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DOS Review Completed.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

INFORMATION

August 20, 1971

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT: Recent Indications of Peking's Views on Taiwan Question in Sino-American Relations

SEP -7 1971  
HAK has seen

[redacted] Taiwan remains the central question in Sino-American relations (despite what Chou En-lai told Reston about the need for the prior resolution of Indochina hostilities), and [redacted] Peking's position on this issue has not altered significantly.

25X1

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[redacted]

25X1

No nation could give a promise not to recover its sovereign territory by any means possible.

25X1

[redacted] Chou En-lai might make a statement to President Nixon which the U. S. could itself interpret as Chinese intent to avoid the use of force toward Taiwan.

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

That the U. S. has already changed its stance on Taiwan was demonstrated by the fact that your talks with Chou En-lai continued for 20 hours. Given the U. S. policy change, China must not miss the chance to negotiate.

[redacted]

25X1

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25X1

As described in the State memorandum to you at Tab A, the essay makes the point that negotiation is a form of confrontation by other means, and in the present context of your Peking visit and the President's upcoming China trip is probably intended to reassure those Chinese who fear that negotiating with the U. S. implies an abandonment of revolutionary fervor or confrontation with the U. S.

SECRET/NOFORN

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 5, 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Mao Quotes and the President's  
Trip to Peking

In connection with President Nixon's trip to Peking, Chinese officials are being asked to study certain selections from the writings of Chairman Mao and Lin Piao. The selections have been related by analogy to the opening of PRC negotiations with the US.

The quotations, the most relevant of which are derived from Chairman Mao's discussion of Communist negotiation with the Chinese Nationalists in Chungking shortly after World War II, are obviously intended to reassure those Chinese who fear that negotiating with the US implies an abandonment of revolutionary fervor or confrontation with the US. They emphasize that negotiation is a form of confrontation by other means, remarking that "sometimes, not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to go before, and also right to go this time; in both cases we have given tit-for-tat."

The quotations go on to suggest, however, that the PRC may be "prepared to make such concessions as are necessary and as do not damage the fundamental interests of the people." "Subject to the principle of not damaging the fundamental interests of the people, it is permissible to make certain concessions in exchange for peace. . . , which the people of the whole country need." "Stick for stick and carrot for carrot. Such is the revolutionary dual policy."


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One quote hints at the PRC's official interpretation of US motivation in seeking negotiations when it refers to the factors which brought Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate with the Chinese Communists after World War II: "The subjective desire of Chiang Kai-shek is to maintain his dictatorship and destroy the Communist Party, but many objective difficulties stand in his way. Therefore, he has to be a little realistic. He is being realistic, and we are realistic too. He was realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in going to negotiate with him."

(NOTE: The source of these particular quotes is the July 26 edition of a Hong Kong Chinese-language paper, WEN HUI PAO. The articles from which they are taken, particularly "On Chungking Negotiations" are now being read throughout China in Mao Thought study sessions in accord with the quoted Mao dictum: "Policy and tactics are the life of the party; leading comrades at all levels must give them full attention and must never on any account be negligent.")

*fu*   
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

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