

NSS, OSD, USAF, JCS,  
State Dept. reviews  
completed

*Att'd [unclear]  
approved [unclear]  
sent per [unclear] RTK 8/3/72  
telegram with [unclear]*

**ACTION**  
**5813-X- Revised**

August 2, 1972

*Hackman  
notified  
8/3/72*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT:

US Military Personnel Support for Iran

In the back channel message at Tab B, Ambassador Farland directed your attention to an embassy telegram which I have attached under Farland's incoming message and asked for your guidance. The subject is the "blue-suiters" -- the US military technical personnel -- which the President promised to the Shah. We are now getting into the specifics of exactly how this is to be worked out, and it is in that context that Farland sent his message.

Since that message, Farland has sent another regular telegram [Tab C] which removes the issue he raised. However, I want you to be aware of the issue and believe you will want to respond to Farland in any case.

Just to put Farland's initial cable into context and to tell you where we stand on this whole subject, there will be two general questions to be addressed as we work out the kind of mission we send:

--A lot of work will have to be done at the military level in cooperation with the Iranians to identify the jobs that need to be done, and that in turn will affect the numbers of US technicians required. This will take about two months in Iran and here. At that point, there may be some question about the magnitude of our operation. The number could reach 2500-3000 and with dependents that could raise the American military presence toward 10,000. But we cannot intelligently discuss the total number until the jobs to be done are identified, and that is what the Pentagon and the Iranians are working on now.

--The immediate issue is to get clear exactly what kinds of jobs the US is committed to doing, and it is on this point that Farland sent his first cable. For the most part, that is a job for the military to figure out, but there is one policy issue that should be addressed now.

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- 2 -

The issue is that the Iranian air force presented to our MAAG chief projections which include US personnel to occupy operational positions in Iranian units. As we have previously talked about and applied the "blue-suiter" approach, we have not envisioned operational personnel such as air crews to fly the F-4s; our picture has been that we would supply people to work alongside Iranians in their units to train them in the use of equipment and in US operational concepts. In military terms, we have operated and envisioned a very sophisticated on-the-job training program. Now the Iranians have added this new element.

To make this more concrete, our MAAG so far has had requests for: (1) 50 USAF pilots to fly F-4s; (2) 6 boom operators for air refuelers (KC-707); (3) 24 USAF crewmen for P3E aircraft to fly maritime patrol; (4) 12 pilots and flight engineers for air refuelers. The last two requests could be met by civilian contract personnel as well as by USAF men. Other requests could surface from the army and navy.

The issue, therefore, is whether as a general practice we will draw a line short of manning combat elements of Iranian units with USAF personnel.

Ambassador Farland in his first embassy telegram proposed that this line be drawn. He used it tentatively when faced with the initial Iranian proposal. He proposed telling the Iranians that our concept is to expand the well defined technical training teams which have operated in Iran so far but to draw a distinction between those and the assignment of US personnel for on-line operational responsibilities. Farland would make it clear that we are prepared to help in every way possible but recommended telling the Iranians now that an operational role "is not possible and was not contemplated in previous discussions." This could be discussed fully with the Shah, so it would not appear that we were backing out on a promise. Presumably the Shah himself has an interest in not looking as if his forces are being run by the US.

As I understand it, US forces do have arrangements with some of the countries of the British Commonwealth for exchanging operational officers. The logic is that if we were some day to conduct joint operations, as we have in the past, it would be useful for each side to understand the operating procedures of the other. We could do this on a small scale with Iranians, too, if it seemed mutually beneficial. However, that exchange relationship is a somewhat different concept from sending active-duty US military personnel to operate some combat elements of the Iranian forces.

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**SECRET**

- 3 -

US operational personnel could be provided if necessary, but since that so far is a relatively small portion of the overall job, it is worth considering some of the problems that would arise. The main one at home is the issue of our intimate military involvement in ways that would give other governments some control over further US involvement. The Congressional implications are obvious. Then the question of doing this for others like the Saudis or Pakistanis might arise. Also, if the Shah were to use his military forces against someone in the Gulf with Saudi opposition, for instance, we would face the problem of whether to allow our personnel to participate in such an operation.

The most important consideration, which stands in a class by itself, is that the US has made a major issue with the USSR for its operational role in Egypt. Our doing the same in Iran--especially in the wake of Sadat's decision--would have implications that you can assess better than I. Simply moving 2500-3000 advisers into Iran may have some implications, but I assume they are manageable.

The basic point, it seems to me, is that we can do most of what the Shah wants without getting into these problems. A substantial enlargement of our technical assistance field teams can make a major contribution to speeding up the training and effectiveness of the Iranian forces, while our doing the job for the Iranians is not all that helpful in the long run. In the few cases where operational people are required for a time, civilian contractors could do the job and we might even let a few USAF technicians slip in as an exception. But as a general rule to start, it might be wise to stop short of operational personnel in combat units.

My assumption is that this issue really was not addressed by the President at all in Tehran, and in any case the Shah himself has now told his people that he does not want Americans in an operational role. After Farland's initial cable, he was informed by Court Minister Alam that Iran did not envisage an operational role for US technicians and that these proposals were the result of overzealousness at lower levels. This essentially removes the issue, but I proposed that you still give Farland an answer to his question.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That you approve the message at Tab A to be sent back-channel to Ambassador Farland and that I use this as guidance in formulating Farland's formal instructions.

Approved HK Other \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

SECRET/EYES ONLY

August 31, 1972



*Approved  
+ sent  
RSC  
8/31/72  
Washington  
replied*

25X1

**TO: AMEMBASSY TEHRAN**  
**FOR: AMBASSADOR FARLAND/EYES ONLY**  
**FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE/HENRY A. KISSINGER**

I have read Tehran's 4467, and Hal Saunders has involved himself in formulating the formal response to it. I apologize for the delay in my own response. As you note I have been traveling again. Now I have read Tehran 4639 which seems to resolve the issue, but I want you to have the response in any case.

For your personal guidance only, this is one of those cases where the commitment made was a broad one without specific reference to the kinds of details which we must now address. My own feeling is that the distinction you described in your initial telegram--that we should do all we possibly can to provide technical assistance and training short of actually having US personnel occupy operational positions in the Iranian forces--is a sensible one as a general practice. However, it was very important that this not be handled in such a way as to dissipate the advantage gained from the President's very forthcoming response. Your talk with Alam seems to indicate that we are over that hurdle.

If you need to discuss the subject confidentially any further, you might consider noting the following points:

SECRET/EYES ONLY

SECRET/EYES ONLY

- 2 -

--The Pentagon and MAAG have been instructed to work with the Iranian forces to identify the tasks where US personnel can be useful. You understand this will take a couple of months in Iran and in Washington. We want to be sure we are organizing ourselves to do this properly and do not want to go at it piecemeal and find later that we have to go back and start over. You are sure that consultations will go smoothly. We will assure that they go as quickly as possible.

--We continue to envision our role as working alongside Iranians with a training rather than an operational mission. We would like to maintain that distinction for two important reasons: (1) Operational involvement would raise domestic opposition over military involvement which we could otherwise avoid. (2) Having attacked the Soviets persistently for their operational role in Egypt, we would prefer not to assume that role now ourselves, and we want to avoid anything that would make it appear as if Iran were somehow dependent on US forces. Since training is the main mission, we feel almost all of what the Shah wants done can be done this way and we do not feel making this distinction as a general practice will significantly limit the effectiveness of the new program. If there were a few cases where minor exceptions seemed logical for a period, we could certainly be flexible.

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SECRET/EYES ONLY

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You may not need to use this, but I did want to confirm that  
we are in accord with the distinction you have made.

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HHSaunders:tmt 8/2/72

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PRIORITY

DE [redacted] #1200 2080820

P 260816Z JUL 72

FM TEHRAN

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

T O P S E C R E T 260741Z JUL 72 [redacted]

FM AMBASSADOR FARLAND TEHRAN 042


TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER

BELIEVE IT MUST IMPORTANT YOU DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO TEHRANIS 4467 WHICH DEALS WITH SUBJECT: US MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN ARMED FORCES. ON BASIS INFO PREVIOUSLY SUPPLIED ME, AM UNCLEAR REGARDING PRECISE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT. DEPENDING UPON TO PREVENT IT FROM BECOMING FULL-BLOWN. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS. WARM REGARDS,

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*Smunder*  
*Majest Action*

*Per Stops - Tehran cable not yet received there will pass it to us when received.*



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

SECRET 236

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04467 01 OF 02 241324Z

FILE COPY

SI  
ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 RSC-01 PH-06  
NSC-10 SS-14 T-03 OMB-01 USIA-12 RSR-01 E-11 EUR-00  
IGA-02 /100 W

006303

R 241230Z JUL 72  
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
TO SECDEF  
SECSTATE WASHDC 9175  
INFO USCINCEUR

- ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_
- HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_
- HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_
- JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_
- KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_
- LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_
- LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_
- NEGROVONTE \_\_\_\_\_
- GREEN \_\_\_\_\_
- RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_
- RODICH \_\_\_\_\_
- SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_
- SORHNFELDT \_\_\_\_\_
- V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_
- WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 4467

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COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

DEPT PLS PASS WHITE HOUSE

SUBJ: US MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN  
ARMED FORCES

REF: A) CHARMISH/MAAG DTG 051325Z JUN 72  
B) CHARMISH/MAAG DTG 231330Z JUL 72


SUMMARY: IIAF HAS REQUESTED SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF  
USAF PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN MEETING FIVE YEAR FORCE  
GOALS. SIMILAR REQUEST FROM IIGF AND SMALLER REQUEST  
FROM IJN ALSO EXPECTED. REQUESTS BASED ON UNDERSTANDING  
OF SHAH (REF A) THAT PRESIDENT, IN MAY TALKS, AGREED  
PROVIDE ANY NUMBER OF TECHNICAL PERSONNEL NECESSARY  
TO ASSIST IN IRANIAN MILITARY ADVANCEMENT.

ACTION REQUESTED: CLARIFICATION AND GUIDANCE TO  
PASS ON TO GOI RE US POSITION ON PROVISION OF MILITARY  
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS US  
RESPONSE BE AS FORTHCOMING AND FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE  
IN KEEPING WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCES

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28





Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04467 01 OF 02 241324Z

TO SHAH, AND AS ADEQUATE TECHNICAL SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF US ADVISORY EFFORT AND EXPANDED EQUIPMENT SALES PROGRAM. WE PROPOSE TO STRESS WITH GOI THAT TAFT TEAM ASSISTANCE TAILORED TO SPECIFIC NEEDS WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE FORMAT FOR US ASSISTANCE AND THAT ASSIGNMENT OF US PERSONNEL FOR ON-LINE OPERATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES WITH IIA NOT POSSIBLE NOR PREVIOUSLY CONTEMPLATED. WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO ASSURE IIA, HOWEVER, THAT WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MEET SPECIFIC TAFT TYPE "BLUE SUITER" REQUESTS WHERE US PERSONNEL ARE AVAILABLE. BLUE SUITER COSTS, OF COURSE, WILL BE BORNE BY GOI. END SUMMARY.

1. ARMISH/MAAG AIR FORCE SECTION HAS RECEIVED LETTER FROM IRANIAN AIR FORCE (IIAF) REQUESTING SUBSTANTIAL US MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT TO ASSIST IIAF IN MEETING FIVE-YEAR FORCE GOALS. LETTER, DATED JULY 15, REQUESTS:

A. TECHNICIANS AT LEVELS 5, 7 AND 9 IN FOLLOWING NUMBERS TO SUPPORT F-4, F-5, C-130, SUPPLY, HAWK MISSILE, P-3C AND AIR TANKER PROGRAMS.

YEAR	1351#	1352	1353	1354	1355	1356
NO OF PERS'L	837	915	713	787	521	253

#IRANIAN YEAR 1351 IS FROM 3/72 TO 3/73, ETC.

REQUEST GIVES BREAKDOWN BY PROGRAM BUT NOT BY SPECIALITY OR SKILL LEVEL.

B. 50 EXPERIENCED USAF PILOTS FOR F-4 AIRCRAFT FOR YEAR 1353.

C. TOTAL OF 300 UPT SPACES FOR 1352 AND EACH SUCCEEDING YEAR IN FIVE YEAR PERIOD. LETTER RECOGNIZES IIAF WILL NOT BE ABLE FILL ALL THESE SLOTS IN YEARS 1352 AND 1353. WHILE COSTS ARE NOT MENTIONED, GOI UNDERSTANDS IT WILL PAY ALL EXPENSES ENTAILED.

2. CHIEF AF SECTION HAS ADVISED IIAF ORALLY THAT:

A. US TECHNICAL SUPPORT CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO FILL VACANCIES

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEHRAN 04467 01 OF 02 241324Z

IN IIAF, BUT ONLY TO MEET GOAL OF AIDING GOI TO DEVELOP INDEPENDENT CAPABILITY PRIMARILY THROUGH MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING AND PROVISION OF SMALL NUMBERS OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS FOR SPECIFIC PROGRAMS.

B. THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD THAT USG CAN SUPPLY F-4 CREWS FOR ACTIVE ROLE WITH IIAF AS THIS CONTRARY TO ALL PREVIOUS US POLICIES.

C. IIAF MUST COMPLETE SPECIFIC VALIDATION OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS BY BASE, WEAPONS SYSTEM AND SPECIALITY, AFSC AND SKILL LEVEL IN ORDER TO DEVELOP CLEAR PICTURE OF OVERALL NEEDS AS NEW SYSTEMS COME ON BOARD, INDIGENOUS TRAINING CAPABILITY AND SPECIFIC SHORTFALLS. ONCE VALIDATION COMPLETED (AND THIS EXPECTED WITHIN ABOUT 90 MONTHS) USG CAN BETTER ADDRESS WAYS WE CAN ASSIST THROUGH US BLUE SUITERS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

SECRET  
28



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

SECRET 933

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04467 02 OF 02 241344Z

43

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 RSC-01 PM-06

NSC-10 SS-14 T-03 OMB-01 USIA-12 EUR-20 IGA-02 RSM-01

E-11 /100 W

006416

R 241230Z JUL 72  
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
TO SECDEF  
SECSTATE WASHDC 9176  
INFO USCINCEUR

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 4467

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
COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

DEPT PLS PASS WHITE HOUSE

SUBJ: US MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN  
ARMED FORCES

3. IIAF LETTER FORCEFULLY ILLUSTRATES WHAT IS UNDER-  
STANDING AT IRANIAN SERVICE LEVEL OF USG POSITION  
ON TECHNICAL SUPPORT. AS REPORTED REF A HIM APPEARS  
TO HAVE UNDERSTOOD PRESIDENT DURING MAY MEETINGS IN IRAN  
TO HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO PROVIDE "ANY NUMBER" OF US  
MILITARY TECHNICIANS NECESSARY TO PERMIT IRAN TO ADVANCE  
ITS ARMED FORCES AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. CHIEF SCS  
AND SERVICE COMMANDERS HAVE TAKEN THIS COMMITMENT  
LITERALLY. THEY ARE COUNTING ON US TO PLUG ALL IMPORTANT  
GAPS IN TECHNICAL SUPPORT DURING FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND TO  
HELP THEM MEET GOALS WITHOUT HEAVY RESORT TO UNWANTED  
ALTERNATIVE OF CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL WITH WHOM THEIR  
EXPERIENCE IN TERMS OF PERFORMANCE, SECURITY, COST AND  
RESPONSIVENESS TO COMMAND, HAS LEFT THEM WARY. WE ANTICIPATE  
THAT IIGF IS LIKELY TO COME UP WITH REQUESTS OF SIMILAR  
MAGNITUDE AS THOSE OF IIAF TO MEET FIVE-YEAR FORCE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04467 02 OF 02 241344Z

GOALS (SEE REF B WHICH IS FIRST SUCH REQUEST RECEIVED) AND IIN WITH LIKE BUT RELATIVELY SMALL REQUESTS.

5. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE CLARIFY US POSITION WITH GOI ASAP IN ORDER TO DAMPEN GROWING EXPECTATIONS RE EXTENT AND NATURE OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED. AT SAME TIME WE BELIEVE EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE SO AS NOT TO APPEAR TO BE UNDERCUTTING UNDERSTANDING SHAH FEELS HE REACHED WITH PRESIDENT AND BECAUSE IMPACT AND RETURNS TO USG OF US ADVISORY EFFORT DEPEND DIRECTLY ON OUR ABILITY TO MEET IRANIAN NEEDS AND ADEQUATELY SUPPORT USG EQUIPMENT SALES. WE CANNOT EXPECT TO MAINTAIN OUR PRIMARY ADVISORY ROLE AND BENEFITS USG DERIVES FROM IT AT TIME OF MAJOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND INCREASING THIRD COUNTRY INROADS (E.G. EXPECTED ARRIVAL OF MORE THAN 100 UK TECHNICIANS TO SUPPORT CHIEFTAN TANK SALE), UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO HAVE US TECHNICAL SUPPORT KEEP PACE WITH US-ASSISTED MILITARY DEVELOPMENT.

6. COUNTRY TEAM WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING WHATEVER GUIDANCE USG COULD PROVIDE FOR US TO PASS TO GOI RE SCOPE AND NATURE OF OUR FUTURE "BLUE SUITER" SUPPORT FOR IIA. WE PROPOSE TO STRESS TO GOI THAT MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS BY WHICH WE CAN HELP IIA IS THROUGH PROVISION OF WELL-DEFINED TAFT TEAMS WITH SPECIFIC MISSIONS FOR FIXED PERIODS OF TIME AND THAT ASSIGNMENT OF US PERSONNEL FOR ON-LINE OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITH IIA IS NOT POSSIBLE AND WAS NOT CONTEMPLATED IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS. WE WILL ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST SERVICES IN IDENTIFYING THEIR SPECIFIC PERSONNEL NEEDS AND IN DEVELOPING PROGRAMS TO MEET THEM WHICH WILL MINIMIZE DEMANDS FOR USPERSONNEL ASSISTANCE. AS IIAF REQUEST DEMONSTRATES, HOWEVER, USG MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SHAH AND IRANIAN SERVICES ARE COUNTING ON USG FOR SUBSTANTIAL PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE TO HELP WITH WHAT IS MOST CRITICAL NEED IF IIA FORCE GOALS ARE TO BE MET. WE TRUST USG WILL FIND WAY TO MAKE MANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION NEEDED, EXPECTED, AND UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN PROMISED BY PRESIDENT. SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD LIKE AUTHORITY TO INFORM GOI THAT WE WILL VIEW TAFT TYPE REQUESTS MOST SYMPATHETICALLY AND WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT WITHIN

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28



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 TEHRAN 04467 02 OF 02 241344Z

LIMITS OF AVAILABLE PERSONNEL TO RESPOND FAVORABLY.  
COSTS FOR THESE PROGRAMS WOULD, OF COURSE, BE BORNE BY  
GOI.  
FARLAND

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28



Department of State  
FILE COPY

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 574

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 04639 011355Z

42  
ACTION NEA-12

INFO	OCT-01	NSCE-00	CIAE-00	INR-06	NSAE-00	RSC-01	PM-06	ROSEN
	NSC-10	SS-14	T-03	OMB-01	L-03	IGA-02	E-11	AID-20
		GAC-01	EUR-20	RSR-01	/112 W			

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
 HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
 HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
 JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
 KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
 LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
 LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
 ROSEN \_\_\_\_\_  
 SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
 SONNENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
 V.I.G. \_\_\_\_\_  
 WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

R 011302Z AUG 72  
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9270  
INFO USCINCEUR  
DOD

063853

C I O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 4639

DEPT PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

SUBJ: U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN ARMED FORCES --

IRANIANS ENVISAGE ADVISORY FUNCTIONS ONLY FOR AMERICANS

REF: (A) TEHRAN 4429; (B) TEHRAN 4467

1. COURT MINISTER ASSADOLLAH ALAM REQUESTED ME TO CALL JULY 31 TO CLARIFY FUNCTIONS OF US MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN IRANIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENT EFFORT. (OTHER MATTERS DISCUSSED ARE REPORTED SEPTELS.) ALAM HAD DISCUSSED WITH SHAH OUR CONCERNS THAT SOME LOWER ECHELON IRANIAN MILITARY SEEMED TO BE EXPECTING AMERICAN PERSONNEL TO FILL OPERATIONAL POSITIONS. SPEAKING FOR THE SHAH, ALAM WISHED TO REASSURE ME AND THE USG THAT IRAN DID NOT ENVISAGE AN OPERATIONAL ROLE FOR AMERICAN TECHNICIANS.

2. ALAM CONCEDED THAT SOME LOWER RANKING OFFICERS HAD PERHAPS HOPED THAT AMERICAN TECHNICIANS WOULD FILL OPERATIONAL POSITIONS. HE ATTRIBUTED THESE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS TO OVER ZEALOUSNESS ON PART OF SOME OF HIS PEOPLE. HE RECOGNIZED THAT PUTTING AMERICANS IN OPERATIONAL ROLE WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE FOR IRAN'S POINT OF VIEW AND COULD CAUSE ADVERSE REACTION IN U.S. ALAM SAID SHAH WOULD MAKE SURE THAT PEOPLE DOWN THE LINE IN IRANIAN MILITARY PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD.

CONFIDENTIAL





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PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04639 011355Z

COMMENT: I RAISED OUR CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD WITH PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA ON JULY 22 (REFTEL B). I ALSO TOOK OCCASION DURING MY RECENT TOUR OF EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN IRAN IN COMPANY OF COURT MINISTER TO STRESS AGAIN THAT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT OUR MILITARY ADVISORS TO DO MORE THAN TEACH IRANIANS TO DO A JOB THEMSELVES. I BELIEVE THAT ALAM'S ASSURANCES, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE SHAH, WILL HELP REMOVE ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON THIS SUBJECT.  
FARLAND

CONFIDENTIAL