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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

AK

15 MAY 1975

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Henry:

(S) Attached is an analysis prepared by my staff concerning possible Israeli requirements for immediate military resupply to Israel in the event of another Arab-Israeli War. The basic conclusion of the paper is that Israeli ordnance stockpiles are sufficient to fight at 1973 levels for at least a month. Given the agreed US intelligence estimate, that another Arab-Israeli War in the next several months would end in an Israeli victory within two or three weeks, the analysis demonstrates that there may be no overwhelming military requirement for the US to resupply Israel with ordnance.

Sincerely,

Bill Clements

Deputy

REFER TO CIA, DOS

OSD REVIEWED 08-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

DOS REVIEWED 09-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

CIA REVIEWED 09-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

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Classified by ASD:ISA
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31 Dec 2005.

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-1396

SECRETIsraeli Requirements for U.S. Support in the Next Arab/Israeli War

The current assumption of most U.S. planners is that the United States will have to rapidly re-supply Israel with war materials in the event of another war. In line with this assumption, the Israelis have prepared an enormous list of re-supply requirements for delivery beginning at D+5. On the other hand, analysis of current Israeli ordnance stockpiles indicates that Israel now has enough material on hand to fight at 1973 levels for at least a month. Since the consensus of the intelligence community is that another Arab/Israeli war in the next several months would end in an Israeli victory within two or three weeks (NIAM 35/36-1-74), there may be no overwhelming requirement for a U.S. re-supply effort.

This conclusion differs from the official Israeli position. Indeed, Israeli estimates of their "days of supply" indicate several serious gaps in their stockpiles. The Israeli estimates appear to be overly conservative, however, and if the currently existing Israeli stockpiles are analyzed in terms of the actual expenditure rates experienced during the 1973 Arab/Israeli War, the deficits are reduced greatly.

Current Israeli Stockpiles

Israel now possesses more war material than ever before. As the following table shows, Israeli stockpiles of the important items of ordnance are, with the exception of general purpose bombs* and perhaps tank ammunition** significantly higher than they were in September 1973. The stockpiles will climb higher in the months to come as Israel continues its own manufacturing efforts.

*Israel did not use many general purpose bombs during the 1973 war and has emphasized the buildup of improved munitions stockpiles rather than of GP bombs.

**The amount of Israeli tank ammunition actually on hand in Israel is unclear. Israeli status reports provided to J-4 indicate a deficit in January 1975 which will continue into June 1975. Computations based on 1973 consumption, subsequent U.S. deliveries and estimates of Israeli production and training expenditures, indicate the Israelis may have 15% more 105mm tank rounds than they reported for June 1975.

OASD/PA&E/REPRO
SPECIAL REGIONAL STUDIES
4/25/75 -- Tillson

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Table I

Israeli Ammunition Supplies a/

| <u>Type Ammunition</u> | <u>September 1973</u> | <u>April 1975 U.S. Estimates</u> | <u>June 1975 GOI Report</u> |
|--|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 105mm Tank | 304,000 | 462,000 | 401,000 |
| Artillery | | | |
| 155mm (HE) | 124,000 | 290,000 | 304,700 |
| 175mm (HE) | 21,600 | 116,900 | 93,700 |
| TOW Missiles | 0 | 4,767 | 3,800 |
| General Purpose Bombs | 69,800 | 62,100 | 62,400 |
| Cluster Bombs (ROCKEYE, CBU 52, 58) | 7,500 | 11,914 | 14,900 |
| Guided Bombs (HOBO, WALLEYE) | 190 | 774 | 750 |
| MAVERICK | 0 | 550 | 500 |
| Air-to-Air Missiles (AIM 7 & 9) | 380 | 1,774 | 1,774 |
| SHRIKE | 145 | 513 | 465 |

a/ The GOI Report levels are based on a January status report from the Israeli attache. The U.S. estimates are based on end of war inventories plus actual U.S. deliveries. The effects of third country procurement and of Israeli production and training on stockage levels are not known. The apparent shortage of tank ammo may be a result of training requirements although Israeli annual tank ammo production capability (108,000 rounds) is only about 35,000 rounds short of the annual tank training requirement of 65 rounds per tank.

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The table shows that Israel has significantly increased its stockpiles of war material. The Israelis now have about 50% more tank ammo, over twice as many 155mm howitzer rounds and five times as many 175mm gun rounds, and significantly more air munitions than they had prior to the Yom Kipper War. Although there are analytic dangers in looking only at ordnance totals, this is a considerable amount of ammunition, particularly in light of what recent analysis of the 1973 war has revealed.

In 1973, for example, the Israelis reportedly had only a seven-day supply objective but fought for 18 days. At the end of this period Israel had exhausted its prewar inventory of 175mm gun ammunition, cluster bombs, and WALLEYE guided bombs. While these and other shortages could have caused difficulties or required some adjustments in Israeli tactics in the absence of U.S. support, they probably would not have significantly effected the outcome of the war. Disregarding U.S. wartime re-supply, at the war's end Israel still had over 40 percent of its prewar inventory of 105mm tank ammo, substantial amounts of artillery ammo, 72 percent of the prewar general purpose bomb inventory, and 40 percent of its AIM 7 and 9 air-to-air missiles.* Table I shows that stockage levels of the items which were exhausted in 1973 have been increased substantially; the mix of air force munitions has been improved by the addition of greater numbers of high technology weapons.

Days of Supply

Although the Israelis have more ordnance on hand than at any time in their history, their force structure has expanded also and the real question is how long Israel could fight at a high level of combat before exhausting its stockpiles. That is, given the existing Israeli force structure, how many days of supply do the various stockpiles give the Israelis?

Table II shows the days of supply available for each major type of ammunition based on actual Israeli planning rates and 1973 expenditure rates. We do not know how the Israelis calculate their days of supply, but the calculations based on 1973 expenditures generally appear to be more realistic than the Israeli calculations. Although the table shows considerably more than 30 days supply of most types of improved air ordnance, new tactics and a desire to hold down losses will likely result in a more rapid use of these items than was the case in 1973. We have no good basis for estimating what the actual expenditure rates of improved air ordnance will be, but we do believe that Israeli Air Force munition stocks are sufficient for approximately 30 days.

* See, for example, The Effectiveness of United States Military Aid to Israel (Report by the SecDef to Congress, December 1974).

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Table II

Days of Supply of Principal Israeli Ordnance a/

| <u>Type Ordnance</u> | <u>Israeli Planning Factors b/</u> (Israeli Stockpile Report) (June 1975) | <u>1973 Expenditure Rates c/</u> (U.S. Stockpile Estimate) (April 1975) |
|--|---|---|
| 105mm Tank | 13 | 45 |
| Artillery | | |
| 155mm (HE) | 27 | 30 |
| 175mm (HE) | 34 | 49 |
| TOW Missiles | c/ | c/ |
| General Purpose Bombs | 13 d/ | 40 e/ |
| Cluster Bombs (ROCKEYE, CBU 52, 58) | 7 | 21 f/ |
| Guided Bombs (HOBO, WALLEYE) | 12 | 110 |
| MAVERICK | 17 | c/ |
| Air-to-Air Missiles (AIM 7 & 9) | 22/11 | 121/143 |
| SHRIKE | 11 | 51 |

a/ Does not include Israeli monthly production capability which is 9,000 rounds of 105mm tank ammo; 5,000 rounds of 155mm How; and 2,000 GP bombs (500 lb).

b/ Israeli intense rates for ground ammo and normal rates for air ordnance.

c/ No reliable experience available.

d/ Does not include MK 82 500 lb bombs.

e/ Based on Israeli consumption of MK 82 bombs as well as MK 83, 84, and 118.

f/ Does not include wartime ROCKEYE expenditures.

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As the table shows, Israeli planning factors portray important gaps in tank ammunition and in improved conventional air ordnance, which, using Israeli figures, would be exhausted in about two weeks or less. These gaps disappear or are at least less constraining if the 1973 actual expenditure rates are applied. Based on these calculations the Israelis could fight for at least a month before exhausting their stockpiles of the ordnance for which their figures portray deficiencies.

There are several caveats which should be noted regarding these calculations: (1) training expenditures and Israeli production have not been included in the calculations, although it appears that expenditures and production may be about equal; (2) Israeli tactics have changed since 1973 and may require different expenditure rates for some types of equipment; (3) Israeli miscalculation or mistakes could result in unexpected requirements; (4) although the 1973 war lasted for 18 days, there was only intense fighting for about seven days on each front; and (5) the analysis has focused on major ordnance items and may have missed particular shortcomings in the Israeli stockpiles. In addition, unforeseen high rate of consumption of key/critical repair parts, for both air and ground major items, due to combat damage or high operational usage rates, may create urgent requests for which there is a valid basis. Our knowledge of the status of repair parts and secondary items is much less than our knowledge of major items and ammunition. These considerations and others may have some effect on Israeli days of supply available, but they do not appear to be significant enough to change the judgment that Israel could fight for at least 30 days with current ammunition stockpiles.

Policy Implications

The initiation of a wartime re-supply effort could have serious political implications and we should not begin such an effort without a clear understanding of actual Israeli requirements. Post war analysis of the 1973 U.S. emergency re-supply effort for Israel has shown that Israel was never in serious danger of defeat and the U.S. re-supply effort during the war, except for its possible effect on Soviet and Arab perceptions, was not critical to Israel's survival. U.S. support of Israel during the actual conflict had major political implications, however, and was certainly a factor in the Arab decision to embargo oil shipments to the United States. A second re-supply effort could easily lead to another oil embargo.

The major conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that, in another Arab/Israeli war, Israel will not require re-supply in a war that lasts less than thirty days. (The intelligence community estimates that a war in 1975 would be shorter than the 18 day Yom Kipper War). Thus, the United States will have more flexibility to act in its own interest, independent of the fear of Israeli losses resulting from material shortages during the first 30 days of a war.

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4/24/75

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT: Israeli Requirements for U.S. Support in the Next Arab/Israeli War (U)

(S) DOD analysis of current Israeli stockpiles indicates that Israel now has enough critical war material on hand to fight at 1973 levels for at least a month. There would probably be shortages in some ordnance or spare parts categories but they are not likely to prevent Israel from defending itself for at least 30 days.

(S) The intelligence community argues that another Arab/Israeli war in the next several months would end in an Israeli victory within two or three weeks. If this is valid, Israeli success is not likely to depend on a U.S. resupply effort during the war. Even if the estimates of the war's duration are wrong, it seems reasonable that Israel would not need inputs of ordnance as early as the Israelis will request them. In other words, the analysis suggests that if war erupts and the U.S. declines to provide or delays emergency resupply to Israel, the war's outcome will be about the same as it would be if we acquiesce in Israeli requests for resupply early in the war. This flexibility to act in our own interest without fear of an Israeli collapse for at least 30 days might avert another oil embargo and retard Soviet efforts to support the Arabs.

Enclosure

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