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JCS REVIEWED 29-Nov-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

INFO CIA
WHITE HOUSE WASH DC [REFER TO DOS] [REFER TO DIA]

CND WASH DC
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ANMCC FORT RITCHIE MD [DIA REVIEWED 01-Dec-2010: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART]

P 030950Z NOV 73
FM [25x1] [DOS REVIEWED 27-Dec-2010: NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED]

TO DIA WASHDC
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S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECTION 1 OF 2 2107 OCT 73

SUBJ: (U) MILITARY OUTLOOK IF CEASE-FIRE FAILS.

1. (U) THE SURPRISE KUWAIT MTNG OF SADAT AND ASAD AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE BLACKOUT IN CAIRO AND OTHER EGYPTIAN CITIES MAY HAVE PERFECTLY INNOCENT EXPLANATIONS, BUT FOR THE PRESENT THEY ARE WORRISOME, AT BEST. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY & VOLATILITY OF THE ISSUES AND GIVE ASADS STATED THREAT TO RESUME FIGHTING IF ISR DOES NOT RETURN TO HER PRE-JUNE 67 BORDERS, A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASE FIRE CANNOT BE RULED OUT.

2. (S/NFD) IF EGY & SYR HAVE, IN FACT, RCVD ARMS RESUPPLY IN THE QUANTITIES CLAIMED BY THE IDF, THERE ARE NO MATERIEL LIMITATIONS TO PRECLUDE RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING. U.S. RESUPPLY TO IDF HAS ALSO ENHANCED ITS CAPABILITY TO CONTINUE THE FIGHTING.

3. (S/NFD) THE QUESTION OF PERSONNEL, HOWEVER, IS MUCH LESS CLEAR. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS BEFORE 22 OCT, THE EGY & SYR AF'S WERE NOT ACTIVE. THEIR INVENTORY OF A/C SEEMED ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT CONTINUED OPERATIONS, THUS LEADING THIS RO TO ASSUME THAT QUALIFIED PILOTS WERE IN SHORT SUPPLY. IF THAT WAS, IN FACT, THE CASE, A BREATHER OF TWO WEEKS, OR EVEN 2 MOS., IS NOT ENOUGH TO SUBSTANTI-

***** *WHSR COMMENT*****

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4. (S/NFD) IF THE ABOVE ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT, THE CLAIMED MASSIVE RESUPPLY OF MIG -21S TO BOTH EGY & SYR WOULD SEEM TO MAKE LITTLE SENSE. 3 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS COME TO MIND; A. IT IS AN EXPENSIVE BLUFF INTENDED TO SUGGEST THAT EGY & SYR OBVIOUSLY STILL HAVE ENOUGH PILOTS OR THEY WOULDN'T NEED A/C; B. PILOTS FROM OTHER SYMPATHETIC COUNTRIES WOULD MAN THE A/C; OR C. MOST WORRISOME HYPOTHESIS IS THAT IF PUSH COMES TO SHOVE, SOV PLTS WOULD BE USED IN COMBAT.

5. (S/NF) THE IAF ALSO PIFFERED AIRCREW LOSSES, BUT, WE ESTIMATE TO A FAR LESS SIGNIFICANT DEGREE. VZE FELL THE IAF STILL HAS AN ADEQUATE POOL OF FULLY QUALIFIED PILOST, AND THAT IT CAN QUICKLY RE-ASSERT ITS SUPERIORITY VIZ- A-VIZ THE ARAB AF'S. THE RESUPPLY & REDEPLOYMENT OF SAM'S & AAA, DOES POSE A PROBLEM AGAIN FOR THE IAF. THESE AIR DEFENSES WOULD EITHER LIMIT FREEDOM OF IAF TO CONTROL THE SKIES, OR WOULD AGAIN PROVE COSTLY IN TERMS OF A/C & AIRCREWS.

6. (S/NFD) THE GND SIT IS SIMILAR TO THE AIR PICTURE. ESTIMATED SOV RESUPPLY HAS RELIEVED ANY FIREPOWER SHORTAGES THAT MIGHT HAVE EXISTED. THE IDF IS STILL OUT TANKED AND OUT GUNNED, BUT IS IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION THAN ON 6 OCT. THE RESERVED MOBILIZED 6-10 OCT ARE ON THE TWO FRONTS. THE HIGHLY MOBLE DEFENSE POSTURE OF THE IDF WOULD ENABLE IT TO QUICKLY COUNTER A THREAT AND EXPLOIT ANY TACTICAL SUCCESS.

7. (S/NFD) THE SURPRISES THAT ROCKED THE IDF FROM 6-22 OCT ARE NOW KNOWN FACTORS AND THE IDF HAS HAD TIME TO REACT TO THEM AND TO MODIFY DOCTRINE & TACTICS TO COUNTER THEM.

8. (SNFD) AS IN THE AIR FORCE, THE KEY FACTOR IN THE GND FORCES IS SEEN AS PERSONNEL. ALL THREE ARMIES SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES. THE IDF HAS ADMITTED THAT A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF ITS CASUALTIES WERE CORPS AND LEADERS. THE IMPROVED FIGHTING QUALITIES OF THE EGY AND SYR ARMIES MUST BE ATTRIBUTABLE, IN GOOD PART, TO IMPROVED LEADERSHIP; IN WHICH CASE, IT IS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THESE LEADERS ALSO TOOK A LARGE SHARE OF THE CASUALTIES. THE KEY ISSUE WOULD SEEM TO BE, THEN--WHICH SIDE HAS THE GREATER POOL OF AVAILABLE LEADERS OR WHICH SIDE CAN MORE SUCCESSFULLY CONVERT FOLLOWERS TO LEADERS. IN RO'S VIEW, THE IDF HAS THE EDGE HERE.

9. (SNFD) WHAT ARE THE MILITARY OPTIONS OPEN TO THE

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THREE ARMIES? THE IDF COMPLAINS THAT IF THE CEASE FIRE
HAD BEEN DELAYED 36 HOURS THEY WOULD HAVE COMPLETED THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE EGY AND SYR ARMIES. THEY NOW
RECOGNIZE THAT THE RESUPPLIED AND REFORMED ARMIES ARE
MUCH MORE FORMIDABLE THAN ON 22 OCT AND THEIR DESTRUCTION
WOULD PROVE TERRIBLY COSTLY IN IDF CASUALTIES. THUS RO
DOES NOT EXPECT AN IDF INITIATIVE TO BREAK THE CEASE FIRE,
ALTHOUGH THE VULNERABLE 3 RD ARMY MUST BE ATTEMPTING
PRIZE. RO WOULD NOT RULE OUT A PREEMPTION IF IDF
BECOME CONVINCED THAT EGY AND/OR SYR WERE GOING TO
BREAK THE CEASE FIRE.

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10. (SNFD) EGY HAS PROBABLY REFORMED AND REARMED THE 23RD MECHINF WHICH HAD DISPERSED IN THE 2ND ARMY REAR AREA. GIVEN ENOUGH CREW, SHE COULD ALSO HAVE BROUGHT THE 4TH ARMD DIV UP TO AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, PRESUMABLY STILL WEST OF IDF WEST BANK FORCES. 35TH AND 45TH ARMDHYDES IN DEFENSE OF CAIRO COULD CONCEIVABLY HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED WITH T-62'S -2ND ARMY FORCES HAVE DOUBTLESS BEEN REARMED AND REINFORCED. IF A CORRIDOR IS OPENED TO THE 3RD ARMY, THUS PERMITTING UNLIMITED RESUPPLY, THIS COULD AGAIN BECOME AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE OF TWO PLUS INF DIVS, AND SAMS COULD BE REINTRODUCED INTO 3RD ARMY AREA. ELEMENTS OF THE 16TH MECH AND 21ST ARMD DIVS, (DESNATED IN CENTRAL SECTOR DURING IDF BREAKTHROUGH TO WEST BANK) HAVE DOUBTLESS FOUND THEIR WAY BACK TO EGY CONTROL AND MAY HAVE BEEN RECONSTITUOND INTO ADDITIONAL BDES. GIVEN ALL THIS, THE EGY ARMY CLEARLY HAS THE CAPABILITY OF MASSING MUCH FIREPOWER AND INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THE IDF. IT MIGHT EVEN BE ABLE TO DRIVE IDF BACK TO EAFG BNK OF CANAL, BUT RO DOES NOT CREDIT IT WITH ABILITY TO SCORE ANY SIGNIFICANT VICTORY IN SINAI.

11. (SNFD) ON THE SYRIAN FRONT, RO FEELS THAT THE CHANCES FOR SIGNIFICANT SYRIAN VICTORY ON THE OCCUPIED GOLAN HTS U

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E ALSO REMOTE. SYR COULD APPLY MASSES FIREPOWER AGAINST IDF FORCES OCCUPYING SYRIA PROPER AND COULD PROBABLY DRIVE THEM BACK BEHIND THE CEASE FIRE LINES WITH HVY CAS ON BOTH SIDES. THE SYR ARMY COULD OPT TO ATTACK IN EITHER CENTRAL OR SOUTHERN SECTOR. IN THIS CASE HOWEVER, THE SYR RIGHT FLANK WOULD BE EXPOSED TO IDF FORCES IN THE SYRIAN SALIENT. WEATHER MUST ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE WINTER RAINS HAVE BEGUN AND THE ENTIRE SYRIAN FRONT WILL SOON BE A QUAGMIRE WITH TRAVEL ALMOST ENTIRELY RESTRICTED TO THE MAIN ROADS. TRACKED VEHICLES CAN TRAVERSE THE MUD IN MOST AREAS BUT SUPPORTING VEHICLES, TOWED PIECES, AND INFANTRY WILL BE LIMITED TO ALL WEATHER ROADS.

12. (S/NFD) ONE LAST POINT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED -THE OUTLOOK STR CONCERTED ARAB ACTION. WHILE THIS WAR SAW A REMARKABLE DISPLAY OF ARAB UNITY IN TERMS OF NEIGHBORING STATES PROVIDING MIL FORCES TO FIGHT PARTICULARLY IN SYR IN PRACTISE, HOWEVER, ACTUAL COOPERATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD WAS LARGELY ILLUSORY. INTERNAL DISSENTION AND RELUCTANCE TO SURRENDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL TO ANOTHER COUNTRY'S FORCES LED TO THE INEFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF PAN-ARAB FORCES.

13. (C) IN SUMMARY, THE RESUPPLIED AND REFRESHED ARMIES ALL HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF RESUMING BATTLE, LIMITED SUCCESSES COULD BE ACHIEVED BY EACH OF THE PARTIES BUT IN RO'S VIEW, THE TIME HAS PASSED WHEN EITHER EGYPT OR SYRIA COULD SCORE A SIGNIFICANT OR DECISIVE VICTORY AND THE HIGH COST REQUIRED TO DO SO WIL PROBABLY DISSUADE ISR FROM ANY SUCH ATTEMPT. IN SHORT, DATT IS OPTIMISTIC THAT CEASE FIRE, (HOWEVER UNPALATABLE TO EACH SIDE) HSS AN EXCELLENT CHANCE OF HOLDING.

14. (S/NFZZL AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS: THIS IS AN EXCELLENT AND CREATIVE PRESENTATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY FACTORS. OF NECESSITY, THE REPORT IS SPECULATIVE, GIVEN THE UNKNOWNNS IN THE VARIOUS MILITARY EQUATIONS. THIS FACT DOES NOT DIMINISH ITS VALUE, BUT ALONG UOUTH THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT, DOES ARGUE FOR HIGHLY RESTRICTED DISSEMINATION. THE REPORT, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT BE REPEATED NOR SUMMARIZEECIN DIA OR STATE ITREPS. IT WHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE REPORT DELIBERATELY DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO FACTOR INTO THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF THE PARTIES NON-MILITARY OR POLITICAL FACTORS. AS FAR AS ISRAEL IS CONCERNED, OF COURSE, THE GOI WILL DECIDE IF THE IDF IS TO RESUME HOSTILITIES AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS. WE SHOULD ALL HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF GOI THINKING IN THIS RESPECT

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