

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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DOS Review Completed.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the
United States
Hanan Bar-On, Minister, Embassy of Israel

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, July 31, 1976
8:45 - 10:05 a.m. (breakfast)

PLACE: The Monroe - Madison Room
Department of State

Atherton: [Shows Kissinger an MENA ticker item of an Egyptian "disclosure" of meetings between Israeli and Syrian intelligence officials in Geneva.] Why didn't they tell us about it?

Kissinger: Some day, for a week, I will accept every recommendation I get on the PLO. Then you will be on your knees thanking me for what I saved you from.

I don't see why it couldn't have been put out at once that we needed PLO security protection, instead of dribbling it out.

Dinitz: Yesterday he said U.S. officials were being escorted everywhere by the PLO. The impression it gives is that you have no freedom of action. It doesn't look right. [He shows an AP report at Tab A.]

Kissinger: It doesn't look right to have officials assassinated in the streets. They just tell the PLO in order to hold the PLO responsible for security. We don't know the mechanics. These people that are close to you are harrassing us every day.

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2

Dinitz: The newspaper men who are harrassing your spokesman are also harrassing us.

Kissinger: I am not mad at you. I am mad at the bureaus, who can't give a straight answer. First, dealing with the PLO in Lebanon is totally different from the PLO in Israel. We have been meticulous in not having contacts with them. Even on the assassination of Meloy, we dealt with them through the Egyptian Embassy. We deal with them only on questions about the local situation.

Atherton: There was suspicion because we didn't explain it the first day.

Dinitz: We have said our piece in a clear way. [He shows the Secretary the official Israeli statement on the matter.]

Kissinger: I have no problem with this. We have told you everything. There is no issue. This is one case where we didn't have to convince you and you didn't have to convince us.

If we had done what you recommended, the Syrians would have taken on the Christians. Now the Christians are strong enough. There weren't even tactical disagreements.

Dinitz: That is right.

Kissinger: Why is the guidance so weaseling? Was I away?

Atherton: It caught us by surprise, and we had to say something. You weren't here.

Dinitz: I heard Marvin Kalb on the radio today on the way over. He says there is quid pro quo between the United States and the PLO. [See Tab A]

Kissinger: When we threatened them [on the evacuation], we didn't even go to them. We went to the Egyptians and the Saudis. When we got a firm date -- when they said there would be "no obstacles" -- only then did we send a note to the PLO saying: "We are leaving on Tuesday. Confirm it." When they confirmed it, we had talks on where the ships were leaving, and exact times.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

3

Dinitz: No, as a friend. You see pictures of U.S. Marines shaking hands with the PLO; the President thanks all concerned, and the spokesman of the President says it refers to the PLO. We are bombarded that we are blind. I am afraid it could be an issue -- an issue in the campaign -- because it shows the impotence of a great power. Even if it is the Mafia that controls the road, as Peter said, and you have to talk to them. But

Kissinger: But these people are also saying we have to talk to the PLO. Marvin is one of the better ones; he ought to understand. When we are actively working to weaken the PLO, why would we do something to build them up? If it was clear that the PLO was key to getting a negotiation started, then we would have a motive.

Dinitz: We would complain.

Kissinger: Of course. But there would be a motive. If Seelye talked to Arafat tomorrow, why could we get out of it?

Some Arab -- in a report I saw -- analyzed the Egyptian-PLO relationship: The Egyptians were trying to exhaust both the Syrians and the PLO so that Egypt could then make an independent deal.

Dinitz: The problem is not the Jordanians, because they think the Egyptians and the PLO are trying to move closer to each other.

Kissinger: You and I have always agreed that at some point in this evolution, the Syrians would go back to the PLO.

Dinitz: But has the moment come? Do you think the arrangements will not hold?

Kissinger: Unless the PLO is weakened, the Syrians will stay there permanently, or else the PLO will gain ascendancy if the Syrians withdraw. If the Syrians were to get any long-term benefit, they had to weaken the PLO.

Dinitz: There is small likelihood that this agreement will be observed. The PLO is damned if they accept it, and damned if they reject it. The Egyptians are very mad at the communique. Cairo announced that Arafat won't go to Damascus.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

4

Kissinger: I think the PLO isn't weakened enough to make it a sensible Syrian move. Whether the Arabs ever act out of strategic interest, or whether they are under such pressure from the Soviets, we can't tell.

It didn't require Syrian withdrawal. It looks like Arafat might not sell it to his people.

Why did the PLO get so involved in the Lebanon situation, in retrospect?

Dinitz: They probably didn't plan on much involvement, but once they started attacking Saiqa, the Syrians were furious.

Kissinger: But why did they get involved with the Christians?

Dinitz: They thought it would be an easy victory.

Kissinger: They [the PLO] couldn't take over all of Lebanon except together with the Syrians.

Dinitz: They thought the Syrians would stay out and Jumblatt could do it.

Kissinger: That is how it looked at the end of March.

Dinitz: But the situation changed with the Syrian move and the Christians' resistance. The Syrians can't even accommodate the PLO now because there is the Christian element.

Kissinger: But it is a mistake to partition Lebanon, because it would guarantee the Muslim part would be PLO, and a radical government.

Dinitz: Because of geography, we are not for that.

Kissinger: There will be some federal state now, perhaps.

Atherton: Probably.

Dinitz: We don't advocate partition.

Kissinger: If the Christians were in the southern part, it would be different.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

5

Dinitz: I was asked to raise our concern with the growing Egyptian-Syrian political warfare. This is something we have been concerned about. [Tab B]

Kissinger: Is this Allon's week? Is this his problem this time? Peres has been quiet.

Rodman: He's been running the soup kitchens on the Lebanese border.

Dinitz: The Salvation Army!

Kissinger: I read that some of the Lebanese in the south won't let the PLO back into their villages.

Dinitz: Three thousand people have been treated by our medical people. They go shopping in Kiryat Shemona.

This [Tab B] is with regard to Egypt's influence on other countries not to establish relations -- the pressure on Spain, on the Africans, in the ECOSOC.

The speech of Sadat is not one that produces great The speech on the 23rd. It was very belligerent.

Kissinger: Against Israel?

Dinitz: Against Israel. Inciting the people [on the West Bank] to rise up against Israel, with the PLO. It was more belligerent than Asad's.

Kissinger: I am going to see Eilts. I will raise this with him.

[Dinitz gives Kissinger and Atherton Tab B]

What are the other worrisome aspects of the speech?

Dinitz: It doesn't show any interest in negotiation or peace. It is reminiscent of the pre-Agreement situation.

Kissinger: We haven't been in contact with the Egyptians and others on the negotiations because we don't want to be asked questions.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

6

Dinitz: And they are not really interested.

Kissinger: We haven't discussed it anyway.

I will raise it.

Dinitz: The other point is the Egyptian attempt to change the status of the Buffer Zone. [He hands the Secretary Tab C.]

Kissinger: That is the arrant stupidity of Waldheim.

[To Atherton:] Have we answered that letter? Tab D.

Atherton: No, we talked to his staff people.

Kissinger: It is not new. Waldheim has suddenly asked us for a formal opinion.

Dinitz: But there is a weakening of the UN position. Because Siilasvuo has gone on vacation. The Swedish chap has also been recalled. The new Commander doesn't know anything about the history of the thing. So there is a vacuum, and the Egyptians have escalated their demands.

Kissinger: I think we should just bury it.

Dinitz: We are not raising it; we are just calling it to your attention.

Atherton: Somebody talked to Urquhart. He is a sensible guy.

Kissinger: Yes. Have Scranton talk to Waldheim or Urquhart and take care of it.

Dinitz: Siilasvuo was due to be back on the 28th.

Kissinger: Right.

Dinitz: Another point: The Iraqi Government has lately requested to admit the PLO in the International Atomic Energy Commission [Agency].
[Laughter]

Rodman: That is good, because the safeguards would apply!

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

7

Dinitz: I need not tell you the ramifications of this!

Kissinger: Have we got a veto?

Dinitz: Here is a paper on this. [Tab E]

Bar-On: You have considerable influence; it is a weighted vote.

Kissinger: We will oppose it.

Dinitz: One additional thing: When former President Nixon was in Israel, we signed a joint communique which referred favorably to increasing landing rights for El Al. It is very important to us and also has important political and psychological effects. We are the only airline which has only one point of entry, New York.

Kissinger: Where does it stand?

Atherton: The CAB has it.

Kissinger: But it hasn't come up in the last two years.

Dinitz: If I may: We've requested Los Angeles, Chicago and Miami. We understand there may be some differences because these are major points and TWA uses them. It could be San Francisco instead of Los Angeles; Cleveland or Detroit instead of Chicago; or Boston and Washington instead of Miami.

Kissinger: That is the last concession you will make!

It's like Mao and Kosygin: Mao swears it is true. He says he told Kosygin, on the way back from the Ho Chi Minh funeral, "We'll struggle against you for 10,000 years." Kosygin said: "That's not the way to talk among Communists." Mao said: "All right, 9,000 years." [Laughter] So Kosygin said: "Come on now." So Mao said: "8,000 years, and that is the last concession we will make!" [Laughter]

Dinitz: Who told you this?

Kissinger: Mao told me that. He swears it is true.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

8

Dinitz: Because I don't think we can ever reach agreement with the CAB.

Atherton: There were a couple of rounds of negotiations with the CAB after the Nixon visit; but there was no result.

Dinitz: They were very courteous, but they said, "Of course, TWA would object and it would have to be a political decision." It is the same in our government; the Minister of Transportation would be against it, but the Prime Minister and the Cabinet could decide on other calculations. So you should talk to the President and see what can be done. You are doing good business in Israel. TWA is one of the few airlines that make money.

Kissinger: If you pave it all, you will have more room. The tanks are moving.

Dinitz: No, nothing has moved on this or on the 105 mm guns. The same thing with the German thing.

Kissinger: The problem is we haven't figured out the bureaucratic thing.

Dinitz: Leber said let the U.S. purchase it on a token basis.

Kissinger: But we have to do paperwork for a purchase.

Dinitz: I think it is simply a little goodwill. Scowcroft says the Pentagon is investigating it. I go to the Pentagon but the Pentagon won't see me.

Kissinger: Why?

Dinitz: Rumsfeld won't see foreign Ambassadors.

Atherton: Brent says the Pentagon promised an answer in the middle of next week.

Dinitz: They now tell us we don't have money to cover all the orders. This is true. But we aren't putting orders beyond our money. There was a rumor that Rumsfeld was keeping it because he was going to Israel and wanted to give it to Shimon Peres in Israel. I don't care who he gives it to.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

9

Kissinger: I will talk to him again.

Dinitz: I have two pleasant items.

The Israeli Philharmonic will be at the Kennedy Center on the 27th for the Bicentennial. Zubin Mehta will be conducting. I understand the President may go.

Rodman: You will be at the UNGA.

Kissinger: I am giving a speech on that day at the UN. I am almost sure my boys in IO scheduled something else for that night.

Rodman: But I told Jock about this.

Kissinger: If there is something else, I'll try to unschedule it.

Dinitz: Now, with Nancy and you in Iran, maybe she could come to Israel.

Kissinger: There is air service between Iran and Israel?

Dinitz: Yes.

Kissinger: She could go to Jordan and then to Egypt too.

Dinitz: She could go through Cyprus or Greece.

Kissinger: Not someone named Kissinger! That would be dangerous.

Dinitz: Rome?

Kissinger: The easier way would be through Jordan. If not this time, I may go to Africa at the end of the month.

Dinitz: East Africa or West Africa?

Kissinger: Probably East Africa. But I would like to go to the Ivory Coast on one trip.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

10

Dinitz: That was our recommendation. Houphouet wasn't there.

Kissinger: He was in Paris for a rest and he hates flying so he didn't come back. But I saw him in Paris.

Dinitz: He'd welcome Scranton, but he wants you.

Kissinger: The Nigerian Foreign Minister came to see me. He was very worried about our not seeing him. It's true.

Dinitz: We've heard things about the situation in Nigeria.

Kissinger: We have too. There is not one Nigerian Chief of State except Gowon who left office alive.

Bar-On: Because he was abroad at the time.

Kissinger: Yes. It's a death sentence to be made Nigerian Chief of State!

All right. Can we talk alone for a minute?

[Kissinger and Dinitz conferred alone from 9:32 to 10:05.]

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A

PLO

BY KENNETH J. FREED

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION IS NOW PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR U.S. OFFICIALS TRAVELING IN THE MOSLEM SECTIONS OF BEIRUT, THE STATE DEPARTMENT ACKNOWLEDGED TODAY.

THIS WAS THE NEWEST DEVELOPMENT IN STATE DEPARTMENT DESCRIPTIONS OF WHAT HAS TURNED OUT TO BE AN EXPANDING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PLO.

UNTIL LAST FRIDAY, THE UNITED STATES DENIED ANY DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. HOWEVER, THE DEPARTMENT HAS SINCE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CONTACTS BEGAN IN LATE JUNE.

SPOKESMAN ROBERT FUNSETH SAID TODAY THAT ALL CONTACTS "WITH THE PLO ARE LIMITED TO SECURITY MATTERS."

STATING THAT THE PLO IS A PRINCIPAL FACTOR IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MOSLEM-HELD WEST BEIRUT, LOCATION OF THE U.S. EMBASSY, FUNSETH SAID THAT THE ARAB GROUP HAS PROVIDED "ESCORT VEHICLES TO ACCOMPANY U.S. OFFICIALS IN PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS AREAS."

ON AT A LEAST ONE OCCASION, THE PLO ESCORTED ACTING AMBASSADOR TALCOTT SEELYE BEFORE HE WAS EVACUATED ALONG WITH SEVERAL HUNDRED OTHER AMERICANS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS EARLIER THIS WEEK.

FUNSETH WOULD NOT PROVIDE DETAILS ON THE TYPE OF PROTECTION THE TERRORIST GROUP IS PROVIDING, NOR WOULD HE DISCLOSE THE FREQUENCY. IN ADDITION, HE SAID HE COULD GIVE NO DETAILS ON WHAT PARTICULAR AREAS REQUIRE PLO PROTECTION.

HE ALSO DECLINED TO ANSWER WHEN ASKED IF THE PLO ITSELF WAS NOT THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF DANGER TO AMERICANS IN SOME OF THE WEST BEIRUT SECTIONS.

IN A RELATED MATTER, FUNSETH SAID THE UNITED STATES ALSO HAD BEEN IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PLO CONCERNING THE JUNE 16 MURDER OF AMBASSADOR FRANCIS MELOY AND TWO OTHER U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

"WE HAVE PASSED TO THE PLO A STRONG REQUEST THAT THE MURDERERS BE IDENTIFIED, APPREHENDED AND PUNISHED," FUNSETH SAID.

THE PLO ITSELF SAID ON JUNE 20 THAT IT HAD CAPTURED THE KILLERS. WHILE NOT SPECIFICALLY DISPUTING THAT CLAIM, FUNSETH SAID THAT "WE HAVE NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION THAT THE PLO IS HOLDING THE MURDERERS."

07-30-76 16:43EDT

July 31, 1976 (Morning)

PALESTINIAN ESCORTS FOR OFFICIAL AMERICANS
Neil Strawser and Marvin Kalb, CBS Radio, World News Roundup.

Egypt, in one of its strongest attacks on Syria in recent months, has accused the Syrians of working with Israel to destroy the Palestinian commando movement in Lebanon, Cairo calling the new Syrian-Palestinian accord a document of surrender.

Here in Washington, some eye brows are being raised by the State Department announcement that Palestinians are providing protection for Americans in Beirut. Marvin Kalb reports.

Kalb: The spokesman, Robert Funseth, continues to maintain that American contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization are limited strictly to security matters, and that American policy toward the PLO has not changed as a result of these contacts. However, the official definition of 'security' seems to expand with each day, until now a channell of communication between the two sides has been established which, in the long run, may turn out to be much more significant than the contacts themselves. That channell is in fact the 'quid pro quo' which the Palestinians are getting in exchange for providing security for Americans who work, live and travel through West Beirut. There are other leftist armed groups in West Beirut, but the U.S. is dealing with the PLO. That is the diplomatic signal that the U.S. recognizes the importance of the PLO. It's a degree of recognition and respectability that the PLO has wanted from the U.S. for a long time. Now, it has it. (State Department).

SECRET

30 July 1976

B

EGYPTIAN POLITICAL WARFARE

WE ARE CONCERNED AT THE INCREASE OF EGYPTIAN INITIATIVES AND STATEMENTS OF A RATHER VIOLENT ANTI-ISRAELI NATURE TO WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WITNESS IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS CULMINATING AS THEY DID ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO IN SADAAT'S SPEECH OF JULY 23rd.

- 1) EGYPT IS CONTINUING TO BE ACTIVE IN TRYING TO THWART ANY MOVE DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SPAIN.

ON THE AFRICAN FRONT, WE KNOW THAT EGYPT EXERCISED PRESSURE ON MAURITIUS TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US. EGYPT HAS ALSO BEEN ACTIVE THROUGHOUT AFRICA IN TRYING TO PREVENT ANY WEAKENING IN THE ENTIRE ISRAEL STANCE OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS. WE KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, OF A PARTICULAR EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION IN SIERRA LEONE. WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT EGYPT IS ~~AIDING~~ IN EXERCISING NOT ONLY PRESSURE BUT ALSO ENCOURAGES THE OFFERING OF FINANCIAL INDUCEMENTS TO SOME AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANY WEAKENING IN THEIR ANTI-ISRAELI STAND.

- 2) EGYPT IS ACTIVE AGAINST ISRAEL AT THE U.N. IN ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AS WELL AS IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES. EGYPTIAN ACTION AT THE BEGINNING OF MAY IN REQUESTING A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS STILL

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S E C R E T

-2-

30 July 1976

REMEMBERED BUT ALSO LATELY EGYPT HAS BEEN SPONSORING ANTI-ISRAELI RESOLUTIONS IN SUCH BODIES AS ECOSOC, ~~IN~~ HABITAT AND OTHER AGENCIES.

- 3) WE ARE OF COURSE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT SADAT'S SPEECH OF JULY 23RD IN WHICH HE BITTERLY ATTACKED ISRAEL AND, FOR EXAMPLE, CALLED ON THE ARAB POPULATION OF THE WEST BANK IN THE GAZA STRIP "TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE AND RESISTANCE AGAINST ISRAEL" AND TO UNITE BEHIND THE PLO. THIS IS CERTAINLY AN OPEN INCITEMENT AND THEREFORE OF CONCERN. IT SHOULD BE SAID THAT THERE ARE ALSO OTHER WORRISOME ASPECTS IN SADAT'S SPEECH WHICH CAST DOUBT IN OUR MINDS ON THE POLITICAL DIRECTION IN WHICH HE SEEMS TO BE ENGAGED AT THE MOMENT.

S E C R E T

JANUARY - MAY 1976

Since the signing of the interim agreement in September 1975, the Government of Israel has been watching carefully for signs and indications that might reveal something of Egyptian intentions regarding the gradual normalization of relations with Israel, as called for under the agreement. It now transpires that the trend has been precisely the reverse: not only has there been no easing of Egypt's propaganda effort against Israel, but Cairo has, on the contrary, been campaigning actively in various international forums in an attempt to isolate and condemn Israel. Clearly, this position is totally inconsistent with a readiness to reach a settlement, and Israel must take this into account in weighing any future moves in the area.

In the pages that follow we present hard evidence to the effect that Egypt, its moderate rhetoric notwithstanding, has not changed its basic position towards Israel and its rightful existence.

A. Egyptian Moves Against Israel at the United Nations and Other International Bodies

1. At the end of April, Egyptian representatives lobbied among leaders of the European Socialist parties with the object of preventing their participation in a Socialist symposium in Jerusalem (Al-Shaab, Jordanian daily, May 12, 1976, and other sources).
2. On May 3, President Sadat requested the convening of an emergency session of the UN Security Council to discuss Israel's actions in the territories and in Jerusalem, charging that these were, among other things, a violation of the Geneva Convention.

3. At the FAO Conference in Rome at the end of May, the Egyptian delegation proposed an amendment to prevent the acceptance of Israel as an original member in the Third Group of the International Fund for Agricultural Development.
4. At the preparatory meeting of the ECOSOC Conference, Egypt was at the forefront of those insisting on reference being made to the notorious Zionism-racism resolution of last November; despite the failure of this move, Egypt continued its pressure to have that resolution mentioned in the resolutions of the Abidjan Conference.
5. In May, there were Egyptian and other Arab attempts to work against a joint meeting of Israel and the European Common Market in Jerusalem.
6. At Habitat (April 31-May 11, 1976) there was an Egyptian initiative, supported by Iraq and Libya, against Israel.

B. Egyptian Activity at Islamic Conference

1. At the Islamic-Christian Conferences in Tripoli (February 1-7, 1976) the Egyptian representative was the most belligerent towards Israel and the Jewish People. He referred to Jews in the crudest terms ("scum of the earth" and similar terms), and reacted in a manner that can only be described as hysterical when the Vatican representative objected to his terminology.
2. At the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Istanbul, an Egyptian-Syrian draft was presented to the Conference calling upon all the member States that still had not done so to break relations with Israel. (Egypt opposed a demand by Syria, Libya and the PLO calling for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations, but this proposal still formed part of the Summary Report of the Conference.)

C. Activity to Prevent Diplomatic Relations and Other Contacts with Israel

1. Since January of this year, Egypt has been engaged in thwarting every move designed to bring about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel. (See, for example, Foreign Minister Fahmy's statement at the Egyptian National Assembly on January 17, 1976, and an article threatening Spain, in Al-Ahram, June 1, 1976.)

2. The Ambassadors of Egypt, Libya and Kuwait boycotted a farewell party in Malta for the Ambassador from West Germany because Israel participated (according to a letter from the Embassy in Malta dated March 2). (There have been other reports of the deliberate avoidance of encounters with Israeli diplomats, but Egyptian behavior in this respect does not appear to be uniform.)

D. Statements by President Sadat

1. In an interview with the Iranian News Agency (February 24, 1976), President Sadat categorically rejected the notion of direct negotiations with Israel as "utterly impossible."

2. At a press conference in Kuwait on February 29, Sadat said: "We must not give Israel a chance to draw air into its lungs.... Egypt will not leave the battle, nor will it abandon its national responsibility, because it regards this as a matter of obligation and honor."

3. In a letter to the African nations on the occasion of International Day in the Struggle Against Racism and Discrimination (March 21), Sadat said: "Racist discrimination, which is still prevalent in certain areas in southern Africa, also is continuing on Palestinian soil. In addition to the barbaric, inhuman, colonialistic repression in Palestine, there is also the cultural repression, manifested in the alteration of the status of Arab Jerusalem."

4. In a speech before officers of the Second Army in Ismailiya (March 22), Sadat said: "We must continue our efforts to find a solution to the Middle East problem, either by peaceful or by military means. If a peaceful solution fails, we cannot allow Israel to sit quietly and relax. We must keep pushing it back and remove it entirely from our land - that is to say, all the Arab land."

5. In a speech on May 1 in Suez, Sadat said: "The goal was, and remains, the liberation of Arab land in its entirety, and the realization of the right of the Palestinian people to regain possession of its soil and to establish a state on that soil. The Israeli occupation has twice retreated from Egypt and once from Syria and the rim of world pressure has begun to tighten around Israel as never before. The United States is now anxious to please us - after it had tried to fight us, face-to-face, for ten full days. Europe, too, has approached us with the same aim, and I felt this myself during my recent trip to Europe.... ~~More~~ important, however, is the fact that we conducted a political struggle on behalf of the Palestinian people, to the point where the status of the PLO in the world has reached a level never attained by any other national liberation movement, and it has succeeded in entering the international arena by the widest possible portal.... The Palestinian people, bending under the yoke of the Israeli occupation, turned to its own salvation when the West Bank rose to the last man, and its inhabitants - including the old and the women and children - went out into the streets to raise their voices against the Israeli occupation, hurling stones in the abominable face of the enemy. From the Suez of the 6th of October, we proudly hail the Palestinian people, without prejudice, for their glorious achievements in the struggle they are carrying on in the occupied territories, under the leadership of the PLO. Through unity of will, goal and organization, with courage and awareness, it has succeeded in coming to grips with the new realities generated by the October victories, and to withstand the repression and the terror of the Israeli occupation. At the time of the municipal elections on

the West Bank, it even succeeded in imposing its own national representatives at a rate of more than 80 per cent of the candidates elected to the local councils.

E. Statements by Foreign Minister Fahmy

1. In a speech before the committees of the Egyptian National Assembly on January 5, 1976, Fahmy said: "One of the manifestations of Egypt's adherence to its national obligations is the perseverance of its activity against Israel in every international forum. It was Egypt that raised the matter of the Israeli aggression on the refugee camps in Lebanon before the Security Council on December 3, 1975. It achieved, for the first time in the history of the Security Council, the agreement of the Council to allow the participation of the PLO during the debate on this subject. This was the strongest challenge that the Palestinians had ever thrown at Israel on the international level, and Egypt thus managed, in effect, to upset the balance of forces in the United Nations, and in the Security Council itself.... Egypt took the initiative in the campaign against Israel on every occasion when Arab rights were involved.... You will surely recall that I issued a clear warning to Israel against keeping its gates open to immigration. During the past 28 years we haven't heard from any other Arab source a reminder to the Israeli rulers that the restriction of immigration to Israel will be one of the fundamental conditions for permanent peace."

2. During a discussion at the National Council on January 17, 1976, Fahmy said: "Spain has no intention of changing its present policy, and the statements attributed to the Foreign Minister of Spain are part of Zionist propaganda. Contacts are being maintained and we are keeping track of every move in every country, in order to protect Arab interests."

3. During a discussion before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly on February 12 (following the convening of

the Jordanian Parliament), Fahmy said: "The only way to foil the plans of the Israeli administration on the West Bank is to step up resistance activities there. Thus our Palestinian brothers who live there will not co-operate with any Israeli plan seeking, ostensibly, to grant them an autonomous regime while, in actual fact, it sought to undermine the representative authority of the PLO."

4. During a speech before the National Assembly on March 15 (following the abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty), Fahmy said: "... the Soviet Union allows immigration of Jews to Israel. Zionist pressure, aiming to link the trade agreement between Russia and America to the subject of Jewish immigration, has succeeded. The Soviet Union signed the agreement publicly while secretly agreeing to this matter of immigration, and the Jews emigrated - 40,000 in 1974 and 60,000 in 1975."

5. In an official statement commenting on the demonstrations in Judaea and Samaria on March 20, Fahmy praised all people who are under occupation in general, and the Palestinian people on the West Bank in particular, for "their heroic stand and their rebellion against the Israeli occupation, violence and terror.... It is clear that Israel wants to return to its Zionist goals, which contradict the international community's objective of a just and durable peace in the Middle East.... The Egyptian Government and people support the position of the Palestinian people against the moves undertaken by Israel in the occupied territories."

6. In an interview with Al-Ahram on April 30, Fahmy said: "The responsibility for putting an end to the state of war with Israel lies on Israel's shoulders only, not on the Arabs' shoulders."

Egypt



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01

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62
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8397

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 2994

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UN, PFOR, MARR, EG, IS

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM FOR SECSTATE

1. FOLLOWING LETTER HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM FOR TRANSMITTAL TO SECRETARY KISSINGER, TEXT IS TRANSMITTED BELOW AND ORIGINAL OF LETTER WILL BE FORWARDED.

2. BEGIN TEXT

21 JULY 1976

DEAR HENRY,

IN CONTINUATION OF OUR CLOSE CONTACTS IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT/ISRAEL AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 1975, I WOULD LIKE TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION A MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM RECENTLY BROUGHT UP BY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT. THIS PROBLEM CONCERNS THE LEGAL STATUS OF BUFFER ZONE 1, WHICH ENCOMPASSES THE STRATEGIC GIDDI AND MITLA PASSES, THE SURVEILLANCE STATIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES, AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S WATCH STATIONS AND SENSOR FIELDS.

AS YOU WILL RECALL, THE NATURE OF THE BUFFER ZONE, UNDER THE AGREEMENT ON THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES OF 18 JANUARY 1974, HAD NEVER BEEN CALLED INTO QUESTION. NOW, HOWEVER,
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

USUN W 02994 222317Z

THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT MAINTAINS THAT THE PRESENT BUFFER ZONE 1 IS NOT A UNITED NATIONS AREA, NOR A CONDOMINIUM BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. EGYPT AFFIRMS THAT THE AREA REMAINS UNDER FULL EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY. WHILE EGYPT HAS VOLUNTARILY ACCEPTED CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS PERTAINING TO THE NON-MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE BUFFER ZONE, IT INSISTS ON ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO UNDERTAKE CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE BUFFER ZONE. IN THIS CONNEXION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 1975 PROVIDES FOR A CLEARER SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN AREA (SOUTH OF LINE E AND WEST OF LINE D). THERE EGYPT IS SPECIFICALLY PERMITTED TO CARRY OUT CERTAIN CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE OIL FIELDS IN ABU RODEIS AND RAS SUDAR, INCLUDING THE MAINTENANCE OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF CIVILIAN POLICE.

THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT HAS RAISED THIS FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION REGARDING BUFFER ZONE 1 IN CONNEXION WITH ITS INSISTENCE THAT IT BE PERMITTED TO PROVIDE NORMAL CIVILIAN SERVICES TO THE EGYPTIAN CITIZENS IN THE BUFFER ZONE (BEDOUINS). AS YOU ARE AWARE, THIS MATTER WAS FULLY DISCUSSED IN THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP THAT WAS CONVENED TO WORK OUT THE PROTOCOL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. AT THAT TIME EGYPT REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS OF EGYPTIAN CIVILIANS WITH ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES IN THE WORKING GROUP. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ISRAEL REFUSED TO AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THE PROTOCOL UNLESS IT COULD RECEIVE SATISFACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUS OF THE CIVILIANS IN BUFFER ZONE 1. THE MATTER WAS RESOLVED IN A WAY THAT LEFT OPEN THE QUESTION AS TO HOW EGYPT SHOULD PROVIDE SERVICES TO THE BEDOUINS. LATER, AT THE COMPLETION OF THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS, GENERAL SIILASVDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF CO-ORDINATOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WORKED OUT, IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH BOTH PARTIES, ARRANGEMENTS WHICH PERMITTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRE TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO THE BEDOUINS. NOW EGYPT IS INSISTING THAT UNEF PERMIT THE INTRODUCTION OF UNIFORMED EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN POLICE INTO THE BUFFER ZONE.

EGYPT HAS ALSO FORMALLY REQUESTED THAT UNEF SHOULD ALLOW EGYPT TO EXPLOIT ITS NATURAL RESOURCES IN BUFFER ZONE 1. IN THIS CONNEXION, IT HAS INFORMED UNEF THAT IT INTENDS TO

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

USUN N 02994 222317Z

SEND AN INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN TEAM TO EXPLORE FOR OIL IN THE BUFFER ZONE. IN DEALING WITH THE EGYPTIAN REQUEST, THE CHIEF CO-ORDINATOR AND THE FORCE COMMANDER OF UNEF HAVE, OF COURSE, CONSULTED WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. ISRAEL, IN OPPOSING ANY EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE BUFFER ZONE, MAINTAINS THAT EGYPT CANNOT ASSERT ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN THE BUFFER ZONE, WHICH IS UNDER A SPECIAL REGIME. CONSEQUENTLY, ISRAEL IS OPPOSED TO HAVING EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN POLICE IN BUFFER ZONE 1, POINTING OUT THAT IT IS ONLY IN THE SOUTHERN AREA THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR THE PRESENCE OF EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN POLICE UNDER SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS. ISRAEL IS ALSO OPPOSED TO ALLOWING EGYPT TO UNDERTAKE OIL EXPLORATION IN THE BUFFER ZONE. UNDER THE UNDERSTANDING WORKED OUT WITH BOTH PARTIES, UNEF WILL HAVE TO GIVE ITS RESPONSE TO EGYPT SOME TIME DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN AUGUST 1976.

THE STATUS OF THE BUFFER ZONE IS, OF COURSE, A FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE AND ANY DISAGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER WOULD INEVITABLY CREATE THE MOST SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 1975 AGREEMENT. IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER WITHOUT DELAY.

SINCE YOU WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN DEVISING AND BRINGING ABOUT THAT AGREEMENT, YOUR VIEWS AND ANY INFORMATION HAVING A BEARING ON THIS MATTER THAT MIGHT BE CONTAINED IN THE RECORDS OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WHICH LED TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. I WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY ADVICE YOU MAY WISH TO GIVE ME ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER.

WARM REGARDS,

YOURS SINCERELY,
KURT WALDHEIM END TEXT
BENNETT

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Bedouin Sector

I. Overall View

A. In the last few weeks there has been discerned an Egyptian effort to change the status of the Buffer Zone in order to make it a de-militarized zone under Egyptian civilian administration.

This process is being manifested on the one hand by a constant Egyptian pressure on UNEF to let the Egyptians increase their presence in the Buffer Zone and especially their control in the Bedouin sector in the north, and, on the other hand, by preventing Israeli activity inside the Buffer Zone, including impeding the extension of Israeli services in the Bedouin sector.

B. Dr. Jonah of the UN Secretariat visited the area at the beginning of June and arrived at an understanding with the Egyptians that until the beginning of August there will be no action taken to change the routine in the Buffer Zone, and at that time, the mixed commission will discuss the entire issue. But the Egyptians have not fulfilled the understanding regarding the Bedouin sector.

C. The Egyptians are probably taking advantage of the present weakness of UNEF which was created as the result of several developments within it, as follows:

1. The long absence of General Silasvou, who has been on home-leave since the beginning of June; (He was due to return on July 28th).

2. General Lilistrand, Commander of UNEF, was instructed by the UN Secretariat to take a long "sick-leave". It seems that UN Secretariat representatives received negative impressions as to his ability to function and will probably not return.
3. During June, the Swedish batallion, which was responsible for the northern sector, was replaccd by another Swedish batallion. The former batallion had been in the area since the Agreement became valid and was cognizant of the rights of each side, and was adamantly opposed to the Egyptian demands (as a result of which, at one point, the Egyptians enforced sanctions against that batallion). The new Swedish batallion lacks the background and experience of the former one.

II. The Egyptian Activity in the Bedouin Sector

The purpose of the Egyptian activity is to demonstrate the Egyptian control in the Bedouin sector, which involves the following:

- A. The introduction of government elements, including police in civilian clothing, and this, within the framework of the extension of health, education and welfare services.
- B. The number of Egyptians involved in these service activities has been gradually increased from 10 individuals to approximately 100. The Egyptians turned the service coordination office in Roumani into a government center and it is called Sinai Administration.

At the time, we were promised by General Silasvou that the

office in Roumani for coordination of health, education and welfare services would not become a branch of the Egyptian administration. General Silasvou also clarified that the above-mentioned center for services coordination would remain outside the Buffer Zone in Kantara, and added that there would not be more than 8 - 10 individuals involved in that location.

- C. Some of the Egyptians involved in extending the above-mentioned services are also involved in policing and control activities. For example, they recently detained 11 Bedouins who entered into the Buffer Zone from the Israeli area, and despite UNEF urging, ~~they failed to hand them~~ over to UNEF. The above-mentioned Egyptians also erected a tent close to the Israeli line in which there could be found Egyptians dressed as civilians around the clock who presented themselves as policemen, and, in one case, attempted to detain the medic who came from the Israeli area.
- D. Recently, the Egyptians demanded from UNEF that they bar the entrance of those coming from the Israeli side who are involved in the extension services, from coming into the Buffer Zone. These are Arabs from Al-Arish who are barred from entering unless they are approved by the Egyptians and carry Egyptian documents. The Egyptians also demanded that these people not enter the Buffer Zone with Israeli vehicles, but rather with Egyptian or UNEF vehicles.
- E. The Egyptians exert pressure on UNEF to allow the Bedouins to move southward towards Tassa.

III. Our Contacts With the UN

Our representative keeps almost daily contact with Mr. John Miles, the political advisor to General Silasvou. Our representative complained to him about the weakness of UNEF, which had not managed to prevent the deterioration of that situation, and that the Egyptians do not honor their understanding with Dr. Jonah. Our representative emphasized that both parties have equal rights in the Buffer Zone.

We cannot afford to acquiesce to change the situation in the Buffer Zone, including the Bedouin sector; every change should be carried out with the consent of both parties. We demanded that UNEF take immediate action to stop the activities of Egyptian administrators and police in civilian clothes in the Bedouin sector, and limit the entrance only to those involved entirely in extending services. We showed great flexibility ever since the Agreement became valid. Furthermore, we think that if immediate measures are not taken to stop this process, then it might also lead to the weakening of the UNEF status and authority in the Buffer Zone.

IV. References in the Agreement Documents

In the Agreement Documents there is no reference to the Bedouin issue. The only reference is included in General Magdoub's letter to General Silasvou dated September 23, 1975. The legal status of this letter is questionable.

V. Conclusions

- A. It seems that the Egyptian effort is two-fold:
1. The introduction of a full-fledged Egyptian civilian administration into the Bedouin sector in the north of the Buffer Zone;
 2. To change the status of the Buffer Zone into a de-militarized zone with an Egyptian civilian administration with no limits on civilian activities.
- B. It is possible that the second purpose as above stated is only tactical and is aimed at exerting pressure on the UN to acquiesce to the Egyptian demands in the Bedouin sector in return for a temporary freezing or concession to their demands over the entire Buffer Zone. ~~As a whole, the~~ Egyptians take advantage of the absence of references in the Agreement Documents to the Bedouin issue in order to establish facts in the area.

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28 JULY 1976

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IRAQ HAS LATELY SUGGESTED THE ADMISSION OF THE PLO AS AN OBSERVER TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (IAE). THE IRAQUI REQUEST HAS BEEN INSCRIBED ON THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AGENCY, WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE ON 21 SEPTEMBER IN RIO DE JANEIRO. IN ADDITION TO OUR GENERAL OPPOSITION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE PLO TO YET ANOTHER UNITED NATIONS AGENCY, THE FOLLOWING PARTICULAR POINTS SHOULD BE MADE:

- A. THE PROVISIONAL PARTICIPATION OF THE PLO IN THE WORK OF THE IAE WILL ENABLE THEM TO MONITOR THE INVENTORY OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN THE POSSESSION OF THE IAE.
- B. AT A TIME WHEN THE U.S. IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PHYSICAL SAFE-GUARDING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES, AND INCLUDES SUCH CLAUSES IN EVERY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION, IT WOULD BE MORE THAN IRONIC THAT A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF AN ORGANIZATION WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO "POLICE" THOSE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS.
- C. THE U.S. & ISRAEL HAVE ONLY RECENTLY AGREED ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION FOR A PERIOD OF FORTY YEARS, AN AGREEMENT WHICH VESTS THE SUPERVISION OF THE TO-BE-BUILT ATOMIC REACTORS IN THE IAE. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT

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28 JULY 1976

THE ADMISSION OF THE PLO TO THE IAE WOULD BRING ABOUT LENGTHY DEBATES AND PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS OF THE WORTH OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE PLO, EVEN INDIRECTLY, WOULD HAVE A SAY.

- D. PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE IAE WOULD REDUCE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ORGANIZATION ALSO IN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SUFFERED FROM TERRORIST ACTIONS IN THE PAST. PUBLIC OPINION WOULD MOST LIKELY SEE IN THE PLO'S ADMISSION TO THE IAE AN INTERNATIONAL SEAL OF APPROVAL OF TERRORIST METHODS ALSO ~~IN THE~~ NUCLEAR FIELD.

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