

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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September 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR


The Attorney General
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Further MBFR Preparations

In preparation for the upcoming consultations with our NATO allies, we need to consider:

- the status of substantive and procedural preparations for MBFR within the Alliance, with special reference to MBFR principles;
- the issues that are likely to arise at the October 5-6 Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting and subsequent NATO meetings;
- the alternative approaches that might be taken by the U. S. on these issues and an assessment of their advantages and disadvantages.

The Department of State should prepare an evaluation of these issues and possible alternative approaches to dealing with them by September 17, 1971. Along with the results of interagency work currently underway on various MBFR options and their implications, this evaluation will be the subject of a Verification Panel (MBFR) meeting now scheduled for September 21, 1971


Henry A. Kissinger

DOS, OSD, NSS,
Reviews Completed

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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URGENT ACTION
September 9, 1971

Gen Haig (note)

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: K. Wayne Smith *KWS*

Ally Regard

SUBJECT: MBFR Consultations

You asked that preparation be started for a Verification Panel meeting on September 21 prior to the Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting.

I have prepared (Tab A) a memo to the Verification Panel (MBFR) asking principally for:

-- A statement of the issues that are likely to arise in our NATO consultations this fall, mainly the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting on October 5-6 and the Nuclear Planning Group on October 26-27. This latter meeting will be attended by Secretary Laird.

-- An assessment of the alternative approaches that could be taken by the U. S. on these issues.

This study request is intended to be nothing more than a holding action against the State bureaucracy. It should yield a suitable forum for you to instruct Jack Irwin on the approach you want taken at the Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting and the on-going NATO consultation controlled largely by State.

At the same time, this meeting should provide an opportunity to review the status of our substantive preparations for MBFR negotiations. The status of this work is as follows:

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-- A set of four options have been defined in the precise terms necessary if they are to serve as the basis for negotiation. Other options will probably be suggested by our analysis.

-- The preliminary results of agency assessments of these options will be available by September 17th prior to our reformulation of them. These initial agency products are usually not very good and I am sure more work will be needed.

-- The analysis of related subjects such as collateral constraints and verification should be completed by the end of September.

The overall objective of these substantive preparations is to have a variety of comprehensive MBFR options and an assessment of their implications ready for Presidential consideration prior to the December Ministerial meetings. Prior to such Presidential consideration, every step possible should be taken to ensure that the President's options are not foreclosed by unilateral agency consultations with the allies. For example, you should know that NATO at the urging of the State Department has adopted guidelines for the Explorer that go beyond existing Presidential guidance even though not dramatically inconsistent with it. In particular, it specifies that MBFR shall involve:

-- Reductions that are "both substantial and significant." The meaning of "substantial" is not specified, but is an old cliché dating back to 1968-69.

-- The area of reductions shall be limited to Center Region of Europe (thereby excluding the Flanks and the naval forces) with a minimum area covering the FRG for NATO and the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland for the Warsaw Pact. The FRG adamantly opposes limiting the area to Germany. No specific provision is made for inclusion of the three Western Military Districts of the USSR, although mention is made that "this area covered by the agreement could be extended."

-- Reductions should involve both stationed and indigenous forces although "an agreement covering stationed forces reductions (could) (should) be considered. (This reflects differences with FRG on emphasizing stationed reductions.)"

-- Reductions in nuclear forces would neither be precluded nor required.

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The bulk of these guidelines, with the important possible exception of the call for "substantial" reductions, are consistent with the President's views but, as you know, this continuing process of agency consultation with NATO can get out of hand unless it is watched carefully. One procedural step might be to establish a MBFR "backstopping" committee similar to the arrangement in SALT.

Hal Sonnenfeldt and I will prepare a more detailed evaluation of the principles for you when the full draft is available. The senior political advisors will be meeting on them again next week and they will be submitted to the Deputies in October.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the enclosed directive (Tab A) to the Verification Panel (MBFR).

Concurrence: Hal Sonnenfeldt

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