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TO THE WHITE HOUSE
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IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE
FOR: DR. HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: AMBASSADOR GRAHAM MARTIN, ROME 1495
REF: WH 10857 (052038Z)

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THIS MORNING THE POUCHED MATERIAL REGARDING THE NSSM 129 STUDY ON POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA. RESISTING THE IMPULSE TO COMMENT EXTENSIVELY, I WILL LIMIT MY OBSERVATIONS TO THE SHORT TERM AND THE USEFULNESS TO THE UNITED STATES OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE EXPLORATORY CONTACTS NOW UNDER WAY BETWEEN THE YUGOSLAV AND ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

2. DISPOSING FIRST OF YOUR QUESTION ON THE YUGOSLAV-ITALIAN TERRITORIAL ISSUE, IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, THERE IS NO DISPOSITION ON THE PART OF ANY ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES TO QUESTION THE DE FACTO PERMANENCE OF THE PRESENT BORDERS. THE ONE EXCEPTION IS THE MSI PARTY WHICH MAY BEAT SOME MUTED DRUMS AT ELECTION TIME. EVEN HERE, THE MSI LEADER, ALMIRANTE, IS TRYING TO ELIMINATE IRREDENTIST CLAIMS OF HIS FOLLOWERS AS ONE OF THE REMNANTS OF FASCIST TRAPPINGS WHICH IS HARMFUL TO THE IMAGE OF THE MSI HE IS TRYING TO CREATE AS A FULLY RESPONSIBLE MODERATE PARTY OF THE RIGHT. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT HE HAS NO DESIRE TO SEE THIS BECOME A MAJOR ISSUE AND THAT, INCREASINGLY, HE HAS THE POWER WITHIN HIS PARTY TO ENFORCE HIS WILL. THIS QUESTION IS NOT LIKELY TO BE RELEVANT, ALTHOUGH IT MAY STILL TAKE A FEW YEARS TO MOVE TO A DE JURE RATIFICATION OF THE STATUS QUO. IF THE TENTATIVE FEELERS NOW UNDERWAY BETWEEN ITALIAN AND YUGOSLAV MILITARY FORCES DEVELOP, PRESSURE FROM ITALIAN MILITARY ON ALMIRANTE WILL TEND TO INSURE NO TROUBLE ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION.

3. LOOKING ACROSS THE ADRIATIC FROM ROME, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT, EVEN MORE THAN THE PARTY (LCY), THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT SEEMS TO BE THE ONE ENTITY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE GLUE TO HOLD THE COUNTRY TOGETHER IN A POST-TITO PERIOD. REPORTS FROM THE RECENT MANEUVERS, INDICATING GREAT PUBLIC SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION, SEEM TO REINFORCE THIS CONCLUSION. I HAVE, THEREFORE, GIVEN QUIET ENCOURAGEMENT TO GENERAL MARCHESI, CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE STAFF, TO AT LEAST INSURE A FAVORABLE ITALIAN RESPONSE TO THE INITIAL TENTATIVE ADVANCES OF YUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES. I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL, AT LEAST, TO FIND OUT WHAT THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE ON THEIR MIND. A FORMAL VISIT TO BELGRADE WILL NOW TAKE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. GENERAL MEREU, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, WILL PROBABLY HEAD THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT. WE WILL KNOW MORE AFTER THIS VISIT TAKES PLACE.

4. I NOTE ON PAGE 35 OF THE 10 SEPTEMBER REPORT TO THE NSM, THE APPROACH TO THE ITALIANS IS EXTRAPOLATED INTO AN INDICATION OF A "YUGOSLAV INTEREST IN A DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, IF ONLY INDIRECT." ON SEVERAL COUNTS I WOULD DOUBT ANY YUGOSLAV PASSION FOR A NATO EMBRACE. IT WOULD COMPROMISE THEIR "NON-ALIGNMENT"; IT WOULD BE A PROVOCATION TO THE SOVIETS; AND, FINALLY, HAVING NOTED THE TENDENCY OF SOME NATO PARTNERS TOWARD THEIR GRECIAN ALLY TO INDULGE THEIR LEFTIST CONSTITUENCIES BY THE EXPRESSIONS OF THEIR "SELECTIVE MORAL INDIGNATION" ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE REGIME, THIS COURSE MIGHT SEEM UNAPPEALING.

5. ON THE CONTRARY, THE NEXT PARAGRAPH (PAGES 36 AND 37) SEEMS RIGHT ON TARGET ON YUGOSLAV DESIRE TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON SOVIETS AND THEIR DESIRE FOR LOGISTIC AND MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER SOURCES. GENERAL MARCHESI HAS JUST INFORMED ME THAT HE FULLY EXPECTS THE YUGOSLAVS TO RAISE QUESTION OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT. HE BELIEVES A FAVORABLE ITALIAN RESPONSE WOULD BE USEFUL IN SHORING UP THE YUGOSLAV WILL TO RESIST, WHICH WOULD IN ITSELF CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE. HE POINTS OUT, HOWEVER, THAT ITALIAN WAR RESERVES WILL NOT PERMIT DIVERSION WITHOUT ASSURANCE OF REPLACEMENT. HE WONDERS IF WE COULD HELP IN THIS REGARD. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE NATO CAN POSSIBLY BE RESPONSIVE, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE OTHER ALLIES, NOTABLY THE FRG, COULD BE HELPFUL.

6. I THINK THIS IS WORTH EXPLORING, BUT NOT THROUGH THE NATO MECHANISM. IN FACT, I WOULD ELIMINATE THE LAST OPTION ON PAGE 38 AND SUBSTITUTE SOMETHING ON THESE LINES:

--ALTERNATIVELY, THE US COULD QUIETLY ENCOURAGE SUCH INITIAL EXPLORATION TO BE DISCREETLY UNDERTAKEN, WITHOUT COMMITMENT, DURING THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF ITALIAN MILITARY DELEGATION TO BELGRADE. THE RESULTS OF SUCH EXPLORATION, WITHOUT INITIALLY DIRECTLY INVOLVING THE US, COULD ASSIST IN DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES DEFINING THE EXTENT, KIND, AND MODALITIES OF COOPERATION IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO TAKE.

7. IN ANY EVENT, UNLESS YOU PERCEIVE SOME OBJECTION, I INTEND TO TELL MARCHESI THAT I, PERSONALLY, FIND HIS THOUGHT VERY INTERESTING BUT I DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH DETAIL TO MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATION TO WASHINGTON UNTIL AFTER THE ITALIANS EXPLORE FURTHER WITH THE YUGOSLAVS WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND.

8. I PERSONALLY THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GO FURTHER AND ACTIVELY ENCOURAGE OUR ITALIAN FRIENDS TO EXPLORE THESE POSSIBILITIES IN CONSIDERABLE DEPTH. I AM QUITE RELAXED ABOUT THE REMOTENESS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING AUTHORIZED TO DO SO, HAVING GONE THROUGH A POST-GRADUATE COURSE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON THE DEEP COMMITMENT OF OUR AMERICAN MILITARY COLLEAGUES TO DO EVERYTHING THEMSELVES. THERE ARE TIMES, AS, ESTABLISHED IN THAILAND, WHEN THE GOAL CAN BE ACHIEVED MORE QUICKLY, AND AT VASTLY LESS COST, WITH A COLDLY CALCULATED AND FIRMLY CONTROLLED INDIRECT APPROACH. THIS COULD BE ANOTHER SUCH CASE, ALTHOUGH I AM THE FIRST TO ADMIT THAT MY PREOCCUPATION WITH THE INTERNAL ITALIAN POLITICAL SCENE, HAS LIMITED MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS AND THAT THERE MAY BE QUITE VALID REASONS PRECLUDING APPROVAL OF THIS SUGGESTION.

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