

(D)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

28 Sep

Memo For LGan Scowcroft

Brent : Please scan the attached message which is of significance in SALI perceptions. Perhaps you have seen already.

(W)  
[Workham]



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AND THE SAME APPLIES TO ROCKEFELLER. OF COURSE WE KNOW OF ROCKEFELLER'S FORMER ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, BUT THAT WAS FIFTEEN YEARS AGO. HIS CURRENT VIEWS ARE A MYSTERY TO US."

C. (U) I MENTIONED THAT FORD'S SUPPORT FOR KISSINGER ASSURED CONTINUITY, BUT HE SAID, "WELL, YES, BUT WE WORRY ABOUT REPORTS OF DISPUTES BETWEEN KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER AND WONDER WHO WILL WIN. OF COURSE WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE KISSINGER, BUT SOME REPORTS INDICATE THAT SCHLESINGER IS GAINING. WHAT DO YOU THINK?" I SAID THAT, HERE IN MOSCOW, I HAD VERY LITTLE FEEL FOR THE US POLITICAL SITUATION. WITH HIS STAFF HE WOULD KNOW FAR MORE THAN I WOULD. WHAT DID HE THINK? HE SAID THAT IT WAS BOUND TO BE A TOUGH PROBLEM FOR FORD. BOTH MEN WERE VERY ABLE AND EACH HAD STRONG SUPPORT. TO RELEASE EITHER WOULD BRING FORTH STRONG CRITICISM FROM THE OTHER SIDE. ACCORDINGLY, HE THOUGHT PROBABLY FORD WOULD MOVE TO REDUCE THE TENSION BY SPLITTING KISSINGER'S JOB, APPOINTING A NEW DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

D. (C) I AGREED THAT HE HAD VALID POINTS.

E.. (C) TURNING TO SVYATOV (RETIRED NAVY CAPTAIN AND HARD-LINER) I SAID, "TELL ME, HOW DO YOU PLAN TO USE YOUR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS." HE REPLIED: "BY THE YEAR 2000 WE MIGHT HAVE AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER. IF WE DO, AT THAT TIME WE WILL COPE WITH THE QUESTION OF HOW TO USE IT." WHEN I ASSURED HIM THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF AT LEAST TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WAS UNCLASSIFIED, HAVING APPEARED FREQUENTLY IN THE OPEN LITERATURE AND HAVING BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY SOVIET NAVAL SPOKEMEN, HE SIMPLY STONE-WALLED IT, INSISTING THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT EVEN CONSIDERING THE CONSTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. COMMENT: THIS INCIDENT OF DELIBERATE FALSIFICATION OF KNOWN FACTS TENDS TO HIGHLIGHT THE ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION WITH USA INSTITUTE ON ANY SUBJECT OTHER THAN EVENTS IN THE US.

F. (U) TROFIMENKO THEN TURNED TO THE "SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE" (NEVER MENTIONING THE GRECHKO DOCTRINE) AND ATTEMPTED TO BLUNT ITS LOGIC. HE SAID THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE TO EVEN A HYPOTHETICAL CASE. "FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU WISH TO SEND US A MESSAGE, AND YOU DECIDE TO DO IT BY HITTING, SAY, TEN OF OUR MISSILE SILOS, WHAT HAVE YOU ACCOMPLISHED? YOU HAVEN'T MADE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT IN OUR CAPABILITY, BUT

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YOU HAVE CERTAINLY MADE US ANGRY. WE MIGHT RETALIATE MASSIVELY. I DON'T SEE HOW THE DOCTRINE CAN DO OTHER THAN DE-STABILIZE THE SITUATION."

G. (C) CONTINUING, HE SAID, "YOU KNOW WHEN YOU PURSUE THE SCHLESINGER TARGETTING POLICY TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION, IT IS CLEAR THAT IT THREATENS, MOST OF ALL, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. A CARRIER AT SEA IS A VERY IMPORTANT, DISCRETE, MILITARY TARGET THAT CAN BE STRUCK INDIVIDUALLY, AND SURGICALLY, WITHOUT IMPACT ON NEARBY POPULATION CENTERS."

3. (C) AT THIS POINT THE ARRIVAL OF KREST'YANOV, BELIEVED TO BE THE KGB CHAPERONE FOR USA INSTITUTE, INTERRUPTED THE CONVERSATION AND SHIFTED TOPICS. WHEN HE LEFT, SEMEYKO, WHO WAS HARD TO UNDERSTAND ABOVE THE DIN OF THE NOW-CROWDED ROOM, BEGAN PRESSING THE NEED FOR THE US TO SOFTEN ITS BARGAINING POSITION ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS, SAYING: "YOUR POSITION IS VERY HARD. YOU WON'T BUDGE. IF YOU WOULD BE A LITTLE MORE WILLING TO COMPROMISE YOU WOULD BE AMAZED AT HOW THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WOULD CHANGE." THEN FOLLOWED CONSIDERABLE CHIT-CHAT ON THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THROW-WEIGHT VERSUS ACCURACY IN WHICH HE CONTENDED THAT US TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP ENTITLED SOVIETS TO SOME ADVANTAGES IN OTHER AREAS. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT, HOWEVER, MY CONTENTION THAT SINCE THE SOVIETS WOULD SURELY FILL TECHNOLOGICAL GAPS, THE US COULD NOT ACCEPT PERMANENT DISPARITY IN NUMBERS AND SIZE. IN CONCLUSION, IN AS FRIENDLY A VEIN AS POSSIBLE, I SAID, "I BELIEVE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER IS SUGGESTING THAT WE HAVE OUT-PRODUCED YOU BEFORE, AND WE CAN DO IT AGAIN. WE WOULD RATHER HAVE A MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT, BUT IF YOU INSIST ON PERMANENT DISPARITIES, WE ARE PREPARED TO OUT-PRODUCE." HE SEEMED TO AGREE AND TO BE DISTRESSED.

## 4. (S) COMMENT:

A. (U) TROFIMENKO'S SPECIALITY IS THE US POLITICAL SCENE. BUT HE ALSO ACTS AS EXPERT ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. SEMEYKO CONCENTRATES ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. SVYATOV, RETIRED NAVY CAPTAIN, TALKS LITTLE, LISTENS, AND IS BELIEVED TO ALSO REPRESENT KGB. OF THE THREE, TROFIMENKO IS BY FAR THE MORE LUCID AND PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT.

B. (C) THIS DIALOGUE ILLUSTRATES MANY POINTS, MOST OF WHICH HAVE APPEARED BEFORE:

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1. PRIMARY SOVIET FEAR IS US TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY. THEY ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT WITH WOULD RESTRAIN THIS CAPACITY.

2. USA INSTITUTE VINGERS EAGERLY DISCUSS US POLICY, DOCTRINE AND PERSONALITIES. THEY STUDIOUSLY AVOID ANY DISCUSSION OF SOVIET COUNTERPARTS. IN MANY CASES THEY ARE SIMPLY IGNORANT OF U1838 197,5340-45. SVYAKOV, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY NOT KNOW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW PRODUCING AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

3. THEY ARE SEEKING INFO ON THE NEW US LEADERSHIP AND WILL EVEN BE FAIRLY OPEN IN RELATED AREAS IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN SUCH INFO.

C. (C) TROFIMENKO'S COMMENTS ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SHOULD BE ANALYZED IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY INFO WHICH WE MAY HAVE.

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D. (C) DURING SEMINAR DISCUSSIONS THE FOLLOWING DAY, KREST'YANOV MADE SOME POINTS RELATED TO PARA 2 F AND G ABOVE, SAYING THAT SCHLESINGER IS "REALLY ADVOCATING A COUNTER FORCE STRATEGY. HE HAS CHOSEN THIS DELIBERATELY OBSCURE MANNER TO ANNOUNCE A RETURN TO THE COUNTER FORCE STRATEGY." CONTINUING, HE SAID THAT THE US ASKS FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS, I.E., LIMITATIONS ON MIRVING, BUT OFFERS NOTHING IN RETURN.

5. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY.

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