is that there is a bargain in which each side calculates its interests and judges what restraints are worth accepting in return for desired restraints on the other side. And this process can -- and I believe in this case did -- involve restraints not previously planned unilaterally.

Question: After the May 20 agreement, it is reported that the US proposed that the ABM treaty be set at 4 Safeguard sites for ICBM defense for the US. How and why did we finally settle for only 1 Safeguard ICBM site, plus Washington?

Answer: At that time, in the summer of 1971, we were still not clear about the scope of the offensive agreement, and whether, in fact, Soviet ICBM deployments could be frozen. They had just begun new construction of some new ICBMs including some SS-9s. So our ABM position stressed protection of Minuteman.

Now it turned out that the Soviet program of ICBM did not develop further in 1971 -- perhaps because of our high level statements of concern -- and we had some hopes that  
to  
our proposal/include SLBMs in the agreement could be negotiated. We shifted to a freeze concept for all systems including ABMs -- that is freezing the two ABM sites we had under active construction at Grand Forks and Malmstrom.  
The latter one, however, had only just begun because of a long labor strike, and at that point our Defense experts argued that protecting Washington from light attacks or accidents was more advantageous than completing Malmstrom.

Question: When you counter the argument that we have been frozen into inferiority you argue that when all our deliverable weapons are counted there is no inferiority. In this calculation you include our forward-based systems. But doesn't this set us up for a Soviet demand to include these systems in SALT II or, alternatively, to permit them "compensation" in SALT II?

Answer: First, the case against the claim that we have been frozen into inferiority rests on more than you have stated. It involves our advantage for several years to come in deliverable warheads on our ICBMs and SLBMs. It also involves, importantly, our present and planned strategic bomber forces. Our forward-based systems weigh considerably less heavily than either of these elements of our strategic capabilities.

Second, there has never been any question that the Soviets would re-raise the FBS question in SALT II. We cannot stop them from doing so; so nothing we can say "sets us up" for such a Soviet demand. This is a question that will obviously have to be reviewed in connection with SALT II and on which we will have to consult our allies very fully, since the FBS are part of the theater forces we maintain jointly with them.

Question: None of the texts actually says what the level of Soviet ICBMs is. What if we suddenly find they have 100 more than the 1618 we think they have; or if they claim they have 100 more? Why didn't we insist on putting in the figure? Why didn't we make a unilateral statement?

Answer: This is not a serious issue. Our intelligence is very good on the question of numbers. The Soviets are quite clear what number we use as the freeze level. Moreover, the Soviet Government has already issued a formal statement that the freeze will be implemented from the date of signature (in accordance with common understanding F-- Standstill).

Now if it does turn out that we were wrong or have been misled it would raise a question about the viability of the agreement. But it seems at least somewhat farfetched that the Soviets would want to jeopardize an agreement so recently reached by whatever marginal advantage they might obtain from what could only be a small excess over the 1618 ICBMs which we consider to be operational and under construction in the USSR.

As regards the inclusion of the figure in the agreement we found that throughout the entire negotiation the Soviets were reluctant to mention their current force levels -- the

-2-

only numbers they were prepared to mention were eventual ceilings for submarines and SLBMs and an SLBM figure beyond which replacement will have to begin. But we made the judgment that since the ICBM figure was not in dispute nothing significant would be lost by not mentioning it.

Let me emphasize again: this is not a question of blind trust; we are dealing here with an area where we have high confidence in our information and where there can be no doubt in the Soviet mind what figure we are using.

Question: The Administration justifies the SLBM ceiling by pointing out that older ICBMs must be retired for the Soviets to reach the ceiling. Wouldn't these older ICBMs be retired in any case by 1977? That is what intelligence projections have shown.

Answer: The intelligence projections have been showing the retirement of these older missiles for several years, but the Soviets apparently don't agree since they keep them in active service.

What they would do without a SALT agreement, I do not know. Perhaps they would modernize them -- some 60 are in silos.

But with SALT we now have a guarantee that they will be retired if the Soviets want to build up their SLBMs. In short, we were aiming for an aggregate of land and sea based missiles, and that is what we have.

Question: Is it true that we turned down a Soviet offer of a complete ban on ABMs, after proposing it ourselves? Would a complete ban be more valuable than deploying AMB sites that most people consider of little value?

Answer: It must be clearly remembered that our proposal for a complete ban, made early in the SALT negotiations, was part of a very comprehensive package. There were strict controls on air defense missiles, a ban on MIRVs, equal aggregate on all strategic forces plus some eventual reductions of SS-9s.

The Soviets picked only the ABM provisions and formally proposed only a site at Moscow and Washington. But it is certainly clear that they did not make a formal proposal for a complete ban, and were very reluctant to talk about dismantling their Moscow site. And we had strong reasons to believe they preferred not to pursue an ABM ban at that time.

As far as the future is concerned, we must bear in mind that a complete ban would have to mean the end of all research and development as well, if we were to have any confidence in the ban -- and this might not be verifiable. Moreover, because the USSR has a massive number of air defense missiles that could conceivably be converted to ABMs, these systems would have to be controlled in a precise way. There would need to be a



-2-

virtual ban on large radars. In short, a protracted and difficult negotiations would be required with some doubt that it would ever succeed, especially if we consider that on the Soviet side they have strategic defense problems with countries other than the US.

Question: Some intelligence projections and estimates given to Congress show that the Soviets intended to level off their SLBM force at about 62 submarines by 1977. If this was our estimate, how can we claim to have stopped the momentum of the Soviet program?

Answer: Such an estimate was derived from the theory that what the Soviets wanted was parity in actual SLBMs on station. So, a force of 62 would give them the same number on station as the US had with the smaller force of 41. Had there been no SALT agreement, and no restrictions on the Soviet program, there is no reason that they could not produce the 8 boats a year they are capable of. If they did, then my arithmetic shows that they could add 40 boats in five years to their current level. I might point out that we have tended to underrate what the Soviet force goals are. On both the SS-11s and the SS-9s, the Soviets went well beyond what was originally projected by our intelligence estimates. The important point is that with the SALT agreements we have clear ceilings, so that we no longer need to agonize over what their ultimate goal is.

Question: The question of mobile missile is confusing. Dr. Kissinger indicated the President had discussed this with Brezhnev. They are permitted by the agreement, yet we claim that their actual deployment would be inconsistent with the agreements objectives. Do the Soviets intend to deploy them, and if they did would we withdraw from the agreement?

Answer: The President was aware of the negotiating situation and wanted to add the weight of his authority to our unilateral statement. We were satisfied that the Soviet appreciated our concern. Whether they will deploy mobile missiles in the face of this statement is their decision. We would have to examine the implications when that deployment was detected.

One of the problems is that the Soviets have deployed a shorter range mobile and it becomes difficult to draw a line between intermediate range missiles and intercontinental ones. The Soviets, in fact, do not have an active ICBM mobile program, but they have the technology.

Since this is clearly high on the agenda for the next phase, our working assumption is that we can resolve it before a Soviet mobile ICBM program is reactivated.

ALLIES

Q. Have our Allies been informed of the details of the SALT agreements? What has been their reaction?

A. Yes, our Allies have been fully and continually consulted on the progress and details of the SALT negotiations. They have been quite satisfied with the consultations and briefings, which have been of great help to us particularly, as you might expect on issues of concern to our Allies. The Chairman of the US Delegation, Ambassador Smith, and others of the Delegation have participated in this process. Through this process the views of our Allies have been taken into account at all stages of the negotiations.

Q. Why does SALT not limit the nuclear threat to our allies?

A. The US originally endeavored to include Soviet MR/IRBMs in a SALT Agreement. The Soviets rejected this, however. They further asserted that our forward-based nuclear systems (FBS) which support our European allies should be included, since the Soviets claimed that they could strike USSR territory and, therefore, were strategic. We rejected this Soviet assertion, stating that our FBS were outside the scope of SALT. Thus, in the context of the current SALT negotiations it was not possible to get any agreement on measures which limited nuclear weapons in the European area. However, the number of missiles threatening our allies is not increasing and in fact has decreased in recent years.

Q. What impact will the no-transfer provisions have on our Allies?  
NATO?

A. Article IX of the ABM Treaty states:

"To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty."

In addition there is a joint interpretative statement which states:

"The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other states technical descriptions or blueprints especially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty."

These provisions do not affect our nuclear cooperation arrangements with NATO and our allies.

HEDGES

Q. What strategic weapons programs are available to the US to counter the possible Soviet threats allowed in the agreements?

A. First of all the ABM Agreement will reduce one of the greatest Soviet threats, a wide spread ABM and will reduce Soviet incentives to develop further offensive forces to penetrate a US ABM. Most programs

that would be required to counter likely Soviet threats of which they would be capable under the agreements are already in the process of development or deployment. These hedges are of several varieties:

Hedges currently in the operational force are now being deployed include MIRVs, SRAMs, silo hardness upgrade program, satellite basing for bombers.

Hedges available through changes in operational procedures include increase bomber alert rate, place forces on advanced alert upon receipt of strategic warning, expand SSBN operating areas.

Hedges currently in R&D include B-1 bomber, SCAD, Hound Dog II, C-4 SLBM, Trident SLBM system, and MaRV.

Hedges inherent in the production base but not planned include deploying more MIRV warheads on Poseidon, deploy more SRAM on bombers, deploy more MIRVed Minuteman IIIs, deploy more satellite bases for bombers.

It is critical to the agreement that we continue our current programs.

Q. What programs are envisioned as hedges against Soviet cheating on the agreements.

A. Why should they enter an agreement like this only to cheat? It would be impossible to gain a true strategic advantage before

we detected cheating and took countermeasures. However, our forces are well hedged if they do. The present structuring of US forces which includes land, sea, and air-based elements was originally intended to protect US deterrent capability against unexpected changes in the threat. This same concept is capable of hedging against all but very high levels of Soviet cheating on the agreement for that case which would take time we can change our operational practices and have the insurance of our on-going development programs.

Q. How quickly can we react to Soviet cheating/abrogation?

A. The US forces and the programs for development and deployment of forces have sufficient flexibility that several options are usually available to react to such an event. Some reactions, such as increasing the alert rate of the bomber force could be placed into effect in a matter of hours. Increasing the on-station rate of US SLBM forces would take slightly longer -- a matter of a few days. Other options involving changes to force structure or hardware would take variable amounts of time, depending on the type of R&D hedge programs that the US chose to employ.

Q. Can the sides develop and test weapons whose deployment is forbidden?

A. Yes. In general development and testing of weapons is permitted. There are some exceptions; for example, the ABM agreement prohibits development and testing of mobile or rapid reload launchers and multiple warhead ABM interceptors. We intend to maintain an adequate research and development program to prevent the Soviets from gaining technological superiority.

#### SALT AGREEMENTS - GENERAL

Q. Haven't the two sides simply put restraints on programs that were going to be halted anyway?

A. The ABM Treaty limits U.S. ABM defenses to a lower level than would have been acceptable in the absence of the agreements. We do not know when deployment of Soviet offensive and defensive weapons would have halted in the absence of an agreement. They are certainly capable of deploying a nationwide ABM system as extensive as their air defenses, and continuing to build missile submarines and ICBM/s indefinitely.

Looking to the future, we would have to plan on a much larger Soviet ABM system, and many more offensive missiles. The agreements will eliminate further growth of Soviet strategic missile forces and avoid the major new programs which would be required on the U.S. side.



Q. What does the agreement do to Sufficiency and Realistic Deterrence? Will they have to be modified?

A. The agreements support the US doctrines of Strategic Sufficiency and Realistic Deterrence.

Q. Since a SAL Agreement doesn't limit qualitative improvements in weapons themselves, won't the arms race continue or even be accelerated in the qualitative area?

A. The Treaty limits ABM defenses to a very low level, which should give both sides confidence in the effectiveness of their deterrent forces and should therefore be a major factor in slowing the offense-defense arms race.

The Interim Agreement will halt the buildup of offensive missiles and give us time to attempt to negotiate constraints in the follow-on agreement to head off the qualitative arms race which you suggest. Even quantitative limits constrain the base from which qualitative advances could take place.

Q. Could we have obtained more advantageous agreements without a Summit deadline?

A. We did not set a Summit deadline for these agreements. When the two sides scheduled the Summit, it was estimated that a number of agreements, including these two, would be ready for signature in May. These estimates proved correct. But the President made

it clear that if we did not have a SAL Agreement that we believed was ready for signature he would have insisted that the negotiations continue. I might add, prolonging the negotiations, while the Soviet buildup in ICBMs and SLBMs continued, would not necessarily have improved the agreements.

#### FOLLOW-ON SALT

Q. If we do not achieve a more complete offensive agreement, are we not as a practical matter stuck with the present agreement?

A. We believe that we will be able to achieve a more complete agreement.

If, however, we cannot, the interim agreement expires in five years. Moreover, within the period of the interim agreement we have the right to withdraw on the basis of the supreme interests clause. If it expires without a follow-on agreement this could be grounds for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty under the supreme national interests clause.

Q. What will be our goals and expectations for Phase II? Will we seek reductions? Qualitative limitations? Additional limitations on ABMs?

A. Our overall goal in the Follow-on Negotiations will be to achieve more complete and permanent limitations on strategic offensive arms. We will try to include categories of weapons not included and may try to address the question of qualitative change. The two countries have also agreed that reductions are a goal of SALT. The specific

U.S. positions to be taken are now under consideration.

Q. How do we propose to secure a more satisfactory offensive posture vis-a-vis the USSR in Phase II? What leverage have we toward this end?

A. We do not consider that the Interim Agreement is unsatisfactory.

It is, however, temporary. Both sides have agreed that it should be replaced by a formal long-term treaty which will be more complete in its scope. We will continue with our planned programs to ensure our security under the agreement. This will give the USSR incentive

to actively pursue such a treaty and protect our security if they do not.

Q. Will we attempt to gain equality in missile launchers in the follow-on negotiations?

A. Striking a more stable and an equitable long term balance will be an important goal in the follow-on talks, but the U.S. position for phase II has not yet been determined.

Q. Will our allies participate in the follow-on negotiations?

A. SALT will continue to be a bilateral negotiation. We will, of course, continue to consult in detail with our allies as the talks progress.

Q. If we have not been able to achieve a more complete offensive agreement in two and a half years, what basis is there to expect we can do better in the follow-on talks?

A. We expect the foundation provided by these initial agreements will help us achieve a more complete agreement within a reasonable period of time. Given the complexity of our tasks and the fact that we were,

so to speak, "starting from scratch," 2-1/2 years was not an excessively long period to work out these two historic agreements.

Q. What will be the relationship between follow-on SALT negotiations and MBFR?

A. It is not yet clear what will be the relationship -- if any -- between follow-on SALT negotiations and MBFR. Through Allied consultations we will make sure the two do not conflict.

Q. Is it too late to negotiate a MIRV ban or freeze. Why didn't the Administration heed Congressional advice and freeze MIRVs? Is it true that the Soviets would have accepted a MIRV ban without on-site inspection, but the U. S. insisted on such inspection? Precisely how useful would such inspection be? Couldn't flight test restrictions provide adequate verification of Soviet compliance?

A. Early in the negotiations, the U. S. Delegation did explore with the Soviets an approach which banned MIRVs. This approach did not lead to agreement, primarily because the Soviets opposed a collateral ban on MIRV flight testing and a provision for on-site inspection, both of which the U. S. considered necessary for verification. Once tested, it is impossible to determine whether or not a missile contains MIRVs without on-site inspection. Some control is gained by a on testing but this is not necessarily fool-proof. It is not just MIRV that is an issue in strategic stability, it is the missile killing capabilities that MIRV can provide. There are many ways that this problem can be approached. The problem of avoiding the instabilities of possible ICBM vulnerability will be an important issue in the follow-on talks.

INTERIM AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

Q. Why did we accept giving the Soviets an advantage in ICBMs and SLBMs?

A. The Soviet edge in numbers of strategic missiles was a strategic fact of life. It is absurd to say that we "gave them" an advantage. Without these agreements, the Soviets could have had 80% more strategic offensive missiles than the US by 1977. Since we would have no additional missiles by that time, the current disparity would have grown even larger. Moreover, it is misleading to consider only numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers. Many factors must be taken into account in judging the relative positions of the two sides. We estimate that we will maintain, and possible even increase, our current substantial lead in strategic warheads for at least the next five years. Since the number of targets we can attack is directly related to the number of warheads in our forcus, warheads are a better measure of relative strength than launchers. Thus, in the most important characteristics of our offensive forces -- MIRVs, force efficiency and system quality -- we have and plan to maintain a clear sufficiency in our strategic posture. It is also important to recognize that the effectiveness of our force in its retaliatory role will be fully maintained. The damage we can inflict in retaliation, which is the keystone of our deterrent capability, will be undiminished under the SALT agreements.

There are no winners or losers in this negotiation; both sides benefit. It was an important achievement to limit both offensive and defensive programs -- Safeguard.

Q. If we feel safe subscribing to numerical inferiority because of an alleged qualitative superiority, what assurances (and checks) do we have that the Soviets will not catch up qualitatively?

A. Both sides are allowed to improve the quality of their strategic forces. However, we estimate that we will retain a substantial lead in important characteristics--such as the number of warheads--for the foreseeable future. We can attempt to deal with qualitative improvements in the follow-on agreement. We are confident that we can maintain a secure deterrent force indefinitely.

Q. Why should we continue with the development and deployment of Trident and B-1 now that we have an agreement?

A. These programs are still needed as hedges against potential threats in the current Soviet force, insurance against abrogation or failure of the follow on talks, and of course in the long run as normal replacements for systems becoming obsolescent.

Q. Can we or the Soviets put long-range ballistic missiles on large planes such as the C-5? On surface ships?

A. The Interim Agreement does not limit long-range missiles on aircraft or surface ships. Neither side has any such weapons, and there is no evidence either side intends to develop or deploy such missiles during the period of the freeze. Limitations on such possible developments may be discussed in the follow-on negotiations.

Q. Does the agreement stop Soviet threats to our bomber force?

A. Soviet air defenses are not limited by the agreements. Also, some believe that Soviet SLBMs may become a threat to U. S. bombers. There is no indication the Soviets are developing such a capability. However, there are off-setting measures we can take such as re-basing and increased alert. In addition, the Interim Agreement limits the number of SLBMs the Soviets may deploy.

Q. Doesn't the failure of the SAL Agreement to cover bomber forces open the possibility of an expanding threat in this area?

A. The Interim Agreement covers those strategic forces which are rapidly growing and potentially the most destabilizing -- ICBM's and SLBM's. The Soviet heavy bomber force was never as large as ours, and has been constant for many years. Limits on bombers may be discussed in the follow-on negotiations. We should remember that while bombers are a formidable retaliatory force, they do not pose a disarming strike threat. Moreover, it would take the Soviets much more than five years to develop a significant bomber capability, for example, on the order of our SAC forces.

Q. Does the SAL Agreement really mean that we have "written off" Minuteman, looking to the future, since there are no limitations on Soviet qualitative developments that would threaten its survivability?

A. We have in no sense written off Minuteman. We are in fact engaged in carrying out major improvements to the MM force (MM III and silo hardening). Studies have shown that the MM force is not threatened today and that it would survive even an all-out Soviet attack under the agreement and beyond.

Should MM become vulnerable in the future, we will have sufficient alternatives to maintain our retaliatory capability. However, the problems created by ICBM vulnerability will be an important subject in follow-on SALT.

Q. Why are mobile ICBMs not constrained? Is this not an open invitation to the Soviets to increase further their lead in ICBMs?

A. It proved impossible in the negotiations to limit all strategic weapons systems for example bombers are not included. This is the major reason why this is an interim agreement rather than a treaty. Neither side has deployed mobile ICBMs. The Soviets were developing a mobile ICBM but now they appear to have stopped the negotiations record makes clear that deployment of land mobile ICBMs would be inconsistent with the purposes of the freeze on ICBMs. We do not expect the Soviets to build and deploy mobile ICBMs during the period of the Interim Agreement. Explicit limits will be involved in the follow on talks.



SLBM

Q. What exactly are the replacement provisions in the agreement? Why have we given the Soviets more opportunity for SLBM replacement of ICBMs than we have? Can we replace Titans with SLBMs?

A. If a new SLBM submarine is started after the date of signature of the agreement, an equal number of older ICBM or SLBM launchers must be destroyed or dismantled. Destruction or dismantling must be completed before the new submarine begins sea trials, and must be complete in a short, agreed period of time. Detailed procedures will be agreed in the Standing Commission.

The sides have equal rights to replace older ICBMs. The agreement permits us to replace Titans with SLBMs if we choose. More importantly, our systems are far more capable than the Soviets since each Poseidon missile carries as many as 10 separate warheads. Moreover we have a significant geographical advantage since we operate from European bases. Our SLBM force is sufficient to assure our retaliatory capability.

Q. Why did we limit the Soviets to 62 modern SSBNs? Why not 41?

A. The Soviets have a large submarine construction program underway - building about eight new boats a year. Without some limitations, the Soviets could have more than 80 missile launching submarines operational or under construction five years from now.

This agreement limited them to 62. Since we have no missile launching submarines under construction at present, and the first new TRIDENT submarine will not be operational until a year or more after the interim agreement ends, the Soviet lead in numbers of submarines could have been much greater than 62 to 41 in 1977.

To reach a total of 62 modern SSBNs and 950 SLBM launchers, the Soviets would be required to dismantle or destroy over 200 ICBM launchers. They also would have to replace older existing SLBM submarines. Thus, if they build the 62 submarines and 950 SLBM launchers they will have to retire about 240 older ICBMs and SLBMs.

While we think it likely, we can not be certain they will choose to carry out such replacements. This is a matter Soviet force planners will have to decide. U.S. forces are designed to meet the concept of sufficiency which means we do not simply try to build the same number of SSBNs as the USSR has. The U.S. will retain geographic advantages, an edge on missile range and submarine technology and a much greater number of warheads on our missiles.

Q. Will the agreement limit the Trident development program or prevent us from starting Trident submarine construction?

A. First development of a new submarine or missile is not limited in any way. As far as construction is concerned, it can proceed to the point of actual sea trials before dismantling/destruction of a replaced boat or ICBMs must take place. Since there are about 6

years of R&D and construction before the first Trident will be ready for sea trials, the interim agreement does not affect the program. Depending on the course of the follow-on negotiations the Trident system can be either a replacement for or add on to our Polaris/Poseidon forces.

Q. Was the Administration's request on Trident intended as a substitute for SLBM constraints, if we failed to get them?

A. The Trident program is intended as an orderly, prudently-paced replacement program for our Polaris/Poseidon SSBNs, which were all deployed in the seven year period between 1960 and 1967. It also hedges against unforeseen developments in the threat, and in the event we do not reach a more complete agreement, it would be available for any needed force expansion. We intend to continue the program as currently planned.

#### ABM TREATY

Q. Why have we agreed to stop an on-going US ABM defense program while allowing Soviet ABM programs to expand beyond their current deployed levels?

A. Since the offensive agreement is less than comprehensive we wanted some ICBM defense and the option to protect Washington. When the Soviets agreed to curb all their strategic offensive missile deployments we were prepared to make an equal deal. The treaty holds both sides to 200 ABMs permitting each side two sites of similar size and purpose -- one ICBM defense site and one NCA.

Given Soviet interest in strategic defenses as evidenced by their heavy air defense system and their vigorous R&D programs, we projected up to 1000 ABMs by 1977 by the USSR if there had been no agreement.

- Q. The agreement calls for each country to retain a limited ABM capability. What real value does this limited capability have in terms of what it could do for the US if the Soviets did launch an attack at the US?
- A. The performance of the defense depends on the size of the attack. The NCA defense would protect Washington against a light or small unauthorized attack. It would complicate the problems of a heavy attack, and may give the National Command Authority additional time to respond. The defense of ICBM's would also complicate any attack and may enable additional Minutemen to survive. The ABM radars will be valuable additions to our early warning capability. The combination thus gives a protected attack assessment command and control and communication capability for a controlled response to less all out attacks and the possibility of additional time even on large attacks.
- Q. Why is it of strategic importance to provide ABM defense of Washington?
- A. ABM defense of Washington and Moscow will reduce the possibility that a light accidental or unauthorized attack could destroy the national command authority and, in the resulting confusion and disorder, lead to a precipitate response that

could mean a full-scale nuclear war. It provides defense of our national command center and enables the President critical decision time to make a considered response to less than all out attacks.

- Q. We are allowed only 100 ABM interceptors at each site. What good is such a low level?
- A. The limited defenses will provide us operational experience, protection from light or unauthorized attack, would complicate any attack, and allow us to start a base for a more extensive defense of ICBM's. (See also the answer to preceding two questions.)

#### ABM Treaty

- Q. Which of the ABM sites under construction will be stopped and what will become of the facilities? How much money have we spent on the site to be stopped? When will we stop and start dismantling?
- A. Construction at Malmstrom will be stopped. Most of the procured hardware can be used for other purposes. It is estimated that we have spent about \$70 million on construction. Additional costs will be incurred for contract terminations and dismantling. There is an understanding which is common practice in international laws not take action inconsistent with the Treaty pending ratification. Malmstrom construction will stop as soon as practical, and dismantling begin after ratification.

Q. How much equipment has already been procured for 4-site Safeguard?

A. About 80 percent of the hardware has been procured for Grand Forks, and about 70 percent, 30 percent and 4 percent for Malmstrom, Whiteman and Warren, respectively.

Q. Do we have any concerns about permitting the Soviets to build a radar base for area defense?

A. The ABM Treaty prohibits this deployment of an area defense or the base for such a defense. A major U.S. objective and accomplishment in SALT was to limit both the actual and potential ABM capabilities of the Soviet radar base.

Q. How do we meet the threat posed by China which the President was previously so definitive about in recommending Safeguard?

A. A treaty providing for a nationwide ABM defense of the U. S. would have had to allow the USSR a similar defense. This would have provided the base upon which a thicker system of population defense could have been added relatively rapidly in the event of abrogation of the treaty. Thus, our retaliatory capability would have been less secure and meaningful limitations or offensive systems would have been difficult or impossible to achieve. The defense of Washington will provide the most important feature which a light nationwide defense would have offered -- protection of our command centers against light attacks. We considered it in our net security interest to

forego a light area defense and rely on deterrence of small attacks if we could also limit the Soviets to a low level and get appropriate limits on Soviet offensive forces.

Q. What happens if Congress will not fund the second US ABM site?

A. We believe they will see the wisdom of doing so in time in our Safeguard program. It is an important part of the capability needed for a considered response to less than all out attacks. If Congress does not fund an NCA defense, the US will have only the Grand Forks ABM site. The USSR may proceed with its second site independently of whether the US exercises its right to a second site.

7. Q. Could we have achieved a 1-to-1 ABM level? Why didn't we go for an ABM freeze in anticipation of a zero level? Is it true that Soviets showed an interest in zero? Is it true that the Soviets showed an interest in deferring the deployment of the second ABM site for each side?

A. There is a direct connection between Offensive and Defensive limits. One without the other could be destabilizing. Thus the ABM limit we could accept related to the extent of limits on offensive forces.

The U.S. proposed a zero level of ABM and NCA/NCA in conjunction with more comprehensive limits on offense. These proposals were not accepted. The Soviets never proposed zero.

Without such comprehensive limits, we needed some defense of ICBM's and wanted the option to defend Washington. The Soviets never proposed a 1-to-1 agreement in which we could defend ICBM's and told us such an agreement was unacceptable.

Q. How do we assure that the Soviets will not develop SAM systems that are capable of performing an ABM role?

A. It is important to recognize that in the absence of a SAL Agreement, the Soviets would be completely at liberty to develop and deploy large numbers of dual-capable ABM/SAM systems. The ABM Treaty contains several provisions prohibiting the conversion of non-ABM components for ABM use. The agreement specifically makes illegal such conversion and to reinforce this prohibition, disallows testing of SAM systems in an ABM mode and restricts the power aperture product of (potential) SAM radars to levels less than that of the MSR and limits the deployment of very large phased- array radars which could be used to extend the capability of SAM radars.

9. Q. What is the meaning of the phrase "tested in an ABM mode?"

A. This is a technical question, let me give some example:

Briefly, a launcher used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, an interceptor missile flight tested against a strategic ballistic missile and a radar used for measurements in conjunction with the flight of an ABM interceptor missile would all be examples of "testing in an ABM mode."



10(a) Q. Are laser ABMs banned?

A. Yes replacing current ABM components by such systems is banned. R&D can take place.

### LEGAL ISSUES

Q. In view of the great importance of the offensive agreement to U. S. national security, how can you justify not submitting it to the Senate for advice and consent as a formal treaty? Why is the House of Representatives being asked to vote on the offense agreement but not on the ABM Treaty?

A. This Agreement is an interim measure limited in scope and time entered into in contemplation of a treaty. However, in recognition of its importance, the Administration is requesting approval of both Houses of Congress by joint resolution. The ABM Treaty because it is being submitted to the Senate pursuant to the Constitutional treaty-making requirements.

Q. What is the legal status of the agreed "interpretive statements"? Are there any unilateral interpretive statements which will be made public in the Congressional hearings on the agreements and what is their legal status? Are there any other side agreements or interpretations which are being kept secret?

A. Agreed interpretive statements represent negotiating history which helps to make clear or supplement certain provisions of the Agreements. They have no independent legal status.

There are also some unilateral statements which were made by the US during the negotiations and which will be brought to the attention of the Congress. They represent a formal communication to the Soviet Union of our interpretation of certain provisions of the Agreements. Other unilateral statements represent only US intentions with respect to the implementation of certain provisions.

- Q. Would the Administration oppose a reservation to the ABM Treaty in the Senate providing for automatic termination if the follow-on negotiations fail?
- A. Yes. This would change the Treaty and as a result would require Soviet acceptance and could prejudice Soviet ratification. We made clear during the negotiations that we would consider withdrawal under the "supreme interests" clause should the follow-on negotiations fail. Moreover, it isn't clear that we would want automatic termination. We would want the option of considering where our best interests lie at that time.

Responses to Senator Jackson's Statements

[Note: It is not our purpose to open a debate with Jackson, et. al., but if questions arise the responses below should be used.]

1. Question: Senator Jackson has charged that this agreement freezes us at a 4 to 1 disadvantage in payload. Is this correct?

Answer: It is absurd to say that the agreement freezes us at 4 to 1 disadvantage in payload when the absence of an agreement would have permitted a dynamic arms race in which Soviet payload advantage would increase further. We have now stopped the SS-9 deployment which could have run free indefinitely. While the Soviets can improve on the SS-11 with new missile, they are constrained by limits on increase to the size of silos and they are on notice by our unilateral statement that significant increase in volume of a follow-on to the SS-11 missile could jeopardize continuance of agreement. Moreover, we had no program that would have done a thing to improve our payloads in the next five years. Hence, the agreement stops nothing on our side that we had planned.

2. Question: Senator Jackson has also argued that the agreement freezes the U.S. in a position of inferiority in number of missiles.

Answer: Regarding the number of missiles, the point is that the absence of an agreement would have guaranteed a widening of Soviet advantage. This agreement puts the lid on this trend for precisely the period at the

end of which, barring a follow-on agreement, we can begin adding to our numbers with the trident system.

3. Question: Senator Jackson has stated that the Soviet missiles have payloads greater than ours and the agreement authorizes them to increase. Comment?

Answer: On payload of particular Soviet missiles nothing in this agreement authorizes Soviets to do a thing that they could not have done even more dynamically without it. And nothing prevents the U.S. from improving payloads if we had a program to do so. Trident is fully protected. Moreover, there are agreed provisions which prevent unconstrained increase in payload, i. e., the size of small silos cannot be increased.

4. Question: Senator Jackson argues that the fact we have more warheads now is not important; they can MIRV their missiles. Comment?

Answer: On warhead numbers, we again should compare having an agreement with no-agreement. Under no-agreement, SS-9 would have been unconstrained and hence so would warhead multiplication. Now at least the SS-9 number is fixed. But we can proceed unconstrained with the only new offensive program we had, the ULMS. We do have a problem about Soviet potential for increasing warheads. But there was never a chance to solve this in SALT I without a MIRV ban, which was unobtainable. What we have done is to make this problem less severe than it would have otherwise have been.

5. Question: Senator Jackson notes that the agreement allows the Soviets to surpass us in submarines; isn't this significant?

Answer: On submarines, we have limited Soviets to numbers some 25 below what they could have built without agreement and are forcing them to pay for any new submarines by reducing their numbers and payloads in land-based missiles plus in some 30 on H-class boats. Moreover, Y-class boats they can build in the next five years are qualitatively inferior to our latest boats and, even more, to ULMS boats.

6. Question: Senator Jackson noted that the agreement prevents the U.S. from getting ABM protection for our Minuteman missiles while allowing them to expand their Moscow system. Would you comment?

Answer: On ABMs, the only way we could have gotten an "effective ABM defense of missile sites" would have been to give the Soviets the same, creating horrendous uncertainties concerning their capability to create a base for a radar base for a more effective defense at Grand Forks. Moreover, we already have a major advantage in high acceleration interceptors and further development in this respect is in no way constrained.

As regards Moscow defense, the Soviets can add 36 interceptors. This has no practical effect on our capacity to hold Moscow hostage, nor, indeed, on the U.K. capacity to do likewise. To suggest the Soviets can

"expand" Moscow system in any meaningful way because of this agreement is absurd. With radar constraints, area limitation and interceptor ceiling, we are obviously better off than if Soviets had been free to do as they please.

7. Question: Senator Jackson, in general, charges that the agreement confers overall advantage to the Soviets. Is this true?

Answer: As we have continued to point out, the agreement confers nothing that the Soviets could not have done anyhow. What it does do is limit a major aspect of the growth of their strategic systems -- the continuing increase in numbers of missiles. Over the foreseeable future we have a decided advantage in real capability -- e. g., warheads.

SALT TALKING POINTS

I. History

- Negotiations agreed in summer of 1969.
- We were under pressure to start immediately but wanted to make meticulous preparations.
- Course of entire negotiation has justified our careful preparation and especially events of last several weeks.

First year centered on issue of scope.

- Both sides took a comprehensive approach to include limits on broad range of all major offensive and defensive systems.
- This led to the following impasse:
  - We could not agree on what was meant by "strategic" -
- Since offensive limits were stymied over definitional problems, -- which of course were also political issues involving our bases and alliance commitments -- we then faced question of whether to conclude an agreement on ABMs alone.
- This was considered, but rejected by President because this would have left dynamic Soviet offensive programs unchecked.
- Since ABM technology is still in incipient stage, it was worth checking further growth but not at expense of leaving aside offensive weapons which are most de-stabilizing element of arms race.

*How was it done?  
Personal interest  
of Pres.*

Breakthrough was achieved on May 20, 1971 understanding, which was the result of a private exchange initiated by the President.

- You will recall at the time, the text was not exactly a model of English clarity.
- It was agreed to concentrate on ABM limits and simultaneously negotiate limits on certain offensive systems.

This posed two major issues to be resolved:

- First, the terms of the ABM limit
- Second, the scope of the offensive agreement, what systems would be included at what level.

The first issue, ABM was of major interest <sup>to</sup> the Soviets, and the second was our major concern.

-- Obviously, progress on one issue was influenced by progress or lack of it in another.

You are generally aware of how matters developed.

In the year from May 20, 1971 until late this spring the issues narrowed down to two major ones.

-- On ABMs, we had two quite different systems. The Soviets already had their defense of Moscow, and we had started Safeguard for ICBM protection.

We had to try to establish equivalence so that there would be no major advantages for one side -- obviously there would be no agreement if this were ~~one~~ <sup>the</sup> case.



- Then we had to set levels that would not be the source of future instability.
- There were several combinations considered, but <sup>only</sup> ~~the~~ one ~~that~~ seemed to meet the concerns and criteria of both sides.
- The result is that each side is able<sup>e</sup> to protect its national capital and one ICBM field, but the total limit on ABM interceptors is 200.

*criteria  
for deployment*

The offensive side proved far more difficult.

- Our basic approach was to freeze the level -- in other words a standstill.
- Of course, we had no missile production programs in being.
- The Soviets were building both land-based and sea-based missiles at increasing rates.
- Their incentive to freeze was minimal however, it was clear that without some limits on at least ICBMs we would not reduce the ABM program designed to protect ~~our~~ our ICBMs against the growing Soviet force.
- It was very attractive to conclude an ABM and an ICBM agreement. The Soviets proposed it.
- The President gave this serious consideration but decided that this would not be in the interests of an agreement that would create a vested interest on both sides.

- He recognized that in the following phases of negotiations the existence of an open-ended Soviet submarine launcher program would threaten the talks.
- In his exchange with the Soviet leaders he emphasized that limits on submarines should be included along with ICBMs in an interim agreement that would last long enough to halt current building programs.
- As a result of these exchanges, including the talks I had in Moscow in April, the President announced a second breakthrough in early May.
- It was agreed that submarines would be included in the freeze and the USSR made a proposal on the specifics.

There were two problems left to be taken up by the President in Moscow.

- First, the composition of the submarine limit -- would it include only the modern types or also some of the obsolete diesel-powered boats.
- Second, what would be an appropriate ceiling on submarine launched missiles.

These issues, along with some less critical technical problems, were raised by the President in his meetings with the Soviet leaders, and it was decided to try to resolve the remaining issues this week if possible.

Work continued in Helsinki, and here in Moscow.

-- On the main issues that involved political decision, these were discussed in Moscow.

## II. Accomplishments

The results are evident to you and I want to touch briefly on the main points in the agreements.

We will conclude an ABM treaty and an Interim Agreement on Limiting Offensive Weapons. The following are the highlights:

### A. The ABM Treaty

-- Limits each side to one ABM site for defense of Moscow and Washington and one site for each side for the defense of an ICBM field.

-- There will be a total of 200 ABM interceptors, 100 at each site.

-- ABM radars will be limited to six Modern ABM Radar Complexes for each side within a circle of 150 km radius around the national capitals; (MARC's are a circle of 3 km diameter, in which radars can be deployed; in practice they can accommodate about one large radar or a few smaller ones).

-- For the ICBM defense fields there will be a total of twenty radars permitted; two of them will be the size of our two large radars deployed at Grand Forks; the other eighteen radars will be much smaller.

-- The Soviet ICBM protection site will be at least 1300 km

Modern ABM  
RADAR  
COMPLEX

from Moscow. It is important that these sites not be in populated areas. Our comparable site will be at Grand Forks.

- The treaty will be of unlimited duration with withdrawal rights if supreme interests are jeopardized, and on six months notice.

*OLPARS*

*limits on radars*

B. The Interim Offensive Agreement

- Freezes ICBMs to those under construction or deployed. This will mean 1618 ICBMs for the USSR and 1054 for us. The USSR will field about 313 large SS-9s. Both sides are prohibited from converting other ICBM silos to accommodate large missiles. Other silos can be modified but not to a significant degree. Modernization is permitted.
- Submarine launched ballistic missiles

There is a freeze on nuclear-powered ballistic missile<sup>sub</sup> limiting numbers to those already operational and under construction.

- There is also a special provision, which provides a ceiling.

That ceiling is 44 submarines and 710 launchers for the U.S.

and 62 submarines and 950 missiles for the USSR.

- *But the only way in which the Soviets should either side desire to shift some of its land based can reach this ceiling is by converting missiles on older submarines and SS-7 and 8 as long as the ceiling is not exceeded. ICBM. By doing this their ICBM force would be reduced by about 210.*

- So ~~the~~ the figures for total missiles land and sea remain fixed, but the internal composition can change.
- Let me explain this in some detail because there will be a misleading interpretation if you take only the bare numbers.

It can be argued that this is a major concession.

- Some will compare totals ~~we~~ <sup>and</sup> claim we ~~gave away~~ <sup>conceded "superiority"</sup> advantages.
- All of the arguments you will hear have been exhaustively debated, in more exotic detail than you can imagine.

Here is what the situation <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~:

- The Soviet submarine program had reached a level of about 43 - 44 modern boats, the Y class either in operation <sup>or</sup> ~~as~~ being constructed. By their calculation they had about 710 missiles ~~on~~ these.
- The Soviets had in addition older class boats, which they first proposed not be covered at all.
- We thought that those missiles <sup>on</sup> all nuclear powered boats, had to be counted.
- This explains the figure 740 -- 710 plus <sup>about</sup> ~~the~~ 30 missiles on the older boats.

768

They can build additional boats up to 62 and 950 missiles.

If they do they must reduce 210 land based missiles or older submarine launched missiles.

So that overall there is a freeze with permission to shift internal composition.

Before you ask it, I will address whether we won or lost?

In this agreement, it is mindless to nitpick for marginal advantages:

- There would be no agreement at all on matters involving fundamental and vital interests without reciprocity.
- There would be no agreement at all if both sides did not see their interests served and their concerns dealt with in an equitable manner.
- The criteria for judging this agreement are:
  - Does it protect our own security now and in ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> future?
  - How does it compare with the probable situation if there were no agreement?

*Why didn't we need?*

The President believes that our strategic posture, including the mutual limits in this agreement, are totally compatible with our national security interests and a stable strategic environment which is the only real basis for security.

- On the offensive side there will be no change as far as the US is concerned, since we had no active program to increase the number of our weapons.
- Our qualitative programs, MIRVs and research and development continue.
- On the defensive side, we have stopped the Safeguard, but have retained the base for a defense of ICBM should that ever become necessary.

- The defense of Washington is more controversial but it was considered important to have a defense of the national command center, provided we did not have to give up our Safeguard base.

Compared to No Agreement,

- We have a limit on Soviet missile<sup>s</sup> at around 2300 - 2400, compared to a potential of 3200 - 3600 five years from now.
- We have limited the large and most threatening Soviet SS-9 to 300 compared to a possible 400 or more in the next year or two.
- If we consider the present balance including our MIRVs and bombers we have about 5780 deliverable warheads, we are not exactly suffering. (FYI: Sovs have about 2210)  
(1977 totals under SALT: US - 9630 Sovs - 3440 - 4200)
- A deadly and highly uncertain race in the defensive field has been stopped.

These are major achievements.

I am reluctant to say it is a first or that it is historic but frankly those two words seem highly appropriate.

Let me conclude by saying a word about the USSR.

## THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

### Introduction and Summary

The President signed two historic agreements -- (1) an ABM treaty of unlimited duration; and (2) an interim agreement to limit the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers for five years.

These agreements were reached despite differences in other areas of our relations with the USSR and are concrete evidence that we are making progress toward a generation of peace.

They are based on a realistic assessment of the strategic situation:

-- The Soviets have been moving forward rapidly with new ICBMs and ballistic missile launching submarines. The Soviet annual rate of increase was 100 ICBMs per year and 250 SLBMs *over the last five years.* ~~in 19~~

-- We have offensive systems in development with which eventually we could counter this Soviet momentum but we had planned nine for deployment for the five years of the freeze.

-- The Soviets have a vigorous ABM development program suggesting further deployment was in the offing.

-- -- The total number of delivery systems on both sides is roughly equal. The freeze affects systems in which the Soviets are moving, while keeping open other fields in which the US is active.

-- Our strategic posture is sound because of our lead in MIRV and weapons technology and our wide range of retaliatory forces (bombers, land and sea based missiles). But the rapid growth in numbers of Soviet systems coupled with improved Soviet technology could threaten in time to undercut our deterrent.



We can, of course, maintain a strong strategic posture without SALT agreements; however, this could face the nation with the prospect of a sharp upturn in the arms race with no real enhancement of U.S. security. On the other hand, SALT presented an opportunity to maintain a strong strategic posture without such an upturn.

The agreements reached achieve this objective.

-- The ABM treaty prohibits widespread ABM defenses that could protect the Soviet cities from our retaliatory forces.

-- The offensive agreement freezes for five years the number of strategic ballistic missiles, thus breaking major Soviet offensive deployment programs.

In return, we have accepted limits on deploying the full 12-site Safeguard system. By playing this bargaining chip carefully, we have not only blocked a heavy Soviet ABM defense, we have curbed the most dynamic offensive deployment as well. At the same time, the agreements permit the U.S. to continue those on-going offensive programs which will ensure the effectiveness of our retaliatory deterrent.

Thus, the ABM treaty and the offensive agreement contribute to maintaining a stable strategic balance and thereby reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. This is in the interests of all countries.

The two agreements are a first giant step to control over strategic arms. But there are still elements of the strategic forces of each side that could eventually threaten the security of the other. The agreements provide

a basis for further negotiations to bring these elements under control. The two sides have agreed to resume such negotiations at an early date.

### ABM TREATY

#### Background

ABM defenses of cities can reduce an opponent's retaliatory capabilities. If this reduction is great enough, he would have to deploy more offensive retaliatory capabilities to offset the opposing ABM defense. This interaction can be a primary impetus for the arms race.

As we approached SALT, we were uncertain about Soviet ABM deployment plans. They had an ABM system around Moscow and an aggressive ABM research and development program. In view of Soviet interests in strategic defenses, as evidenced by their extensive air defense system, we feared that the Soviets might deploy a comparable ABM defense for Soviet cities. Such a defense would have seriously undermined U.S. retaliatory capabilities.

The U.S. Safeguard program was aimed at defense of a portion of the Minuteman ICBM force, defense of strategic bombers, defense of our command centers in Washington and later a thin defense against a small attack. In his annual reviews of this program, the President made clear that the extent of U.S. ABM deployment would depend on progress in constraining Soviet strategic offensive capabilities through SALT.

Early in SALT both sides agreed that nationwide ABMs should be banned. However, we believed the nature of permitted ABM systems should be

ted to the scope of offensive limitations. If offensive limits would be comprehensive, we would be prepared to ban ABMs; if not, we wanted some protection of our ICBMs and the option to protect Washington. In view of Soviet willingness finally to accept a freeze on the total number of their offensive missiles, we were willing to work out an equal bargain on ABM that took both sides' objectives into account.

#### The Main Provisions of the ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty limits each side to:

- A defense of its national capital, consisting of 100 ABM interceptors.
- A defense of a location containing ICBMs, consisting of 100 ABM interceptors. These ICBM defenses will be located at least 1300 kilometers from the respective national capitals, thus preventing territorial defense.

The ABM Treaty contains additional provisions to prohibit acquisition of a suitable radar base for an extensive defense of cities and acquisition of ABM capabilities by indirect means, e. g., by converting air defense missiles to ABMs.

The ABM provisions limit city defenses to very low levels by:

- Limiting interceptors to relatively small numbers;
- In the case of the national capital defense, limiting the radar base for defense expansion by confining the radars to a small number of modern ABM radar complexes;
- In the case of defense of ICBMs, locating the defenses in sparsely populated areas;

-- Deterring and impeding the conversion of ONO-ABM components to ABM use and by banning deployment of very large sophisticated non-ABM radars which could provide the radar base for an extensive ABM defense of cities.

The ABM Treaty, by limiting ABM defenses of population, will make a major contribution to assuring the deterrent capabilities of the strategic offensive forces of the two sides, thus reducing substantially incentives for further offensive deployments. However, it will permit deployment of a radar base at a remote ICBM location that could support heavier defenses of ICBMs. This radar base thus provides a hedge against major increases in the threat to U.S. ICBMs and thereby helps to deter such threats.

#### U.S. Interests

The Treaty will have the following effects of major impact to U.S. security:

-- The Treaty prohibits extensive ABM defenses of Soviet cities. This provides added assurance that our retaliatory forces will be able to penetrate to their targets now and in the future thus enhancing the U.S. deterrent posture.

-- The Treaty permits a light defense of Washington, D. C. and the surrounding area in which are located critical elements of our national command and control systems as well as large numbers of people. Such a defense can protect Washington against accidental, unauthorized or small attacks.

-- The Treaty permits a defense of some ICBMs and an adequate

radar base as a hedge for thickening of ICBM defense in case the agreement breaks down, thus providing insurance for our deterrent against the possibility of threatening Soviet strategic offensive developments.

-- This combination of defenses will give us a protected warning, assessment, and command capability which will allow the President to make considered and controlled responses to less than all-out nuclear attacks.

#### Effects of the ABM Treaty on Safeguard

Safeguard was intended to defend some of our ICBMs, to provide added assurance that our bombers could survive a surprise attack, to defend our national capital, and to defend the U.S. against a light attack such as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) could mount in the 1980s.

The ABM Treaty permits part of the ICBM defense along with development of a base for a more effective defense for ICBMs -- site defense -- a system the development of which has already been started as a hedge against threats to Minuteman survivability.

Bomber survivability depends primarily on launching the bombers, which can be recalled, in response to tactical warning of ballistic missile attack. Improvements in our warning systems, rebasing of our bombers, and improvements in bomber reaction time give us confidence in bomber survivability.

In short, the Administration decided that, on balance, our net security interests would be advanced by agreeing to limit Safeguard in return for corresponding limits on Soviet ABMS and appropriate limits on Soviet strategic offensive forces.

The Interim Offensive AgreementBackground

Our policy of strategic sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to deter an attack on or coercion of the United States and its allies. The relationship between U.S. and USSR strategic forces must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be underestimated. The strategic capabilities of both sides have become so large and diversified that our programs need not be driven by fear of minor numerical imbalances. However, the Soviet Union cannot be permitted to establish a significant advantage in the overall numbers of strategic offensive forces.

The current U.S. levels of offensive missiles were reached by 1967. During the early 1960s, the United States decided to stop the deployment of strategic offensive forces at those levels and turned to further survivability improvements within these levels through such programs as Multiple Independently Retargetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) (which increase the effectiveness of surviving forces), silo hardening, bomber dispersal and improvements in command and control survivability. This Administration initiated two programs which hedge against very advanced Soviet threats -- the B-1 manned bomber and the trident SLBM system.

Soviet deployment of strategic offensive forces lagged significantly behind that of the United States until the late 1960s, when their deployment of ICBMs accelerated and their deployment of SLBMs in Y-Class nuclear-powered submarines (similar to our Polaris submarines) took a similar sharp turn upward. By 1970, they were deploying ICBMs at the rate of about 250 per year and SLBMs at the rate of about eight submarines (128 launchers) per year.

Of particular concern was the Soviet deployment of the SS-9 missile with a large payload and a guidance system which gave it the potential to destroy Minuteman silos. We were uncertain about Soviet plans for SS-9 force levels, accuracy, and MIRVs, but the Soviet technical potential for increased threats to Minuteman survivability was evident. Consequently, the United States initiated programs to protect Minuteman silos and set as a principal SALT objective the reduction of threat posed by modern large ballistic missiles like the SS-9.

Moreover, the momentum of Soviet missile deployments was such that they could have 50 percent more strategic missiles than the U.S. by 1977. Thus, breaking the momentum of this deployment was an urgent U.S. SALT objective.

#### Provisions of the Interim Offensive Agreement

The Interim Offensive Agreement on strategic offensive forces provides the following:

-- The total number of strategic offensive missiles frozen approximately at levels currently operational and under construction.

-- ICBM launchers (both hardened silos and soft launch pads) are limited at those operational and under construction as of July 1, 1972.

-- Heavy ICBM launchers are limited to those operational and under construction as of July 1, 1972. Replacement of small missiles with heavy missiles is prohibited, as is replacement of old, heavy missiles with new heavy missiles. There can be no changes in the size of small ballistic missile silos.

-- SLBM launchers on nuclear submarines are limited to those operational and under construction as of July 1, 1972, except that the agreement allows either side to replace launchers for SLBMs on old nuclear submarines and old heavy ICBMs with new SLBM launchers in new submarines.

-- The duration of the Interim Offensive Agreement is five years.

-- Bombers are not limited.

-- Neither side has deployed mobile ICBMs. The negotiations made clear that deployment of such systems during the freeze would be inconsistent with the purpose of the agreement.

#### U.S. Interests

The Agreement will freeze the total number of Soviet and U.S. missiles at approximate levels for five years. This achieves one of our



prime objectives in SALT -- breaking the momentum of the Soviet offensive missile program, especially by stopping the number of modern large missiles such as the SS-9 at about 300.

The freeze will not affect U.S. planned programs. We did not plan to deploy additional missiles in the next five years. Under the agreement, the Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV programs can continue. Development of the Trident SLBM system can continue; the deployment of this system will not occur within the five year duration of the interim offensive agreement.

Thus, the agreement does not limit us from continuing current and on-going offensive programs, but it stops the Soviets from increasing the numerical gap in missile launchers. In number of warheads, the U.S. will continue its wide lead.

The Soviets have been deploying new ballistic missile launching submarines at a rapid rate. They now have operational and under construction about as many Y-Class submarines as we have Polaris and Poseidon submarines. Without some limit, they could have 80 Y-Class submarines or more in five years.

-- Under the agreement, to deploy new SLBMs beyond those now operational and under construction, the Soviets would have to destroy older ICBM or SLBM launchers in order to remain within the overall limits on ballistic missile launchers. If they build up to the permitted

//

levels the Soviets will have to retire at least 240 launchers of which at least 30 will be on submarines.

-- In any case, the Soviets will be limited to a maximum of 62 modern SLBM submarines and 950 SLBM launchers.

-- One key aspect of the Interim Offensive Agreement is to make the Soviets choose between (1) destroying about 200 old large SS-7 and SS-8 missiles; and (2) foregoing deployment of an equal number of SLBM launchers.

We could also build additional submarines.

-- We could, if we choose, retire our 54 Titan missiles and deploy an equal number of Poseidon launchers in new submarines, resulting in a larger net increase in warheads than the Soviets could achieve by deploying 20 more of their current Y-Class submarines and SLBMs.

-- Our Trident SLBM program is still in early development. We will be in position to go forward rapidly with Trident deployment in five years if we need to.

In achieving the Interim Offensive Agreement we have not diminished our nuclear support which is essential to the defense of our allies in Europe and Asia, despite strong Soviet efforts to reduce our forward based nuclear aircraft, as the price for limits on strategic offensive systems.

### Verification

Early in SALT, the Soviet Union made clear that it would not agree to on-site inspection for verification of a strategic arms agreement. This objection to on-site inspection, of course, limited the range of verifiable possibilities for these agreements. This was one reason it was not possible to negotiate a ban in MIRV as an initial step in SALT.

The ABM treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement were formulated to be verifiable by national means. We have a wide variety of sophisticated and effective technical sensors. Our means are fully capable of verifying the agreements. The agreements make clear that neither side will interfere with these means nor take deliberate concealment measures. These technical means combined with hedges on our strategic programs enable us to take the necessary counteractions to protect our security in the event of a violation.

### Duration and Withdrawal

The ABM treaty is of unlimited duration; it contains a clause which permits either party to withdraw if its supreme interests are, in its view, jeopardized. Thus, for example, if unforeseen developments threaten the sufficiency of U.S. retaliatory forces, the U.S. could withdraw from the treaty. The Interim Agreement, being only a temporary measure, is of limited duration -- five years. This permits ample

time for negotiating a more complete follow-on SALT agreement. Both sides are committed by the ABM treaty to such negotiations.

### Strategic Bombers

Strategic bombers were not included in the agreement. We have about 450 B-52 bombers compared to the Soviets' approximate 190 heavy bombers. About 280 of our B-52s will be equipped to carry up to 20 stand-off missiles (SRAM). This will greatly multiply the striking forces of our bomber component. Soviet heavy bomber forces are not projected to increase over the next five years. Thus, we believe that the U.S. will retain a sizeable advantage in bombers.

### A Net Assessment

The SALT agreements make a major contribution in protecting our security and in moderating many of the dangers we would otherwise face over the next several years. Specifically, without these agreements the Soviets could have 3200 strategic offensive missiles by 1977. We could have no additional missiles by that time. Thus, the current disparity would grow even larger.

However, we estimate that we will maintain our current substantial lead in strategic warheads for at least the next five years. This lead might even be increased. Since the number of targets we can attack is directly related to the number of warheads in our forces, warheads are a better measure of relative strategic strength than launchers. Thus,

14

in the most important characteristics of our offensive forces -- MIRV, force efficiency and system quality -- we have and plan to maintain a clear sufficiency in our strategic posture.

It is also important to recognize that the effectiveness of our force in its retaliatory role is fully maintained. The damage we can inflict in retaliation will be undiminished under the SALT agreement. This is the keystone of our deterrent capability.

The differences between ABM interceptor levels non-limited by SALT and levels limited by SALT illustrate one dimension of the extent to which the ABM treaty will contribute to stabilization of the strategic arms race. A second important dimension, not illustrated, is the extent to which the ABM treaty will reduce uncertainty about future ABM levels, thus decreasing the need for extensive hedges against high ABM interceptor levels.

Some competition can continue -- particularly in qualitative improvements which are reflected in the number of independent warheads. Even these developments are somewhat slowed and constrained on the Soviet side by limiting the number of strategic missiles, and in particular limiting the number of modern heavy missiles. In time, these developments could also adversely affect the strategic balance. Thus, both sides should have incentives to find ways in the follow-on negotiations to control such competition.

Yet, if Soviet deployments of additional missiles also continued and their ABM program went forward as well, the strategic balance could require compensating U.S. action without enhancing U.S. security. This is why the SALT agreements are in our interest.

-- We have constrained the cycle of action and reaction and enhanced the stability of the strategic balance .

-- We have curbed the momentum of the Soviet build-up.

-- We have even greater confidence that our offensive weapons can penetrate to Soviet targets since a nationwide Soviet ABM is prohibited.

-- We have bought time for further negotiations.

-- We avoid the need for major new programs yet we can continue with the prudent measures to protect our position five years from now:

1. The Trident submarine will be ready for deployment.
2. The C-4 SLBM will be available.
3. Site defense ABM development can be completed.
4. B-1 development will be complete.

Thus, we have the programs needed to encourage the Soviets to live up to the agreement and negotiate seriously for more comprehensive follow-on SALT agreements, and protect our security if they do not.

We enter these agreements with confidence.

-- That our security will be enhanced;

16

-- That we can verify the agreement;

-- That we have curbed the strategic arms race and built a basis that can aid further agreement not only on strategic arms, but on other outstanding issues affecting world peace.

7 A

Rationale for 740 (operational and under construction)

	44 boats	Y	(16)	656
Soviets claimed	48 boats	Y	(16)	768
Our estimate	44 boats	Y	(16)	704+
	<sup>43 = 685</sup> H class (2 conversions)			30 - 36

If 48 boats have mix of 16 + 12 tube boats (say 4-12 tube) it would be 752.

We picked [arbitrary] figure within range between 656 and 768; i. e. 710,

and added 30 H class tubes. We could not challenge Soviet 48/768 claim

as long as they insisted on it. So had to use it as high end of range.

Soviets accepted 740 on this basis. We estimate that at most Soviets

may have 60 - 70 tubes fewer than 710 and this is the range of risk we are

accepting, i. e. they could construct that many without immediate replace-

ment.



NODIS

UNILATERAL STATEMENTS ASSOCIATED  
WITH ABM TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT

	<u>Tab</u>
No Increased Defense of Early-Warning Radars . . . . .	1
Mobile ABM Systems . . . . .	2
Tested in ABM Mode . . . . .	3
No Precedent in ABM Non-Transfer Provision . . . . .	4
Current ABM Test Ranges . . . . .	5
Deferral of ABM Sites. . . . .	6
Standstill . . . . .	7
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty . . . . .	8
Compensation for SLBM Launchers & Submarines . . . . .	9
Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers . . . . .	10
Covered Facilities. . . . .	11
Standing Consultative Commission . . . . .	12
"Heavy" ICBMs. . . . .	13
Location of ICBM Defenses. . . . .	14
"Significantly Increased" - ICBM silo launchers . . . . .	15

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

1. No Increased Defense of Early Warning Radars. On July 28, 1970, Garthoff handed Grinevsky a note with the following text: "Since Hen House radars can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the US would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement." (Comment: Soviets never challenged this statement. On September 7 and 8, 1971, Garthoff reminded Kishilov of the July 28 statement and Kishilov indicated understanding of the point on vulnerability.)

2. Mobile ABM Systems. In Mini-Plenary on January 28, 1972, Nitze made following statement: "Article V (1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the US side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the US side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?" (Comment: On April 13, 1972, Soviet side reported there was a general common understanding

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

SECRET - NODIS

-2-

on this matter and it was decided that an agreed interpretation was not necessary.)

3. Tested in ABM Mode. In Mini-Plenary on April 7, 1972, Nitze made following statement: "Article II of the Joint Draft Text uses the term 'tested in an ABM mode,' in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the US view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of 'tested in an ABM mode,' we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be 'tested in an ABM mode' if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory

SECRET - NODIS

SECRET - NODIS

-3-

with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria." (Comment: On May 5, Grinevsky told Garthoff that the Soviet Delegation did not believe it was necessary that the subject be further addressed.)

4. No Precedent in ABM Non-Transfer Provision. On April 18, 1972, Parsons made following statement in Special Working Group: "In regard to this Article (Article IX), I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The US side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution."

SECRET - NODIS

SECRET - NODIS

-4-

(Comment: Soviet side has not challenged this interpretation.)

5. Current ABM Test Ranges. Garthoff made following statement to Grinevsky and Kishilov on April 26, 1972, at meeting of The Four: "Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that 'the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges.' We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the areas within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current US ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to 'additionally agreed test ranges' to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges." (Comment: On May 5, 1971, Grinevsky, reading from a prepared text, told Garthoff there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were. The use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under

SECRET - NODIS

SECRET - NODIS

-5-

the Treaty. The reference in Article IV to current and additionally agreed test ranges was sufficiently clear.)

6. Deferral of ABM Sites. On May 6, 1972, Semenov, in private meeting with Smith, proposed a "joint statement" to read as follows: "The Parties understand that at present the USSR is deploying an ABM system for defense of the national capital, and the USA is deploying a system for one ICBM deployment area. Deployment of ABM components for the defense of the one deployment area of land-based ICBM silo launchers in the USSR, and of the national capital in the USA, for the time being would not be carried out." In reply, on May 17, Smith said he was instructed to state that the US Government had no interest in deferring the second ABM site for each country. In private meeting with Smith on May 19, Semenov said he was authorized to state that the sides proceed from the premise that deployment of ABM system components in one area for defense of land-based ICBM silo launchers in the USSR, and for defense of the national capital in the United States, could be implemented at the discretion of the sides.

7. Standstill. In meeting of Delegations on May 6, 1972, Semenov made following statement: "In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the US side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty, beginning from the

SECRET - NODIS

-6-

date of signature of these two documents." In reply, Parsons made following statement in Mini-Plenary on May 20, 1972: "The US agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval."

8. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. In Mini-Plenary on May 9, 1972, Smith made following statement: "The US Delegation has stressed the importance the US Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive

SECRET - NODIS

SECRET - NODIS

-7-

arms." Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US Supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the US Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The US Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the US position. Having advised the USSR of its position on this matter, the US Government is prepared to agree that Article XV of the ABM Treaty be composed of paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 as now formulated in the Joint Draft Text." (Comment: The Soviet side has not indicated any disagreement with this statement. Semenov said he would bring it to the attention of his leadership. He noted that the positions of the sides coincide on the importance attached to concluding a more comprehensive statement limiting strategic arms in the follow-on talks.)

9. Compensation for SLBM Launchers and Submarines. On May 17, <sup>and May 18</sup> 1972, Semenov made the following unilateral "Statement of the Soviet

SECRET - NODIS



SECRET - NODIS

-8-

Side:" "Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently in the possession of not only the US, but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement, the US and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 US submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement US allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the US. Therefore, the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above all the question of liquidating the American missile submarine bases outside the US, must be appropriately resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations." On May 24 Smith read following statement to Semenov and handed him the text: "The United States side has studied the 'statement made by the Soviet side' of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third countries. The United States does not accept the

SECRET - NODIS

SECRET - NODIS

-9-

validity of the considerations in that statement." <sup>also</sup> (Comment: Semenov said he understood the position stated by the US side, and noted that the US could consider the Soviet statement as a unilateral one.)

10. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers. Allison made following statement in Mini-Plenary on May 20, 1972: "In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the Interim Agreement the US Delegation now withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the US would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement." (Comment: Soviets have not reacted.)

11. Covered Facilities. Nitze made following statement in Mini-Plenary on May 20, 1972: "The US Delegation withdraws its proposed additional sentence to paragraph 3 of Article V of the Interim Agreement. In taking this step, I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of Article V, including in particular their application to fitting out or berthing submarines."

SECRET - NODIS

SECRET - NODIS

-10-

(Comment: Following Nitze's statement, Semenov said Soviet side confirmed that Article V was adequate for purposes of Interim Agreement, including its application to ballistic missile submarines.)

12. Standing Consultative Commission. On May 24, Smith read following statement to Semenov and handed him the text: "The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement, agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels." (Comment: Semenov said he would report this statement to Moscow. He felt that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.)

13. "Heavy" ICBMs. Delegation <sup>made</sup> planning-to-make following statement <sup>in mini - Semenov 1973 on May 26, 1973.</sup> "The US Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these

SECRET - NODIS

SECRET - NODIS

-11-

circumstances, the US Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: "The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The US proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

14. Location of ICBM Defenses. Delegation made following statement in Mini-Plenary meeting on May 26, 1972: "Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: 'The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.' In this connection, the US side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo

SECRET - NODIS

SECRET - NODIS

-12-

launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area."

15. "Significantly Increased". Smith introduced following statement into record in Mini-Plenary meeting on May 26, 1972: "The Parties agree that the term "significantly increased" means that the increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers". Semenov said statement corresponds to Soviet understanding.

SECRET - NODIS

AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE  
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the continental USSR.

The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed.

\* \* \*

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased.

\* \* \*

- 2 -

The Parties understand that during the period of the Interim Agreement there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties further understand that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.

\* . \* \*

The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

May 26, 1972

AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY  
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

\* \* \*

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

\* \* \*



The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

\* \* \*

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

\* \* \*

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

\* \* \*

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

\* \* \*

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the U.S. and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.