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Sept. 17/11

**IMPACT OF PROVIDING SELECTED ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL**

Three items of equipment are considered below: APC's, SHRIKE Missiles and 105mm Anti-Personnel ammunition. In each case, the quantities considered are added to the level of Option 1-C of the Urgent List; the impacts described are attributed to the total (Option 1-C plus the additional quantity requested by Israel). The impacts are also considered for the Option 1-C level plus alternate lesser quantities. The lesser quantities are treated below as the first alternative for each item; the larger quantities are shown as the second alternative for each item.

OSD REVIEWED 08-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(B)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Det

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APC, M113A1

Alternative 1 - 200 (Option 1-C) plus an additional 100, total 300 for urgent delivery (1 April 75).

Impact: Implementation of this alternative will significantly delay equipping new units in the 16-division force structure and seriously impact on US Army readiness (especially in support of our commitments to NATO). Providing 300 APCs by 1 April 75 will require further draw down of prepositioned stocks in Europe which have already been seriously depleted. APCs would have to be provided in "as-is/operable" condition.

NOTE: Since October 73, a total of 769 each M113A1 APCs have been provided to Israel by withdrawal from the Army inventory and 1,295 are programmed for delivery from production by December 76. If Alternative 1 is selected, payback to US Army should be on a one-for-one basis from scheduled Israeli production.

Alternative 2 - 200 (Option 1-C) plus an additional 200, total 400 for urgent delivery (1 April 75).

Impact: Implementation of this alternative closely parallels Alternative 1 above. The quantity (400) of APCs requested is sufficient to equip one(+) armor division. If approved, the withdrawal will significantly delay equipping of new units in the 16-division force structure and seriously impact on US Army readiness (especially in support our commitments to NATO). APCs would have to be provided in "as-is/operable" condition.

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SHRIKES

- Option IC for SHRIKES is zero.
- U.S. SHRIKE inventory is extremely low in relation to inventory objectives/War Reserve Materiel (WRM) requirements.
- Total U.S. SHRIKE missile requirement is 11,864.
- Total (of all four types) on hand is 2221 or 19% of the total WRM requirement. Providing 400 missiles would reduce total on-hand assets to 15% of WRM requirements.
- Virtually all of the Navy on-hand stocks are aboard carriers or at overseas bases. Some of the Air Force stocks are also at overseas bases.
- Asset situation is as follows:

	<u>AGM 45-3A</u>	<u>-4</u>	<u>-6</u>	<u>-7</u>
WRM:	6182	1265	3542	875
On Hand:	776	686	472	273
Production: CY74	200	125	47	
CY75	763	50	551	43
CY76			820	

Alternative 1 - Provide 200 SHRIKE missiles (any mix) for urgent delivery.

- A possible mix:

AGM 45-3A	100*
45-4	100

*(Would complete an earlier Israeli request for AGM 45-3A model and provide an additional 75).

Impact:

- Would reduce total on-hand assets to approximately 17% of WRM requirements.
- Providing the above mix would reduce on-hand inventories by:

<u>AGM45</u>	<u>Inventory Reduction</u>	<u>Percent of WRM Requirements Reduced To</u>
-3A	13%	11%
-4	15%	46%

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Alternative 2 - Provide 150 (4), 100 (-6), and 150 (-7) for urgent delivery. (Would reduce total on-hand assets to 15% of WRM requirements).

Impact:

AGM 45-4

- Withdrawal of 150 missiles would reduce inventory by 22%.
- Would reduce on-hand assets from 55% to 42% of WRM requirements.

AGM 45-6

- Withdrawal of 100 missiles would reduce inventory by 22%.
- Would reduce on-hand assets from 13% to 11% of WRM requirements.

AGM 45-7

- Withdrawal of 150 missiles would reduce inventory by 55%.
- Would reduce on-hand assets from 31% to 14% of WRM requirements.
- The majority of missiles provided would have to be withdrawn from active fleet units.

Summary (SHRIKES)

- Alternative 2 would further increase already serious shortages in U.S. anti-radiation missile inventory and further degrade U.S. capability against enemy radars.
- Mix of SHRIKE models sought by Israel would especially degrade U.S. in its currently more advanced versions, the AGM 45-6 and AGM 45-7 (latter going out of production).
- Follow-on models (AGM 45-9 and 10) are scheduled to begin entering U.S. inventory in 1974/75 but in limited quantities, especially in relation to U.S. needs..
- Alternative 1 is the lesser of two evils and represents a compromise which would ease the pressure somewhat on our more advanced versions currently in inventory.

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105mm APER M494E3

Alternative 1* - Totally deplete US Army Depot Stock by withdrawing 3,000 rounds.

Impact: Implementation of this alternative would have a significant impact on US Army readiness. US Army inventory contains 13,000 rounds of which 3,000 rounds are in Depot Stock and 10,000 rounds are in the hands of Active Army units. There are no scheduled receipts from production for the US Army.

NOTE: To date, 75,000 rounds of 105mm APER have been approved for release to GOI, of this quantity, 2,000 rounds have been delivered from US Army assets and 73,000 are programmed to be provided from new procurement. Current delivery schedule will provide 3,000 rounds in July 75 with balance at 10,000 rounds per month from August 75 thru February 76. If a decision is made to withdraw 3,000 rounds from US Army Depot Stock, this quantity should be recouped on a payback basis from the scheduled Israel production.

Alternative 2 - Provide 13,000 rounds from Active Army units (10,000 rounds) and Depot Stocks (3,000 rounds).

Impact: Implementation of this alternative would have a severe impact on US Army readiness as it would totally deplete US Army on-hand assets. Withdrawal of rounds issued to Active Army units is not considered feasible/cost effective due to problems associated with collection from widely dispersed units, condition classification, reestablishment of Ammunition lot numbers to meet safety standards, and renovation as required.

*Alternative 1 - Withdraw 1,000 rounds for Israel.

Impact: This would lessen impact of Alternative 1 by preserving 2/3 of the Army Depot Stocks.

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