

ACTION

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Classification



Department of State

TELEGRAM

ORIGINATING POST:

STATE

MRN: **137451**

INCOMING

AMERICAN EMBASSY, BRUSSELS

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IMMEDIATE

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TO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8707
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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: LEAD EDITORIAL WASH STAR-NEWS JUNE 26, 1974
BREMER FOR SECRETARY; RODMAN FOR SCOWCROFT; DECAIRE FOR
ZEIGLER AND WARREN FRM S/PRS

QUOTE: IT IS UNFORTUNATE -- AND ALSO NO COINCIDENCE --
THAT THE LATEST DUSTUP BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE
KISSINGER AND SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON SHOULD HAVE
HAPPENED ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S SUMMIT MEETING
WITH SOVIET LEADERS. THE CHARGES AND ANGRY DENIALS OF
SECRET "DEALS" MADE WITH THE RUSSIANS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE MISSILE LIMITATION AGREEMENT OF 1972 ARE FAIRLY
TYPICAL OF THE KIND OF "MISUNDERSTANDING" BETWEEN THE
STATE DEPARTMENT AND CAPITOL HILL THAT SEEMS TO OCCUR
ALTOGETHER TOO FREQUENTLY THESE DAYS.

THE SENSE OF THE CHARGES WAS THAT, THANKS TO TWO UNDIS-
CLOSED ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE RUSSIAN NEGOTIATORS, THE
FIRST INTERIM SALT AGREEMENT WAS ACTUALLY MORE FAVORABLE TO
THE SOVIET UNION THAN IT APPEARED ON THE SURFACE. THE
RUSSIANS, IT WAS SAID, WOULD BE PERMITTED TO DEPLOY MORE
MODERN SUBMARINE MISSILE LAUNCHERS THAN THE AGREEMENT
SPECIFIED. AND AT THE SAME TIME, THE UNITED STATES HAD
ASSURED THE RUSSIANS THAT IT DID NOT INTEND TO BUILD THE
NUMBER OF SUBMARINES THAT IT WAS PERMITTED TO BUILD.

THE FIRST OF THESE CHARGES AT LEAST APPEARS COMPLETELY
GROUNDLESS. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET
UNION WAS ALLOWED TO DEPLOY UP TO 950 MODERN SUBMARINE
MISSILE LAUNCHERS, IN RETURN FOR RETIRING 210 OF ITS
OLDER LAND-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES. SHORTLY AFTER IT WAS
SIGNED, A DISPUTE AROSE OVER THIS PROVISION, THE RUSSIANS
ARGUING THAT THEY WERE ALSO PERMITTED TO CONVERT THEIR
OBSOLESCENT DIESEL-POWERED SUBMARINES WITH MODERN MISSILE
LAUNCHERS OUTSIDE OF THE 950 LIMITATION. AFTER A MONTH
OF HAGGLING, RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ANATOLI DOBRYNIN SIGNED AN
AGREEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING REAFFIRMING THE 950 TOTAL AS
SPECIFIED IN THE PUBLISHED AGREEMENT.

S/S - 15

EXDIS
S/S - 10

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THE SECOND CHARGE SEEMS ALMOST EQUALLY INSUBSTANTIAL. ACCORDING TO KISSINGER, PRESIDENT NIXON ON THE LAST NIGHT OF THE 1972 MOSCOW SUMMIT VOLUNTEERED THE INFORMATION TO THE RUSSIAN LEADERS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NO INTENTION OF BUILDING UP TO THE LIMIT OF 710 SUBMARINE MISSILE LAUNCHERS PERMITTED UNDER THE AGREEMENT. THE REASON WAS NO GREAT SECRET AT THE TIME: THE UNITED STATES HAD DECIDED TO WAIT FOR THE NEW TRIDENT-CLASS OF SUBMARINES WHICH WOULD NOT BE READY FOR DEPLOYMENT UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN 1977.

IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW EITHER OF THESE THINGS ADDS UP TO SECRET AGREEMENTS IN ANY WAY DETRIMENTAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES OR IN ANY SENSE DECEPTIVE TO THE CONGRESS OR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE AMERICAN INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS, EVEN THOUGH IT IN NO WAY CHANGED THE FACTS THAT HAD BEEN LAID BEFORE IT EARLIER. IT MAY BE ARGUED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS INDISCREET IN TALKING TO THE RUSSIAN LEADERS ABOUT HIS SHIPBUILDING PLANS, EVEN THOUGH THIS IN NO WAY CHANGED THE LIMITS SPELLED OUT IN THE SALT-I DOCUMENTS.

SENATOR JACKSON, TO BE SURE, IS STILL FAR FROM SATISFIELD, SAYING THAT HE FEELS CONGRESS WAS DELIBERATELY DECEIVED. IT STRIKES US AS ALMOST INCREDIBLE THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE ARMS CONTROL SUBCOMMITTEE WAS UNAWARE OF THE DECISION TO WAIT FOR THE TRIDENT INSTEAD OF BUILDING MORE POSIEDON TYPE SUBMARINES. BUT THE INCREDIBLE, IN THIS TOWN, BECOMES MORE COMMONPLACE WITH EACH PASSING DAY.
UNQUOTE

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