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MORI per C05146856

State Dept. review completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

SECRET EXCLUSIVE

FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM AMBASSADOR MARTIN, ROME 1494

1. THESE OBSERVATIONS MAY BE OF SOME USE TO THE PRESIDENT IN DETERMINING WHAT HE MIGHT WISH TO STRESS IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MORO ON MONDAY.

2. AIDED BY A SKILLFUL USE OF IUNENDO AND RUMOR, A THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF THE PECULIAR PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ITALIAN "CLASSE POLITICA" IN ROME, AND AN ASSIDUOUS WOOING OF THE PRESS BY HIS FOLLOWERS, MORO EMERGED FROM THE NATIONAL CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC COUNCIL LAST WEEK WITH AN ENHANCED IMAGE AS A POLITICAL TACTICIAN. THE REALITY IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. MUCH MORE THAN HE WOULD HAVE LIKED, HIS PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION WITH THE LEFT IS MUCH GREATER NOW THAN IT WAS TWO WEEKS AGO. HIS CHANCES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SWEEPSTAKES HAVE BEEN DIMINISHED, ALTHOUGH HE CANNOT BE WHOLLY COUNTED OUT. THE FACT REMAINS THAT MANY MORE OF THOSE WHO WILL VOTE WILL NOW OPPOSE HIM TO THE BITTER END. AT THE SAME TIME, HE CAN TAKE COMFORT FROM THE FACT THAT THE RESULTS OF THE COUNCIL WERE, AND HAVE BEEN MADE TO APPEAR EVEN MORE SO, A PARTIAL DEFEAT FOR FANFANI, WHOSE CHANCES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE ARE ALSO NOW SOMEWHAT LESS THAN THEY WERE TWO WEEKS AGO. INCREASINGLY, ONE HEARS TALK OF TURNING TO RUMOR OR LEONI AS CANDIDATES MORE OR LESS ACCEPTABLE TO THE MAJORITY OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND WHO WILL HAVE A BROADER APPEAL THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE POLITICAL SPECTRUM THAN EITHER MORO OR FANFANI. SARAGAT IS WAITING IN THE WINGS READY, IF AN IMPASSE DEVELOPS, TO BE THE CANDIDATE TO WHOM ALL MAY RALLY. ANDREOTTI IS A RATHER DARK HORSE POSSIBILITY AS IS LA MALFA OF THE REPUBLICANS. I DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER DE MARTINO A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY, ALTHOUGH PERTINI, THE SOCIALIST PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, IS AN OUTSIDE POSSIBILITY.

3. MORO HAS ACCEPTED SOME OBLIGATIONS TO THE SOCIALISTS, AMONG THEM TO OPPOSE US ON THE CHIREP ISSUE. MORO MADE A TACTICAL ERROR IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY BY STRONGLY INFERRING THAT ITALIAN INTRANSIGENCE ON THIS ISSUE IS WHOLLY DUE TO THE SOCIALISTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO THE ADAMANT OPPOSITION OF NENNI. NEITHER DE MARTINO, THE SOCIALIST VICE PREMIER NOR NENNI, STILL THE NOMINAL LEADER OF THE AUTONOMISTS, WILL WISH TO ACCEPT SUCH TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY, CERTAINLY NOT PUBLICLY. ONLY THIS MORNING NENNI PUBLICLY DISASSOCIATED HIMSELF FROM SOCIALIST PARTY SECRETARY MANCINI'S CALL FOR "NEW AND ADVANCED EQUILIBRIUMS".

4. IN AN ELECTION WHICH WILL BE DECIDED BY THE SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 1000 VOTES OF THE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF THE ASSEMBLY, PLUS 50 ODD VOTES FROM THE REGIONS, WHERE THE BALLOTING IS SECRET, NO ONE CAN BE SURE THAT ANY COMMITMENT WILL BE KEPT, EVEN THOSE BOUGHT AND PAID FOR. WE WILL GET A CLEAR IDEA OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS ONLY

I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION IN PART 2012/12/20 : LOC-HAK-165-5-15-7  
BE SERVED BY PERMITTING US TO APPEAR TO FAVOR ANY PARTICULAR  
CANDIDATE AT THIS STAGE, PARTICULARLY SO SINCE WE HAVE  
~~CONCLUDED THAT WE CAN REASONABLY WORK WELL WITH ANY OF THOSE~~  
WHO SEEM TO HAVE ANY REAL CHANCE.

5. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH MORO ON 2 OCTOBER I REITERATED  
THE AMERICAN POSITION THAT WHILE I HAD MADE IT CRYSTAL  
CLEAR TO ALL THAT WE CONSIDERED THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC  
PARTY TO BE THE CORE OF OUR INTERESTS IN ITALY, AND WOULD  
CONTINUE TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO HELP THE PARTY PREPARE  
TO ENTER THE VITAL 1973 ELECTIONS AS A UNIFIED AND HARD-  
HITTING PARTY, WE DID NOT, AS OF NOW, INTEND TO SUPPORT HIM  
OR ANY OTHER CANDIDATE AS A PREFERRED CHOICE IN THE DECEMBER  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

6. MORO FULLY INTENDS TO USE THE APPOINTMENT WITH THE  
PRESIDENT IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO FURTHER HIS OWN CANDIDACY.  
THE AGREEMENT NOT TO ANNOUNCE THE APPOINTMENT UNTIL FRIDAY  
WAS, OF COURSE, BROKEN. STORIES APPEARED IN THE ITALIAN PRESS  
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS BEFORE THE RELEASE DATE.

7. CONSEQUENTLY, I HAVE QUIETLY INFORMED PRESIDENT  
SARAGAT, PRIME MINISTER COLOMBO, AND MOST OF THE CO-  
FACTION LEADERS THAT THE APPOINTMENT WAS AT MORO'S REQUEST;  
THAT I HAD RECOMMENDED THE APPOINTMENT BECAUSE I WAS CERTAIN  
THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WISH TO REEMPHASIZE HIS HIGH REGARD  
FOR ITALY BY RECEIVING ITALY'S FOREIGN MINISTER AS HE HAD  
THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF OTHER IMPORTANT NATIONS; THAT I AM  
SURE THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE, ON THE VERY FIRST  
CELEBRATION OF COLOMBUS DAY AS A NEWLY ENACTED OFFICIAL  
HOLIDAY, TO RECEIVE THE HIGHEST RANKING MEMBER OF THE  
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THEN IN THE UNITED STATES; AND I THOUGHT  
THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WISH TO REITERATE THE REPRESENTATIONS  
MADE BY ME IN ROME AND BY SECRETARY ROGERS IN NEW YORK  
REGARDING THE COMPLETE SERIOUSNESS OF THE EFFORTS OF THE  
UNITED STATES TO INSURE THE CONTINUING REPRESENTATION OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UN AND THE FULL EXPECTATION THAT  
WE WOULD RECEIVE COMPLETE ITALIAN SUPPORT ON THE PROCEDURAL  
MOTION AND ON THE IQ RESOLUTION.

8. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY POINT  
OUT TO MORO THAT WE DO, INDEED, EXPECT FULL ITALIAN SUPPORT ON  
BOTH VOTES, AND THAT, UNDER THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES NOW  
PREVALING, WE SIMPLY WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE LACK OF  
SUCH SUPPORT.

9. IF MORO AGAIN ALLUDES TO "DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE  
COALITION" THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WISH TO OBSERVE THAT IT  
SEEMED TO HIM THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN RATHER  
EASILY SURMOUNTED BY MORO LAST YEAR, THAT HE BELIEVES  
THAT MORO WOULD HAVE A EVEN EASIER TIME THIS YEAR, AND THAT  
HE HAS INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR MARTIN IN ROME TO GIVE HIM  
EVERY ASSISTANCE IN THIS TASK.

10. MORO'S VERSION OF WHAT WAS SAID WILL BE QUICKLY CIR-  
CULATED IN ROME. THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE AN OBVIOUS  
ADVANTAGE IN INFORMING ME PROMPTLY OF WHAT DID ACTUALLY  
TRANSPIRE, SO THAT I MAY QUIETLY AND INFORMALLY SET THE  
RECORD STRAIGHT IN CERTAIN RESTRICTED BUT HIGHLY IMPORTANT  
CIRCLES IN ROME. WARM REGARDS.

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