



# Department of State

AMEMBASSY MEXICO

# TELEGRAM

REFER TO DOS

ACTION:  
S/S-15

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

CONTROL: 1043

RECEIVED: 22 FEB 74  
2:14 pm

INFO:  
AMB  
DCM  
POL  
ADM  
USIS  
CHRON  
USDEL

O 221854Z FEB 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8919  
BT  
UNCLAS STATE 035716

TOSEC 104

FOLLOWING SENT SECSTATE WASHDC FROM TEL AVIV 20 FEB 74:

QUOTE UNCLAS TEL AVIV 0984

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 6, 1973, MEETING WITH  
US JEWISH INTELLECTUALS

1. SUMMARY: YEDIOT AHARONOT FEB 15 CARRIED SUMMARY OF REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO SECRETARY AT DEC 6, 1973, MEETING WITH US JEWISH INTELLECTUALS. YEDIOT AHARONOT VERSION WAS ABOUT TWO THIRDS LONGER THAN THAT APPEARING IN FEB 9 WASHINGTON POST. ISRAELIS PARTICULARLY HAVE NOTICED SECRETARY'S ALLEGED COMMENT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR GOI TO ENTER PEACE SETTLEMENT AS LONG AS ARABS CONTINUED TO FEAR ISRAELI STRENGHT AND HIS REPORTED EXPRESSION OF DOUBT AS TO FUTURE US CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM EMB TRANSLATION OF ARTICLE ENTITLED "KISSINGER: ISRAEL MUST REACH SETTLEMENT WHILE ARABS STILL FEAR HER" BY SHLOMO NAKDIMON. WE HAVE COMPARED THE ARTICLE WITH VERSION D SCRIBED IN FEB 9, 1974 WASHINGTON POST, AND DELETED DUPLICATIONS.

2. BEGIN EXCERPTS. LATELY , DR KISSINGER HAS HAD CLOSED MEETINGS WITH DIFFERENT GROUPS OF INTELLECTUALS IN THE US. A FULL REPORT OF ONE OF THOSE MEETINGS HAS FALLEN INTO THE HANDS OF THE UNDERSIGNED. IT IS NOT A TRANSCRIPT TAKEN WHILE DR KISSINGER SPOKE BUT WAS RECONSTRUCTED LATER FROM NOTES TAKEN DURING HIS SPEECH.

3. EVERYBODY, INCLUDING DR KISSINGER, AND ALSO THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES, ASSUMED (BEFORE TH OCT WAR) THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT AT ALL URGENT AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO DO ANYTHING, BECAUSE THE ARABS WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO FORCE ANY ACTION.

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE 35716

Classification

4. WHEN THE WAR BROKE OUT, THE ASSUMPTION OF DR KISSINGER AND OF AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERTS WAS THAT ISRAEL WOULD WIN WITHIN THREE OR FOUR DAYS. NO SUPPLY OPERATION FOR ISRAEL WAS THEREFORE PLANNED. THE ISRAELIS ALSO BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD WIN SOON. ONE OF THE REASONS WHY IT TOOK SO LONG FOR THE DISPATCH OF AMMUNITION, SPARE PARTS AND ARMS TO ISRAEL TO BE ORGANIZED, WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT ASKED FOR IT IN TIME, THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD NEED SUCH AMPLE SUPPLIES.

5. WHEN THE URGENT DEMAND FOR AMMUNITION AROSE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO PUT INTERNAL PRESSURE ON THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY TO GET THE AIRLIFT MOVING AND ON THE PORTUGUESE GOVT FOR MIDWAY LANDING RIGHTS (AT THE SAME TIME, THE RUSSIANS FLEW THEIR AIRLIFT OVER NATO COUNTRIES WITHOUT ANYBODY INTERFERING).

6. THE FACT THAT THE ARABS WERE CAPABLE OF FIGHTING FOR 17 DAYS WITHOUT THEIR ARMIES BREAKING DOWN WAS CONSIDERED AS A VICTORY FOR THEM, AND INDEED THEY MUST BE REGARDED AS TH ONES WHO WON THE WAR. THE ARMS THE ARABS HAD, AND PARTICULARLY THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK MISSILES, HAD PUT 400 ISRAELI TANKS AND 70 ISRAELI AIRCRAFT OUT OF ACTION IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE WAR. ISRAEL'S STOCK OF AMMUNITION HAD RUN OUT. AIRCRAFT THAT RETURNED FROM BOMBING MISSIONS WITHOUT HAVING DROPPED ALL THEIR BOMBS WERE FORCED TO LAND WITH THE BOMBS (NORMALLY, THEY ARE DROPPED IN THE SEA BEFORE LANDING) IN SPITE OF THE DANGER, SO GREAT WAS THE SHORTAGE.

7. THE ARABS MIGHT HVE ACHIEVED MORE BUT FOR THEIR MISTAKES. THEY SENT THEIR TANKS INTO ATTACK OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF THEIR MISSILE SYSTEM. THUS THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE COULD HIT THEM AS IN 1967. THE ARAB ARMIES SHOULD HAVE ADVANCED MORE SLOWLY AND ONLY AFTER BRINGING THEIR ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SYSTEMS FORWARD. HENRY KISSINGER SAID THAT HE HAD WARNED THE ISRAELIS FROM THE BEGINNING THAT AT THE MOMENT WHEN SUCCESS WOULD TURN THEIR WAY, THE UN WOULD ORDER A CEASEFIRE. THEREFORE, THEIR STRATEGY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GUIDED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS - ACHIEVING MAXIMUM RESULTS BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE.

8. BEFORE HIS FLIGHT TO MOSCOW -- DR KISSINGER REVEALED -- HE SENT ISRAEL A MESSAGE THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO COME TO TEL AVIV ON HIS WAY BACK ONLY IF HE WAS PROMISED THAT ISRAEL WOULD RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE, BUT WHEN HE ARRIVED IN LONDON, HE WAS TOLD BY THE BRITISH THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS. HE CONTACTED THE SOVIET AMB AND WARNED HIM THAT THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THE ARABS STOP VIOLATING THE AGREEMENT.

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE 35716

Classification

9. HE ASKED (THE AMBASSADOR) HOW IT WOULD LOOK IF GROMYKO WOULD LEAVE FOR CAIRO AND FOUR HOURS AFTER HE HAD LEFT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD OPEN FIRE. WHO WOULD BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS WEREN'T INVOLVED?

10. THEN DR KISSINGER WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT ISRAEL'S VULNERABILITY IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF THE OIL CRISIS, SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IN THE US CONGRESS WAS DWINDLING VISIBLY. HE HAD HAD GREAT TROUBLE WHEN HE TRIED TO SECURE THE 2.2. BILLION DOLLARS OF AID FOR ISRAEL. THE CONGRESS COMMITTEE WANTED TO CUT THE AMOUNT BY 500 MILLION. HE MANAGED TO PREVENT THIS ONLY BY THE ARGUMENT THAT THE US HAD ALREADY COMMITTED ITSELF TO THE FULL AMOUNT AND THAT THE ARMS HAD ALREADY BEEN EXPENDED IN THE WAR. IF CONGRESS WOULD CUT THE ALLOCATION, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO ASK FOR THE 500 MILLION UNDER ANOTHER BUDGET HEADING AND THEN THE ARABS WOULD REGARD THE NEW REQUEST AS A FURTHER HOSTILE STEP.

11. KISSINGER BELIEVED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD CONTINUE TO DO DAMAGE IN THE HOPE OF GETTING A FOOTHOLD IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THAT WAS WHY HE INSISTED ON NOT BRINGING THEM IN ON THE PEACE CONFERENCE. THE ONLY COUNTRY APART FROM THE UNITED STATES WHICH HE DEFINED AS SUPPORTING ISRAEL

"WITH CERTAIN RESERVATIONS" WAS IRAN.

12. THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' EFFORTS TO APPEASE THE ARABS DEPRIVED THEM OF A CHANCE OF EXERTING INFLUENCE IN THE MID EAST. IN DR KISSINGER'S OPINION, THE ARABS NO LONGER RESPECTED EUROPE, WHILE THEY TREATED THE US WITH RESPECT FOR ITS OPEN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. JAPAN WAS ALSO BEHAVING STUPIDLY. IT HAD OFFERED KING FAISAL OF SAUDI ARABIA A BILLION DOLLARS WHILE HE NEITHER NEEDS NOR WANTS MONEY. JAPAN WOULD NOT ACHIEVE ANYTHING IN SPITE OF WHAT IT DID.

13. THE OIL CRISIS WOULD BECOME MORE SEVERE IN THE US IN THE COMING MONTHS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO REDUCE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, THE SECRETARY BELIEVED.

14. IN THE YEARS 1971-1972 HUSSEIN WAS PREPARED TO SIGN A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND EVEN HAD TOLD HIM SO. HE ALSO SAID THERE WERE TIMES WHEN THE EGYPTIANS SHOWED THEMSELVES WILLING TO ENTER INTO REAL NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER THEY EXPELLED THE RUSSIANS, THEY EXPECTED A GESTURE ON THE PART OF THE US AND ISRAEL. HE BLAMED HIMSELF FOR HAVING BEEN SO PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF VIET-NAM, THAT HE HAD NOT PRESSED ISRAEL TO ACT.

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE 35716

Classification

15. REVIEWING THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HE SAID THERE WERE FIVE SUBJECTS: BORDERS; SECURITY (DEMILITARIZED BUFFER ZONES); GUARANTEES: THE PALESTINIANS; JERUSALEM.

16. IN HIS OPINION IT WAS NOT WISE TO TRY AND SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS IN ONE GO AND PROMISES ABOUT ULTIMATE TARGETS SUCH AS DE JURE RECOGNITION COULD NOT PREVENT WAR, AS WITNESS INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

17. THE SUBJECTS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ONE BY ONE. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING TO BE TRIED FOR AT GENEVA WERE LARGE BUFFER ZONES BETWEEN THE ARMIES, AND AS OPTIMUM TARGET THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ENTIRE SINAI PENINSULA, FROM WHICH THE ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW. HISTORY, HE SAID, TAUGHT THAT THE SIDE THAT HOLDS SINAI PROVES TO BE THE INFERIOR ONE FROM THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT. A DEMILITARIZED SINAI MEANT THAT AN ARMY ENTERING IT WOULD BE A CASUS BALLI. ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT, BUT MOST OF IT WOULD HAVE TO BE DEMILITARIZED. IN A MISSILE WAR, BORDERS, OR EVEN AREAS, PROVIDED NO DEFENSE.

18. AFTER THESE WITHDRAWALS AND AFTER AGREEMENT ON THEM WAS REACHED, OTHER SUBJECTS COULD BE APPROACHED. THE WITHDRAWAL AND DEMILITARIZATION SHOULD BE SETTLED AS FAST AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY WITHIN TWO TO FOUR MONTHS, AT MOST A YEAR. OTHERWISE, THERE MIGHT BE ANOTHER WAR, WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY LIMITED US SUPPORT.

19. KISSINGER SAID HE WAS AGAINST THE IDEA OF A SECURITY TREATY WITH AMERICAN GUARANTEES. HE DID NOT SEE ANY SUBSTITUTE FOR AGREED BORDERS.

20. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS COULD BE SOLVED NOW. "THEY NEED TO BE FAR HUNGRIER THAN THEY ARE" BEFORE THEY WOULD AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT AND TO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S STATUS.

21. THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM SHOULD ALSO BE LEFT TO THE END.

22. ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT CANNOT AFFORD TO CAUSE DELAYS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT COULD NOT HOPE FOR ANY CHANGE TO ITS ADVANTAGE IN THE MEANTIME. THE ARABS HAD WON MORE THAN THEY IMAGINED. THEY WERE STILL AFRAID OF ISRAEL, BUT IF ISRAEL DID NOT START WITHDRAWING FAST, THERE WAS EVERY CHANCE THAT THE WAR WOULD START AGAIN WITH THE POSSIBLE RESULT OF TOTAL DISASTER. AT THE SAME TIME HE STRESSED, THAT HE DID NOT MEAN THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW TO THE BORDER OF 1967 AND HE THOUGHT THAT THE BORDER ON WHICH

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE 35716

Classification

AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE BETTER. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE STRESSED AGAIN THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REFUSE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORIES, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE DEMILITARIZED AND BECOME BUFFER ZONES.

23. KISSINGER DECLARED AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS EXPOSE, AND REPEATED IT SEVERAL TIMES IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, THAT US HAD NOT REACHED ADVANCE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS OR THE ARABS ON THE COURSE OR THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, THE NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA WOULD HAVE "TO WRITE THEIR OWN SCRIPT." HE DID NOT AGREE WITH PEOPLE IN THE STATE DEPT AND THE WHITE HOUSE WHO WANTED TO OUTLINE A STRATEGY OF OVER-ALL AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE.

24. ISRAEL'S PUBLIC IMAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE RIGID, BUT WITHIN THE ISRAELI GOVT-- KISSINGER THOUGHT-- THERE SHOULD BE UNDERSTANDING FOR THE NEED TO BE READY TO GIVE UP LARGE AREAS. EOWEVER, SUCH A CONCESSION MUST ON NO ACCOUNT SEEM TO BE MADE OUT OF WEAKNESS, FEAR OR NERVOUSNESS, BUT WOULD HAVE TO COME AS THE NATURAL RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS.

25. KISSINGER SHOWED HOMSELF VERY SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBLE REACTION OF THE ISRAELIS. HE SAID THAT THE OLDER GENERATION, WHO HAD COME TO ISRAEL, DRAINED ITS MARSHES AND BUILT A NEW SOCIETY AND THE STATE, HAD AGAIN AND AGAIN EXPERIENCED SUCCESS IN THE FACE OF SUPERIOR FORCES. NOW, SUDDENLY, THEY FOUND THEMSELVES AGAIN IN A POSITION WHICH THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD ABANDONED FOR GOOD: THE POSITION OF A WEAK JEWISH COMMUNITY FACING A STRONG, HOSTILE WORLD. THIS GROUP, HE THOUGHT, WOULD FIND IT HARDER THAN ANYONE ELSE TO ADJUST TO THE NEW SITUATION.

26. HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE AFRAID THAT THE FACT THAT HE WAS A JEW MIGHT BE A SORT OF WEAKNESS FOR THEM, THAT IT WOULD AFFECT HIS BEHAVIOR BY MAKING HIM LEAN OVER TOWARDS THE ARABS. TO THIS HE REPLIED THAT HE COULD, OF COURSE, NOT ANALYZE ALL HIS (UNCONSCIOUS) MOTIVES BUT HE DID NOT THINK THAT HIS "RELIGION" WOULD WEAKEN HIS SUPORT FOR ISRAEL.

27. EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD BE HARDER IN THE FUTURE TO OBTAIN AMERICAN AID FOR ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY ANOTHER AIR LIFT, KISSINGER SAID, THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WOULD BACK ISRAEL. WHEN PRESSED TO SAY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE WAR WAS RESUMED, HE ANSWERED HE WOULD ADOPT THE IDENTICAL POSITION HE HAD ADOPTED IN OCTOBER, NAMELY, THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE GIVEN ALL THE ARMS AND HARDWARE IT NEEDED. (HE SEEMED TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

-6-

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE 35716

Classification

TAKE CREDIT FOR A CONSIDERABLE SHARE OF THE OCTOBER DECISION TO SEND ARMS TO ISRAEL BY AIR.) HE SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION THE ODDS WERE TWO TO ONE THAT HE WOULD SUCCEED (IN SECURING URGENT MILITARY AID FOR ISRAEL, BUT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE IT, BECAUSE RESISTANCE IN CONGRESS AND AMONG THE "BUREAUCRACY" TO ANOTHER AIR LIFT WOULD BE GREATER THAN IN THE PAST.

28. ONE REASON WHY THERE WAS NO TIME FOR LONG NEGOTIATIONS AND WHY ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO REACH AGREEMENT FAST WAS, IN HIS OPINION, THAT PEACE WAS NOT IN THE ARABS' INTERESTS. THEY COULD ONLY GAIN FROM ANOTHER WAR. AT THE MOMENT, THOUGH, MANY OF THEM WERE NOT SURE OF THAT. THEY WERE STILL AFRAID OF WHAT ISRAEL COULD DO ON THE BATTLEFIELD, AND ALSO THEY WANTED TO GET RID OF THE RUSSIANS. US INTELLIGENCE HAD REPORTED THAT IN EGYPT, SYRIA AND ALGERIA, THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE LUKEWARM IN THEIR SUPPORT. THEREFORE THERE WAS STILL A REASONABLE CHANCE OF A FAIR BORDER SETTLEMENT IN THE COMING MONTHS.

29. KISSINGER EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WIND UP THE BORDER QUESTION AND WITHDRAW BEFORE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION WAS WOUND UP OR EVEN STARTED TO BE DISCUSSED. THE SAME APPLIED TO DE JUR RECOGNITION. ISRAEL HAD MADE A MISTAKE IN THE PAST IN INSISTING ON NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD SOLVE ALL THE QUESTIONS AT ONCE: IT COULD NOT PERMIT ITSELF TO MAINTAIN THE SAME POSITION NOW IT WAS SO MUCH WEAKER.

30. HE BELIEVED THAT IF AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED AFTER THE WAR OF 1967 UNDER WHICH ISRAEL WOULD HAVE CARRIED OUT CONSIDERABLE WITHDRAWALS AND THE TERRITORIES WOULD HAVE BEEN DEMILITARIZED, THE ARABS WOULD HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO START A WAR BY PUSHING TANKS INTO A DEMILITARIZED ZONE WHICH THEY OWNED.

31. FOR SADAT AND FOR ALL EGYPTIANS, OCCUPIED SINAI WAS A VERY MEANINGFUL FACTOR. KISSINGER-- ACCORDING TO THE REPORT-- CLAIMED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD TOLD THE US SO, AND ALSO ISRAEL, IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS FOR YEARS, AND THEY WERE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE ON LESS THAN THE BORDERS OF 1967.

32. HIS LONG-RANGE TARGET WAS TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN THE MID EAST FOR ANOTHER TEN YEARS. BY THEN, A GREAT DEAL WOULD HAVE CHANGED, SUCH AS THE OIL FACTOR AND PERHAPS ALSO THE ATTITUDE OF EUROPE. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AIM SHOULD BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF "TRUE PEACE." ONE MUST TRY FOR THE BEST THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED, FOR ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE RESUMPTION OF THE WAR. END EXCERPTS.  
KEATING UNQUOTE RUSH

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 2 8 5 5 Q

RECD: 12 FEB 74 8:51P

O 120041Z FEB 74 ZFFA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 5842  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 9477  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2693  
RUEHCR/USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 7251  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 7158  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 7351  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 7852  
BT

SCOWCROFT  
MCFARLANE  
RODMAN  
SAUNDERS

SECRET STATE 026000

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XDS  
TAGS: PFOR, XF, XI  
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE

1. WE ARE SENDING YOU BY SEPTTEL IN THIS CHANNEL TEXT OF ARTICLE BY MARILYN BERGER IN FEBRUARY 9 WASHINGTON POST HEADLINED "KISSINGER REMARKS TO U.S. JEWS LEAKED IN REPORT." YOU SHOULD NOT COMMENT IN ANY WAY ON ANY QUERIES YOU MAY RECEIVE ABOUT THIS ARTICLE FROM PRESS, DIPLOMATIC CORPS OR OTHERS OUTSIDE OF HOST GOVERNMENT, AND YOU SHOULD TAKE NO INITIATIVE TO RAISE SUBJECT WITH HOST GOVERNMENT. IF QUERIED BY RESPONSIBLE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, HOWEVER, YOU MAY REPLY AS FOLLOWS.

2. SECRETARY HAS PUBLICLY LABELED THIS REPORT AS "IN-ACCURATE" AND "OUT OF CONTEXT." IT REPRESENTS DELIBERATE PROVOCATION ON PART OF LEFT WING INTELLECTUALS STRIVING, BY EVERY AVAILABLE MEANS, TO PREVENT USG FROM PLAYING CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. REPORT IS MISCHIEVOUS ATTEMPT TO DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN U.S. AND ARABS AND TO UNDERMINE SECRETARY'S EFFORTS TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. IT IS A MIXTURE OF HALF TRUTHS, DISTORTIONS, AND TOTAL INVENTION RESULTING FROM A MEETING SECRETARY HAD WITH GROUP OF

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

**SECRET**



Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

-2- STATE 20080 12 FEB '74

JEWISH LEADERS IN EARLY DECEMBER AS PART OF HIS EFFORT TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT FOR OUR MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY. DESPITE DISTORTIONS IN REPORT, A CAREFUL READING WILL SHOW THAT BASIC THRUST OF MESSAGE HE WAS SEEKING TO GET ACROSS TO THIS GROUP WAS THAT ISRAEL HAD SUFFERED A DEFEAT IN OCTOBER WAR AND HAD NO ALTERNATIVE TO REASSESSING ITS POLITICAL POSITIONS AND AGREEING TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT.

BT  
#8888

KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.  
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY  
CLEARANCES: NEA:MR. SISCO  
S/S: SRGAMMON

**SECRET**

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NOV 1974



# Kissinger Remarks to U.S. Jews Leaked in Report

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

Early in December, just as he was about to launch a diplomatic offensive to get a settlement in the Middle East, Henry A. Kissinger spent an evening with seven Jewish writers and professors.

As a group these intellectual leaders in the American Jewish community were united in their sense of concern over the fate of Israel. The meeting on Dec. 6 in the Secretary of State's office was arranged to deal with those concerns.

It was a time of growing uneasiness among American Jews—and in Israel itself—that in its push for a settlement the United States could exert pressure in only one place—Jerusalem. There was a pervading anguish that Israel might be sacrificed for the larger goal of Soviet-American detente.

Kissinger, facing his first major crisis as Secretary of State on the very issue he had tried to avoid for years, was eager to line up American Jewish support, and through this assuage Israeli fears that because he was Jewish he would bend over

backwards to be fair to the Arabs. Only in this way, he has said, could he get Israel to negotiate. At the same time he had to prove to the Arabs that his Jewish heritage would not make him "tilt" toward Israel.

Notes of Kissinger's lengthy meeting with the Jewish writers and professors have now been circulated privately, much to the embarrassment of Kissinger, who made some undiplomatic and injudicious statements to his old Harvard colleagues in what he considered an informal talk.

For example, according to the nine-page report on that meeting drafted from his recollections of the discussion by one of the participants, Kissinger called the Europeans "craven" and "contemptible," referred to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia as a "religious fanatic" and asserted that he had "deliberately stalled" on getting a cease-fire during the October war to "gain time" for Israel.

Kissinger has called the report of his remarks "inaccurate" and "out of context" although its accuracy has been confirmed by

several of the others who were present.

The meeting had been suggested to him by Rita Hauser, a Republican New York lawyer who had been active during the 1972 campaign in getting Jewish support for President Nixon's re-election. Those invited to the meeting who were able to attend on short notice were Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary; Irving Howe, editor of Dissent; Henry Rosovsky, dean of the faculty of arts and sciences at Harvard, and Harvard professors Seymour M. Lipset, Michael Walzer, David Landes and Kenneth Arrow.

"There was a lot of nervousness in the Jewish community," Mrs. Hauser, who also attended, said in a telephone interview last week. "I thought it would be important for Kissinger to give his views to the intellectuals who write and think so that they could convey his thoughts."

The "nervousness" was summed up at the meeting by Podhoretz, who said he told Kissinger that some Israelis were wondering whether he is a Churchill disguised as a Chamberlain

(the British prime minister who appeased Hitler at Munich) or a Chamberlain disguised as a Churchill.

According to the report of the meeting, Kissinger sought to convey the impression that he had been instrumental in getting the arms airlift to Israel approved at a time when Israel had run out of ammunition and when congressional support was visibly declining in the face of the energy crisis.

Beyond that, he claimed to have given the Israelis an extra 96 hours—or four days—while he went to Moscow to discuss the cease-fire. At the same time he reportedly said that Israel's last minute gains were basically unimportant and that it would not have made a difference if they had had another two days.

It was at his meeting with Soviet leaders in Moscow on Oct. 20 and 21 that Kissinger was able to get a provision for direct negotiations between the Arab nations and Israel—a matter of great importance to the Israelis at the time. The Soviet Union was then pressing in the United Nations for a cease-

fire which they had not wanted earlier when the Arabs were making gains.

At the time that the cease-fire was agreed upon, the Israelis expressed dismay that Kissinger had worked as quickly as he did. They had hoped for more time to advance on the West Bank of the Suez Canal. But the agreement on an Oct. 22 cease-fire had the effect of creating the kind of stalemate that was seen as a precondition for getting a settlement.

Kissinger's reported remarks on his role in getting a cease-fire had a parallel in some comments he was said to have made a month earlier in Cairo to a leading Egyptian editor, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, showing that he was trying then to demonstrate his credentials to the Arabs.

According to Heikal, Kissinger said that in his efforts to get a cease-fire during the early days of the October war, "I was not taking Israel's side as you believed."

Kissinger reportedly told Heikal: "All our experts believed that if you restarted the war you would be exposing yourselves to a decisive attack by the Israeli armed forces. It was then that I proposed a cease-fire and a return to the original lines. I believed this measure would benefit you more than Israel."

Ironically, he reportedly told the Jewish writers he saw that the Israelis had run out of ammunition, indicating they could not have

kept going without the airlift which he was instrumental in pushing through. But he had reportedly told Heikal the month before. "Even if the Israelis had not had the arms we sent them, they would not have been in the powerless situation you imagine. They had prepared their counterattack of the Suez Canal before even receiving our aid."

Kissinger reportedly told his former Harvard colleagues that the Arabs must be regarded as the victors of the October war. Israel, he told them, had lost the war strategically although it had won tactically.

He was also reported to have said that the Arabs could only gain through further conflict and that they had won more than they yet realized. The Israelis, he asserted, would not gain through any delay in negotiating.

What had been happening, he said, was that with congressional support declining, he could not be sure that if another war broke out and Israel again ran out of ammunition he could manage to get another airlift. He stressed that he would make every effort to do so, but one participant recalled that Kissinger said the chances were 2 to 1 against his bringing it off again. Another recalled that he put the odds at 3 to 2.

Israel's diplomatic isolation would grow, Kissinger reportedly told his former Harvard colleagues. Japan, he predicted, would break relations in less than six

months and other Asian states would follow. Europe, he reportedly said, would not break relations but would do everything possible to undercut the United States and Israel in currying favor with the Arabs.

According to the report of the Dec. 6 meeting with his former Harvard colleagues, Kissinger exhibited extreme anger with the Europeans for their Arab policy. He was said to have described their behavior as "craven," "contemptible," "pernicious" and that of "jackals." One participant said he could not recall the use of the word "pernicious," but he confirmed the other phrases.

Of King Faisal, Kissinger said that he is a "religious fanatic" concerned mostly about the future of Jerusalem and little interested in the Sinai or the Palestinians. Kissinger reportedly said the king kept his hold on the other Arabs only through his oil policy.

Kissinger was said to have taken some blame upon himself for being so involved in Vietnam that he did not press Israel to move toward a settlement in the years prior to the October war, before he became Secretary of State. What he was seeking now, he told his former colleagues, was the establishment of large, demilitarized buffer territories between the opposing armies. Any move into the demilitarized zones, he said, would be a *casus belli*.

According to the report on his meeting, Kissinger was asked whether Israel

was to be "Taiwanized" in order to get or preserve detente. The secretary was said to have told his colleagues that the United States had given up little for detente with the Russians, who had, in fact, made more concessions than had the United States. He added that the new relationship with the Chinese was absolutely necessary to be able to press the Russians. Some participants, but not all, recalled that Kissinger said it was necessary to play one off against the other.

A number of the academics who went to the meeting said some of their concerns had been assuaged by Kissinger's remarks. Some confessed to feeling a bit better after they saw the results of Kissinger's diplomatic efforts in the January Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

Irving Howe, writing in New York magazine shortly after his Dec. 6 meeting with Kissinger remained unsure, despite Kissinger's efforts to reassure.

Urging Jews to speak out against potential pressures, Howe concluded that "a time may come when it will be necessary to turn to more dramatic and militant methods, perhaps a march on Washington. A time may come when the traditional Jewish outcry of *gevalt!* provoking scorn and worse, may be necessary. Let us keep our voices in readiness, but meanwhile there is the work of politics, pressure, persuasion. Silence is intolerable."

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Meeting with  
Jewish Intellectuals

PARTICIPANTS: Rita Hauser  
Henry Rosovsky, Harvard University,  
Dean of Faculty of Arts and Sciences  
David Landes, Harvard University,  
Department of History  
Michael Walzer, Harvard University,  
Department of Government  
Kenneth Arrow, MIT, Department of  
Economics  
Irving Howe, Editor of Dissent  
Seymour M. Lipset, Harvard University,  
Department of Government  
Norman Podhoretz, Editor, Commentary

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

TIME AND DATE: Thursday, December 6, 1973  
7:25 - 9:15 p.m.

PLACE: 7th Floor Conference Room  
Department of State

[Dr. Kissinger introduced Mr. Rodman but said that it was not necessary to take notes of the meeting. Mr. Rodman took rough notes. This accounts for the sketchy quality of the following.]

Secretary Kissinger: Anyone who is concerned for Israel has to base it on a realistic assessment of the situation.

I want to make clear that there is no understanding with the Soviets or the Arabs. Our bureaucracy, as you know, is filled with Arabists.

Our strategy over the last four years has been based on the principle that there would be no negotiations from Soviet pressure. The Arabs would learn that there was no way to change the situation. This strategy succeeded -- too well. The Arabs were frustrated at the fact that they could see no diplomatic way out.

But now the situation has changed fundamentally. Israel has to face the fact. Whatever its tactical victories, Israel militarily lost the war.

There are stories that we settled the war too quickly in October and deprived Israel of a victory. This is not correct. You should realize the probable course of events if war breaks out again. It was always clear to Israel that once they gained the upper hand, the pressure for a ceasefire would become overwhelming. That was understood, that was agreed, between us. We kept them well-informed of the diplomatic situation as it unfolded.

It became clear that Thursday there would be a call for a ceasefire. My trip to Moscow bought them through Monday. Even so, Israel couldn't score a decisive victory. This was the objective situation. Even with the advance notice they had that a ceasefire was coming.

Israeli military tactics are a combination of German tactics in 1940 and Israeli tactics in 1967 -- they use their air as artillery. This is why they didn't at first ask for anti-tank weapons. We stripped thirty percent of our inventory to give them the anti-tank weapons when they needed them.

The Arabs concentrated with massive anti-tank and SAMs. There were shattering losses for the Israelis in the first four days. They were not prepared psychologically for this. Unfortunately, in present circumstances, there was no way to avoid a war of attrition.

Mr. Rosovsky: You say, if Israel had been more prepared October 6, the war would not have been much different.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, the great myth is that we pressured them not to preempt. It is true that long ago, in abstract talks with Rabin, I had

said that preemption would have made it an impossible political situation. But militarily, the outcome of October 6 would not have been much different. They lost most of their aircraft to SAMs, not the Egyptian air force, and had they preempted they would simply have suffered the same losses four hours earlier.

It is hard for the Israelis to understand psychologically. But we have to be unsentimental where the survival of a people is at stake.

Egypt made overconfident, stupid mistakes. They drove their armor outside of the SAM belt and they got clobbered on the East Bank.

Mr. Podhoretz: Couldn't they have destroyed the Third Army with two or three days more?

Secretary Kissinger: No, they got two to three days more than they would otherwise have had. There was no way, given the international climate, that the U.S. could vote against a ceasefire.

They also didn't give us an idea where they were heading.

Mr. Podhoretz: Two or three more days? And still not?

Secretary Kissinger: They never told us they needed more. When I left for Moscow, there was no reason to think they didn't see it as a bonus. When I told them from Moscow that I was coming to Tel Aviv, they agreed that they would be in substantial compliance by the time I got there.

We were never told at any time that any other action was planned. We were worried about the Arabs attacking, the Syrians.

This is history now.

A senior Israeli told me that the Third Army is better for them as a hostage than destroyed.

The problem is they have reached the limits of their strategic possibilities. They have lost the possibility of a quick knockout. They thought that re-equipment was only a peacetime problem. Any war that is now foreseeable

requires an airlift. This raises the questions of the sustained political climate. Bureaucratically in this country it can be sustained only against opposition.

Question: Do responsible Israeli officials agree with your assessment?

Secretary Kissinger: Their Ambassador here would agree, I think. With the analytical part. Also, Rabin and Allon.

Ms. Hauser: And Dayan.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know. The Prime Minister? The history they'll agree with. My analysis of the situation now -- it is hard to disagree.

They might disagree with the conclusions.

Ms. Hauser: What conclusions?

Secretary Kissinger: More about the diplomacy.

The oil weapon is extremely effective. It will become more so as time goes on. It could result in the total diplomatic isolation of Israel.

Now we face the following situation: the Europeans are vultures.

The Soviets -- well, the Arabs are irate at them.

The U. S. is in the position that all of them must come to us. This is our influence -- but you can ask, at what price?

It is not a question of US-Soviet cooperation to produce a settlement. What we want is their quiescence.

What conclusions do I have? There is no master plan. There is no understanding with anybody.

We are not now in any conflict with Israel -- maybe because we haven't discussed anything. It wouldn't be helpful until something is on the table.

Only disengagement has been discussed -- their ideas are okay, provided they move fast enough.

There are five elements in the negotiation of a settlement: frontiers, security, guarantees, the Palestinians, and Jerusalem.

It is important not to conduct the debate in slogans.

I have heard what Morgenthau said: That we are pushing Israel to the 1967 frontiers and this is the equivalent to Czechoslovakia in 1938.

On final security zones, I have no position. I haven't discussed it.

But it is essential for Israel that it not face the Arab armies. It is essential to have neutralized buffer zones whose violation will amount to a casus belli. So the next war, if it starts, will start outside of the SAM shield in the Sinai.

On guarantees, it is a misleading debate. Guarantees can't substitute for an adequate settlement. A bilateral treaty has been suggested, but I believe it is a mistake to tie us organically to the conflict.

On the domestic opinion here, I'm not an expert. But I'm familiar with the House of Representatives. I've testified before them. There is a noticeable turn against all-out support for Israel. On the \$2.2 billion, we won it with a pro-Arab argument -- that we had already paid the price and might as well get it out of the way rather than pay the price a second time with the Arabs.

It is totally impossible to restore the strategy of post-1967. This leads to constant crises; it is impossible internationally.

Really, there is no Kissinger opinion on frontiers. I have told Dinitz all that I have told you. He knows this. Israel will have extremely painful decisions to make -- especially for this generation.

Mr. Rosovsky: What is your view of the Arabs?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a complicated situation. There are different Arabs. Faisal is playing a complicated game -- he is isolated in the Arab world; he is a religious fanatic, and a friend of the U. S. He is using this to neutralize the radicals.

He won't settle it [the embargo] separately, but he can do so only at the request of the other Arabs.

Sadat I was rather impressed with. Most of them are charming, emotional, romantic. Sadat is one of the few who has an idea of where you go -- systematically.

If we move reasonably fast, we can get him to accept demilitarized zones. The chance will be lost in two years. Will his successor be willing to do it?

Certainly, Israel's security depends on Israel's strength. There is no substitute for it. But it makes a helluva lot of difference if the war starts -- politically, in an international zone; and militarily where there is no SAM belt; and internationally, in a situation where we can break the link between the oil, Soviet arms, and Arab unity.

A time interval will help.

Faisal is passionate about Jerusalem. It is his one preoccupation.

Hussein -- the greatest opportunity missed was the Israeli failure to settle with him. It was my mistake too. Late in 1971 and early 1972, he made a proposal.

Ms. Hauser: Israel floated an idea today. Peace de jure looks impossible without a long passage of time, a testing of intentions.

Secretary Kissinger: Supercleverness is their failing. In 1969 they told me they wanted a written peace agreement because they felt the Arabs attached a special significance to the written word. In 1971 it was offered to them. Then they said they had to have direct negotiations. In 1973 they have it, now they want a de jure peace.

This raises incredible issues: the Palestinians, and Jerusalem.

It is not in their interest to have comprehensive negotiations.

It would be better to have fragmented negotiations.

Mr. Podhoretz: The Arabs together talk of the destruction of Israel like Taiwan -- in two phases. This is stage two. There is the view that there is a sell-out for a deal with the Soviets.

Secretary Kissinger: It is absurd that the liberals now attack us for detente. Who has been sold out? Look at our domestic situation. We've had the toughest policy possible. Look at the reaction to the alert.



Today we couldn't start an airlift if we couldn't show that we made a massive peace effort.

With the oil pressure, we couldn't do it again. The Arabs would attack now if they knew our domestic situation. Our strategy is to squeeze the Soviets to the sideline, not to settle it with them. We would allow them to participate enough so they don't line up with the radicals.

Are we doing it with the Arabs? No.

Mr. Landes: You said not to get into the lump-sum negotiation. But both sides focus on the ultimate outcome.

Secretary Kissinger: The Arabs are off that now.

Mr. Landes: It is hard to move off that.

Secretary Kissinger: It is hard to move at all.

Maybe that the moderate Arabs do want only the destruction of Israel in stages. But it is irrelevant partially because it is a question of gaining time. In 1970 Faisal was talking about a crusade; now even he speaks of the issue in terms of Israel's existence within the 1967 borders.

Whether it will be Taiwanized will depend on our actions -- and that of our successors. It depends on whether future administrations can support actions of the kind that we have taken. The risks will have to be thought through.

Mr. Lipset: The Palestinians and Jerusalem are the hardest issues.

Secretary Kissinger: The first step is disengagement. We must do this quickly while the Arabs are willing -- because in fact it removes one of their most important pressures, their ability to get another war started.

They are fleetingly interested in this now. They are so in need of showing they gained something from the war that the Arabs may now accept an interim step, though it is not even in their interest.

Mr. Landes: Why not?

Secretary Kissinger: Because with a new war, we couldn't start an airlift. If the Russians were smart, they would do it while the country is alert to the energy crisis.

We are now focusing on separation of forces. We have six months to get demilitarized zones.

Mr. Walzer: Then the Arab threat will be less if the Palestinian question is not solved.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and then we're at the later stage. It may be that Sadat will accept it. I didn't discuss it in detail, but I think he may.

I met three times secretly with Hafiz Ismail before the war. I told him he had to consider Israeli security.

Mr. Arrow. You say you can't restock for a war of attrition. This is the scenario for the destruction of Israel.

Secretary Kissinger: Israel is in great danger. We shouldn't kid ourselves. From any line. If we can't restock, there is mortal danger. That is more important than where the frontiers are.

On the Sinai, it used to be ten minutes air time away. But now with SCUDS, it is five minutes. There is a new strategic situation -- if Israel is on the October 6 lines, there are two choices: full mobilization, or a quick retreat to draw the Arabs away from the SAM's.

Taiwanization is the danger. But in the long term. It won't reach the critical phase in this Administration.

Mr. Podhoretz: Why not?

Secretary Kissinger: Because we can maintain it, and we have the reputation for being brutal when we are challenged.

Mr. Howe: Plus, it takes time for an agreement to be broken.

Secretary Kissinger: We can manage. But the things it takes to keep the Soviets out of there in crises will have to be carefully studied. We are seen to be ruthless, and we are constantly communicating with them. The

challenge to Israel is to insure that the ultimate challenge is in the context of the maximum political, bureaucratic and international support.

Mr. Podhoretz: It is as gloomy as Morgenthau said.

Ms. Hauser, et al: No.

Secretary Kissinger: With some wisdom in the Jewish community, and among friends of Israel, maybe we can manage it.

Mr. Rosovsky: The Europeans, some are okay. We should say we face a common problem.

Secretary Kissinger: We will next week [at the NATO Ministerial]. But it is better to keep them out, because they would only try to get ahead of us with the Arabs. A settlement would get them off our back. And I think they feel a little shame at how they behaved.

Ms. Hauser: If you say the Arabs have every incentive to start a war, therefore, you have to give a little bon bon to Sadat?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But Israel shouldn't look nervous. They should be fierce. But they must understand what we are doing.

Ms. Hauser: And the supporters of Israel should look fierce too?

Secretary Kissinger: To stand up publicly for the security of Israel, and its right to legitimacy, yes. But privately you should make clear to the Israelis that you understand the situation. And you have to have an understanding of what is being attempted.

Mr. Landes: Is peace possible, with the Palestinians? It is always possible for them to stir it.

Secretary Kissinger: It is a complex diplomacy. No one settles for our necessities; they settle for their own necessities. The Palestinians have to get a little hungrier, in my view. Because Jordan is the best neighbor for Israel. The "legitimate rights" is a booby trap. That is the most dangerous. They want to be the spokesman for the West Bank.

My proposal to you is to understand what we're trying to do. We should avoid slogans in the debate, slogans like "overcompensation" or "secret deals with the Soviets".

I have described what is being attempted.

Frankly, it was a mistake for Israel not to move more urgently for settlement. I was a party to it. [They all nod]

Mr. Rosovsky: What is your message to us?

Secretary Kissinger: Nothing is now serious with Israel.

Mr. Lipset: Can we say to the Israelis what you said?

Secretary Kissinger: More or less.

Mr. Rosovsky: Israel is in danger. In ten years will it exist?

Secretary Kissinger: In ten years will it exist? Certainly this government will never participate in anything that we believe involves any risk of its destruction.

Mr. Rosovsky: I am happy to hear that.

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly Israel will exist ten years from now. If there is a new war, I'll do what I did -- but whether I can manage depends on how it starts.

Mr. Landes: This is a tremendous burden -- such a decision; one can make mistakes.

Secretary Kissinger: It can be a mistake to do nothing.

Mr. Rosovsky: Yes, yes.

Mr. Podhoretz: I was in Israel -- they ask me, what's Henry up to? I don't know. They ask, is he Churchill disguised as Chamberlain or Chamberlain disguised as Churchill? [laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not conscious of doing anything. Am I Churchill disguised as Chamberlain or Chamberlain disguised as Churchill? The Soviet Union would be totally out of control without the Chinese relationship. And what have we given up? The Chinese relationship was a necessity, not for detente but to manage the Soviet Union.

Newspapers triumphs are ephemeral -- there is no reason to be in this job unless one can do something, with some integrity, that lasts.

[The meeting ended with warm expressions of gratitude.]