No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-226-7-1-2

Blasts at U.S. Base in Germany Kill 3

HEIDELBERG, Germany, May 24 (AP)—Bombs went off tonight in two cars parked inside the United States Army's European command headquarters compound, killing three American servicemen and injuring five other persons.

It was the second bomb attack on an Army compound in West Germany in the last two weeks. An American lieutenant colonel was killed and 13 persons were injured May 11 by three bombs that shattered the officers' club of the Fifth Corps headquarters in Frankfurt.

An Army spokesman said today that the almost simultaneous blasts in cars parked some 150 yards apart had blown a hole in a wall of a data-processing building at the Heidelberg compound and had shattered glass in a movie theater and officers' club at Heidelberg's Campbell Barracks. The post is headquarters for the European command's 190,000 men, most of them in Germany.

The three dead, an Army officer and two soldiers whose identities were not immediately released, were near the data-processing center when the first bomb exploded. The Army said that three military personnel and two civilians had been treated for cuts.

The second blast went off 10 to 15 seconds later in a car parked on a large lot facing the officers' club and theater.

Reports from the scene said United States military policemen had seized three Germans in connection with the blasts. An Army spokesman could not confirm this report immediately.

In a filmed television interview broadcast shortly after the blasts, Interior Minister Hans Deitrich Genscher said that those being sought in recent terrorist attacks were largely identifiable with what is called the Baader-Meinhof gang.

The leftist extremist group has been sought for the last two years in connection with a series of bank robberies, car thefts and other acts of violence.

A group calling itself the "Red Army Action" claimed responsibility for the three bombs that shattered the headquarters and officers club in Frankfurt on May 11. The group also said it bombed German police buildings May 12 in Munich and Augsburg.

The military police cordoned off the Heidelberg post, situated about a mile from the commercial heart of this medieval university city. The area has been under tight security along with other United States installations in West Germany because of the bombing in Frankfurt.

Much Less of a Big-War Risk Seen by Bundy in Next Decade

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 24 — McGeorge Bundy, adviser on national security to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, predicted today that the risk of large-scale war would be much less in the coming decade than at any time since World War II.

At the same time, Mr. Bundy, now president of the Ford Foundation, forecast that one of the dominant foreign-policy issues of the coming decade would concern the allocation of global resources.

"Our own society is unlikely to survive in the coming generations on a subcontinent marked by consumption of an extraordinarily high share of resources which are limited, in a world where most human beings are desperately poor," he said.

Mr. Bundy testified before a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs subcommittee as it began a set of hearings on "national security policy and the changing world alignment."

Also testifying before the subcommittee, headed by Representative Clement J. Zablocki, Democrat of Wisconsin, were Eugene V. Rostow, Professor of Law at Yale University; Robert Scalapino, Professor of Political Science at the University of California in Berkeley, and Stanley Hoffmann, Professor of Government at Harvard University.

In various ways, all the witnesses foresaw a new global power balance evolving but they differed on the form it would and should take.

Superpower Détente Seen

Mr. Rostow, an Under Secretary of State in the Johnson Administration, saw a détente developing between the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

Shakes Argentina

for investigations, neither the police nor the military have disclosed the results of any internal inquiry.

What most impressed public opinion in the case of "Coca" Morello, as she is known in Goya, is the absence of any known charges against her and the sworn statement that her torture by investigators under military jurisdiction included high-voltage electric shocks as well as threats of rape.

Miss Morello was released after Roman Catholic bishops brought pressure on the military Government of President Alejandro A. Lanusse, who is seeking to reduce political tensions.

Private interviews with Miss Morello deeply impressed many [illegible] attending a national [illegible] conference that addressed [illegible] to the na[illegible] political

[illegible] of a person to [illegible] of confer[illegible] rights, but [illegible] torture



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Balance of Humanity

By Anthony Lewis

LONDON, Nov. 17 — The Russian State Choir performed the other night in the Queen Elizabeth Hall, London. On the pavement outside there was a counter-performance: Victor Yoran, a Soviet Jew in exile, played works for unaccompanied cello by Bach and Ravel.

Mr. Yoran was protesting the refusal of Soviet authorities over the last three years to let his wife, his son and his mother join him in Israel. Others with him carried signs condemning the treatment of Jews in the U.S.S.R., for example the dismissal of 24 Jewish musicians from the Moscow Radio Orchestra after one sought a permit to leave for Israel.

The incident evoked a disparate memory. One of the most bizarre moments in the 1972 Republican convention came during a film on the accomplishments of President Nixon. When he was shown with Leonid Brezhnev of the U.S.S.R., the hall in Miami burst into the loudest applause of the evening.

AT HOME ABROAD



Eugene Mihaesco

The applause was doubtless for the idea of détente rather than the person of Brezhnev. Still, it was remarkable to see thousands of Republicans applauding at the burly image of the Soviet Communist party leader, the imposer of a head tax on Jewish emigrants, the author of the formal doctrine that the Soviet Union may suppress freedom in any Socialist country.

The delegates' enthusiasm for friendship with the most powerful of Communist countries contrasted with their equally strong support for continued American air and naval assault on one of the smallest. North Vietnam. Then Mr. N

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se Tanyas and wounded and made homeless by his bombs.

How does one explain the difference in American attitudes toward Communism in Moscow and Hanoi?

Has Russian Communism been smoothed into something more congenial? Hardly. The persecution of dissenters, more cruel than of Jews, is too well known to need rehearsing—the punishment in mental hospitals and labor camps. One savage recent example is the death of the 35-year-old poet Yuri Galanskov in a camp this month. He was known to have severe stomach ulcers; but when his mother brought honey for him last June, camp authorities barred it, saying he was not sick but was "just a hooligan who shirks his work."

Or perhaps we could say that the Soviet Union does not invade other countries, as North Vietnam did the South in the spring offensive. But that "invasion" was part of a war in what had been one country for many hundreds of years and is still regarded as such by most Vietnamese. The Soviet Union only a few years ago brazenly invaded a totally foreign country, Czechoslovakia. Have we forgotten already?

No, the reason for the difference in attitudes is plain enough. The Soviet Union is big, powerful and dangerous to the United States. North Vietnam is small, weak and no danger whatever —a country we can afford to abuse.

Power is a reality in the world, and it is necessary wisdom for the United States to recognize that. We have no effective power to help the Czechs and would not improve things by delusions to the contrary. Détente with the Soviet Union, as in the SALT agreement, serves important purposes whatever the nature of Soviet society.

The question is whether the reality of power excludes more human concerns in foreign policy. Henry Kissinger might well say yes; he might indeed regard anyone who asked such a question as a sentimentalist. But Americans still do have to live with their foreign policy, so they ought to understand its human consequences.

A world balanced among the strong may have grave consequences for the weak. That is because the balance is essentially an agreement by the powerful to let each other have their own way in their own spheres.

Andrei Sakharov, the great Russian dissenter, said in a recent interview that things had grown worse in the U.S.S.R. since Mr. Nixon's visit to Moscow: "The authorities seem more impudent because they feel that with détente they can now ignore Western public opinion." Limits on American influence in Soviet affairs may be an inescapable part of great-power agreement. But it does not follow that we must cease to care about what we do [illegible] in our world.

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MT 1-17-76

Mission to Moscow

The decision to have Secretary Kissinger visit Moscow next week to seek a breakthrough in the deadlocked strategic arms limitations talks (SALT II) despite the fast-deteriorating Angola situation is soundly based. While strains on any front must unavoidably hinder negotiations on other issues, the mutual Soviet-American interest in dampening down the nuclear arms race separates it from all other aspects of their limited adversary relationship.

"We have never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations," Mr. Kissinger said Wednesday. This was an admonition to such Administration critics as Ronald Reagan; but the more important question is how far the Ford Administration—and the Brezhnev Administration in Moscow—are prepared to challenge their military advisers in curbing the buildup of new nuclear weapons.

The irony in the SALT II deadlock is that it concerns two weapons of secondary importance and yet threatens the vital limitations on the primary weapons of destruction that were agreed in principle at Vladivostok in November 1974.

The Vladivostok accord would limit the strategic ballistic missiles that could destroy both countries in 40 minutes. The Soviet Backfire bomber and American cruise missile that have taken center stage in the recent SALT controversy are slow, subsonic delivery systems that, under any realistic agreement, would only add marginally to the overkill both sides already possess.

Most important, both Backfire and the cruise missile are second-strike rather than "first-strike" weapons, since they would take hours to arrive on target, giving far too much warning to be used in a pre-emptive blow. The Vladivostok agreement places ceilings that are much too high on potential first-strike weapons—limiting MIRV multiple warhead missiles to 1,320 and other strategic missiles and bombers to an additional 1,080—but the hope is that these ceilings subsequently can be reduced.

A reduction of the MIRVed missiles to 900 or less, with half of them deployed at sea would head off for a very long time the possibility of either side acquiring a credible first-strike capability against the land-based forces of the other. It would also head off the critical danger of crisis instability, the danger that either side would be tempted to shoot first in a crisis for fear of the theoretical advantage the other might gain if it sought to destroy the bulk of the adversary's land-based forces with a small portion of its own multiple warhead missiles.

* * *

The effort to consolidate the Vladivostok agreement and to proceed to such reductions must not be permitted to break down in the dispute over the Backfire bomber and the cruise missile. There are many ways to limit both these new weapons to a level that would not substantially affect the stability of the nuclear balance. The best way would be to ban them both.

Short of that, limits on numbers and range can be imposed that would head off a major addition to strategic capability. This undoubtedly is the route the Soviet government evidently is prepared to challenge its military completely.

An imperfect agreement, however, will be better than none if it includes—or even keeps the way open for—the vital reduction in ceilings on first-strike weapons to which both sides are committed in principle by the Vladivostok accords.

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

Christian Science Monitor 1/19/76

Pravda pushes SALT, detente

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

On the eve of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's arrival in Moscow for talks with Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev, the party newspaper Pravda sounded two encouraging notes:

It made a plea for a new SALT (strategic arms limitation) agreement, and it stressed the importance of improving over-all Soviet-American relations.

Pravda was less encouraging on the subject of Angola, which will be the second major topic of Dr. Kissinger's negotiations in Moscow [illegible]. It hailed the latest victories of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and rejected the idea of a compromise coalition with the two other nationalist movements in Angola supported by the U.S.

Pravda did not devote a separate article to the deadlocked SALT talks but it discussed them in its Jan. 18 international review. It stated starkly, "If favorable steps are not consistently taken in this direction, all other successes in the development of Soviet-American relations may lose their meaning."

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SALT

1/18/76 NYT

OWN ARMS OFFER REJECTED BY U.S

Move to Ban Mobile ICBM's Was Dropped in '75 After Moscow Accepted It

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 17—The United States last spring turned down one of its own proposals for limiting strategic arms after the Soviet Union had accepted it, according to high Administration officials.

The proposal was to ban mobile intercontinental missiles, which are still in the development stage and would be launched from aircraft or railway cars, trucks, and barges.

Before the Soviet acceptance, the officials said that the consensus in the United States Government was that mobile missiles would be more to Moscow's advantage, because the Soviet Union had a larger territory for concealment. After the Russians agreed, the United States decided that it was more important to keep American options open.

American analysts explained the Soviet shift this way. Moscow decided that it had more to fear from the development of a new American intercontinental missile launched from the C-5A cargo aircraft than it had to gain from going forward with its own land-based mobile missile program.

A Dead Issue Now

The officials said that the ban was a dead issue now. Both sides are accelerating programs to develop mobile missiles. The Administration will spend about $40 million this fiscal year and is expected to ask for about $70 million next fiscal year.

The deployment of land-mobiles may also make future arms control agreements more difficult, the officials said. It will be difficult to know how many there are. They move around and can be camouflaged. If both sides in the future would want to reduce the number of missiles on each side, it would be difficult to verify that the new ceilings were not being violated.

After the Soviet leaders last year reversed their four-year-long rejection of the idea, the officials said Secretary of State [illegible] the plan and decided not to fight for it, the official said. He felt he had other, more important fights to make.

One high official gave his

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events.

"After sitting through the discussions on this after we got the Soviet acceptance, I can only conclude that Schlesinger, Ikle and the Joint Chiefs of Staff went along with putting the ban in our proposal only because they felt the Russians wouldn't buy it."

James R. Schlesinger was Secretary of Defense at that time. Fred C. Ikle is director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Issue of Minuteman Defense

The debate over mobiles began in earnest in 1970. One group, centered mainly in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, then led by Gerard Smith, contended that whenever there was a chance to eliminate new weapons technology, it should be grasped. They also stressed the verification problem. But most Administration studies and meetings did not approach the problem this way.

Discussion on what to do about mobiles came up in the context of what to do about the presumed future vulnerability of the United States Minuteman missile, which are launched from silos and are readily identifiable. The fear was that as Soviet missile accuracy improved and the payload on missiles increased, Moscow would be able to destroy almost every Minuteman.

This would leave the United States with 41 strategic submarines and 450 long-range bombers to hit back at Soviet cities. This was not considered safe enough to fight nuclear wars. A solution had to be found for minuteman vulnerability.

The answer began to focus on making a new version of the Minuteman mobile. But then the debates swung against mobiles for three reasons. First, Americans would not accept and Congress would not approve mobiles roaming around the country. Second, they could be stolen by terrorist groups. Third, the Soviet Union was a bigger place to hide them than the United States.

The ban on mobiles was then incorporated into the American negotiating proposal. To back it up, the Air Force began to test an air-launched intercontinental missile. The idea was that this would be a bargaining chip. If the Russians gave up their landmobiles, the United States would give up its air-mobiles.

When Mr. Kissinger informed the Russians later in the spring that the United States would not accept their acceptance of the American proposal, the officials said, the Russians did not press the point.

Erie County Lays Off 55

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ARMS PACT GIVEN PRIORITY IN SOVIET

Pravda Again Calls Moves to End Nuclear Race Key to U.S.-Russian Aims

By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 18—The Soviet Union indicated today that it considered the achievement of a new agreement on limiting strategic nuclear weapons to be essential to continuing Soviet-American accommodation.

Commenting on Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's visit, scheduled for this week, to try to break the arms deadlock, the official Communist Party newspaper Pravda called "concrete measures" to halt the arms race the best gauge of the "true intentions" of both countries. It said that Moscow was determined to do its part to bring about an arms settlement.

The sober note struck by Pravda in its weekly international review, which lays out Moscow's line on developing events, reflected a concern that had been expressed privately by Soviet insiders over the inability of Moscow and Washington to conclude the offensive weapons agreement that was outlined at the brief Soviet-American summit meeting near Vladivostok almost 14 months ago.

Pravda said that steps to check the arms race had "especially great significance" for Soviet-American détente. "If positive shifts in this direction are not consistently achieved, all other successes in the development of Soviet-American relations can lose their significance," the party newspaper said.

Today's comments, which echoed a tone struck in Washington, underscored the seriousness with which the Kremlin seems to be anticipating Mr. Kissinger's arrival here Tuesday evening. While pledging Moscow's determination to find a solution, Pravda did not indicate any concessions the Soviet Union was prepared to make on the arms issue.

However, the remarks did suggest that Moscow was unwilling [illegible] further until perhaps after the American election. Soviet sources here have appeared aware of the problems of concluding a sensitive arms accord in the

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heat of the American election campaign. At least one Soviet analyst has pointed out that too much delay might make it almost impossible to put a rein on accelerating technological development.

Limits Set at Vladivostok

The agreement outlined at the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974 set a limit of 2,400 delivery vehicles for each side, of which 1,320 could carry multiple independently targeted warheads.

The working out of the agreement by Soviet and American experts has since been blocked on several points, including most recently disagreement over whether a new Soviet bomber and an American cruise missile should be included within the limit. Neither was foreseen in the original agreement.

Soviet military strategists have been reported unwilling to conclude a new accord that does not include the subsonic cruise missile, which can be launched from aircraft or submarines and fly under antimissile radar. Similarly, they believe that the bomber, code-named Backfire by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, should not be counted because it does not have the range to strike at the United States and return to base. American experts have contended that mid-air refueling would make the Backfire a full-fledged delivery system.

The Soviet press has taken a sharper tone on strategic arms limitation recently, to the extent of accusing the Americans of foot-dragging. Several articles have given particular coverage to an essay earlier this month in The New York Times by Townsend Hoopes, former Under Secretary of the Air Force, who charged that Washington had complicated the arms agreement by developing the cruise missile.

Soviet insiders have privately expressed varying hopes for a new arms agreement, which the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, had sought to have in hand in time for the 25th party congress next month. One source found "quiet resignation" about an accord among officials braced for further de-

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lay if he wasn't planning to sign something."

While seeking a new agreement with Mr. Kissinger, the Kremlin does not seem in any mood to give ground on other issues, such as Moscow's military involvement in Angola or its insistence on a new Geneva peace conference on the Middle East.

Commenting on Mr. Kissinger's visit, Pravda asserted that the Soviet Union was "full of determination to do everything that depended on it so that a solution might be found to the problem of limiting strategic offensive weapons and halting the arms race."

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Wash Post 1-20-76

Soviets Hope to Show Progress on SALT

By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Staff Writer

MOSCOW, Jan. 19 — The Soviet Union expects to show "substantial progress" toward a strategic arms limitation agreement in talks this week between U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet sources said today.

The sources, working-level specialists who were briefed by officials from the party's policy-making Central Committee, said Brezhnev may propose a joint document, affirming what has already been achieved over the past year of negotiations, even if a compromise cannot be struck on the principal outstanding issues—the role of the U.S. cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber.

It is not clear exactly how such an interim accord would be handled or how significant a step it would be. But Soviet sources say that Moscow is eager for the talks to demonstrate that progress is being made on the crucial strategic arms question, accenting the positive as much as possible.

Despite the strains of recent months in Soviet-American relations—particularly over the civil war in Angola—the Kremlin evidently still wants a new and important development in superpower ties to take into next month's 25th Communist Party Congress.

The SALT meeting, it is emphasized here, provides the only remaining opportunity for such an accomplishment.

Kissinger is to arrive in Moscow about 8 p.m. Tuesday Moscow time (noon EST). The U.S. Embassy said the talks are not expected to start until Wednesday morning and Kissinger is due to depart at noon on Friday—leaving only two full days for the bargaining.

Moscow's interest in making headway on SALT was underscored in the public comment so far. Prospects for the talks, Pravda, the Communist Party newspaper, said yesterday, are that the Soviet Union is brimming with determination to do everything in its power to insure that a SALT accord is reached."

Checking the strategic arms race, said Pravda, is the "weightiest touchstone" of the Soviet-American pursuit of detente.

The main objective for the negotiations is reaching agreement on all the remaining items in the SALT package, the Soviet sources said.

But if that proves impossible, they said, the Kremlin wants some form of joint statement stressing those areas where progress has been made—hence the suggestion that Brezhnev and his colleagues are preparing what amounts to another "agreement in principle" on SALT that leaves aside unresolved problems for further bargaining.

By disclosing those elements already agreed upon, the new accord could be presented as an advance on the generalized framework for a SALT-II pact devised by Brezhnev and President Ford at Vladivostok in November 1974. That document limited each side to 2,400 strategic missiles and boers, only 1,320 with multiple warheads.

The main obstacle to reaching the overall treaty now, is the continuing Soviet-American differences on whether the Backfire bomber should be equated with the Cruise missile as a strategic weapon and included in the weapon limitations. Both sides have drafted positions aimed at breaking that deadlock, but whether they are compatible will become known only after the talks.

On the other major issue Kissinger has said he will raise with the Soviets, Angola—he will not find as warm a reception.

Sources said that Moscow's support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola remains unchanged. To link Angola to the SALT discussions would only complicate matters, unneccesarily, one Soviet analyst said.

In the privacy of the Kremlin bargaining sessions, however, the Soviets will certainly let Kissinger argue the potential danger to detente Brezhnev and the others offer him nothing promising in return.

No formal agenda has been prepared for the talks, according to Soviet and American sources. But one Russian said that if time permits Brezhnev will bring up the continuing stalemate in U.S.-Soviet trade relations, as well as the mutual balanced force reduction talks in Vienna aimed at reducing East-West armies in Central Europe. Americans also expect the Middle East to be mentioned.

But the success of the sessions, Soviets and Americans here agree, will depend entirely on what happens with SALT.

U.S. Advisers Meet For Review of SALT

The National Security Council met yesterday morning at the White House to make its final review of the new bargaining position in the nuclear arms control talks that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is taking to Moscow.

As is usual, officials did not amplify on the NSC meeting, which Kissinger said last week would "review the bidding" on prospects for breaking the deadlock in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II).

The continuing warfare in Angola, where the United States and the Soviet Union are supporting competing forces, undoubtedly also was considered in the NSC meeting by the President and his principal national security advisers.

Kissinger said last Wednesday that the United States considers the "massive involvement" of the Soviet Union in Angola to be "incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions" and "a wholly unnecessary set-back to the constructive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations."

Nevertheless, Kissinger said, the United States would continue its efforts to overcome the SALT deadlock because "limitation of strategic arms is a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations."

Since Kissinger made those remarks, the position of the U.S.-supported forces in Angola has deteriorated further.

Kissinger's talks in Moscow with Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev and other officials will have major significance for SALT and for Angola.

En route to Moscow, Kissinger will stop in Copenhagen today for talks with Danish leaders. After his Moscow talks, Kissinger on Friday will visit Brussels, to report to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council, and then go to Madrid, before returning to Washington Sunday.

LEONID BREZHNEV ... accentuating the positive

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Kissinger in Moscow for Talks on Arms

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 20—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger arrived in a light snow today for a crucial round of talks with Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, that both sides hope will break the deadlock in negotiations for an accord limiting each side's long-range missiles and bombers.

With the temperature at Vnukovo Airport about 10 below zero, Mr. Kissinger smiled as he greeted Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. Other officials milled around for Soviet and American television before Mr. Kissinger drove to his Soviet government guest villa in the Lenin Hills part of Moscow.

The friendly reception was in contrast to the sharp statements made by Mr. Kissinger on his departure from Washington last night and in Copenhagen this afternoon. He said then that continued Soviet involvement in Angola would impair Soviet-American relations even though the arms control talks would continue.

Met With Danish Leaders

"I am going to make clear to my hosts," he said at Andrews Air Force Base yesterday, "that the United States will not accept Soviet intervention in other parts of the world. Continuation of such measures must lead to a deterioration of Soviet-American relations."

In Copenhagen, where Mr. Kissinger's Air Force jet stopped for fuel and he took four hours out to confer with Danish leaders, Mr. Kissinger said at a news conference that in the Middle East and other fields "cooperation is complicated by the situation in Angola."

But despite his irritation over the Angolan situation, Mr. Kissinger seemed optimistic that significant progrses could be made to overcome the impasse in the arms talks.

A new American negotiating position was sent to Moscow last week in the expectation that Mr. Brezhnev would respond with compromises of his own when talks began in the Kremlin tomorrow.

Pentagon Aide on Team

The impetus for this round of talks came from Mr. Brezhnev in November, reporters on Mr. Kissinger's plane were told, and he remained interested in Mr. Kissinger's coming to Moscow despite the American side's request for a postponement because of the differences within the Administration on what position to take.

The United States proposals were worked out after "spirited" debate, according to one official who participated in the interagency discussions in W[illegible]

Ul[illegible] of having a united negotiating front, a senior Defense Department official has been included for the first time in Mr. Kissinger's team. He is Dr. James P. Wade, who heads the Pentagon's task force on strategic arms limitation.

Dr. Wade, who has generally taken what is regarded as a tough stance against concessions to the Russians, will be able to "report back directly to the Defense Secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," a former Defense Secretary, James R. Schlesinger, the Pentagon complained that Mr. Kissinger did not always keep the defense establishment fully informed.

Moreover, so long as a consensus exists in the American Government on the negotiations, Dr. Wade's participation makes it easier for President Ford to defend any agreement against criticism from conservative critics.

The latest round of negotiations evolves from the accord reached in Vladivostok in November 1974, when Mr. Ford and Mr. Brezhnev outlined an agreement to last from 1977 to 1985 that would limit each side to a total of 2,400 long-range bombers and missiles. Of that total, 1,320 missiles could be capped with multiple warheads.

Final agreement on such an arrangement has been held up in part over the question whether a new Soviet bomber and the American cruise missile, a pilotless aircraft yet to be developed, are to be included under the ceilings.

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1/21/76 NYT 35M

Kissinger's Mission

By James Reston

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20—Late on the night of President Ford's State of the Union address, Secretary of State Kissinger flew to Moscow, and the interesting thing about this mission is that the Soviet Government proposed it, suggested first one date, then a second, and finally negotiated agreement on a third.

Mr. Kissinger went off, on the urging of President Ford, despite the present illness of his wife, professing not to know what the Soviet Government had in mind, but the most likely explanation is that Moscow is concerned about the rising anti-Soviet sentiment in the United States, and in the Presidential election campaign over strategic arms control, the Middle East, and Angola.

The assumption in Washington is that Ambassador Dobrynin and his colleagues in the Soviet Politburo did not urge Mr. Kissinger to come to Moscow in order to humiliate him. This would clearly create a crisis and revive the old spirit of the cold war in the U.S. election debates.

Accordingly, at least on this assumption, there is reason to think that the Soviet Union may be prepared to make some tactical if not substantive concessions to break the stalemate in the strategic arms limitation talks, and avoid deeper involvement as a key issue between Mr. Ford and Ronald Reagan, and between the Republicans and Senator Henry Jackson in the Presidential campaign.

Moscow has never pretended that it was indifferent to the outcome of Presidential elections in the United States. Nikita Khrushchev boasted that he had made moves that might help Jack Kennedy in the election of 1960. Though Richard Nixon was never a favorite of the Soviets, they calculated that he would be re-elected in 1972, and said so, with reckless indiscretion, at the strategic arms talks in Helsinki.

Events affecting the state of the world can often be more important in elections than speeches on the state of the nation. We may not like this—in fact we don't like it at all—but it is a fact. If Mr. Kissinger gets a compromise on the control of nuclear weapons in Moscow this week, especially if it is a genuine move toward limitation of the nuclear arms race, but even if it is a tactical compromise indicating some progress, it will still be a factor in the Presidential debate, and nobody knows this better than President Ford or the Soviets.

Reagan of California is arguing that [illegible] or coexistence with Moscow is a "one-way street" and a fraud in which Washington makes all the concessions and Moscow gets all the technological and political advantages. Scoop Jackson on the Democratic side is making the same argument, with more knowledge of the facts.

Leonid Brezhnev has to go before the Communist Party Congress in a few weeks and Mr. Ford has to go against Mr. Reagan in the New Hampshire primary, defending the policy of détente, and they have a common interest in demonstrating that compromise is better than confrontation and a return to the cold war.

Also, in practical terms, the Soviets can make concessions in the SALT controversy over their Backfire bomber and the U.S. cruise missile, without risking a change in the balance of military power in the world.

The Soviets have the Backfire bomber in production. Our cruise missile, an unmanned remotely controlled weapon, won't be operational for five or six years. Moscow can agree to limit the numbers and bases and refueling capacity of the Backfire so that this bomber will not be a threat to the United States. That is the issue that has been worrying Washington—the freedom to produce the Backfire in unlimited numbers, and base them within striking distance of the United States.

This is an immensely complicated military, scientific and political problem, and nothing said here is meant to suggest that Mr. Kissinger has gone to Moscow, on direction from the President, to ease Mr. Ford's political problems at home.

But to go back to the beginning, it was the Soviets who suggested the Kissinger visit, and a hopeful aspect is that they recognize the drift in American public and political opinion back toward the venomous days of the 40's, 50's and 60's, and feel this is not in their national interest or in ours.

In any event, compromises on the control of nuclear weapons must be submitted to the Congress for approval, and, before they could be put into operation, have to meet the most searching analysis by experts on atomic weapons, like former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Paul Nitze and Gerard Smith, who have been negotiating with the Soviets for years.

Still, even a limited compromise in the Kissinger-Soviet talks this week in Moscow would be a political event in the campaign if nothing else. It would help the President ease the pressure on détente and the Russians, and this may have been what Moscow had in mind by inviting Mr. Kissinger [illegible] place.

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Learning From Arms Talks With the Soviet

By Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr.

ARLINGTON, Va.—The recent statements by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger about the failure of Congress to support his covert policy in Angola adds to the evidence that he fails to understand how policy must work in this democracy.

By failing to report accurately Soviet conduct that is contrary to both the concept and the specific agreements of detente, including the strategic-arms-limitation agreements, he has created a euphoria concerning the state of the relationships between the Soviet Union and United States.

By striving to deal with the symptoms of the disease in Angola instead of dealing with the disease (Soviet policy objectives) itself, Mr. Kissinger insures that the disease will flourish—that is, that Soviet misconduct will increase and proliferate in other areas and with respect to other policy interests, unchecked by realistic United States public opinion.

One area of recent debate, the question of Soviet violations of the first agreement on limiting strategic arms as it was explained by Mr. Kissinger and Government witnesses to the Congress—violations of the deal Congress thought it was approving—is becoming clearer to the public.

In view of the imminent prospect of another step being taken in the march toward a second strategic arms limitation agreement as a result of Secretary Kissinger's current trip to Moscow, the time has come to raise the debate over the arms talks to the relevant issue: What can be learned from the disaster of the earlier interim agreement that can be of use to the American public and the Congress in approaching the prospective new permanent agreement?

The continuing shift in the balance of strategic and conventional forces to the advantage of the Soviet Union is a cause for grave national concern. It is particularly important that the United States objective in strategic arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union be stabilization of nuclear-arms competition on a basis that

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will be consistent with maintaining our security interests.

This means insuring that any agreements negotiated provide for essential equivalence in strategic-force capabilities and keep open to the United States those research-and-development and deployment objectives that are essential to insure continuing equivalence over the long term in competition with a closed society that places a high premium on the acquisition of superior military power.

We must under all circumstances avoid a repetition of our experience in the first arms-limitation agreement in which negotiations against a deadline produced technically imprecise agreements that had seriously detrimental effects on our security.

Recent arguments over the need for the United States to have a strategic cruise missile, and whether or not to make room for this missile by adding to the 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles that each side agreed to at Vladivostok, suggest the need for time for additional public debate on this issue before any deal is signed.

Any agreements reached must be competently drafted and clear on all significant particulars, leaving no room for evasion or circumvention. In addition, they should be adequately verifiable by national technical means. In this respect, the Soviet Union's ability to evade the United States understanding of the intent of the 1972 agreements by deploying large numbers of much heavier missiles, the SS-19; the evidence suggesting Soviet violations of the United States understanding of the antiballistic-missile treaty's provisions relating to agreed ABM test ranges, and to the testing of antiaircraft systems as ABM systems; and Soviet use of decoys and camouflage to interfere with United States national technical means of verification provide an object lesson to the drafters of any future arms-control agreements.

Past performance makes it clear that to continue shifting the strategic balance to its advantage the Soviet Union can be counted on to exploit every weakness of the structure, language and enforceability of such agreements.

I believe it is of the greatest national importance that the President fully inform the Congress and the American public of the deficiencies in the strategic-arms agreements as they have come to light through our observations since 1972 and of the Soviet actions that have succeeded in defeating the key objectives that the Congress and the public were told earlier had been achieved by those agreements.

The President should be frank in discussing Soviet conduct that has been inconsistent with our larger expectations under the 1972 agreements and of the deterioration in United States security that has resulted.

The shifting balance of conventional forces is equally a source of concern. As a result of Congressional cuts in this year's budget appropriations for the Defense Department will be inadequate to correct the disadvantageous and accelerating shift in the balance of conventional forces, which in turn poses substantial risks to the peace of the world and to the security of the American people.

In this regard, rhetorical pledges to

maintain a defense second to none are no substitute for the financial resources essential to make that pledge a reality.

Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. (ret.) was Chief of Naval Operations.

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

Christian Science Monitor 1-22-76

SALT gets last chance in Moscow

Kissinger, Brezhnev also discuss Angola

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Limitation of strategic arms appeared to be the main topic, but Angola also came up in first-day talks between visiting American Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev.

An official Soviet statement issued after the first three hours of talks said only that "discussion has been started on the questions pertaining to the preparation of a new agreement on the limitation of strategic arms." The Americans concurred in the statement, which also said "an exchange of views took place on general issues of Soviet-American relations." It did not specify what any of these other issues were.

Dr. Kissinger, however, informed reporters about one of them — Angola. Before the morning talks began, he and Mr. Brezhnev sparred, in the presence of reporters, about whether Angola would come up in the talks.

In reply to a query, Mr. Brezhnev said he had no questions about Angola. Angola was not his country. Dr. Kissinger asserted the subject would certainly be discussed. Soviet

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Thursday, January 22, 1976

★SALT gets last chance in Moscow

Continued from Page 1

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko reminded Dr. Kissinger that the agenda is always adopted by mutual agreement, and Dr. Kissinger retorted, "Then I'll discuss it!"

On his way to lunch Dr. Kissinger confirmed to reporters that Angola was mentioned in the initial talks.

In his brief exchange with journalists before the first session, Mr. Brezhnev linked his planned visit to the U.S. to a strategic arms agreement. The visit was originally scheduled for last year, but the U.S. did not want a Brezhnev visit without a SALT agreement in hand to sign. Previously, so far as observers recall, the Russians had not acknowledged any link between the two.

Prior to the first session Mr. Brezhnev also said the topic of reduction of military forces in Europe would be considered. Negotiations for mutual agreed military reductions by NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries have been stalled for two years.

The Soviet newspapers have given Dr. Kissinger polite but modest coverage. His photo and a short biography appeared in Izvestia on the evening of his arrival in Moscow Jan. 20. As the talks started Jan. 21, Pravda, the Communist Party organ, noted that Dr. Kissinger came to discuss "problems of mutual interest" and was met at the airport by the Soviet Foreign Minister and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.

The Jan. 21 Pravda sounded a positive note in reporting on a recent Harris public opinion poll showing 60 percent of Americans in favor of continuing Soviet-American SALT talks and two-thirds against a return of the cold war.

The official news agency Tass, in reporting on President Ford's State of the Union Message, highlighted both Mr. Ford's hopes for a new SALT agreement and his proposal for a larger military budget than last year's.

Dr. Kissinger's two and a half days of negotiations in Moscow are widely considered the last opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union to limit the current buildup of strategic weapons before the next generation of weapons takes over. The two sides agreed on broad principles for a "SALT II" accord in Vladivostok 14 months ago, but have bogged down on implementation of the principles since then.

The Soviet newspapers have not yet reported another major topic that is to figure in the bilateral talks this week — the new crisis in Lebanon. They have carried refutation of charges that Syrian Army units entered Lebanon. But as of this writing they have not reported that Palestine Liberation Army units entered Lebanon from Syria and are taking over Christian areas.

Izvestia has reported that fighting in Lebanon reached "the peak of tension" in recent days because of Lebanese Air Force attacks on Muslim positions. Komsomolskaya Pravda on Jan. 21 said there were "permanent armed provocations by the Israeli military and open threats from Tel Aviv."

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Soviet Bomber and U.S. Missile Are Major Arms-Talks Issues

By DREW MIDDLETON

The cards on the arms negotiating table in Moscow this week were a manned Soviet bomber with what some describe as intercontinental striking power and an American missile whose developers say is highly accurate because it is directed by a computer.

These weapons, which would expand the nuclear and conventional potential of the two superpowers, are the Tupolev V-G bomber, code-named the Backfire by the North Atlantic alliance, and the low-flying, subsonic cruise missile, whose ancestor was the German V-1, or buzz bomb, of World War II.

The Russians are already deploying the Backfire, whose development, followed a trail blazed by the American aerospace industry. It is the first Soviet weapon that has such a long range because of its ability to be refueled in flight.

For the cruise missile, the Americans are developing a comparatively economical system that would significantly increase the abilities of the Air Force and Navy, but is not considered in the Pentagon as a first-strike strategic weapon.

Second-Strike Threat

Pentagon sources suggest that because of their accuracy, mobility, and ultimate deployment in large numbers, the cruise missiles would represent a second-strike threat against the Soviet Union.

At issue in the Moscow talks was wether the Backfire and the cruise missile were to be counted against the ceilings for nuclear delivery systems set at the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974.

Apparently the issue proved too complicated and far-reaching for complete solution in the Moscow negotiations that ended Thursday. Some points in regard to the position of the Backfire bomber and the long-range cruise missile in the Soviet-American strategic relationship were resolved but others, according to United States officials, remained subject to negotiation.

At Vladivotok, the Rusians and Americans set a limit of 2,400 on long-range missiles and bombers and provided that 1,320 of these vehicles could be equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads.

Diplomatic sources in Washington reported before Secretary Kissinger's trip that both sides were prepared to make concessions on the two key weapons.

The Soviet Union, it was said, would limit Backfire to tactical rather than strategic bases. This was interpreted by military analysts to mean that the bombers would be based at fields deep in Soviet territory from which it could support Soviet ground and naval forces on the periphery of Europe or Asia but from which it could not carry out intercontinental strikes.

Another reported concession was that Backfire would not be fitted with refueling probes. Military analysts say that the first squadrons to reach the Soviet air and naval air forces have been fitted with such probes.

The United States, on its part, the report said, would limit the range of cruiser missiles so that these would pose no threat to targets in the interior of the Soviet Union.

As weapons systems, the Backfire and the cruise missile are widely dissimilar. The common factor is that each expands the over-all nuclear potential.

The time element, in the view of Pentagon sources, is also important. The Backfire already has been deployed with squadrons of the Soviet Air Force and Naval Air Force in Eastern Europe. At the present stage of development, it will be at least two years, perhaps three, before any cruise missiles are delivered to the United States Air Force and Navy.

Refueling Cone Fitted

The Backfire-B, the second version of the aircraft is believed by North Atlantic intelligence to have a non-refueled maximum combat radius of 3,670 miles (A flight refueling nose probe has been fitted and Backfire is now considered by Western sources as an intercontinental bomber.

In strategic terms this means that a Backfire could fly from the Soviet Union to the United States, refueling en route, attack and return. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, the standard reference work, reports that it was originally designed for a speed of 1.25 to 1.5 times the speed of sound. [illegible] The engines may be Kuznetsov turbofans similar to those in the TU-144, the Soviet supersonic airliner.

The development of the bomber apparently was one of the most difficult programs faced by the Soviet aerospace industry since World War II. It took at least 10 years and was beset by many problems.

Work began before the death of Andrei N. Tupolev, in 1972. As a leading figure in the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute in Zhukovsky, outside Moscow, Mr. Tupolev was responsible for outstanding innovations from propeller-driven sleds to the first Soviet supersonic transport aircraft.

His son, Aleksei A. Tupolev, is now the head of the Tupolev bureau in the institute and is regarded by Western intelligence sources as the chief designer of the Backfire.

The first model fell short of its designed speed and range. It was first tested in 1970 when a prototype was observed near the Tupolev plant in Kazan, on the Volga River.

Second Model Deployed

After changes in the landing gear and the installation of a refueling probe, the second model was tested and sent to Soviet squadrons.

Backfire is believed to carry the full range of Soviet free-fall weapons, air-to-surface missiles and decoy missiles to help penetrate defense systems.

The cruise missile owes its importance mainly to its potential as a highly accurate pilotless aircraft.

Its disadvantages are that it is not fast and would be vulnerable to interception.

This may be balanced by its versatility. It can be launched from a land installation, an aircraft, a surface vessel or a submarine. The maximum range has been reported to be well over 3,300 miles from land, 1,200 miles from the air and 1,500 miles from the sea.

As a low-altitude missile, the weapon will operate in most instances beneath the Soviet radar scan. Moreover, radar will not be able to distinguish between a cruise missile with a nuclear warhead, or one conventionally armed.

The initial estimates are that cruise missiles would be cheap to develop and produce, compared with other weapons systems. The Defense Department asked for $168 million for the air-launched version and $336 million for the sea-launched model in 1975 and 1976. The Navy's figures are higher because it is developing both a strategic and a tactical weapon.

The New York Times

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

U.S. Department of Defense

An artist's conception of Backfire, the Soviet bomber

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SOVIET PROPOSES PLAN TO RESOLVE ARMS PACT SNAG

Suggests Cutting Ceiling on Missiles and Bombers but Excluding Its Backfire

KISSINGER IS OPTIMISTIC

Progress Also Reported on U.S. Weapon—Much Work on Accord Still Ahead

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

BRUSSELS, Jan. 23 — The Soviet Union has proposed to the United States a new approach to resolve the issues still holding up a treaty limiting each side's strategic bomber and missile forces, American officials said today.

Reporters traveling with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger from Moscow this morning were told that the Russians had elaborated their plan to take care of one of the more controversial problems—whether to include the new Soviet bomber, known in the West as the Backfire, in the over-all force level of 2,400 missiles and bombers agreed upon in Vladivostok 14 months ago.

Under the new Soviet proposal, the maximum force would be reduced from 2,400

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to 2,100 or 2,200, but the Backfire would not be counted. This would meet Soviet insistence that the bomber not be included as a strategic delivery vehicle, while meeting American concern that the deployment of the new hundred of the bombers would increase Soviet strength over the 2,400 limit. The Backfire has been described by the Pentagon as capable of carrying out missions against the United States.

Progress on Cruise

Major progress was also reported on handling the American cruise missile, although on this question as well as on the Backfire much work still has to be done, and new proposals formulated in Washington. Mr. Kissinger, before leaving Moscow, called the new ideas "significant and constructive."

Although Mr. Kissinger said at a news conference here after briefing allied ministers that he was pleased by the results of the arms control talks during his three days in Moscow, he apparently made no headway in persuading Soviet leaders to reduce Russian or Cuban involvement in Angola. Reporters were told that the Cubans now had nearly 11,000 troops fighting in Angola.

The Kissinger mission also fell short of achieving the agreement in principle on arms control that had been the maximum goal. But this was explained by American officials as the result of the unexpected

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Associated Press

Knut Frydenlund, Norwegian Foreign Minister, straightens tie of Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, as David K. E. Bruce, the U.S. envoy to NATO, observes. Scene was the NATO meeting in Brussels, where Mr. Kissinger reported on his conversations with Soviet leaders. The tie-straightening was turnabout for the same thing last December.

Soviet Offers a Plan to Spur Arms Pact

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

Soviet approach unveiled by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, to Mr. Kissinger during their final four-hour meeting at the Kremlin last night.

The Brezhnev ideas, worked out by the Politburo during the day, were described as so sweeping and unexpected that they would require close study in Washington before leaving Mr. Kissinger said, "We will reply in a few weeks and then continue the negotiations."

Reply to Dobrynin

He is expected to convey the American response to Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in Washington and will probably return to Moscow for further negotiations, if so.

American officials said that the results of the last days had underscored that only Mr. Brezhnev could actually negotiate on strategic-arms limitation. Other Soviet officials, such as Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, have in the past not been given enough negotiating leeway to do more than present a proposal and defend it, thereby making negotiations a longer process.

By going to Moscow, reporters were told, Mr. Kissinger can exchange proposals over several days. Mr. Brezhnev was supported as usual by several generals and experts who advise him on military matters.

[illegible] Mr. Brezhnev, as head of the ruling Politburo, does not risk allowing anyone else to deal with [illegible] also allows him to take personal credit for a settlement.

Reporters traveling with Mr. Kissinger were not given all the details of the Moscow negotiations, but some main points were divulged. Mr. Kissinger briefed allied foreign ministers and envoys on the Moscow discussions headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

German, Dutch and other spokesmen affirmed that the Americans were now much more optimistic about concluding the arms-limitation accord, although no progress was made on Angola.

Negotiations on the details of the accord that Mr. Brezhnev and President Ford had agreed upon in outline in Vladivostok in November 1974 had been stalled for four months.

In Vladivostok, the leaders set a total limit of 2,400 bombers and missiles each side. Of that total, each side could have 1,320 missiles with independently targeted multiple warheads. But problems arose on what bombers and missiles to include in the totals. According to Mr. Kissinger, good progress has been made on these problems.

The Americans had insisted that the new Soviet bomber, the Backfire, had to be included. The Russians refused to agree, asserting that it was a medium bomber, not meant to attack the United States. Moscow in turn demanded that the new American technological development, a small, low-flying pilotless aircraft known as the cruise missile, had to be included if its range exceeded 360 miles.

Since this missile is to be an integral part of the armaments for the American bomber force over the next decade, the United States has resisted, claiming that only ballistic missiles—those that fly beyond the atmosphere at supersonic speeds—should be included.

The Americans would like the aging B-52 bombers to have cruise missiles, at ranges of [illegible] and fire them. Without these penetration aids, the B-52's would be easy targets for Soviet anti-aircraft guns. The Pentagon also plans to use cruise missiles in the B-1 now being developed, although that bomber presumably can penetrate more easily into Soviet air space.

The following developments, some new momentum to the negotiations, occurred in Moscow:

The Soviet Union agreed that bombers could carry 15 to 20 cruise missiles with a range of about 1,500 miles and that the cruises would not be counter against the 2,400 total. Rather, the bomber would be counted as only one unit against the total and would also be regarded as the equivalent of one of the 1,320 missiles carrying multiple warheads. American officials said that agreement was near on this issue.

Progress was not made on cruise missiles that would be fired from surface ships or submarines, American officials said. The Russians still want all such missiles to be counted beyond the 360-mile range and have not agreed to the concept accepted for aircraft.

The Russians proposed the over-all cut in force levels from 2,400 to 2,100 or 2,200, to allow for the backfire, without acknowledging that the Backfire was a strategic bomber. There would have to be additional restraints, such as insuring that it would not be de- [illegible] United States has planned a force level of only 2,200, so the reduction would not be a set-

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competition in only six states. This year, however, there are very few instanc[illegible] sufficient strength to avert a full scale Reagan-Ford showdown. One place where head-to-head contests may not come off is New York, where the state GOP has been under Nelson Rockefeller's thumb for nearly two decades. Another is Texas which probably belongs to John Connally. Neither prospect is particularly encouraging for Ford.

Several GOP primaries will be held for the first time this year in Southern states, places where the Republican party's organization is embryonic. In Arkansas, Alabama and Mississippi, for example, there is a very slim base of local, state or even federal officeholders; there the Republican party organizations amount to the state and national officers and not much more. Within the GOP, there are two schools of thought about how the six to eight Southern primaries will affect the Ford-Reagan contest. Some argue that the Republican party electorate in the deep South amounts to a distilled essence and will be Reagan to the core. Others say that the Southern primaries will arguably give President Ford a better shot than would caucus-convention arrangements at winning delegates in the heartland of Reagan country.

Assessments vary about the relative strength of the two men among organization Republicans, but it is probably fair to say that Ford holds a clear edge with GOP officeholders—particularly among his old colleagues in Congress—and Reagan is stronger at lower levels of the party. To date, Reagan has attracted endorsements and assistance only from freshman US Senators Jesse Helms (North Carolina) and Paul Laxalt (Nevada) and a few conservative representatives.

But the Ford campaign has apparently rejected the idea of attempting to blunt the effects of the Reagan [illegible] here and there as favorite sons or stand-ins for the President. Voters in recent presidential primaries have developed a notable inclination to vote for bona fide candidates, not uncommitted organization slates or favorite sons. One Republican senator, a natural as a stand-in, admits he's cautious: "When the going gets tough, it's possible for a stand-in to get touched up a little in his home state." Few are inclined to underestimate Reagan's potential right now.

Primaries attract activists. In the GOP, that segment has shown an ideological bent to the right, toward Reagan. Rep. William Steiger of Wisconsin, a Ford supporter who chaired the National Republican party's reform commission, says flatly, "The activists will be for Reagan."

By all estimates lower level GOP organization types —county chairmen and the like—are more conservative now than when Barry Goldwater launched his blitz in 1964, but they are also hoping that it will all be decided before it comes time for them to make a choice. Sen. Charles Mathias of Maryland, who recently ended his own presidential bid on grounds that any efforts he made to line up support among moderate Republicans would merely "put water on Reagan's wheel," puts it this way: "Organization people are reluctant to abandon an incumbent President. What they do about it—whether they work to protect him—is the important thing." Most are waiting for the outcomes in New Hampshire, Florida and Illinois to decide that question.

Those primaries will also decide whether Gerald Ford can finally settle into his job or whether America will face a full year with an unelected, obviously lame-duck President.

Ken Bode

Unruly Bombers, Unseen Missiles

[illegible] 1/24/76

Upsetting SALT II

by Peter J. Ognibene

After President Ford met General Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivostok in November 1974, a new strategic arms limitation agreement seemed imminent. The *aide-memoire* resulting from that meeting established an upper limit of 2400 strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, of which no more than 1320 of the latter could be equipped with multiple warheads capable of being directed independently to different targets. Administration spokesmen, notably Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, created the impression that the few remaining issues in dispute could be resolved in short order.

There has, however, been no SALT II agreement, but Kissinger is slated to go to Moscow this week to see if

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one can be worked out. The weapons which at the time of Vladivostok seemed quite insignificant: the Soviet Backfire bomber and the American strategic cruise missile.

Depending on one's interpretation, the Backfire is either a medium-range bomber for fighting wars on the periphery of the Soviet Union or a strategic weapon that threatens the United States. The reports of three Secretaries of Defense have been ambiguous. Melvin Laird speculated that the Backfire was an intercontinental bomber. His successor, Elliot Richardson, did not rule out such a role but concluded that "the weight of evidence favors the view that it is best suited for peripheral attack" (*viz.*, against China or Europe). Finally James Schlesinger emphasized the bomber's putative strategic role but admitted that its actual purpose remained "an open question. We must await evidence from basing, operational and training patterns, or tanker development before we can confidently judge whether the Soviets intend the Backfire for intercontinental missions and, if so, to what extent."

In a few weeks the new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, will weigh in with the Pentagon's latest assessment. Perhaps additional evidence will permit him to speak more definitively than his predecessors, but that seems unlikely. For one thing, the physical characteristics of the plane are not going to change: with arctic bases and in-flight refueling, the Backfire could reach American targets, thus making it in fact a strategic weapon.

Capabilities do not ineluctably beget intentions. Both the United States and Soviet Union, for instance, are technologically capable of building miniaturized nuclear "suitcase bombs," but neither has apparently perceived any reason to do so. Unlike the United States, which glorified strategic air power in the 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet military doctrine has tended to downplay the importance of long-range bombers and emphasize, instead, tactical aircraft as an adjunct to highly mobile land armies. Thus in Soviet eyes the Backfire may be essentially an efficient type of long-range artillery to prepare the battlefield for armor and infantry, much as massed Soviet guns pulverized the Nazis in World War II to pave the way for the Red Army.

The Soviet Union may communicate its actual intentions for the Backfire, as Schlesinger suggested, by its choice of bases, tankers and mode of operation. The United States would prefer to include the bomber under the Vladivostok ceiling, but the Soviet Union has resisted that idea for at least two reasons. First it considers the plane a tactical weapon, and second, more to the point, it is hoping to get some American concessions on aircraft in Western Europe: the so-called US forward-based systems (FBS). The American position has been that FBS is properly a subject for the multilateral force reduction talks between the NATO and the bilateral SALT forum.

Thus the Backfire dilemma seems likely to be resolved only if the United States and Soviet Union can reach agreement on limiting its deployment. If the USSR decides not to modernize or enlarge its antiquated tanker fleet of some 50 aircraft and instead restricts the bomber to southern bases, it would clearly pose no strategic threat to the United States. (China might be concerned however.) But even this might not completely resolve the issue.

Although SALT is bilateral in that the United States and Soviet Union are the only participants, the negotiating process itself is many-sided. Just getting the diverse collection of agencies within the executive branch—from the somewhat dovish Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the hawkish Joint Chiefs of Staff—to reach a common negotiating position is a complex and often frustrating exercise. But even if those obstacles and others posed by the Soviet negotiators can be overcome, the congressional ratification process remains to be dealt with. Indeed the offensive arms limitation agreement concluded by Nixon and Brezhnev four years ago was almost derailed by Sen. Henry M. Jackson and like-minded legislators who believed the Soviet Union had won an unacceptable advantage.

Because southern-based bombers can become northern-based simply by flying north, a SALT II agreement that doesn't limit the number of Backfires, even if it does restrict their deployment, may be unacceptable to Jackson and others who have influence in such matters. Consequently it would be wise for the administration to work hard now to involve Congress in its current negotiating efforts and, particularly, in any new initiatives. But that apparently is not being done. Kissinger has refused repeated requests to testify before Jackson's subcommittee on arms control and may well have to pay for this slight if and when he goes to Capitol Hill with a new arms control accord. As the presidential campaign heats up, SALT II could become a target of political opportunity.

News reports and analyses of the SALT II deadlock have attempted to link the Soviet Backfire to American cruise missiles, but they are—or at least ought to be—separable issues. Resolving one will not automatically

Where was TRB?

Due to an oversight, TRB's column which was to run in the issue dated January 17 was never forwarded to the printer. Be assured that TRB is well, Reagan-watching in the Northeast. When we told TRB what had happened, he said, "It's your loss." And that of our readers, for which we apologize. TRB appears in this issue as usual.

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resolve the other, and of clearly the more perplexing and, in the long run, the more dangerous.

The United States once deployed jet-powered, cruise missiles on submarines; but they were inefficient, inaccurate, inordinately large and could be fired only when the boats surfaced. After the navy went to sea with its Polaris fleet, which could launch ballistic missiles while remaining underwater, the service declared cruise missiles obsolete and deactivated them. The Pentagon's resurgent interest arose not out of any need for this type of weapon but out of the advance of technology. Improvements in miniaturized circuitry, accuracy, propulsion and warheads have made it possible to build nuclear-tipped cruise missiles which can be launched from the wing racks of air force bombers and from standard, 21-inch, submarine torpedo tubes. Defense officials have cited no present or projected Soviet threat to rationalize these weapons; rather, it seems to be a case *par excellence* of the technological imperative: it can be built; *ergo*, it must be built.

The navy and air force programs are currently in "advanced development," with preliminary flight tests scheduled to start soon. The Soviet Union, according to the testimony of Pentagon officials, is not known to be building strategic cruise missiles; so this is not a case of tit for tat. However it may be the administration's latest variant of the "bargaining chip" approach to arms negotiations.

According to several press accounts, the United States has linked its development of cruise missiles to a resolution of the Backfire question. The Soviet Union has rejected this effort at "linkage" and may have complicated matters further by raising the thorny FBS issue. Some reports indicate the United States has proposed that cruise missiles not be limited under the Vladivostok ceiling which, if true, would be nothing less than a prescription for a new and potentially uncontrollable arms race.

The SALT I agreements were possible only because they could be verified by "national technical means," *i.e.*, reconnaissance satellites. Bomber bases can be photographed, missile silos can be counted, and ballistic-missile submarines can be tallied while they are being built. The United States can calculate with precision the size and character of its adversary's strategic arsenal; the Soviets do likewise by subscribing to *Aviation Week*. Thus each side can verify with confidence any ceiling on bombers and ballistic missiles. But if cruise missiles were deployed those reconnaissance satellites would be useless for verification.

The problem in a nutshell is this: bombers, submarines and ICBMs require major facilities which can be detected by satellites; cruise missiles do not. They can be deployed—indeed, *hidden* is a better word—on conventional submarines, surface vessels, aircraft, reported that the Soviet Union had tested cruise missiles, the government would be forced to assume that virtually every Soviet ship, large aircraft and ground force within 1200 to 2000 miles of the United States or an American ally were armed with these nuclear weapons. If a SALT II agreement excludes cruise missiles and the United States proceeds to develop and produce them, the Soviet Union will almost certainly follow suit. Once both sides have successfully tested such weapons, there would be no way to verify any subsequent accord limiting them. To police such an agreement would require on-site inspections of Soviet bases and forces by American or international teams, but the Soviet Union has consistently opposed such inspections as "spying" and is likely to in the future. The only effective way to ban cruise missiles, then, is not to build them; once they have been successfully tested, it will be too late.

In these pages last year, Tad Szulc raised some important questions concerning Soviet compliance with the SALT accords ("Soviet Violations of the SALT Deal: Have We Been Had?" *TNR*, June 7, 1975). Since then, the secret testimony given by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger last March has been declassified and made public. Although Schlesinger testified that "the Soviet Union has been, and today is, in compliance with the terms of the SALT agreements," he pointed to certain "ambiguities" and suggested that "one could expect the Soviets to tread at the limits of the provisions of the SALT agreements." He was, by implication, critical of Kissinger's use of "unilateral statements" in SALT I when both sides could not reach agreement on key points. The implied lesson was clear; only language mutually agreed upon will be binding on the Soviet Union. Unilateral statements by the United States are only so much whistling in the dark.

Resolving the present SALT II deadlock will not require another high-wire act by Kissinger so much as some hard-headed statecraft. The first order of business, it seems to me, is to separate the Backfire and cruise missile issues; linking them makes no strategic sense: it just complicates an already difficult situation. However the United States will have set an unfortunate precedent if the Backfire is permitted to escape all control. The plane need not necessarily be counted under the Vladivostok ceiling of 2400 strategic bombers and ballistic missiles so long as the number and deployment of the Backfire and its support elements (primarily tankers) preclude it, for all practical purposes, from entering the strategic arsenal. Although the Backfire would be only a marginal addition to Soviet firepower in any event, if it were stationed in arctic bases within range of American targets, it would be in fact a strategic weapon. To omit it from the 2400 limitation in that instance would not be arms control but arms build-up.

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The Soviet Union leads the United States in anti-ship missiles, which are short-range, nonnuclear cruise missiles. The strategic cruise missile, however, is entirely an American initiative: we turned it on and we can turn it off. Indeed, if we encourage the Soviet Union to match our efforts, it would ultimately work to our disadvantage because so much of our population is situated close to blue water whereas most Soviet urban centers are well inland. If cruise missiles are permitted to proliferate, we may soon have reason to fear that the holds of Russian fishing trawlers contain cargoes more potent than tuna.

Boston Desegregation, Part II

Busing the Powerless

by Joseph Featherstone

It's clear in Boston in 1976 that the era in which race was thought of as a Southern dilemma is long dead and gone. The issues are American, not Southern. Schools in the most defiantly resistant Black Belt counties in Mississippi and Alabama have desegregated, while Boston is in turmoil. Times of defeated ideals make people especially sensitive to hypocrisy, and the symbolism in Boston's present resistance has not escaped many observers. Massachusetts has a liberal and progressive reputation, which in many ways it deserves. Sen. Brooke is the first black to sit in the US Senate since 1881, and recent Massachusetts leaders have by and large presented a decent set of faces to the world. Much Massachusetts liberalism has taken on an abstract, ceremonial and symbolic cast in recent years however. There are signs that the progressive promises of recent years are about to be reneged on. Budget problems have mounted. There are pickets at the State House protesting slashing cuts in all the social services. The governor and the legislature are dumping people off the welfare rolls and cutting off money for medical care; long lines of unemployed stand outside the state offices. The temptation to opt for a reactionary populism is enormous.

Boston, too, has a reputation as a civilized place. Visitors think of it as a repository—perhaps museum would be a better word—for a good many ideals about American life, education and culture. Some of the Bicentennial visitors may picture it as the home of the abolitionists, which is accurate so long as you remember that Garrison preached an end to slavery here, at the clear risk of his neck. The fact that mobs spat on Sen. Edward Kennedy because of his stand on busing is difficult to square with the ideal of Boston and its past, or, for that matter, with the legendary love affair between the Kennedys and the Boston Irish. Yet it was in Boston the other day that someone firebombed the old Kennedy home, birthplace of JFK, scrawling "Bus Teddy" on the sidewalk outside. The desegregation issue has done a lot to wedge apart liberal elites and the constituency for egalitarian change. Busing may yet inaugurate a new national era of fake, reactionary populism of the sort symbolized by the paradox of Gov. Wallace's popular appeal and his tax program for the state of Alabama, which enriches the corporations.

The desegregation issue has become badly tangled. The attack on the legally mandated Jim Crow dual systems of the South is now almost complete. Southern desegregation has worked well in some places, and badly in others. Some systems in the South are turning into models of race relations that pose a shameful contrast to a good deal of what is happening in the North. Others got rid of dual schools by firing all black teachers. Extending the law to the North proved to be difficult. For a long time, the lawyers were bogged down in the distinctions between *de jure* and *de facto* segregation. Old-fashioned Southern segregation was a matter of law and official policy, whereas Northern-style segregation was the product of extra-legal forces, the housing market and so on, and therefore beyond legal remedies involving the schools. Or so thinking ran. By 1970, however, civil rights lawyers began persuading the lower federal courts to give much more detailed scrutiny to the facts of urban segregation outside the South. The notion that a clear line separated *de jure* and *de facto* segregation has not in fact stood the test of evidence. Lawyers representing black plaintiffs in many cities outside the South have been able to show that a good deal of segregation is the result

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NYT 1-25-76

Arms Cheating May Be A Matter of Interpretation

By JOHN W. FINNEY

WASHINGTON —, Between initial ambiguities in draftsmanship, overselling by the Administration and political rivalries, the initial euphoria over the 1972 strategic arms agreements has disintegrated into a debate over whether the Soviet Union is cheating the United States.

It is in great contrast to the heady atmosphere that prevailed less than four years ago in Moscow, when the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a treaty sharply limiting antiballistic missile defense systems and an interim, five-year agreement limiting the offensive missiles each side could possess. The doubts followed Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to Moscow last week as he sought to complete a new longer-term strategic arms agreement with apparently limited success.

In 1972, the emphasis was upon how the two sides finally had slowed the atomic arms race and should now be able to make reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Almost as importantly, the two sides had reached their agreements by getting around the previous obstacle on inspections by deciding that it would be sufficient to rely upon national means of verification.

Now the preoccupation, at least politically in the United States, is whether the Soviet Union can be trusted to comply with the 1972 agreements and also in the future agreement the two sides fitfully have been trying to reach to plan a new ceiling on offensive strategic weapons.

For the last year, particularly from the political right, charges have been made that the Soviet Union has been violating the 1972 agreements. They were started by the former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, and Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, the former Chief of Naval Operations, neither of whom were great fans of Mr. Kissinger who negotiated the agreements. They have been picked up by Senator Henry M. Jackson, who has Presidential ambitions, and there are indications they will become a détente-related issue in the political campaign.

The charges have produced indignation in Moscow. The Kremlin, in an article in Pravda, denied that it had violated the agreements and suggested it had doubts about American compliance.

The Soviet Union has been accused of violating the spirit if not the letter of the agreements by deploying a new class of heavy intercontinental missiles known as SS-19's, by testing antiaircraft radars in an antiballastic missile manner, by constructing new silos which could be used by intercontinental missiles, by covering some submarine construction pens and missile test areas, and by constructing a new antiballistic missile radar on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

It has been as difficult for the critics to prove the charges as it has been for the Administration, caught up in self-imposed secrecy, to disprove them. The difficulty in establishing a case one way or the other is that the agreements, in their technical complexity and correspondingly

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selves to c

said last June that the Soviet Union has "not violated the [Strategic Arms Limitations] Agreement, nor used any loopholes." Mr. Ford may have overstated his case; at least, he left himself open to the counter-charge by Admiral Zumwalt, seconded by Senator Jackson, that Mr. Kissinger had drafted agreements with enough loopholes "to drive a truck through."

In some cases, the evidence of Soviet violations is ambiguous. For example, intelligence agencies recently raised the possibility that the Soviet Union was using laser beams to blind the early detection satellites of the United States. It turned out that the satellites were picking up not laser beams but the flares of gas pipelines that had exploded.

Mostly, however, the difficulty lies in the ambiguity of the terms of the agreement, some of which were hastily worked out by Mr. Kissinger in the final, frantic hours of negotiations. For example, the testing of the anti-aircraft radars, which is generally acknowledged within the Administration came close to a technical violation. The agreement specifies that the radars can not be tested in "an antiballistic missile mode," a provision designed to prevent the upgrading of anti-aircraft defenses into missile defenses. But the agreement also permits radars to be tested for range instrumentation purposes. Naturally, the Soviets contended they were just calibrating and testing the radars. However, once the United States raised the issue in the Standing Consultative Committee, created to consider violations, the testing stopped.

Some of the ambiguities have apparently been cleared up in last week's talks. That apparently applies, for example, to the SS-19 missiles, which had been a particularly disturbing development under the interim agreement. In case of the SS-19's, Mr. Kissinger had not been able to get Soviet agreement on the terms and relied upon unilateral interpretations by the United States of what the agreements meant. The initial accord specified that neither side would convert light missiles into heavy missiles under the numerical limitations, but they were unable to agree on what was light and what was heavy. As a result, the United States declared unilaterally that it would regard any missile "significantly" heavier than the largest light missile then in operation in the Soviet Union, namely the SS-11, to be a heavy missile.

It is generally agreed within the Administration that the Soviet SS-19 missile is about 50 percent heavier than the SS-11, which meant that the Soviet Union was not complying with the unilateral interpretation of the United States. But since that interpretation was unilateral, it could still be contended that the Soviet Union was not violating the agreemen. The matter was apparently resolved last week with the SS-19's being substituted for the SS-11's.

During Congressional hearings on the agreements, Mr. Kissinger conveyed the impression that Soviet noncompliance with the unilateral interpretations would, or could be construed as Soviet violations of the agreements. As he retreated from that position, he exposed himself to the charge by Admiral Zumwalt and Senator Jackson that the Soviet Union violated the agreements as they were explained to Congress and the United States acquiesced in th Soviet circumvention.

More is at stake than the personal credibility of Mr. Kissinger, who at times seemed to have been driven into being an apologist for Soviet actions. Ultimately what is at stake is public credibility in future strategic arms agreements and with the whole

raising the charges is to obstruct future agreements, including the one Mr. Kissinger now seeks, and détente. If the public comes to believe that the Soviet Union is violating the 1972 agreements, then it will be that much more difficult to sell Congress on any new agreement.

John W. Finney reports on military affairs for The New York Times.

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Wash Post 1-25-76

New SALT Proposals Face Tests

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

MADRID, Jan. 24—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger returns to Washington Sunday with innovations on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms negotiations that are certain to have an impact in current American politics.

The proposals Kissinger is carrying from his Moscow talks require "a helluva lot of work" inside the Ford administration to determine if they can be converted into a new Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) accord, one American official said. Inevitably, there will be intense internal debate. The consequences will rebound in the Presidential campaign, as a plus or minus for President Ford.

New information about the exchanges between Kissinger and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev became available as Kissinger arrived here from Brussels to formalize a unique defense relationship with Spain.

Many details of the Moscow talks are still secret. The information that is obtainable is coming from sources who believe they have achieved significant advances in the deadlocked SALT bargaining. These proposals now will face the test of challenge in the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill, and in the primary elections, as further facts seep out in the infighting that always surrounds this volatile subject.

From what can now be pieced together on this most complex issue in U.S.-Soviet relations, the following new departures will be under discussion in the 14-month-long negotiations, if "present negotiating trends continue":

News Analysis

The Soviet Union, for reasons described as partially clear and partially obscure to U.S. negotiators, agreed to consider lowering the ceiling on the total numbers of intercontinental nuclear missiles and bombers set by President Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974. That ceiling was 2,400 weapons for each nation.

What the Kremlin would get includes an agreement that its new bombers, known as the Backfire, would not be counted in the reduced ceiling figure, which could drop by several hundred, to perhaps 2,200 or 2,100 or any other agreed figure. The Soviet Union also would get a range limitation of about 1,500 miles on air-launched cruise missiles which the United States has the lead in developing. The Kremlin had sought to limit these missiles to a range of 375 miles.

The United States would obtain limitations, which Brezhnev reportedly now has put into writing, that the Soviet Backfire cannot be used at ranges long enough to strike the United States. The Kremlin insists it is not intended for that purpose. This would have to be accompanied by restrictions on the [illegible] disposition and refueling of the Backfire to reinforce the Soviet assurances.

With air-launched cruise [illegible] permitted up to a 1,500-mile range, the United States would have the [illegible]

See SALT, A7, Col. 1

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SALT Proposals Face Challenges

SALT, From A1

theory, at least, to hit many targets inside the Soviet Union with this new weapon if it can penetrate Soviet air defenses. It could not reach deep in Soviet territory, however.

Each American bomber carrying cruise missiles would be counted as only one weapon for against the Vladivostok arms ceilings of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles, rather than having each of the many missiles aboard the bombers counted against that ceiling as the Soviet Union once demanded. Each bomber can carry 12 to 20 cruise milliles, which are similar to pilotless jet aircraft. Each bomber also would be counted as one weapon in the Vladivostok sub-ceiling of 1,320 on a side for weapons with multiple warheads.

Both nations, under this approach, would not only remove the central barrier to completing a SALT accord, but by reducing nuclear ceilings downward by several hundred from the planned 2,400 level, they would have a modest start toward actual nuclear arms reductions. This is more costly to the Soviet Union initially than to the United States, for the present Soviet arms level is about 2,600 weapons, while the United States level is below 2,400.

Numerous obstacles remain to be overcome in the present SALT stalemate, even if all of the objectives cited above materialize.

The largest disagreement, in the judgment of State Department officials in Kissinger's delegation, is on sea-launched, long-range cruise missiles fired from ships or submarines — a counterpart of the air weapon.

The Defense Department is especially anxious that sea-launched cruise missiles be permitted in the projected SALT accord, which would run for 10 years. The Soviet Union still insists that any sea-launched missile with a range of over 375 miles must be counted against the Vladivostok strategic arms ceilings.

There is a fundamental strategic difference in such a range restriction. The Soviet Union, which has considerable short-range sea-launched cruise missiles under a 375-mile range, can use them from ships or submarines relatively close to the Unites States to hit concentrated targets all along the American east and west [illegible] targets.

U.S. sources declined to forecast how this issue might be compromised, if at all.

Even apart from this problem, it virtually requires a computer to work out some of the variations in mixes of weons that might result from this new approach.

Some of the arguments to come can be foreseen. Critics will argue that the Soviet Backfire bomber should be counted, assurances or not, and that the reduction in total numbers of missiles and bombers on each side is only a juggling of numbers.

Sources in Kissinger's party say that, on the contrary, any reduction will mean an actual and "significant" cut in the existing Soviet mix of 2,400 intercontinental bombers and land and sea-launched missiles.

The United States, these sources say, would have preferred a lower ceiling than 2,400 to start with, and can readily absorb a cut of several hundred in the total number for the following reasons:

At the end of the originally-projected 1985 period for the SALT II accord, these sources said, the U.S. nuclear modernization program will show 1,000 land-based Minuteman missiles, 496 submarine-launched Poseidon nuclear missiles, 240 Trident missiles, if Congress fully authorizes the projected 10 Trident long-range submarines, and an equal number, 240, new B-1 bombers, if Congress approves that many. This makes a total of 1,976 missiles and bombers.

Added to this, these sources say, the United States could retain whatever number of older B-52 bombers it decides to keep operating, and come out with a total figure of 2,200 or less.

Why did the Soviet Union agree tentatively to the reductions, an approach which U.S. sources said was initially suggested by Kissinger and then given added dimension in the proposal suggested to him by Brezhnev?

These sources say they can only conjecture the possible multiple motives. First, they believe, Brezhnev was anxious to be able to report progress toward an accord at the Soviet Communist Party Congress which opens Feb. 24 — the same date of the New Hampshire election primary in which President Ford also has an interest in claiming foreign policy progress.

The Soviet Union's move also puts some limits on the range of air cruise missiles, which the United States wanted to have set at 2,000 miles, and to some extent, limits their numbers. Also, the Soviets want to try to block the sea-launched version, or at least bargain for a greatly reduced range.

In addition, there is nothing in the present proposals about cruise missiles with conventional warheads, which have been championed at the

against the nuclear ceilings, it is indicated, because it is said there is no sure way to determine if a cruise missile has a nuclear or non-nuclear warhead.

Also, U.S. experts surmise, the Soviet Union wants to retire some older missiles of its own, and the Kremlin and the United States are both pledged to bargain, after a SALT II pact, on reductions of nuclear force levels.

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Make or Break On SALT

Charlon—Gamma—Liaison

Kissinger and Brezhnev, 1974: A new lid on the nuclear arms race?

For the Ford Administration, Henry Kissinger's mission to Moscow this week is a calculated risk. The Secretary of State will meet with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in what could be a make-or-break effort to end the deadlock in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Given the sorry state of détente, especially in Angola, and a highly volatile situation in Lebanon, the time hardly seemed ripe for Kissinger to attempt another feat of diplomatic legerdemain. But both Kissinger and President Ford still regard SALT as the key to détente, and they were determined to nail a new lid onto the nuclear arms race.

A breakthrough in the second round of SALT negotiations was by no means assured in advance. The Russians, Kissinger revealed last week, had signaled that they were ready to make a "significant modification" of their position on the issue that has stymied the talks for months: How to factor the Soviet Backfire bomber and U.S. cruise missiles into the SALT ceilings on strategic weapons. In response, Kissinger would be carrying with him the latest compromise offer from Washington. At best, however, Kissinger and Brezhnev would come up not with a finished SALT II pact, but merely with a set of guidelines for the homestretch negotiations. "We think there's a reasonable chance for some resolution," said a top-level White House aide—but he put the odds at no better than 50-50.

Escalation: The backdrop for the Kissinger-Brezhnev talks was hardly encouraging. The U.S. had won a diplomatic victory of sorts on Angola when the Organization of African Unity refused to recognize the Soviet-backed faction as the former Portuguese colony's legitimate government. But on the battlefield, the side supported by the U.S. suffered heavy losses last week at the hands of forces spearheaded by Russian tanks and Cuban troops (page 31). In the Middle East, the Lebanese civil war had escalated to ominous proportions: the Lebanese Army and Air Force had intervened on the side of the Christian Phalangists against the Muslim leftists and Palestinian commandos (page 26). That development significantly raised the level of concern in Washington. All-out war in Lebanon could prompt Syria and Israel to intervene—which might in turn drag their superpower supporters, Russia and the U.S., into a new confrontation.

The effort to negotiate a new SALT pact also faced trouble at home. Presidential aspirants such as Ronald Reagan and Democratic Sen. Henry Jackson have charged the Ford Administration with appeasing the Kremlin in order to keep détente afloat. And the Russians have been accused of cheating on the 1972 SALT I agreement. Last week, rumors circulated in Washington that the State Department and White House were sitting on evidence of hitherto unrevealed—and far more serious—Soviet violations of SALT I. Said one well-connected source: "Imagine what would happen back home if, when Henry Kissinger is discussing a new SALT agreement in Moscow, a Jackson or a Reagan breaks the news of still more Russian cheating."

Given the odds against him, it was not surprising that Kissinger was in less-than-buoyant spirits. Even friends accustomed to his mercurial mood found him unusually bleak—resigned to the possibility that his long run as architect of U.S. foreign policy may be almost over, and deeply depressed over what he sees as the decline of Western democracy. One confidant reported the Secretary of State to be "as gloomy as I have ever seen him. Henry is down, down, down." Even his long-time association with Richard Nixon came back to haunt him last week. In sworn testimony to lawyers for Morton Halperin, a onetime Kissinger aide who is suing both men for ordering his telephone tapped in 1969, Nixon said he had left the job of choosing targets for the national security wiretaps up to Kissinger. Kissinger has said several times under oath that lesser officials picked the targets. The apparent conflict threatened to reopen old Watergate wounds.

Tensions: The Angolan situation offered the Secretary no cause for optimism. As Kissinger and Ford were making the go-ahead decision on the Moscow trip, they were aware that Russia was apparently reinforcing its flotilla off West Africa and using its own planes, for the first time, to fly Cuban troops to the war zone. Even that did not persuade Kissinger to cancel the Moscow visit. At a news conference, he warned that Russia's actions in Angola were "incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions." But he insisted that the U.S. had "never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations." Kissinger declared that the consequences of a breakdown in SALT would

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be intolerable: an economically disastrous new arms race and, possibly, some future nuclear confrontation.

Neither country had disclosed publicly what compromises it might offer on SALT II—or what it might accept. Sources in Washington told NEWSWEEK, however, that the Russians were apparently willing to limit the deployment of their Backfire bombers to bases from which the planes could not reach the U.S., in order to exempt them from SALT ceilings on strategic weapons.

Trade-off: The Soviet Union also was said to be ready to promise that it would not develop a capability to refuel the bombers in flight. Kissinger reportedly obtained the Pentagon's approval for this arrangement, in return for which American cruise missiles—low-flying, jet-powered robots capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads—would also be exempted from the strategic arms restrictions, subject perhaps to some limitations on the range or deployment.

Whether or not he achieved a breakthrough on SALT, Kissinger intended to step up the pressure on Russia over its involvement in Angola. While in Moscow, he planned to bring up the subject of a cease-fire and an "African solution" to the problem that would involve a phased withdrawal of both Cuban and South African troops. Kissinger also sought to enlist Washington's NATO allies in his campaign. NEWSWEEK learned that Kissinger sent a lengthy cable to NATO headquarters in Brussels urging that this week's NATO Council meeting—which the Secretary of State planned to attend on his way home from Moscow—be used for a verbal assault on the Soviet Union and Cuba as a menace to peace and stability in Africa.

One key to Kissinger's strategy was the hope that Russia would back down on Angola in order to help obtain a SALT II accord. But it seemed unlikely that Leonid Brezhnev would be willing to accommodate the Secretary of State. Recent commentaries in the Soviet press indicated that Brezhnev and his colleagues were taking an even harder line than before on their policy of supporting "wars of national liberation," no matter what Washington had to say. "No one loses the top job in Russia by being tough with the U.S.," observed a European ambassador in Moscow. In this election year, a hard line on Soviet dealings also seemed to be good politics in America—and bad news for Washington's architect of détente.

—ANGUS DEMING with LLOYD H. NORMAN in Washington and bureau reports

Catherine LeRoy—Gamma-Liaison

Muslims attack a Christian stronghold in the suburbs of Beirut: 'All bets are off'

Lebanon's New War

The Lebanese Army tanks and personnel carriers had just left Beirut when suddenly, out of the surrounding hills, Muslim militiamen and their Palestinian allies swooped down on the column. One tank exploded and six personnel carriers were captured. Then two British-made Hawker Hunter jet fighters pounced on the left-wing attackers. Braving thick anti-aircraft fire, the Lebanese Air Force jets strafed the Muslims twelve times—pinning them down long enough for the convoy to escape. In the process, the war in Lebanon became radically and ominously different.

It was no longer just a fratricidal street fight between rival Christian and Muslim terrorists. Right-wing Christian Phalangists were pressing their attack on the Palestinian refugees—until then only sporadic participants in the civil war. That brought the Palestinians into the thick of the fight. The Lebanese armed forces—which had supported the Phalangists mostly from the sidelines—also jumped into the fray. The army was fighting hard for the Phalangists, and the strafing attack appeared to signal the entry of the previously uncommitted air force on the Christian side.

The fighting quickly spread all over Lebanon. And although Premier Rashid Karami announced a cease-fire late in the week, there was not much hope that it would hold for long. There also was growing speculation that if lasting peace was not restored, Syria might feel honorbound to come to the Palestinians' r cue—possibly with support from Russians—and that such intervent might draw Israel into the war.

The escalation of the fighting beg when Christian militiamen besieg three Palestinian refugee camps. Th motive was plain: to highlight Palest ian involvement in Lebanon while t United Nations Security Council d bated the Palestinian issue in New Yo Phalangist forces clapped a strangleh around the camps of Tal al Zaatar and J el Basha, located in the eastern subu of Beirut. Despite desperate Palestin efforts to break the Christian grip, food reached the camps.

The greatest Phalangist victory came Dbaiye, a small camp of 3,500 Palest ians situated 10 miles north of Beirut. T Palestinians there had vowed to fight the last man. But when the Phalangi smashed the camp's last defenses, a cost of more than 100 killed, the Palest ians surrendered. Christian militiam promised to disarm—and deport—all legal "foreigners."

Revenge: The defeat stunned the Pal tinians. Yasir Arafat, leader of the Pal tine Liberation Organization (PLO), cused the Lebanese Army of helping t Christians, and the Palestinians so began to take their revenge. Leftists downtown Beirut mounted a punishi offensive calculated to shake the Chr tians loose from their strongholds in t Holiday Inn and Hilton Hotel. To t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-226-7-1-2

BALTIMORE SUN - 27 JANUARY 1976 Pg 2

Analysis: Time feared short for SALT

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—From the hard evidence available, Henry A. Kissinger's dogged pursuit of new United States-Soviet controls on nuclear weapons reflects his judgment that time is against the U.S.

He is said to be resentful of suggestions that his efforts cloak a desire merely to keep arms control alive through the special political perils of an election year. He is irritated, moreover, at suggestions that his mission to Moscow last week failed.

The secretary of state's judgment on the main issues is by no means universal in Washington. Many critics here are suspicious of the terms that Mr. Kissinger and presumably President Ford might be willing to accept in a new strategic arms limitation (SALT) agreement.

But his position is consistent with his known views on the state of the nation and the world. The elements of his SALT appraisal range from the specifics of the potential agreement, to the decline of national will, to fundamental shifts in the global balance of power.

Little, in fact, is known of the potential agreement. Mr. Kissinger went to Moscow to try to break the negotiating deadlock over how or whether to count the Soviet Backfire bomber and American cruise missiles—essentially pilotless bombers—in a new SALT agreement.

He came away without an agreement. But he did bring back from Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, a new formula, still vague publicly, for the next SALT package.

According to administration officials, the new formula would reduce by 10 per cent the 2,400 strategic launchers each side would be permitted under the informal accord reached by Mr. Ford and Mr. Brezhnev at Vladivostok 14 months ago.

Such a formula implies solution of the Backfire-cruise missile problem. The most obvious solution would be to restrict both weapons technically in ways to reduce or eliminate their threat as long-range weapons.

Why the Russians would be willing to narrow the numerical advantage permitted by an earlier SALT agreement is not clear, apparently not even to Mr. Kissinger. There is some speculation that Mr. Brezhnev needs an agreement politically and that he might be willing to eliminate old missiles—SS 7's, 8's, and 13's—and obsolescent bombers.

Under existing accords, Moscow controls about 2,550 strategic launchers, the U.S. about 2,100. A reduction of 10 per cent in the Vladivostok ceiling of 2,400 would permit each side 2,160, of which 1,320 could be armed with multiple warheads.

Some U.S. officials believe Mr. Brezhnev would like to consolidate his military forces and to convert more resources to domestic improvement. Another consideration, in this judgment, may be his concern that the Soviet military will become too powerful as his personal power begins to fade and the problem of succession develops.

Whatever Mr. Brezhnev's motives, serious or dilatory, the glacial pace of previous SALT negotiations hardly inspires optimism about a quick solution. Yet Mr. Kissinger is said to have returned with reasonable hope for an agreement by early summer, to be placed then immediately before Congress.

Here the dynamics of an election year enter. No one is certain of public opinion on the issue. The administration knows that any SALT agreement remotely conceivable will be attacked by conservatives as an American sellout, whatever its merits.

The chances that the Senate might act on a treaty before election day are remote. Still, one administration specialist reports firmly: "Everything I have seen from the President indicates he will proceed if he thinks a treaty can be reached in the national interests."

Whether Mr. Ford's and Mr. Kissinger's perceptions of the national interest will coincide at every point is uncertain. What is clear are the perceptions under which Mr. Kissinger argues for moving as quickly as possible.

They include these ingredients:

• The prospective formula protects most projected American nuclear weapons while providing for a quantitative reduction by the Russians. Apparently the Russians would rely on quality to sustain what they regarded as the essential balance.

• An early agreement is desirable to protect even existing U.S. programs against a suspicious Congress and to avoid fueling pressure for arms expansion in the Soviet Union.

• The U.S. needs to save money on strategic weapons in order to devote more to conventional forces. Mr. Kissinger is known to believe that Moscow, in an expansionist phase, will be flexing its muscles around the globe. "There will be other Angolas," one source said. The U.S., in this analysis, must be able to respond to the degree permitted by the national will.

• Unnecessary delay will cause grief for Mr. Ford, or his successor if Mr. Ford is defeated, at a difficult time next year.

WASHINGTON POST - 27 JANUARY 1976 Pg 16

Soviet Ships Moving Away From Angola

The Soviet Union has put a lot of ocean between its warships and Angola over the last several days—perhaps in reponse to Ford administration statements of concern about the naval movements.

The Soviet Kotlin-class, guided missile destroyer, Pentagon officials said yesterday, has moved from its former position just north of Angola to the Guinea port of Conakry, some 2,000 miles to the south. The destroyer's oiler is with her.

The Soviet Kresta cruiser, which provoked Ford administration concern when it was headed south from the Mediterranean toward Angola, was reported yesterday to be steaming in the same direction as the destroyer and oiler. Its position was 400 miles southeast of Conakry, more than 1,000 miles from Angola.

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NATO - CONTINUED

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It is vital, a British military expert says, that Britain and the other major European powers retain this capability. "The European countries have to have their own defense industries," he says. "If (a nation) were devoting (its) industry to totally civilian causes, it wouldn't be half so advanced

American.

Along these lines, France recently voiced an objection at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers here in Brussels to even studying standardization of the organization's weapons. In the end, however, France reluctantly went along with the study-group proposals—and most NATO officials are optimistic that the French will ultimately realize the necessity of their full participation in any standardization programs.

Whichever way the French do move (and it will be "a hard political choice" for them,

unity of some kind and then bid against the U.S." for making weapons, a European military man says. "But . . . I personally think that however we coordinate ourselves, we would still be weaker than the U.S. To some extent, therefore, the U.S. must exercise restraint."

An American military man agrees. "If we take everything," he says with particular reference to the tank of the future, "then Europe may simply throw the whole ball to us and say, 'Okay, if you do it so well, do it all.'"

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NATO - CONTINUED

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It is vital, a British military expert says, that Britain and the other major European powers retain this capability. "The European countries have to have their own defense industries," he says. "If (a nation) were devoting (its) industry to totally civilian causes, it wouldn't be half so advanced from a technological standpoint. The defense industry has valuable spin-off."

This spin-off factor, of course, isn't lost on the U.S., Germany and Britain; nor is it lost on France, which in recent years has gone very much its own way in defense matters—even to the point of withdrawing from NATO's integrated command in 1967. What's more, the French have traditionally shunned the concept of standardization because to [illegible]

American.

Along these lines, France recently [illegible] ministers here in Brussels to even studying standardization of the organization's weapons. In the end, however, France reluctantly went along with the study-group proposals—and most NATO officials are optimistic that the French will ultimately realize the necessity of their full participation in any standardization programs.

Whichever way the French do move (and it will be "a hard political choice" for them, one NATO man says), it is the consensus here that standardization can't fully succeed without the backing of the French and their enormous industrial-military complex. It is the further consensus that the U.S., with its massive industrial-military complex, must also recognize its crucial role in shaping NATO's future—even if this means sacrificing short-term economic and political gains.

"Some in the U.S. believe that European [illegible] unity of some kind and then bid against the U.S." for making weapons, a European mili[illegible] we coordinate ourselves, we would still be weaker than the U.S. To some extent, therefore, the U.S. must exercise restraint."

An American military man agrees. "If we take everything," he says with particular reference to the tank of the future, "then Europe may simply throw the whole ball to us and say, 'Okay, if you do it so well, do it all.' "

Thus, the tank talks proceed in an air of urgency. And if this urgency is dictated as much by economic factors as it is by military necessity, the philosophy here at NATO seems to be, well, so much the better. "Once the military wanted one thing, the politicians another," a NATO insider says—and the politicians, looking out for national interests, usually won. "Now that money is scarce," he concludes, "They can't play around."

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-226-7-1-2

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Part II -- Main Edition -- 2 February 1976

EDITORIALS

SALT Breakthrough...

A break in the deadlock in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), which now appears possible as a result of the Brezhnev-Kissinger discussions in Moscow, would be good news for world peace. But equally important is the way the deadlock evidently is being broken.

Ingenious new proposals by the two countries would impose small but significant reductions for the first time both on the MIRV multiple warhead missiles and on the other strategic nuclear missiles and bombers the Soviet and American military are permitted to deploy under the high ceilings set by earlier SALT accords.

In return for agreed deployment of the two new weapons in dispute—the Soviet Backfire medium bomber and the projected American long-range cruise missile—each side in effect has offered to constrain the types and deployments of the new delivery systems and to give up some existing weapons. The net effect should be increased stability of the nuclear balance as well as reduced offensive forces.

The Soviet Union has proposed to reduce by several hundred the overall ceiling of 2,400 strategic missiles and bombers agreed for each side at Vladivostok in November 1974, if the United States withdraws its insistence that the Backfire medium bombers Moscow wants to deploy must be counted under the ceiling. Moscow has also agreed to negotiate constraints on aerial refueling for Backfire and on its base locations to underpin Soviet assurances that the bomber will have no significant strategic capability against targets in the United States.

The 2,400 ceiling on long-range American missiles and bombers would also be reduced by several hundred. It was the Soviet Union—with its traditional reluctance to abandon expensive weapons, even when obsolete—that insisted at Vladivostok on a minimum of 2,400 missiles and bombers; the United States initially proposed a ceiling of 2,000 and has only about 2,150 programmed now.

NEW YORK TIMES

2 FEBRUARY 1976

...Mutual Restraint

The United States, in turn, has offered to accept a major constraint on deployment of air-launched cruise missiles in return for Soviet agreement to a range of 1,500 rather than 375 miles. For each bomber equipped with strategic cruise missiles, each side would have to give up one of the 1,320 MIRV multiple warhead ballistic missiles, such as Minuteman III and Poseidon, to which it is entitled under the Vladivostok agreement—a heavy price. As a result, as few as 100 B-52's may be so equipped—a total of 1,200 to 2,000 cruise missiles, instead of the 11,000 the United States Air Force has indicated it might deploy if unlimited. And the substitution of subsonic, second-strike cruise missiles for first-strike ballistic missiles would add stability to the strategic balance.

Many problems remain to be resolved, including the recalcitrant issues of sea-launched cruise missiles and a numerical limit on Backfire deployment. Verification of a cruise missile agreement will be difficult and subject to charges of violations that could overshadow recent controversies over alleged Soviet violations of the SALT I accords. Ronald Reagan has yet to be heard from and it has to be seen whether President Ford will be willing to take the political risks of completing a new SALT treaty by March or April if, as Secretary Kissinger evidently has reported, this should prove possible. Uncertainties about Mr. Brezhnev's health and his possible departure from office could endanger agreement, if it is delayed too long.

But for the first time in many months, there now appears to be improved prospect of completing a SALT II treaty in good time, a treaty significantly better from the arms control viewpoint than that projected at Vladivostok.

NEW YORK TIMES - 2 FEBRUARY 1976

Of Cruise Missiles, Arms Control and Defense Costs

To the Editor:

In arguing for the continued development of the cruise missile, on the grounds that this new weapon may have the potential to replace our present manned bomber force and our static land-based missiles at a fraction of the cost of the present systems, Robert R. Perko's Jan. 9 letter to The Times stated that I had (in an Op-Ed piece of Dec. 30, 1975) characterized this development as "senseless." This is not quite accurate.

What I characterized as "senseless" was the U.S. negotiating position on the SALT talks. That position seeks to legitimize the operational deployment of 200 [illegible] the deployment of one cruise missile would require the dismantling of one bomber or one land-based missile, the case for continued research and development of the cruise missile would be strengthened. Even within the framework of firm numerical ceilings, however, the United States should exercise great restraint in actually substituting new deterrent weapons for old. For our past practice of forcing the technological pace, of moving from development to operational deployment of higher and higher performance nuclear weapons well in advance of any objective need to do so, has served mainly to accelerate the arisen over the cruise missile. Typical of this confusion was the publication in the Jan. 17 Times of an editorial dismissing the cruise missile as of secondary importance and an Op-Ed article praising it highly as an amazingly accurate missile profoundly feared by the Russians.

Offering my personal views (as I do now), and not necessarily those of the Navy Department, I attempted in a Jan. 9 letter to point out the tremendous potential of the cruise missile for reducing the cost of defense matériel. My position was criticized by Thomas Halsted [letter Jan. 19], who contended that the Soviets would

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NYT 2-2-76

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WASHINGTON POST 5 FEBRUARY 1976. Pg 17

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Morale Hit By Loss Of Bases

By Alan Cowell

Reuter

ANKARA — Turkey's shutdown of U.S. bases has converted thousands of American servicemen into soldiers without a cause and commanders are worried about low morale and lax sexual morals, according to reliable sources.

Some 26 installations, including sensitive listening posts that once eavesdropped on the Soviet Union, were closed down and have been under Turkish command for almost six months.

Hundreds of the original 7,000 U.S. servicemen in Turkey have left for home without being replaced because there is no work for them, the sources said.

"There is a high rate of attrition, particularly among the experts who ran the intelligence systems," the sources said.

Those who remained are said to be questioning more and more the role they are supposed to play with the bases closed and to be growing resentful at their Turkish hosts for not reopening them.

Vietnam veteran Col. Robert Bagley recently went on his installation's radio station at Karanursel on the Sea of Marmara to exhort the troops to "share and enjoy" the community activities available to them.

"It's more like they are sharing and enjoying each other," one source said. "You get young married couples and men without their families in a closed community and things start to happen."

"The soldiers here live an incubated existence. Unlike say, West Germany, where there are bars and women and kicks off base, the soldiers in Turkey tend to stay on base because there is nothing for them outside," this source said.

Turkey shut down the bases in retaliation for the U.S. arms embargo, but failed to reopen them when the ban on arms shipments was relaxed last October.

"There was a widespread feeling among the troops that the embargo was unfair, but that is changing into a feeling that the Turks now are being unfair by keeping the bases closed," one observer said.

Commanders are under orders to avoid confrontations with Turkish officers who have been in command at the installations since the bases closed.

Despite this, several incidents have been reported that have strained the working relationship between Turks and Americans.

At the Sinop listening post on the Black Sea coast, trouble erupted when a Turkish officer demanded the keys to the U.S. gun room, which the American commander refused to hand over. The incident was smoothed over when Turkish commanders told their officer to drop his demand.

At the big NATO base at Incirlik in the southeast, hundreds of locally employed Turkish workers started a work slow down when several of their colleagues lost their jobs.

"So we buckled under yet again and increased severance pay," an informed U.S. source said, voicing the feeling among many Americans here that there is a limit to their patience and restraint. "The soldiers are asking what they are supposed to be doing here and the military is asking how long you can go on spending millions of dollars and getting nothing in return."

Negotiations on reopening the bases have been underway since last October. But informed sources said there were still major problems to be overcome.

Turkey accompanies its shutdown with a series of restrictions on American privileges that has curtailed some duty-free importing from the United States.

"American troops are incapable of living on the local economy, so when shipments are late or there's trouble about registering American cars, you start getting complaints and this adds to the low morale," one source said.

The U.S. embassy is aware of these problems, but Ambassador William Macomber is believed to be concerned that adverse publicity about the plight of U.S. servicemen will strengthen the anti-Turkish lobby in Washington and make his negotiations more difficult.

WASHINGTON POST
5 FEB 1976, Pg 12

Indian Ocean Powers

Agence France-Presse

CANBERRA, Feb. 4 — French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs M. Bernard

BALTIMORE SUN 5 FEBRUARY 1976. Pg 4

Kissinger urges DID for unified policy

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington – Urgently selling his foreign policy at home, Henry A. Kissinger asked Americans yesterday to "demand of their leaders" a unified foreign policy based on both "conciliation and firmness."

The secretary of state closed out his current domestic speech-making tour by making it plain in Laramie, Wyo., that the leaders he had most in mind are in Congress.

In effect, Mr. Kissinger summoned Americans away from what he fears is a trend toward renewed isolationism without putting it quite that way. Above everything else, he implicitly blamed Congress for "leaks, sensational investigations and the demoralization of our intelligence services" which frustrate the administration in foreign policy.

The address at the University of Wyoming was a sequel to one in Los Angeles the day before. In the first presentation he argued for pursuit of mutual interests with the Soviet Union—such as arms limitation and trade—while countering Soviet expansionism.

But while Mr. Kissinger was speaking in Laramie, one of those controversies that have eroded his influence in the past appeared to be developing.

It grew out of a report by National Public Radio about Mr. Kissinger's latest negotiations toward a new strategic arms-limitation (SALT) treaty in Moscow last month.

According to the report, Mr. Kissinger proposed, in effect, that the Russians could deploy as many Backfire bombers as they liked during a five-year period, while U.S. cruise missiles—subsonic, pilotless jet vehicles—would be counted within a treaty ceiling on each side of 2,400 strategic launchers.

He did so, moreover, the report said, although the National Security Council had rejected that option before he left for Moscow.

The State Department promptly denied the report in every substantive way. Indeed, the reported circumstances and terms would be unacceptable, from everything known publicly, to virtually every level of the administration, including Mr. Kissinger.

But the report, and the denial, underlined substantial, very real differences within the United States over treaty details, though Mr. Kissinger said yesterday a new agreement is "within reach."

Mr. Kissinger is said to be prepared to leave the Backfire out of the ceilings, as long as it is deployed and equipped in a way to reduce its strategic threat to the U.S. He also is reported willing to count the bombers that carry longer-range cruise missiles within a treaty sublimit of 1,320 on multiple warheads.

Seaborne cruise missiles of 375-mile range reportedly would be excluded from the ceilings entirely for both sides.

Some U.S. strategists, including military leaders, believe the restrictions on cruise missiles would place them at a long-term disadvantage. They also are basically more optimistic about U.S. readiness to stay in the arms race if the treaty negotiations fail.

As for Mr. Kissinger's negotiating tactics, one source familiar with the pattern said the secretary had not strayed outside his mandate. But the source added, he might have put the pieces of that mandate together in a way not specifically approved by the National Security Council.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 FEB 1976, Pg 10

Red Cross to Weigh Ban On Incendiary Weapons

LUGANO, Switzerland, Feb. 4 (Reuters)—The International Committee of the Red Cross has set up an international working group to examine proposals for banning incendiary weapons such as napalm.

The group is part of a conference of diplomats, lawyers, doctors and weapons experts from about 30 countries who have been meeting here since last

NEW YORK TIMES
5 FEB 1976, Pg 11

France Asks U.N. Meeting

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Feb. 4—France requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council today, charging Somalia with protecting the terrorists involved in today's incident.

French officials here said the hijacking of the bus, which created an uproar in France, was the latest incident in a continuing dispute with Somalia over its support of the Front

OPINION AND COMMENTARY

Joseph C. Harsch

Moscow's 'throw weight' advantage

So much has been heard of late about the nuclear advantage the Soviet Union has in the int of nuclear weight it can throw at ts in the United States that I have been g questions of those who know far more any reporter can about such matters. I have learned is not presented here as inal or authoritative word. The experts work on it full time are in wide reement. But for what it is worth here is eporter's finding on the subject.

doubtedly, the Soviets can throw more ar material at the United States today the U.S. can throw back. This cause the Soviets long ago went in for rather than quality. They have bigger dug deep into the ground from which r missiles could take off on inter- nental flight. The bigger size means that missiles do not have to be as accurate as ican missiles in order to knock out such a on. The smaller the blow the nearer the hit has to be in order to take out an ient missile.

U.S. has an advantage in the number of nuclear blows it can send back. It had a ear lead in the technique of mounting than one aimed blow in a single missile. two countries are limited under the vostok agreement to the same total number of missiles — 2,400 each. And not more than 1,320 each are supposed to be fitted with multiple, independently targetable warheads (MIRVs). The U.S. was so far ahead in the development of MIRVs that it still has a lead in the deployment of such weapons, but this advantage in the number of blows will diminish as the Soviets complete deploying their quota of MIRVs.

The above means that unless the U.S. takes new measures to adjust the balance the time will come when the Soviets can not only throw more weight but perhaps (if their technology is good enough) pack more single blows into their equal number of missiles.

The question is, how dangerous is the imbalance going to be if nothing new is done to correct it, and what corrective steps can, and should, be taken?

The answer seems fairly clear that the imbalance if uncorrected would become damaging to the general interests of the U.S. and its allies. Failure to maintain something like a balance in strategic weapons would tend to diminish the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella under which America's allies shelter. If they began to doubt that it would be used in a crisis they would probably tend to look around for other means of security. The NATO alliance in Europe and the Japanese alliance in Asia would probably lose meaning. Meanwhile Moscow might use its superior "throw weight" as an instrument of power politics. It backed out of Cuba when the United States had massive nuclear superiority. Would it have backed out if the ratio had been reversed?

What then to do to adjust the balance?

There are several possible answers. The Soviets' advantage in "throw weight" is entirely in their extra large, land-based, fixed missiles. If for any reason the Soviets had to abandon their silos and change over to mobile missiles that advantage would disappear. Their SS-9 and SS-18 missiles are too big and heavy to be fitted into a submarine, carried around by a bomber, or moved on the ground.

The United States has on the drawing boards and in development stages at least two weapons which would make the big SS-9 and SS-18 missiles obsolete. One is the air-breathing, unmanned "cruise" missile which, in theory, would be totally accurate. Another is a highly accurate version of the ballistic missile. Supposedly, it will be able to come within 150 feet of its target. A third method would be to make American land-based missiles mobile. Instead of mounting them in underground silos they would be shifted around under surface shelters. In effect you would build a hundred barns for 10 weapons. So the Soviets would have to knock out all hundred barns to be sure of getting the 10 missiles. That would use up their "throw weight" — fast.

If Washington chooses any one of these methods to dig the Soviets out of their big silos and big missiles the strategic balance is restored and the United States advantage in technology again becomes the major factor in the strategic balance.

An example of that advantage surfaced the other day in the annual defense posture statement issued by the U.S Department of Defense. It said that Soviet antisubmarine techniques "remain inadequate" and that their submarines, which "are still relatively noisy," also "have a poor capability for sustained combat operations, and many of their missile systems lack a reload capability."

In plain English this means that American surface ships can hear Soviet nuclear submarines, and ride around on top of them. American submarines, on the other hand, are so silent that they can escape Soviet detection.

Thus Washington can, any time it chooses, use its decisive lead in technology to wipe out the present Soviet advantage in nuclear "throw weight."

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Rowland Evans

SALT: Political Ammunition

WP 2/11/76

President Ford is moving toward approval of a new SALT agreement despite bitter opposition within his administration and threats of a major political explosion.

The verification panel, the administration's policymaking body on strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), met last week in a session that left "blood on the floor" (as described by one official) and produced no consensus. Shortly thereafter, the President was warned through senior aides that the prospective SALT II agreement would trigger a nasty Senate investigation and possibly resignations of middle-level officials.

Nevertheless, Mr. Ford seems determined to support Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's quest of a climactic U.S.-Soviet arms control pact. In a campaign news conference in New Hampshire last Sunday, the President strongly defended the looming agreement—apparently believing that detente is still good politics.

Accordingly, one of two unlikely events must occur to avert a SALT II agreement and the accompanying political confrontation. The first would be Dr. Kissinger's inability to pin down an agreement with Moscow. The second would be Mr. Ford's political advisers' prevailing on him not to supply heavy ammunition to Ronald Reagan's challenge for the nomination.

At issue are two new weapon systems: the Soviet Backfire bomber and U.S. cruise missiles which can be launched with uncanny accuracy from planes or ships. Negotiating at the Kremlin last month, Kissinger proposed that the Russians be limited to 275 Backfire bombers constructed over the next five years, while the U.S., in effect, would be permitted cruise missiles on only 34 bombers and 25 surface vessels and none on submarines.

Since this went beyond options approved by the National Security Council (NSC), Washington hard-liners were outraged. The Soviet Union cannot build more than 275 Backfires in five years anyway, they argued, while Kissinger's limits would practically end development of the cruise missile—one new weapon where the U.S. clearly leads.

These objections were stated by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements, normally a Kissinger ally, and others at a Jan. 21 NSC meeting called to receive Kissinger's report from Moscow. Although the NSC did not formally reject the proposal, criticism was intense, to the displeasure of President Ford.

The President was spared an immediate decision by the Kremlin. Secretary Leonid Brezhnev again proved himself the hard Russian bargainer by demanding no limits at all on Backfire bombers but offering a public statement that the Backfire's range is only 4,000-5,000 kilometers (half the actual range, say hardliners). Simultaneously, Brezhnev demanded not cruise missiles on surface vessels, plus the restrictions proposed by Kissinger.

Nobody believes this latest Soviet proposal is a last-ditch demand. Rather, in typically tough bargaining, the Kremlin predictably will pull back with a "concession"—a meaningless limit on Backfire bombers plus cruise missiles permitted on a few surface vessels.

In New Hampshire, Mr. Ford indicated he would accept any Backfire limit as better than none. But the real issue is the cruise missile, regarded by Kissinger mainly as a bargaining chip to gain new limits on strategic weaponry in SALT II. Disagreeing vehemently, his critics see the new weapon as a major breakthrough and view the prospective Backfire-cruise missile settlement as a huge Soviet gain in the European regional power balance. However, the President privately says that cruise missile development is not as far advanced as the Pentagon has claimed.

The overriding arguments are more political than military. Kissinger contends now is the time for agreement—before a new generation of Soviet hard-liners and U.S. dovish liberals takes over. Nor do Mr. Ford and Kissinger believe Congress will vote necessary defense money if there is no SALT II agreement. But Kissinger's critics dread the psychological impact on Western European governments of a Backfire-cruise missile agreement clearly in the Kremlin's favor.

That argument will detonate the political explosion resulting from a SALT II agreement. Sen. Henry M. Jackson would launch public hearings with testimony from James Schlesinger, more potent politically out of office than as Secretary of Defense, and perhaps officials whose resignations are now threatened. With Reagan talking about cruise missiles in New Hampshire, the political perils are obvious.

Only Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seems able to avert the SALT explosion. Rumsfeld has been no Schlesinger taking a hard SALT line and feels open conflicts between the Defense and State departments hurt the President. But as a practical man, he may ponder the political cost of SALT II and so advise Mr. Ford. That is the last slender hope of the hard-liners.

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CURRENT NEWS
SPECIAL EDITION

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12 FEBRUARY 1976 No. 78

Commentary

VOLUME 61 NUMBER 2 *FEBRUARY 1976*

Appeasement & Détente

Theodore Draper

APPEASEMENT became a dirty word in the 1930's. It had been, for centuries, a perfectly clean, even a virtuous term. How could a word that had meant peace and conciliation turn into its opposite? The transformation came when it began to be used in connection with the concessions to and deals made with the fascist dictatorships in the 1930's. The turning point was probably the speeches by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons on October 3 and 6, 1938. Just back from Munich, where he had agreed to tear off a vital part of Czechoslovakia and hand it over to Hitler's Germany, he spoke exultantly about "our policy of appeasement," of which the Munich agreement was to be only the first step. He looked forward to "the collaboration of all nations, not excluding the totalitarian states, in building up a lasting peace for Europe." The "real triumph," he said, was the execution of "a difficult and delicate operation by discussion instead of by force of arms."

A year later, force of arms instead of discussion made it almost impossible to say the word "appeasement" without shame and loathing. The word, of course, was not to blame. But why had it been misused? Why did it turn into such a ghastly mockery? Clearly—though this is not the whole story—because appeasement could not appease the unappeasable. In those circumstances it was betrayal and capitulation on the installment plan. The stench of the Munich agreement might not have been so sickening if it had been recognized for what it was. What made it so unbearable was its glorification, such as [illegible] in the London *Times*: "No conqueror returning from a victory on the battlefield has come home with nobler laurels than Mr. Chamberlain from Munich yesterday."

Détente is another one of those perfectly good words that, misapplied, gets a bad name. It appears to be a relatively recent importation from the French. The first citation in the Oxford English Dictionary is dated 1908. The word is usually defined as a "relaxation of tension," which may mean much or little depending on what kind of tension is being relaxed by how much. At the 1974 hearings on détente of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, speaker after speaker complained that the word was hard to pin down. Former Ambassador George F. Kennan said that he had "never fully understood the use of the word 'détente' in connection with" Soviet-American relations. In response, former Senator J. W. Fulbright remarked that "détente is a difficult word to have inherited in this connection, but I think we are stuck with it." Former Senator Eugene McCarthy commented that "the meaning has changed every time it is applied." Professor Marshall Shulman referred to "the ambiguities of the word 'détente,'" and Professor Herbert Dinerstein pointed out that "everyone has a different notion about what détente is." Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk said it was a "process," not a "condition." Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger agreed that "it is a continuing process, not a final condition."[1]* An academic definition has made it into "a logical spectrum of relations along which [illegible] détente but, whatever it is, it would seem to be

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* Numbered notes are to be found at the conclusion of this article, on page 11

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fluctuating and ambiguous. In theory, it has been situated somewhere between cold war and rapprochement or even entente. Since détente moves uneasily between these two poles, it occupies a purely relative position, without a definite profile of its own. This conception of détente is always moving away or moving toward something else.[3] No wonder, then, that détente according to this theory has been so hard to pin down; it is by its very nature transitory and volatile.

In practice, however, the current Soviet-American détente should have a much more positive and recognizable character. The materialization of détente was supposed to be the main achievement of the summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972 at which the new phase of Soviet-American relations was formally inaugurated. It consisted of three agreements—military, commercial, and political. The military agreement took the form of SALT I, providing in principle for quantitative parity in antiballistic missiles. The commercial agreement set up a U.S.-USSR commission to promote trade and development of economic resources. The political agreement was embodied in the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." These three agreements gave this détente some substance and delineation. Détente could not be all that vague and ambiguous if it had "Basic Principles," no matter what they might be or whether or not they were lived up to.

Most of the debate on détente has made it appear that the only alternatives are détente and cold war. Any criticism of the current version of détente is sure to bring forth in tones of incredulity the horrified challenge: "Do you mean to say that you want to go back to the cold war?" That the cold war may not be the only alternative to détente seems to have escaped notice. It might also be asked, with equal incredulity and horror: "Do you want to go back to 'appeasement'?" In fact, an even more incredible question to some might be: "Do you realize that appeasement was built into détente?"

Let us see.

II

DÉTENTE has been so confusing not because there is a lack of definitions and interpretations but because there have been too many. There is not only an American version but different American versions. There is not only a Soviet version but different Soviet versions.

The original American theory of détente was developed, largely by Henry Kissinger, in 1972. The main concept behind it was the "linkage" of the military, the economic, and the political. The idea, as he explained it, was "to move forward on a very broad front on many issues" in order to create many "vested interests" on both sides.

After the Moscow "linkage," Kissinger was euphoric. He extolled SALT I as an "agreement without precedent in all relevant modern history." The summit meeting had been so successful, he reported, that the American side had achieved all that it had planned and "give or take 10 per cent—an extraordinary record for any diplomatic conference. For Prime Minister Chamberlain, Munich had brought "peace in our time." For President Nixon, Moscow had made possible "a new structure of peace in the world."

The second thoughts were not so ecstatic. It became increasingly clear that SALT I had been little more than a promissory note. In 1974, Secretary Kissinger himself said that, if a more far-reaching follow-up nuclear agreement were not reached "well before 1977, then I believe you will see an explosion of technology and an explosion of numbers" of fearsome proportions.[5] In that same year, Professor George B. Kistiakowsky, one of the most eminent and experienced experts in the field, testified: "The SALT I agreements do not inhibit or limit the strategic-arms race. They merely channel it into such directions as each side perceives to be militarily most advantageous to it." He characterized the antiballistic-missile treaty as "to a large degree another agreement not to do something that neither party wants to do anyway."[6] Despite the onrush of 1977, SALT II shows no signs of coming through in time to stop the technology-and-numbers explosion.

SALT I may have been oversold, and, to that extent, may have made the "linkage" with the commercial agreement even more expensive than it needed to be. But even if SALT I had been all that Kissinger had hoped for it, its linkage with the commercial agreement would still have been based on a theory that built appeasement into détente. It is this aspect of détente that should be more clearly understood.

On the American side, it was always recognized that the Soviets were mainly interested in détente for economic reasons.[7] The basic Soviet reason flowed from a declining rate of growth and productivity. According to official Soviet data, this rate fell from 10.9 per cent in 1950-58 to 7.2 per cent in 1958-67 to 6.4 per cent in 1967-73; Western recalculations of the Soviet figures show the actual decline to be from 6.4 per cent in 1950-58 to 5.3 per cent in 1958-67 to 3.7 per cent in 1967-73.[8] By 1966, the problem was already so troublesome that Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin had called for abandonment of economic isolationism to prevent the Soviet economy from falling too far behind. A key reason for the Soviet dilemma was the failure to keep up with the advanced technology of the West. At first the Brezhnev regime had tried to overcome this weakness through earlier détentes with France and Germany. But by 1972, the American-Soviet détente made the United States the main source of scientific-technological transfer.

There was, however, a hitch. The Soviets were unable to pay for what they wanted. They demanded large-scale, long-term U.S. government credits at abnormally low interest rates. They sought most-favored-nation status without being able to reciprocate. They wanted the delivery of entire factories and plants on terms which meant that the Soviet Union would do all the owning and the Western donors would take all the risks. If anything went wrong, the Soviet Union and a few favored capitalists could not—and only the American taxpayer would—lose.*

* Hedrick Smith, the former New York *Times* correspondent in Moscow, has told of a "joke" that circulated within advisers what he should seek in America. 'Ask them to sell us cars,' suggested one. 'Ask them to build us computer factories,' said a second. 'Ask them to build atomic-power stations,' said a third. 'No,' replied Brezhnev thoughtfully. 'I'll just ask them to build us Communism'" (*Atlantic Monthly*, December 1974).

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This situation was made to order for one of Kissinger's beguiling theories—at least, enough people were beguiled to put it across. It was the theory of "incentives." According to Secretary Kissinger, the Soviets were advised in 1970 and 1971, in advance of the agreement on détente, that they could get paid off in credits and most-favored-nation treatment "if they engaged in what we considered responsible international behavior."[9] A Kissingerian formulation of the incentive-payment theory went as follows:

> We see it [economic relations] as a tool to bring about or to reinforce a more moderate orientation of foreign policy and to provide incentives for responsible international behavior and, therefore, it has to be seen in this context.[10]

An academic exponent of détente explained for popular consumption that trade, technology, and investment "would serve to offer a continuing incentive to Soviet leaders to accept the constraints of a low-tension policy." These incentives could be "regulated," he assured his readers, so that "our resources are not used to strengthen Soviet military capabilities"—as if it were possible to draw a line between the civilian and military uses of natural gas, petrochemicals, computers, and truck factories—and so that "the political competition is conducted with restraint"—as if restraint were not as much in the Soviet as in the American interest without incentive payments.[11]

The most important American incentive payments to the Soviets have been economic. This relationship has been inherently unequal. If all went well, Americans could benefit through profits and jobs. So far, many deals have failed and a few have succeeded, so that the profits from increased Soviet-American trade have gone to a few favored or fortunate entrepreneurs. The Soviets, however, have an altogether larger stake in the relationship. They want to get out of it a structural change in their economy and a bail-out mechanism for their agriculture. This economic exchange is not an ordinary one; the Western contribution to the Soviet economy is heavy with political and military significance.

The most recent study by Professor Marshall I. Goldman of how the economic détente has worked is not reassuring. Professor Goldman is not an enemy of détente or of Soviet-American trade—quite the contrary. Yet his cautionary analysis of what has been going on in the name of détente is most disturbing:

> The types of goods and the types of negotiating tactics the Russians tend to use in purchasing goods from the United States make it possible for the Russians to obtain high technology products for bargain prices that no other buyers could cajole. Moreover, much of the technology and sometimes the products themselves have been heavily subsidized by the American taxpayer. The initial subsidy for development and production, the bargain prices, and the subsidized interest rate of the Export-Import Bank means that the Russians are often able to obtain a trip[No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-226-7-1-2
> ican purchases.

These advantages, Professor Goldman adds, have an important political component built into them.[11a] One does not have to believe that the Soviets obtain all the benefits to see that the incentive theory works mainly in the Soviets' favor.

Curiously, the Soviets never bothered to develop a similar theory or practice vis-à-vis the United States. In fact, the Soviets have pursued a contrary course, at times most inconvenient for the United States. For example, until March 1974, months after the Arab-Israeli war was over, the Soviets urged the Arab oil producers to continue their embargo against the Western states and Japan.[12] This Soviet exhortation was not a mere peccadillo; it was a potentially deadly attack on the economic lifeline of the Western powers and Japan. The incentive theory seemed to work only one way.

KISSINGER had another theory which should have made incentive payments unnecessary. It was the theory of "marginal advantages." He first produced it during the 1972 summit meeting in Moscow and kept repeating it until events proved it to be a conceptual breakdown instead of a conceptual breakthrough. In one of his clearest formulations of this embarrassing memory, he maintained that "to the extent that balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an opponent, it no longer applies." He explained why:

> The reason is that the determination of national power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age. Throughout history, the primary concern of most national leaders has been to accumulate geopolitical and military power. It would have seemed inconceivable even a generation ago that such power once gained could not be translated directly into advantage over one's opponent. But now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength.[13]

This theory made the whole Kissingerian system of détente seem absurdly easy to operate. It was, in fact, a "self-regulating mechanism"—the diplomatic equivalent of perpetual motion. It ruled out "marginal advantages" and "increments of usable political strength" in the nuclear age by making them inherently "unrealistic" and catastrophically "dangerous."[14] Unfortunately, the Soviet leaders again failed to respond with a similar theory. Only a year later, their policy and actions in the Middle East were clearly based on an altogether different theory of what the nuclear age permitted in the way of struggling for "marginal advantages." Kissinger himself must have recognized that his theory, not "marginal advantages," was unrealistic and dangerous or he would not have bothered to respond to Soviet actions in the Middle East or Angola. After all, he should have reasoned, the Soviets were going after unusable and intangible "increments of power."

As if all this were not troublesome enough, Kissinger produced another, contradictory theory. In his testimony at the Senate hearings on his confirmation as Secretary of State, he delivered himself of this rule:

> But assuming the present balance holds, and [illegible] of what [illegible]
> of conceiving a rational objective for general nuclear war makes it, therefore, less risky to engage in local adventures.[15]

One theory said that the nuclear age made "marginal advantages" unnecessary to worry about and, therefore, local adventures for such advan-

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tages less likely. Another theory said that the same nuclear age made local adventures "less risky" and, therefore, more likely.

What it all came down to in the end was an understanding of the political implications of the nuclear age. But before we get to this point, let us see what the Soviet view of détente has been.

III

In the "Basic Principles" of Soviet-American relations of May 29, 1972, the Soviets seemingly committed themselves to an interpretation of détente which fitted in with Kissinger's theory of "marginal advantages." These principles contained the following mutual restraints on engaging in "local adventures":

> Prevention of the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of Soviet-American relations.
>
> Doing the utmost to avoid military confrontations.
>
> Recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.
>
> Special responsibility to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions.

These principles implied that there were two sides to détente—political and nuclear. The former was designed to prevent situations from developing which might bring on the danger of nuclear war. On ceremonial occasions, such as his speech at the Helsinki conference at the end of July 1975, Brezhnev has paid lip service to the combination of military and political détente.[16]

The "Basic Principles" also signified that détente applied not only to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union but also to the relations of each with the rest of the world. Kissinger has assured us that "we consider Soviet restraint in the Middle East an integral part of détente policy"[17] and "the principle of restraint is not confined to relations between the U.S. and the USSR, it is explicitly extended to include *all* countries."[18]

There seemed to be agreement, then, on two constituent elements of a true détente—it must apply to the political as well as to the nuclear realm, and it must apply to the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union with the rest of the world as well as to the relations between themselves.

However, there are Soviet theories underlying détente which, like the American, must be taken into account to find out what it really means. For example, a basic Soviet theory is that of the "new relationship of forces." It was expressed by Brezhnev not long ago in the following formula: "International détente has become possible because a new relationship of forces now exists on the world scene."[19]

What is this "new relati[illegible] short answer, spelled out in all Communist propaganda, is that the "new relationship of forces" now favors the "socialist world" led by the Soviet Union. The point here is not whether the theory is right or wrong. The point is that, for the Soviet Union and its followers, détente is not an abstract, ahistorical condition; it is the product of a concrete, historical "relationship of forces" which determines not merely what détente is but—far more important—what it does.

A second Soviet theory in this connection is that of the "two spheres." An authoritative exposition of this theory was recently given by Professor Georgi Arbatov, a high-level Soviet spokesman and present head of the Institute of the USA of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR:

> What is involved here [the policy of détente] is essentially different spheres of political life in our time (though they may influence one another in various ways). One of them is the sphere of social development, which steadily makes headway in any international conditions—whether détente, "cold" war, or even "hot" war. . . . The other is the sphere of inter-state relations, in which other extremely important questions are resolved—questions of war and peace, methods of resolving controversial foreign-policy questions, and possibilities for mutually advantageous international cooperation.
>
> The drawing of a clear line between these two spheres is one of the basic premises of the Leninist foreign policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. . . .[20]

In the pro-Soviet Communist movement, the theory of "peaceful coexistence" has been promulgated somewhat more clearly and starkly. It is now said that peaceful coexistence

> refers exclusively to the domain of inter-state relations between socialist and capitalist countries. It rules out just one form of struggle between socialism and capitalism—the form of direct military collision.[21]

Formerly, as we have seen, détente was supposed to cover anything of a political or military nature which could exacerbate Soviet-American relations, give one side unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, or serve to increase international tension. The theory of the "two spheres" eliminates a huge political area—under the trade name of "social development"—from the domain of détente. By reducing détente to the avoidance of "direct military collision" between the United States and the Soviet Union, it leaves everything else wide open.

This tendency to shunt détente out of the political sphere into a narrow military sphere has now come to a head with the need to rationalize large-scale Soviet military intervention in Angola and the use of Cuban troops as Soviet proxies. A writer in *Izvestia* of November 29, 1975 insisted that it was impossible to bring "the sphere of class and national-liberation struggle" within "peaceful coexistence."[22] On November 30, an *Izvestia* correspondent reported that détente "gave a powerful impulse to the national-liberation movement of colonial and oppressed peoples."[23] On December 2, an *Izvestia* commentator held that "the process of détente does not mean and never meant the freezing of the social-

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the Soviet Union from giving "sympathy, compassion, and support" to those whom it chose to represent as "fighters for national independence."[24] On December 6, a writer in *Pravda* boasted: "Détente created favorable conditions for the new successes of the cause of national liberation."[25] On

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December 8, a report in *Pravda* of an "international anti-fascist conference" brought these glad tidings: "The thought that runs all through the documents of the conference and the speeches of its participants is that the strengthening process of détente creates favorable conditions for the struggles of the popular masses against imperialism and neocolonialism, against all forms of fascism and internal reaction."[26]

These thoughts were not entirely new. The Soviet Union has long claimed the right to support "national-liberation movements." In the heyday of détente, however, this motif was muted in favor of emphasis on avoiding international friction. Now almost any action which the Soviet Union chooses to take that could cause a dangerous exacerbation of Soviet-American relations, obtain direct or indirect unilateral advantage, or increase international tensions is being conveniently classified as "class and national-liberation struggle." That the Soviet political line should be turned around to provide a propaganda smoke screen for military intervention on the west coast of Africa is something new and ominous. If this sort of intervention can be justified in the name of détente, almost anything short of direct conflict with the United States can be made to fit the "Basic Principles."

There are indications, too, of a general "left turn" in the line which the Soviet Union is pressing on the world Communist movement. One telltale sign was an article in *Pravda* of August 6, 1975, by K. Zaradov, editor-in-chief of the official pro-Soviet Communist organ, *Problems of Peace and Socialism (World Marxist Review* in the English version). Zaradov's article was clearly aimed at the French and Italian Communist parties rather than at the Chinese. He called them "present-day conciliators" whose "logic is the same as that of the Mensheviks"—storm signals in Communist political meteorology. Why this sudden outburst? Because, according to Zaradov, the present-day conciliators and quasi-Mensheviks "would like to dissolve it [the proletarian party] in an ideologically amorphous organization, in any alliance created according to the formula 'unity for unity's sake.' "[27] The point was not lost on the Italian and French Communists who protested against this onslaught in the official organ of the Soviet Communist party. How high up the inspiration for Zaradov's article had come from was soon made clear by an item in *Izvestia* of September 19. This unusual social note reported that General Secretary Brezhnev had received Zaradov and had congratulated him for his fine work.

Another indication has come from the American Communist party, the most slavishly pro-Soviet of the Western Communist parties. At its recent national convention, its General Secretary discovered that "in the U.S. in the 1970's monopoly capital is preparing the climate in which fascism can come to power."[28] Various roles have already been assigned—Governor George C. Wallace as the "leading fascist demagogue"; William F. Buckley, Jr., as an "adroit exponent of 'intellectual' fascism"; a curiously promiscuous company—William B. Shockley, Herrnstein, H. J. Eysenck, Christopher Jencks, Edward C. Banfield, Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman—as "leading exponents" of "Nazi-like poison."[29] Since everyone knows that monopoly capital rules the United States, and now we know what monopoly capital is preparing, it does not take too much foresight to see where the Communist propaganda line is heading. The Soviets may soon be saving the entire world from the menace of American fascism.

All these aspects of Soviet policy—military intervention, political theorizing, Communist propaganda—are intimately related to the changing Soviet view of détente. Fundamental to all of them is one simple rule—that what always counts most is the relationship of forces, not the arrangement of words.

IV

THE Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 proved to be the first real test of the Soviet-American détente. It provided so clear a violation of the "basic principles" by the Soviet Union that even Secretary Kissinger had to admit as much, albeit in the relative obscurity of a Senate committee hearing. The violation concerned the message sent by Brezhnev to Algerian President Boumédienne and apparently to other Arab leaders telling them that it was their Arab duty to get into the war against Israel. Pressed by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., Secretary Kissinger agreed, "Yes, I would say this was a violation."[30*]

Nothing more was heard of this awkward admission. All concerned would have benefited if more attention had been paid to it. Kissinger himself had testified that Soviet "restraint" in the Middle East was "an integral part of the détente policy." If it did not hold there, it was unlikely to hold wherever American and Soviet interests seriously clashed. In that case the détente relationship was relegated to taking care of relatively minor matters, leaving the major ones to a nuclear alert or rival military interventions. It can now be seen that the Middle East crisis of October 1973 was a dress rehearsal for the Angola crisis of 1975-76.

After the Middle East crisis, however, the American line on détente underwent some changes. The concept of détente is like an accordion; it can be stretched out or pulled in. It can be as broad as it seemed after the summit meeting of May 1972 or it can be as narrow as it became after October 1973. To take care of all possible contingencies, Kissinger began to stress the schizoid character of détente. It was, he explained in March 1974, "composed of both competition and cooperation" with "profound ambiguities at every stage of this relationship."[31] Later, he spoke of détente as if it were merely an improved method of communications, "a means by which a competition which is inevitable—in the nature of present circumstances—is regulated while reducing the danger of nuclear war."[32] It had become a means to an end which was contradictory and ambiguous, a regulatory system without an agency to do the regulating.

Above all, détente was now largely reduced to limiting "the risks of nuclear war," as Kissinger put it.[33] Former Senator J. William Fulbright

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Senator Byrd: On the question of harassment, which is one of the key points of the Jackson amendment, is not the entire system of government in Russia based on harassment and terror, as a practical matter?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the government is more obtrusive than in our country (p. 88).

Obtrusive!

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could think of nothing better than: "Détente, in its essence, is an agreement not to let these differences [between the two superpowers] explode into nuclear war."[34] Professor Marshall Shulman instructed us that the main business of détente was "to reduce the danger of nuclear war."[35] The case for détente after October 1973 came essentially to rest on its relationship with nuclear war and on little else that was unambiguous and uncontradictory.

WE have now come to the heart of matter. It is right here—the relationship between détente and nuclear war.

Was there a meaningful "linkage" between nuclear war, economic-incentive payments, and political restraint? The American—or Kissingerian—theory and practice of détente was fundamentally dependent on a positive answer to this question. If the answer was negative, the entire American policy rested on a dubious foundation.

For the past thirty years, during hot wars, cold wars, and détentes, nuclear weapons have not been used. They were not used by the United States when it had a nuclear monopoly, even when its forces were decimated by Chinese Communist troops in Korea, even when the United States suffered defeat in the longest and most humiliating war in its history in Vietnam. There is obviously something about nuclear warfare that has set it apart from all other forms of warfare in which we still engage. There is something about nuclear weapons which cannot be fitted into hot wars, cold wars, or détentes. The nuclear war, as much as any type of war can be, must as yet be regarded as *sui generis*. We still have no experience with it; we cannot fathom its bottomless depths of pure nihilism; we cannot imagine a rational use for it.

With the nuclear weapon we reached the *reductio ad absurdum* of all warfare—a weapon that was *too destructive*. This was already the lesson when the United States still had a monopoly of it. As soon as the Soviet Union became an atomic and then a nuclear power, we achieved a higher stage of military "absurdity"—a weapon that was *too mutually destructive*. This second stage was reached by the mid-1950's, so that we have been in it for about two decades.[36] The third stage came in the late 1960's when the United States realized that the Soviet Union would achieve rough nuclear parity. The "absurdity" had now arrived at its final destination—the power of *mutual annihilation*.

In exasperation, Secretary Kissinger once dramatically exclaimed:

> And one of the questions which we have to ask ourselves as a country is what, in the name of God, is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?[37]

It was, as the saying goes, a good question. It implied that on the level of mutual annihilation it mattered little how much more annihilating a nuclear power could or would be. Kissinger implied that there was no political "significance" to be attached to those incomprehensibly high levels of destructiveness. Nuclear warfare cannot be weighed in political scales or translated into political terms. Politics, so to speak, is sub-nuclear. Thus Kissinger himself inferentially cut the ground from under the nuclear-political linkage.

The control of nuclear warfare, then, is of an order so different from the control of "conventional" warfare, let alone the control of political and ideological rivalries, that the former must be dealt with as something apart. Just as nuclear warfare has resisted every calculus of political or economic usefulness, so, too, it is not amenable to political blandishments or economic payoffs. The enormity of the nuclear problem defies all past human experience. This is not to say that the human race need or should resign itself to the ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation; it means that the threat must be faced on its own terms, without pretending that it can be got around through "linkages" of an altogether different order of magnitude. Economic incentives and political phrase-mongering—the tools of détente—are not in the same league as nuclear arms.

The promoters of détente sought to save it by reducing it to a hard core of avoidance of nuclear warfare. They were in fact exposing its essential hollowness. They were giving it the self-same function that the cold war of unblessed memory used to have—as an alternative to hot war. They were giving détente undeserved credit for an impasse that had been brought about by the mutual destructiveness of nuclear warfare. The linkage of détente with nuclear war betrayed a misunderstanding of both.

The trouble with the narrow nuclear interpretation of détente is that it puts all the rest of the world's troubles and all the other possible forms of conflict outside détente. If détente is as schizoid as both the latest American and Soviet versions make it out to be, one must constantly ask what belongs and what does not belong to the sphere of détente. If, as the Soviet spokesman Arbatov has told us, détente belongs exclusively to the sphere of "inter-state relations" and not at all to the sphere of "social development," the question arises whether the war in the Middle East or in Angola belong to the former or the latter. In the Soviet view, the latter is decidedly the case, which tells us how broad the category of "social development" is and how narrowly détente has been confined. If, as Secretary Kissinger has told us, détente is composed of both "competition and cooperation," the question arises: What pertains to competition and what to cooperation? An even more awkward question must be asked: If cooperation is the real essence of détente, what is the nature of the competition? Isn't it the bad old "cold war"? Kissinger has also begun to talk of "moderating competition," a formula combining "accommodation and resistance."[38] Does this mean that when we get "accommodation" we have détente, and when we get "resistance" we have cold war? If we can have "accommodation and resistance" together, why not détente and cold war together? These semantic games are hopelessly muddling and contaminating all discourse on world affairs today.

How far one can go to equate détente with the avoidance of a Soviet-American nuclear war was

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Senate hearings on détente. He set out to demonstrate that "détente makes for a unique stability in the ultimate issues of war and peace, but permits, nay, encourages movement and change in all issues of lesser moment." Next, he explained that this unique stability of détente was based on the

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conviction that "nuclear war would be an act of mutual destruction." This line of reasoning led him to his grand climax: "Détente means that the two countries will not make war on each other."[39]

If that is all détente means, it is accomplishing exactly what the fear of "mutual destruction" was able to accomplish with or without détente. One would like to be as sure as Professor Dinerstein is that détente in this sense possesses a "unique stability." If it does, it is only because the mutual destructiveness of nuclear war possesses that same "unique stability." In any case, we have gone very far from the détente of 1972 which, according to Kissinger, had moved "on a very broad front on many issues." Those who have tried to save détente by moving it on to a very narrow front on the single issue of nuclear warfare have unwittingly been administering the last rites to it.

V

Therefore, critics of détente must answer: what is the alternative that they propose? What precise policies do they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of the cold war? Does détente encourage repression—or is it détente that has generated the ferment and the demands for openness that we are now witnessing?[40]

Such was the angry challenge that Secretary Kissinger hurled at critics of détente last July. He seemed to think that the answers to his questions were crushingly obvious. I, too, think that the answers were so obvious that it was a mistake to ask the questions.

1) *What is the alternative that they propose?* One alternative would be to cease and desist from the unconscionable exploitation of the word "détente," or at least to stop waving it as a banner. It has now become an obstacle to thought. It is of little or no use in relation to nuclear war. It is a mockery in relation to such wars as we have, as in the Middle East and Angola. It admittedly does not apply to ideological conflict. It has been defined and redefined virtually out of existence. If it continues to serve as a political shibboleth, it must surely suffer the same fate as "appeasement," if it has not done so already.

2) *What precise policies do they want us to change?* One policy that was misconceived from the outset and should be changed without delay is that of "incentive" payments to the Soviet Union. It is this policy more than any other which has opened the door to appeasement in the guise of détente. Arbatov and other Soviet spokesmen have stormed against the idea that the Soviets are expected to make any "payments" to the West.[41] The theory and practice of American incentive premiums are especially ruinous in connection with nuclear-weapons negotiations. If the threat of mutual annihilation is not persuasive enough to bring one or the other side to its senses, and here I do not point an accusing finger at the Soviet Union, immeasurably lesser incentives are at best superfluous and at worst irrelevant. Advance payments to the Soviet Union for services in the common interest that may or may not be rendered have never worked and even make matters worse. They merely serve to convince the masters of the Soviet Union that the famous "relationship of forces" has so changed in their favor that payments must be made for nothing more than a piece of paper.

3) *Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased danger?* Let us recall that this question was flung out with much unction and indignation only a half-year ago. Since then the level of tension and danger has increased dramatically. The question was plainly addressed to the wrong parties. The Angola crisis is hardly the work of the critics of détente. Some of them may even have seen such dramatically increased danger coming since the last Arab-Israeli war. The real question is whether the leaders and fellow-travelers of détente were prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased danger.

4) *Do they wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of the cold war?* To answer this question, it is useful to recall Secretary Kissinger's answer to another question put to him at the end of 1974:

> *Senator Byrd:* Is it not correct that since 1972, in a period of so-called détente, there has been a methodical improvement and expansion of nuclear and conventional power in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe?
>
> *Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, that is correct.[42]

At least we have it from Secretary Kissinger that détente, in its heyday, did nothing to discourage the Soviets from improving and expanding their military power. Whether the same can be said of the United States seems more doubtful, but let us assume that both sides have improved and expanded their nuclear and conventional power in the détente years between 1972 and 1974. It may be argued that the situation would have been worse without détente. Perhaps—but it certainly did not get better, and it is most unlikely that more intercontinental missiles and more megatonnage would have significantly changed the nature of the problem. The obvious answer, then, to this question about crises and arms budgets is: No. But what does it have to do with détente? Has détente saved us from constant crises and high arms budgets? Could Secretary Kissinger tell Senator Byrd that détente had prevailed on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe not to improve and expand their nuclear and conventional power? More to the point, the answer, unfortunately, again is: No.

5) *Does détente encourage repression—or is it détente that has generated ferment and the demands for openness that we are now witnessing?* This is the most incredible question of all. It reveals how much Kissinger's understanding of the Soviet system has changed since he took up residence in Washington. In one of his major works, *The Necessity for Choice*, published in 1961, he discussed this very question at some length. He frowned on those who thought that "Western diplomacy should seek to influence Soviet internal developments." He scoffed at "the tendency to change in Soviet society." He reproached those who saw "in every change of tone a change of heart." He decried "the persistence with which it has been claimed that the economic needs of the Soviet Union would impose a more conciliatory policy on it." He severely disapproved of the fact

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that, "whatever aspect of the Soviet system they have considered, many in the West have sought to solve our policy dilemma by making the most favorable assumptions about Soviet trends." He instructed us sagely: "The tendency to justify negotiations by changes in Soviet attitude makes us vulnerable to largely formal Soviet moves." And this: "The possibility of evolution of Soviet policy in a more conciliatory direction may be jeopardized by the eagerness with which it is predicted."[43]

NOTHING could illustrate more aptly the timeliness of these warnings than the connection between détente and Soviet repression. By the time Kissinger asked the question, "Does détente encourage repression?," in July 1975, repression was already in full swing. The most open period in recent Soviet history came in 1967-71, before the American-Soviet détente. The official crackdown on the underground *samizdat* movement took place in 1972, the very first year of that détente. The orchestrated vilification of Andrei Sakharov, the recent Nobel Peace Prize winner, started in August 1973. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was arrested and deported in February 1974. Hedrick Smith of the New York *Times* has by chance answered Kissinger's question in his new book, *The Russians,* an account of his experiences in the Soviet Union in 1971-74, dealing with precisely the years of détente, and an ideal corrective to much of what correspondents in Moscow have to send out while they are still there:

> The technology of Soviet repression had become more sophisticated and more effective as détente proceeded. The unexpected irony was that détente, instead of spawning more general ferment among the Soviet intelligentsia, as the West had hoped and the Kremlin had feared, became a reason for tighter controls and sometimes provided new techniques for quieting disaffected intellectuals.[44]

This reflex on the part of the Soviet leadership is not new. The precedent had been set by Lenin in 1920-21. At the same time that he introduced the New Economic Policy or NEP, liberalizing the Soviet economy, and as he began to make deals with Western powers, he liquidated every vestige of dissidence in both the country and the party. The two went hand in hand in order to prevent present and potential dissidents from taking advantage of "decreased tension." Stalin combined the Popular Front outside Russia with the Great Purge inside Russia. Yet Kissinger has assured us: "Changes in Soviet society have already occurred, and more will come. But they are most likely to develop through an evolution that can best go forward in an environment of decreasing international tensions."[45] The trouble with this line of reasoning is that the Soviet leadership has known what to do about it for the past fifty years. Whenever there is danger that decreasing international tensions will foster changes in Soviet society unwanted by the party, repression is increased. That is why détente has been rather than less repression. There may be other reasons for pursuing a policy of détente, but discouraging repression is not one of them.

One wonders why Secretary Kissinger thought that his questions were so crushing and the answers to them so self-evident. Had he forgotten so much?

VI

SECRETARY Kissinger, former Senator Fulbright, and others have insisted that the only alternative to détente is cold war. Since they seem to think that a return to cold war is unthinkable, or at least unbearable, that would leave us only with détente. The reality is far more confused and disagreeable. Détente, cold war, and appeasement have all been mixed up together, with appeasement given the least consideration.

One of the ways appeasement was built into détente has already been noted. The whole theory and practice of giving "incentives" to the Soviet Union to do what it should do in its own interest or not at all was the entering wedge of appeasement. We tried to buy with gratuitous and unreciprocated favors what is not for sale, especially not in the one field that is supposed to matter most in détente—nuclear warfare.

But a humiliating climate of appeasement had also been created. It was symbolized by the presidential refusal to receive Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn because the gesture might displease Leonid Brezhnev. Had Brezhnev ever refused to meet with an anti-U.S. personage in order not to displease Richard Nixon or Gerald Ford? This type of appeasement is not new and not limited to the United States. West Germany, whose détente with the Soviet Union goes back to 1970, has practiced the same kind of appeasement at the expense of one of its own foremost writers. The German incident shows that present-day appeasement takes certain characteristic forms in more than one country.

In the summer of 1973, the eminent German writer Günter Grass was invited to give a private reading from his works at the home of Ulrich Sahm, the German ambassador in Moscow. Grass made indirect contact with Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn in preparation for his visit, and Solzhenitsyn intended to give him a manuscript to take back. Meanwhile, both Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn issued statements warning against the risks of détente. This situation so frightened Ambassador Sahm that he sent a private letter to Grass withdrawing the invitation. Grass refused to let the matter remain private; he published the letter and discussed its implications on television and in the press. A former upholder of *Ostpolitik,* he now renounced it on the ground that its restrictions meant the betrayal of culture in general and Russian writers in particular. Grass was thereupon publicly and offensively rebuked by a spokesman of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[46]

The Solzhenitsyn and Grass incidents were symptomatic of a moral flaccidity that always goes along with appeasement. The Soviets consider culture and ideology to be outside the boundaries of détente, but they seem to be the only ones to think so or to act on this premise. Indeed, cultural appeasement was also built into détente by virtue of how the different political systems work.

A well-known American specialist in Soviet

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of the scholarly-exchange program. The Soviet scholar who comes to the United States can see anything he asks for in American universities and libraries. He goes back and writes about America's most painful contemporary problems—ethnic con-

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flicts, student riots, unemployment, crime, black nationalism, and the like. The American scholar has had to accept a different set of rules:

> Indeed, and the best illustration of that is the simple fact that for American scholars the most interesting subject of study in the Soviet Union is Soviet political history—for example Stalin and Trotsky, the history of the party, the relationship between party and government, the purges of the 1930's, Soviet foreign policy, Soviet economic policy, and so forth. We have never been able to send a single American scholar to the Soviet Union to look at any of these problems.
>
> When the exchange visits first started there were applications on our side for the study of these areas, but the Russians resolutely refused to allow for applicants into their country. Then, realizing how applications in these fields of study would be treated by the Russians, our young scholars shifted their applications to the study of less sensitive questions, such as local government which hardly exists in the Soviet Union or 19th-century political history and problems of that kind. In others words, the Russians turned us away from the issues which are most central to us, and we are now doing their job for them, because our professors tell their young students not to bother with subjects that would prejudice their chances of being allowed into the Soviet Union. . . .
>
> Soviet control over opportunities for study in the USSR has so influenced some of our more timid colleagues interested in going or returning to Russia, that they will not join other intellectuals in protests against the Soviet treament of dissidents, minorities, etc. and will even refuse to participate in conferences that may be distasteful to the Soviet government. The Soviet government has in fact acquired some influence both over the direction of Western scholarship and over Western political attitudes.[47]

In effect, appeasement was built into détente whenever we adapted ourselves to them but they did not adapt themselves to us. In these circumstances, appeasement worked silently, automatically, almost unthinkingly. It was the most insidious kind of appeasement because the cards were stacked in the Soviets' favor without any overt effort on their part.

SUCH have been the acrid fruits of détente. They did not burst forth because there was anything wrong with the ideal of détente. They flourished because too much appeasement was built into détente. Appeasement did not work in the 1930's; it has not worked in the 1970's and for the same reason—appeasement cannot appease the unappeaseable. We now have it from Secretary Kissinger that this is precisely the position we are approaching today.

The latest Kissingerian theory was foreshadowed by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor for the State Department, in an address on "The Meaning of 'Détente'" at the Naval War College in the late spring of 1975. Sonnenfeldt described the Soviet Union in terms which previously in the era of détente:

> Its power continues to grow and its interests to expand. Indeed, it can be said that in the broad sweep of history, Soviet Russia is only just beginning its truly "imperial" phase: its military forces have acquired intercontinental reach only fairly recently; its capacity to influence events in remote areas is of relatively recent standing; and it is only just acquiring the habit of defining its interests on a global rather than a solely continental basis. For us, therefore, the problem is that of building viable relationships with an emerging world power.

One reads these lines with astonishment. "Only just beginning"? "Only fairly recently"? "Of relatively recent standing"? Unfortunately, Sonnenfeldt did not give any clue to how recent his "recently" was. The unwary reader might imagine that all this had happened during the past three years of détente. Let us take just one of these astounding statements—that the Soviet Union "is only just acquiring the habit of defining its interests on a global rather than a solely continental basis." A quarter of a century ago, North Korea could not have carried on its war if the Soviet Union had not trained and equipped its army. Continental or global? The major supplier of North Vietnam was the Soviet Union. Continental or global? In one way or another, as Communists, the Soviet leaders have defined their interests on a global basis for almost six decades. They have had much more experience in this respect than the Americans have had. This patronizing view of the Soviet Union as a global power tells more about the Counselor's historical awareness than it does about the Soviet Union.

In any case, if this is where the broad sweep of history has taken us, it should have had some bearing on the state of détente. But Sonnenfeldt was not yet ready to go that far. Instead, he gave the fact that the Soviet Union "continues to grow in power, weight, and reach" as a reason "why we must persist in the basic policies we have been pursuing over the past several years"—incentives and all.[48]

Secretary Kissinger himself went public with the new theory in an interview with Flora Lewis which appeared in the New York *Times* of December 21, 1975. He explained that the Soviet Union had become an imperial superpower in an expansionist phase that must run its course. The Soviets, he warned, will exploit every opportunity to enlarge their dominion, unless the risks are made too great for them. The Soviet move into Angola demonstrates how far afield this expansionist momentum had carried them. Unless the United States answered in kind in Angola, the next stage of Soviet expansionism would be even more dangerous and costly.

By this time the official line had clearly gone beyond the Sonnenfeldt version of early 1975. It went even further at Secretary Kissinger's news conference on December 23. It also began with a strange history lesson:

> The basic problem in our relation with the Soviet Union is the emergence of the Soviet Union into true superpower status. That fact has become evident only in the 1970's. As late as the Cuban missile crisis, the disparity in [illegible] between the United States and

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favor.

In this broad sweep of history, we jump from the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 to the 1970's. This leap makes it appear as if we had to wait until December 1975 to discover what was going on.

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The missile crisis convinced the Soviet leadership that it was necessary to catch up with and overtake the United States in strategic arms. The Soviets caught up much more quickly than the Americans had counted on; in fact, back in 1965, the top American leaders did not think that the Soviets had any intention of catching up. By the time the SALT I talks were started in late 1969, the Soviets had made such progress that the Americans were ready to settle for freezing both sides at a level of rough strategic parity. Despite SALT I, if we may trust Paul H. Nitze, who deserves to be heard respectfully as a SALT negotiator from 1969 to 1974, the Soviets have not been satisfied with parity and have been aiming at strategic superiority, a position which Nitze thinks they began to achieve in 1978.[49]

One cannot, therefore, jump historically all the way from 1962 to the 1970's. Something was happening within two or three years of the Cuban missile crisis that brought us to the present balance in strategic power. The shift has been going on for about a decade, and its implications have been apparent throughout the course of détente. It is rather late in the game to discover that the Soviet Union possesses "true superpower status."

And what, in the name of God, is "true superpower status"? At least as long ago as 1964, Henry Kissinger referred to the Soviet Union as a "superpower."[50] In 1968, Kissinger noted that the Soviet Union was one of the two powers which possessed "the full panoply of military might."[51] Does the new status mean that the Soviet Union in 1964 was an "untrue" superpower? Or does "true superpower" mean a "super-superpower"? How much more of the full panoply of military might, *circa* 1968, was it necessary for the Soviet Union to possess to be promoted to the rank of "true superpower"? If the United States is also a "true superpower," why the special emphasis on this new classification?

This broad sweep of history is more a political than a historical operation. The new status of the Soviet Union has been discovered just in time to explain a crisis in American détente policy, as if the crisis were a result of immanent historical forces instead of a misconceived policy. That the crisis for détente may be a mortal one was made plain by Secretary Kissinger in his December 23 news conference. These were fighting words:

> We do not confuse the relaxation of tension with permitting the Soviet Union to expand its sphere by military means and that is the issue, for example, in Angola. . . .
>
> If the Soviet Union continues action such as Angola, we will without any question resist. . . .
>
> Unless the Soviet Union shows restraint in its foreign-policy actions, the situation in our relationship is bound to become more tense, and there is no question that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind.

Thus Kissinger has now been forced to give up in fact, if not in name, one of the underlying myths of détente—the theory that the Soviet Union had become a status-quo power. This notion was actually the implied premise of the "Basic Principles" of May 1972. It has been a costly myth, made all the worse because it was implicitly fostered by official U.S. policy.

THIS IS not the place to discuss at length what the U.S. should do in Angola, a large and difficult subject by itself. I wish to restrict myself to the implications of the Angolan crisis for détente. The first thing that needs to be said, in my view, is that the Angolan situation represents two problems—one immediate and tactical, the other long-range and strategic. It is necessary to differentiate between them, for what may be good in the long run need not be good in the short run. Angola may not be the best place for the United States to face the issue tactically; it is the right place to understand the issue strategically. On the tactical level, the United States need not permit the Soviet Union to decide the time and place of every confrontation of this kind.

As I write, it is too early to tell what the full story of Angola is. Whatever the truth may be about the various foreign interventions, the Soviets clearly outbid all the others by bringing in thousands of Cuban proxies, the nearest thing to using their own troops, and by arming their side with far more, far more costly, and far more advanced weapons. In terms of the political significance of the Angolan situation for détente, however, it matters less what each side has done than that such a faraway Soviet-American contest should have taken place at all. For if, as Secretary Kissinger has maintained, the United States must react as strongly as he has urged it to react in Angola in order to discourage the Soviet Union "from taking advantage" of favorable opportunities, we are faced with the paradox that it is necessary to wage cold and not-so-cold war in dangerous situations in order to save détente for non-dangerous situations—in short, that détente works when and where it is needed the least. If détente is so restricted, fluctuating, ambiguous, and paradoxical, it can hardly be taken as seriously as we had been led to believe.

Tactics aside, Kissinger is finally right on the strategic problem: the Soviet Union *is* in an imperial, expansionist phase. We are faced strategically with a long-term Soviet imperial pressure, now gathering momentum and based, as Soviet spokesmen like to say, on a "new relationship of forces." If the Soviets can get the world to accept their version of this "new relationship of forces," the consequences will be cumulatively disastrous.

This renewed Soviet pressure was building up while the United States was beguiled by détente. It is imprudent and implausible to conduct a foreign policy based on holding back the new Soviet expansionism while still officially enmeshed

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theories and policies cannot coexist peacefully. One of them must go.

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Notes

[1] *Détente*: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, August-September 1974, pp. 61, 67, 102, 147, 208, 239, 301.

[2] Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Impact of Détente on Chinese and Soviet Communism," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1974, p. 134.

[3] "If tensions mount, the parties may move toward cold and then hot war. If tensions diminish, the parties move toward détente (whether short- or long-lived): from détente they could move further toward rapprochement or even entente" (*ibid.*).

[4] May 29, 1972.

[5] July 3, 1974.

[6] *Détente*: Hearings, pp. 161-62.

[7] Robert Ellsworth, *Department of State Bulletin*, November 23, 1970, pp. 642-43. Also: "The condition of the Soviet economy is clearly the primary determinant of present Soviet foreign policy" (Marshall Shulman, *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973, p. 43).

[8] *Détente*: Hearings, p. 32.

[9] *Emigration Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974*: Hearings before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, December 3, 1974, p. 106.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

[11] Marshall Shulman, New York *Times*, March 10, 1974.

[11a] Marshall I. Goldman, *Détente and Dollars* (Basic Books, 1975), pp. 275-76.

[12] Marshall I. Goldman, *Daedalus*, Fall 1975, p. 137, and Note 35, p. 143.

[13] June 15, 1972.

[14] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace*, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 18, 1970, p. 232.

[15] *Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger*: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, September 11, 1973, Part I, p. 101.

[16] *Pravda*, August 1, 1975, p. 1 (in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII, No. 31, p. 13).

[17] *Emigration Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974*, p. 77.

[18] September 19, 1974.

[19] *Information Bulletin*, issued by the *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 13 (1975), Nos. 12-13, p. 14.

[20] *Izvestia*, September 4, 1975 (in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII, No. 36, p. 3).

[21] *World Marxist Review*, September 1975, p. 59.

[22] N. Polyanov, *Izvestia*, November 29, 1975, p. 4.

[23] V. Kobysh, *Izvestia*, November 30, 1975, p. 2.

[24] V. Matveyev, *Izvestia*, December 2, 1975, p. 4.

[25] Oleg Skalkin, *Pravda*, December 6, 1975, p. 5.

[26] O. Kirsenko, I. Shchedrov, A. Arkhipov, *Pravda*, December 8, 1975, p. 3.

[27] K. Zaradov, *Pravda*, August 6, 1975 (in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII, No. 31, pp. 15, 17).

[28] Gus Hall, *The Crisis of U.S. Capitalism and the Fight Back* (International Publishers, 1975), p. 44.

[29] *Political Affairs*, November 1975, pp. 3, 6, 16.

[30] *Emigration Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974*, p. 89.

[31] March 28, 1974.

[32] Henry A. Kissinger, interview with William F. Buckley, September 13, 1975.

[33] November 12, 1973 (interview in Peking).

[34] *Congressional Record*, Senate, November 9, 1973, p. S-20136.

[35] New York *Times*, March 10, 1974.

[36] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 88. In 1950, U.S. policy-makers had expected the second stage to be reached in 1954 (p. 60). But even if Huntington is right, and it did not come about for another two years or so, the difference is hardly significant now.

[37] July 3, 1974.

[38] Flora Lewis, New York *Times*, December 21, 1975.

[39] *Détente*: Hearings, pp. 301-302.

[40] July 15, 1975.

[41] Arbatov and Polyanov, *op. cit.*

[42] *Emigration Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974*, p. 76.

[43] Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 195-201.

[44] Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (Quadrangle, 1976), p. 439.

[45] September 19, 1974.

[46] The story is told by François Bondy, *Survey*, Spring-Summer 1974, p. 43.

[47] Robert F. Byrnes, Distinguished Professor of History and Director of the Russian and East European Institute, Indiana State University, *Survey*, Autumn 1974, pp. 52-53.

[48] *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1975, pp. 3-8.

[49] *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, p. 226.

[50] *Ibid.*, July 1964, p. 539.

[51] *Agenda for the Nation* (Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 587.

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★Pravda encouraging

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"The role of concrete measures directed at curtailing the arms race is especially great," Pravda continued, "because they are the most weighty touchstone of the genuine intentions of the [two] sides.

"As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is filled with the determination to do everything that depends on it in order that the problem of limitation of offensive strategic weapons and stopping the arms race find a resolution. . . . Not only not to tolerate deviation from the course already constructed, but to add new successes in the development of Soviet-American relations on the basis of earlier achieved agreements and treaties — such is the aspiration of the Soviet people."

On overall relations with the U.S. Pravda said: "The Soviet people consider normalization and development of Soviet-American relations a most important tendency in the policy of peaceful coexistence. Everyone sees what a beneficial influence their cardinal improvement, beginning in 1972, exerted on the international political climate."

On Angola Pravda dismissed the idea of a government of national unity as advocated by half the members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), saying that such a plan was "obviously the result of the influence of imperialist circles of the West."

Pravda's weekly review did not mention the Soviet Union's Eastern adversary, China. But a new blast at China in the Jan. 16 Pravda made it clear that Peking's sudden release of a Soviet helicopter crew three weeks ago does not signal improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations.

After an initial surprised silence, the Soviet press had resumed low-level criticism of Peking. The Jan. 16 piece by I. Alexandrov was the first authoritative Soviet commentary on China since the return of the helicopter crew.

There were no new accusations in the article. But it was the harshest Soviet criticism of China in months. Mr. Alexandrov termed the Chinese leaders "renegades who have usurped power," and he implicitly called for their overthrow. He looked forward to the time when "the Chinese people" would restore "friendship with the Soviet Union," "cast off the fetters," and "call to account" those who are trying to poison their minds with Maoist raving and who humiliate them."

In foreign affairs Mr. Alexandrov accused Peking of "using dictatorial-bureaucratic methods to achieve its great-power hegemonistic ambitions, to pursue a policy of expansion against neighboring states, and to incite to a third world war."

Soviets now need 10 new small rolls

By Reuter

Moscow

Soviet bakers have been instructed to produce new small rolls to cut back wastage of bread, the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda reports.

The newspaper quoted deputy food industry minister V. I. Ployakov as saying the new rolls, weighing from 1.7 to 2.4 ounces, would be mainly destined for factory and school canteens where wastage is believed to run high.

In most canteens in the Soviet Union, bread is provided in large-cut hunks which are often left half-eaten and quickly go stale. Once provided free on tables, a charge was introduced for it after poor harvests in the early 1960s.

The minister's disclosure came among other signs of an official campaign to save bread in the wake of last year's very poor grain harvest. It was the lowest for 10 years and only two-thirds of the planned target, according to partial figures released.

"Bread is our greatest treasure. We must respect it and look after it," Mr. Polyakov told Komsomolskaya Pravda. "We must try to make sure that not one gram is wasted."

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