

SECRET



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1970 APR 24 14 20Z

O 241352Z ZYH
FM ROME 25X1
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

State Dept. review
completed

SECRET 241148Z APR 70 [Redacted]
FM AMBASSADOR MARTIN ROME 317
O THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR DR. KISSINGER

MORI/CDF per
C05146757

I MENTIONED IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE 22ND THAT I WAS TO SEE RUMOR THURSDAY AFTERNOON. I MET WITH HIM PRIVATELY AT HIS HOME FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. IT WAS A VERY FRANK REVIEW OF THE SITUATION AS HE SAW IT, OF WHAT HE WAS GOING TO ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE IN THE FORTHCOMING ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGIONAL ELECTIONS, OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OUTCOME TO THE FUTURE OF ITALY AND OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, AND HIS HOPES FOR SOME ASSISTANCE FROM US TO EVEN THE SCALES WITH THE MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

HE CONFIRMED WHAT WE ALREADY KNEW, THAT HE HAD BEEN AN ADVOCATE OF DISSOLUTION AND EARLY NATIONAL ELECTIONS, BUT THAT THE INABILITY TO PUT TOGETHER A MAJORITY IN THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY DIRECTORATE IN FAVOR OF DISSOLUTION HAD REALLY MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR SARAGAT TO TAKE THIS ACTION. WITHOUT RANCOR HE CONFIRMED THE FACT THAT THE DEEP RIVALRY BETWEEN FANFANI AND MORO FOR THE SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY WOULD PRECLUDE EITHER FROM LEADING AN ATTEMPT TO UNIFY THE PARTY AND THAT THERE WAS NO RECOURSE EXCEPT FOR HIM TO

MAKE THIS ATTEMPT. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS NOT AT ALL A HOPELESS TASK BUT THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE A LITTLE LUCK AND SUPPORT FROM THE FRIENDS OF ITALY.

HE WAS EXTREMELY CANDID IN HIS COMMENTS ABOUT THE PRESENT DISARRAY WITHIN THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ATTRIBUTING IT PARTLY TO THE NORMAL CONSEQUENCES OF REMAINING IN POWER FOR 25 YEARS AND PARTLY TO THE INDIVIDUALISTIC AND INTENSELY COMPETITIVE NATURE OF THE CLASSE POLITICA RPT CLASSE POLITICA IN ITALY. HE BELIEVED THAT THE RECENT CRISIS HAD HAD A SOBERING EFFECT AND THAT THERE WAS AN INCREASING REALIZATION THAT IF THE PARTY DID NOT UNDERGO A PROCESS OF REINVIGORATION THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN 1973 MIGHT WELL BE THE LAST IN A DEMOCRATIC ITALY. HE EXPOUNDED FOR A CONSIDERABLE LENGTH AS IT AFFECTED THE CONTROL OF THE PARTY AND HIS DESIRE TO CONCENTRATE ON SECURING THE ELECTION ON THE LOCAL LIST OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES WHOSE ORIENTATION WOULD BE TOWARDS THE CENTER, WHO WOULD SUPPORT A TIGHTENING OF PARTY DISCIPLINE, AND WHO WOULD BE DEDICATED TO THE CONTINUED DEVOTION OF ITALY TO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN MUCH IMPRESSED BY HIS CONVERSATION WITH ROGER MORTON AND THE INDICATION THAT IT MIGHT BE POS-

SIBLE TO EXPECT SOME TECHNICAL HELP IN THE MODERNIZATION OF THE PARTY MACHINERY. HE SAID THAT HE NEEDED CLEAR EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL SUPPORT -- THAT AMERICA STILL BELIEVED IN ITALY AND THE ESSENTIALITY OF ITALY'S POSITION IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. HE SAID THAT MY SPEECH AT THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN MILAN HAD BEEN A VERY GREAT HELP. HE SAID THAT HE NEEDED TECHNICAL HELP ON THE MODERNIZATION OF THE MACHINERY, AND MATERIAL HELP TO COUNTER THE MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT TO THE OTHER SIDE.

I REMINDED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT, ON THE OCCASION OF ROGER MORTON'S VISIT, I HAD INDICATED THAT WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE FORTHCOMING ON THE FIRST ITEM. I THOUGHT WE COULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE ON THE QUESTION OF TECHNICAL HELP BUT THAT THE QUESTION OF MATERIAL HELP WOULD POSE REALLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS. HE REMINDED ME, HOWEVER, THAT ANY REALISTIC ESTIMATE OF SOVIET STRATEGY COULD LEAD TO NO OTHER CONCLUSION EXCEPT THAT AN EMPHASIS ON SOUTHERN EUROPE WAS NOW CLEARLY EVIDENT. HE SAID THAT BOTH THE ITALIAN AND YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENTS WERE CONCERNED OVER EXTENSIVE SOVIET MANEUVERING TO EXPLOIT ETHNIC AND CLASS DIFFERENCES IN YUGOSLAVIA, LOOKING TOWARD A POST-TITO PERIOD. HE SAID THE ORCHESTRATION OF COMMUNIST

PROPAGANDA MACHINERY AGAINST GREECE HAD BEEN SO ENORMOUSLY EFFECTIVE THAT THE LIBERALIZATION MOVES RECENTLY ANNOUNCED HAD BEEN NEGATED BY THE ORCHESTRATED AND WELL-STAGED EXPLOITATION OF THE TRIALS. HE ASKED ME IF I WAS AWARE OF THE RECENT SOVIET DECISION TO MAKE AVAILABLE MORE THAN \$1 MILLION DOLLARS TO THE PSIUP, THE EXTREME RADICAL LEFT OF THE SOCIALISTS. 25X1

WITH THIS KIND OF MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT TO A TINY FRACTION OF THE OPPOSITION, HIS JOB WAS GOING TO BE AN INCREASINGLY UPHILL BATTLE WITHOUT SOME COMPENSATING HELP FROM THE OUTSIDE. HE ESTIMATED THAT TOTAL AVAILABILITIES TO THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY WOULD BE BETWEEN 14 AND 16 BILLIONS OF LIRE (ABOUT 22.3-25.4 MILLION DOLLARS) OF WHICH ABOUT 11 BILLIONS WERE CONSUMED IN NORMAL PARTY ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS.

RUMOR CONFIRMED THAT IN ADDITION TO HIS CONCENTRATION ON SECURING THE ELECTION OF LOCAL CD CANDIDATES WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A COHESIVE WORKABLE MAJORITY IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY DIRECTORATE, HE INTENDED TO MAKE A MASSIVE EFFORT IN THE THREE REGIONS OF EMILIA, UMBRIA AND TUSCANY. HERE, HE SAID, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD PROBABLY WIN BUT HE VERY MUCH HOPED TO REDUCE

THEIR PERCENTAGE AND TO INCREASE THAT OF THE CRISTIAN DEMOCRATS.

RUMOR SAID IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO INDICATE THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF THE "MATERIAL" HELP WE MIGHT GIVE. HE SAID HE HAD CLEARLY OUTLINED THE EXISTING DISPARITY AND WOULD WELCOME ANY HELP THAT HE COULD GET.

HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WITH OR WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP HE WOULD DO THE BEST THAT HE COULD, BUT THAT HE HOPED SOME MEANS MIGHT BE FOUND TO EVEN THE BALANCE IN VIEW OF THE MASSIVE SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THEIR ALLIES. I SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS OBSERVATIONS AND BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH HIM WHEN I HAD HEARD FROM WASHINGTON.

IT WOULD BE USEFUL AND, I BELIEVE, IN OUR INTEREST TO PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT. IF THIS COULD BE DONE, WE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INSURE MAXIMUM RETURNS FOR OUR INVESTMENT. HOWEVER, FOR THE REASONS I OUTLINED IN MY MESSAGE OF THE 22ND, I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ACCEDE TO THE DEMANDS WHICH ARE GOING TO BE MADE BY OTHER PARTIES FOR A BROAD-SPECTRUM OF SUPPORT. I DO BELIEVE THAT AN INVESTMENT OF THE MAGNITUDE I MENTIONED IN MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE, DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARDS OBTAINING ELECTION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC LOCAL CANDIDATES WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A MORE COMESIVE AND WORK-ABLE MAJORITY IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE DIRECTORATE, WOULD BE WELL WORTH OUR WHILE AND I REITERATE MY RECOMENDATION THAT WE DO THIS.

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