

880

PRIORITY
DE RUEORR #0087 2661603
P 231509Z SEP 75 ZFFA

S E C R E T NQFORN/SANDY CIRCUIT/PRIORITY/WHP087

Egym

TO: GENERAL SCONCROFT
FROM: BG SVENSEN

(SNFD) - I HAD ONE HOUR DISCUSSION WITH MGEN NASSAR, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. I CONCLUDED A POINT ABOUT THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI AGREEMENT CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF STABILITY (REAL OR IMAGINED) WHICH HOPEFULLY WOULD ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT IN EGYPT AND PRODUCE SOME MEASURE OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS. GEN NASSAR THEN SAID THE THIS WAS THE BIGGEST DECISION THEY (GOE) HAD TO MAKE (GUNS OR BUTTER) AND IT WAS DIFFICULT. DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE EGYPTIAN ARMY WAS NOW SAYING IT IS PLAIN FOR ALL THE WORLD TO SEE THE U.S. HAS TRADED THE AGREEMENT FOR A MASSIVE REARMING OF OUR ENEMY. HIS PROPOSITION IS NOW EXACERBATED BY ANNOUNCEMENTS OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SUCH AS F-16 AND POSSIBLY PERSHING. THE ARMY SAYS THEY ARE BEING DISARMED (AND INDEED THEY ARE, AS CURTAILMENT OF SOVIET SPARE PARTS CONTINUES TO TAKE ITS TOLL) WHILE THE ENEMY IS REARMED WITH LATEST SOPHISTICATED. "WHO WILL ARM US? NOT THE SOVIETS WHO THEN?" IT IS A VERY DIFFICULT QUESTION TO ANSWER. IT BEARS DIRECTLY ON WHAT WE WILL DECIDE TO DO WITH THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

(FNFD) THIS IS THE FIRST INDICATION WE HAVE HAD FROM A SENIOR EGYPTIAN MILITARY OFFICER OF SIGNIFICANT DISENCHANTMENT WITHIN THE MILITARY. IT IS INTERESTING THAT GEN NASSAR REFERRED TO NEXT TWO YEARS AS THE TIME FRAME FOR ACTION. THE RECENT WORLD-WIDE PRESS COVERAGE GIVEN TO U.S. REARMING OF ISRAEL, ESPECIALLY WITH HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY, OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED HIM AND LED HIM TO COMMENT ON THE AMBIGUOUS NATURE OF U.S. INTENTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT SADAT, IT HAS, IN NASSAR'S VIEW, DAMAGED EFFORTS TO GAIN BROAD APPROVAL FOR EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI AGREEMENT NOT ONLY WITH THE REJECTIONISTS BUT WITHING EGYPTIAN ARMY. BASED ON THE QUESTION "WHO WILL ARM US?", I SUSPECT PRESIDENT SADAT WILL BRING THE PROBLEM TO PRESIDENT FORD'S DOOR STEP IN THE FORM OF A SHOPPING LIST. THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT MAY BE A MAJOR FACTOR

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

SCONCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

PSN:017166 PAGE 01 TOR:266/17130Z DTG:231509Z SEP 75

***** S E C R E T ***** COPY REFER TO DOS

OSD REVIEWED 08-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

DOS REVIEWED 09-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

***** S E C R E T ***** COPY

IN SADAT'S COURSE OF ACTION OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS,
WARM REGARDS,
BT

PSNIB17166

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR1266/17:30Z

DTG1231509Z SEP 75

S E C R E T

*****S COPY

TELEGRAM

---US MISSION TO UN---

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

O 232019Z SEP 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
BT

TOSEC: 130049
RECD NY: 9/23/75 4:37PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 226616 TOSEC 130049

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, US

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO
FAHMY
(S/S NO. 7518747)

Egypt

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

1. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS A SUGGESTED MESSAGE
OF CONGRATULATIONS TO FAHMY ON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE GENEVA WORKING GROUP. SINCE
ALLOIN IS IN NEW YORK, YOU COULD GIVE HIM SIMILAR CON-
GRATULATIONS ORALLY WHEN YOU SEE HIM TOMORROW MORNING.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE CAIRO

E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR FAHMY

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO FAHMY FROM ME.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

DEAR ISMAIL:

NOW THAT THE FINAL MARATHON SESSIONS OF THE GENEVA
WORKING GROUP HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED, I
WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND MY CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU,
AND THROUGH YOU TO PRESIDENT SADAT, ON A DIFFICULT
JOB WELL DONE. I KNOW THAT EGYPT HAD TO MAKE SOME
TOUGH DECISIONS AS THE WORK IN GENEVA PROCEEDED, AND
THAT THESE WERE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR THE
PRESIDENT AND YOU IN THE EXISTING POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE
IN THE AREA. WE DID OUR BEST TO BE HELPFUL WHEN YOU
ASKED US, BUT THE MAIN WORK WAS YOURS AND THE MAIN
CREDIT GOES TO THE PRESIDENT AND YOU, AS WELL AS TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- TOSEC 130049

GENERAL GAMASY TO WHOM I WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR CONVEYING MY CONGRATULATIONS. I BELIEVE THE OUTCOME BOTH REFLECTED A BUSINESSLIKE AND REALISTIC APPROACH, AND PROTECTED EGYPT'S ESSENTIAL INTERESTS. WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT HERE TO EXPEDITE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO PUTTING AMERICAN CIVILIANS IN THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE STAND READY TO BE OF HELP WHENEVER WE CAN AS THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS GOES FORWARD. I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS PROCESS IS CARRIED OUT WILL BE OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE IN CREATING THE RIGHT KIND OF ATMOSPHERE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATING EFFORTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

HENRY

END TEXT.

3. RECOMMENDATION: THAT YOU APPROVE THE ABOVE MESSAGE.
APPROVE..... DISAPPROVE.....

ROBINSON

BT
#6616

NNNN

TELETYPE UNIT

---US MISSION TO UN---

SECRET

Classification

O 232020Z SEP 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

TOSEC: 130050
RECD NY: 9/23/75 4:40PM

BT
SECRET STATE 226617 TOSEC 130050

EXDIS

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, US

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - RESPONSE TO FAHMY'S QUERY
ABOUT YOUR UNGA SPEECH
(S/S NO. 7518746)
REF: CAIRO 9425

LEGYM

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

1. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS A PROPOSED RESPONSE
TO FAHMY'S INQUIRY, CONVEYED THROUGH AL-BAZ, ABOUT
THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE IN YOUR UNGA SPEECH ABOUT "AN
INFORMAL, MULTILATERAL MEETING."

2. BEGIN MESSAGE

SECRET/EXDIS

IMMEDIATE CAIRO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, US
SUBJECT: FAHMY'S QUERY ABOUT SECRETARY'S SPEECH

REF: CAIRO 9425

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. IN RESPONSE TO FAHMY'S QUERY REFTEL, YOU MAY SAY
THAT PURPOSE OF INCLUDING THE PASSAGE HE HAS ASKED
ABOUT IN MY UNGA SPEECH WAS TO MAKE CLEAR OUR WILLINGNESS
TO EXPLORE ANY POSSIBILITY FOR MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD
PEACE. WE FEEL THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT QUESTIONS
OF PROCEDURE NOT GET IN THE WAY OF PROGRESS. THIS IDEA
WAS PUT FORWARD AS ONE OF SEVERAL IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR
STANDING READY TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY PROMISING INITIATIVE
TOWARD PEACE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED.
I ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO MAKE A SERIOUS
EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL,
AND THAT WE INTEND TO CONSULT OVER THE COMING WEEKS WITH
ALL CONCERNED REGARDING THE REOPENING OF THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE. THE IDEA OF AN INFORMAL, MULTILATERAL

SECRET

SECRET

-2- T0SEC: 130050

MEETING WAS NOT INTENDED AS A FORMAL PROPOSAL, BUT AS A CONCEPT THAT COULD BE EXPLORED IN ON-GOING CONSULTATIONS. SUCH AN INFORMAL MEETING, IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT ON IT, COULD TAKE STOCK OF THE SITUATION, EXPLORE WHAT DIPLOMATIC AVENUES -- WHETHER BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL -- MIGHT PROVE MOST FEASIBLE, AND COULD ALSO DISCUSS PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT ARISE IN A MORE FORMAL BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL SETTING. IT MIGHT, IN OTHER WORDS, PROVIDE ONE WAY OF PREPARING THE GROUNDWORK FOR MORE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS SIMPLY AN IDEA, AND WE HAVE NO FIRM AND FIXED VIEWS ABOUT HOW IT MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE ANY REACTIONS FAHMY MAY CARE TO CONVEY TO ME.

END MESSAGE.

3. RECOMMENDATION: THAT YOU APPROVE THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION TO CAIRO.

APPROVE..... DISAPPROVE.....

ROBINSON

BT

#6617

.....

④



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

NOD429

PAGE 01 CAIRO 09497 241345Z

41
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISD-00 /001 W

099491

O 241252Z SEP 75
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6683

S E C R E T CAIRO 9497

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG US IS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM FAHMY

1. DURING MY MEETING WITH FAHMY EARLY THIS AFTERNOON, HE RECALLED THE TWO DOCUMENTS GIVEN US DURING THE ALEXANDRIA SHUTTLE RE NOT PERMITTING THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN OCCUPIED AREAS. HE THEN HANDED ME THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO YOU DATED TODAY, SEPT 24, ON THE SAME SUBJECT:
TEXT FOLLOWS:

2. QUOTE: DEAR HENRY:

I TRUST YOU RECALL THAT WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED ALL ALONG WITH THE QUESTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES WHICH ISRAEL IS ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. AS YOU VERY WELL KNOW, THIS POINT IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND EXPLOSIVE ON MANY COUNTS. FIRST, IT SHEDS SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO FUTURE ISRAELI INTENTIONS. IT IS AN OPEN PROVOCATION AND A CONSTANT IRRITATION TO THE ARAB MASSES, BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, FOR IT SYMBOLIZES THE MANNER IN WHICH ISRAELI CONCEIVES OF DEALING WITH ARAB INHABITANTS. IT FANS ARAB FEARS OF ISRAELI EXPANSION AND COLONIZATION AND IS A PERPETUAL REMINDER OF THE WORST ASPECT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

NODS-00



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 09497 241345Z

MOREOVER, IT IS AN UNVEILED DEFIANCE OF SEVERAL RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONDITIONS IN OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, AS WELL AS A CLEAR-CUT VIOLATION BY ISRAEL OF ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE RESULTING DAMAGE BECOMES COMPOUNDED WHEN SUCH BRAZEN ACTS ARE PERPETRATED A FEW DAYS AFTER REACHING THE RECENT AGREEMENT WITH ALL THE COMMOTION IT CREATED THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. IT WOULD BE CONSTRUED EITHER AS A BY-PRODUCT OF THE LATEST DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH ISRAELI OR AS AN ACQUIESCENCE BY EGYPT TO UNLAWFUL ISRAELI BEHAVIOR. AT ANY RATE, IT IS MOST INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT.

YOU RECALL THAT I RAISED THIS QUESTION WITH YOU MORE THAN ONCE IN THE COURSE OF OUR TALKS IN ASWAN AND ALEXANDRIA. WE WANTED AN ISRAELI UNDERTAKING NOT TO INTRODUCE ANY DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. I HANDED MR. SISCO A DRAFT OF A LETTER OF ASSURANCE TO BE ISSUED TO US BY THE U.S. THAT ISRAEL WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY SUCH CHANGES.

YESTERDAY, THE MEDIA CARRIED A NEWS ITEM TO THE EFFECT THAT BEGINNING NEXT WEEK, NEW JEWISH SETTLERS WILL BE BROUGHT TO A NEWLY-ESTABLISHED SETTLEMENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE CITY OF RAFAH, AN IMPORTANT URBAN CENTER IN SINAI. NEWS STORIES HAD IT THAT WITHIN TEN DAYS, THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY JEWISH FAMILIES WILL MOVE TO THEIR NEWLY-DESIGNATED LIVING QUARTERS. THESE NEW SETTLERS WERE DESCRIBED AS NEW IMMIGRANTS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY ISRAELI OFFICIALS GIVE THE DISTINCTIVE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS THEIR INTENTION TO EXPAND THIS SETTLEMENT AND MAKE IT A HUGE CIVIC CENTER.

YOU MIGHT AGREE WITH ME THAT IT IS MOST UNTIMELY AND UNFORTUNATE TO ADD FUEL TO THE FIRE BY TAKING SUCH ACTIONS AT THIS POINT IN PARTICULAR. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A FIRM AMERICAN STAND THAT IS ADEQUATE TO DETER THE ISRAELIS AND DISSUADE THEM FROM GOING

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NON-SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 09497 241345Z

AHEAD WITH THIS PLAN, OF COURSE WE ARE THINKING
OF TAKING MEASURES CBMMENSURATE WITH THIS CHALLENGE, BUT
IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF YOU EXERT YOUR INFLUENCE ON
ISRAEL TO ABANDON THIS DANGEROUS COURSE, THAT WOULD
CERTAINLY JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROGRESS,
WITH WARM REGARDS, ISMAIL
UNQUOTE
EILTS

SECRET

NON-SECRET

(1) LDX



EYES ONLY - DIRECT

Department of State

24 SEP 75 14

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TELEGRAM
ACTION

SECRET

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 09504 241439Z

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ACTION NODS-00

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INFO OCT-01 190-00 /001 W

100346

O 241417Z SEP 75
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6089

S E C R E T CAIRO 9504

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR UNGA XF
SUBJECT: FAHMY ON PROPOSAL FOR INFORMAL MULTILATERAL MEETING

REF: CAIRO 9425

1. DURING MY MEETING WITH FAHMY TODAY, I DREW UPON PARA 4 SECTO 13007 TO ANSWER HIS QUERY REPORTED REFTEL. FAHMY WAS NOT SATISFIED.

2. HE ADVERTED TO THE SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS YOU AND HE HAD DURING THE ALEXANDRIA SHUTTLE ABOUT A LATE OCTOBER DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH THE SYRIANS AND RECONVENING GENEVA IN LATE NOVEMBER. THESE, HE NOTED, HAD BEEN THE BASIS FOR VARIOUS PUBLIC COMMENTS HE HAS RECENTLY MADE ABOUT THESE SUBJECT. THE NEW IDEA, AS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED TO THE UNGA, MOST OF WHOSE MEMBERS HE CLAIMED ARE NOT CONCERNED OR INTERESTED, HAD COME OUT OF "THE CLEAR BLUE SKY". IT HAD COME AS A SURPRISE, AND GOE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS PUT TO IT ABOUT THE IDEA.

3. HE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT, HE SAID, THAT WE WOULD HAVE CONSULTED GOE ABOUT THE IDEA, ESPECIALLY IF IT IN ANY WAY INVOLVES EGYPT. EVEN IF NOT, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR GOE TO KNOW WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND TO PERMIT IT MORE EFFECTIVELY TO COUNTER SYRIAN, PALESTINIAN AND SOVIET ATTACKS. HE ASSUMED WE MUST HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH SOMEONE ABOUT IT BEFORE SUCH A CONCEPT WAS ADVANCED.

SECRET

EYES ONLY - DIRECT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODS-00

EYES ONLY - DIRECT



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 09504 241439Z

IS IT TO BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR GENEVA? I REMINDED HIM THAT THE IDEA IS SIMPLY ONE OF THREE OPTIONS AND THAT GENEVA WAS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED AS ANOTHER. IS EGYPT TO BE INVOLVED? WHAT ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS? ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS ARE MUCH ON HIS AND SADAT'S MINDS AND ARE PRESUMABLY AFFECTED IN SOME WAY BY OUR IDEA. THE EXPLANATION I HAD PROVIDED HIM, HE ARGUED, WAS TOO VAGUE TO BE OF ANY USE IN HELPING GOE UNDERSTAND WHAT IS REALLY INTENDED. HE ASKED THAT I REQUEST MORE DETAILED ELABORATION FROM YOU.

4. HE THEN INSTRUCTED AL-BAZ TO TAKE NOTES ON OUR EXPLANATION AND SEND IT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THE LATTER'S INFORMATION. HE ALSO DICTATED TO AL-BAZ HIS SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EXPLANATION LEFT MANY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED AND HE HAD ASKED FOR A MORE DETAILED CLARIFICATION.
EILTS

EYES ONLY - DIRECT

SECRET

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TELEGRAM

---US MISSION TO UN---

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

CONTROL: TOSEC-130082
RECD: 9-24-75 12:32PM

DISTR: S/S

EGM

O 241628Z SEP 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 227512 TOSEC 130082
FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 9498 ACTION SECSTATE SEP 24.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 9498
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR FAHMY

REF: STATE 227386 (TOSEC 130070)

I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO FAHMY AT 1300 LOCAL TODAY.
HE READ IT, MADE NO COMMENT, BUT SEEMED PLEASED.

EILTS

UNQUOTE ROBINSON
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

TELEGRAM

---US MISSION TO UN---

SECRET

6

Classification

CONTROL: 130088
RECD NY: 9-24-75 2:48PM

DISTR: S/S

U 241842Z SEP 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
BT
S E C R E T STATE 227683 TOSEC 130088

NODIS
CHEROKEE

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 9500, SENT SECSTATE SEPT 24:

QUOTE S E C R E T CAIRO 9500

NODIS CHEROKEE

Egypt

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG US SY OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: FAHMY REQUEST FOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH ASAD

REF: SECIO 13009

I TOLD FAHMY TODAY THAT WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY REPLIES FROM ASAD TO YOUR MESSAGES. HE WAS INTERESTED BUT OPINED YOU WILL RECEIVE AN ORAL REPLY FROM KHADDAM WHEN LATTER IS IN NEW YORK. HE CONCEDED HE HAD NO DIRECT INFORMATION TO SUPPORT HIS VIEW. HE REMAINS CONVINCED THAT, DESPITE THE SYRIANS' DENOUNCIATION OF THE SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, THEY, TOO, WANT ONE AND WILL LOOK FOR SOME WAY TO SEIZE THE BAIT. EILTS UNQUOTE.

ROBINS

N
BT
#7683

SECRET

Scowcroft, N&C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

BD

SECRET/NODIS

September 25, 1975

MR. SECRETARY:

The attached proposed schedule for the Sadat visit for your consideration was prepared before your latest guidance to me this afternoon. It therefore does not take into account the new visit dates, the question of Camp David versus Williamsburg or the idea of the President's meeting again somewhere with Sadat at the end of the first week. We will crank these points into the proposed program before going to the Egyptians. To save time, however, I would appreciate your reviewing the attached as it stands since there are a number of other questions on which we need your decision.

I am sending up separately for your approval an instruction to Hermann about the revised dates.

[Handwritten signature]

ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.

Attachment:

As stated.

SECRET/NODIS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

7518911 ✓

ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S *[Handwritten initials]*

September 25, 1975

SECRET/NODIS

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Joseph J. Sisco *[Handwritten initials]*FROM: S/CPR - Henry E. Catto, Jr. *[Handwritten initials]*
NEA - Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. *[Handwritten initials]*Sadat Visit: Objectives and Program

The purpose of this memorandum is to define principal objectives we should seek to achieve from the Sadat visit and to suggest for your consideration elements of a program in Washington and elsewhere tailored to these objectives and President Sadat's wishes. The attached first cut of a program draws on discussions between Eilts and Fahmy and others, suggestions from the Egyptians and invitations already received to entertain Sadat and his party.

Objectives

1. Enhance the prospects for peace in the Middle East and for effective implementation of the Sinai agreement.
2. Strengthen U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations.
3. Build on the good start at Salzburg to further strengthen the personal relations between Sadat and President Ford.
4. Enhance Sadat's position in Egypt and his stature with the other Arabs.
5. Give Sadat the opportunity to show his qualities as a moderate statesman to the American people in order to broaden understanding in the Congress, the media, and public of Egyptian policies, problems and perceptions. We hope thereby to garner support for cooperation with Egypt, including aid.
6. In the course of all of the above, demonstrate to others, Arabs in particular, that there are tangible benefits to cooperating with the U.S.

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GDS

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- 2 -

Proposed Program

There is attached a first draft proposed program for the visit of President Sadat. Pending resolution of the question of Sadat's arrival date, this is drawn up simply in terms of "first day", "second day", etc. This proposed program incorporates suggestions received from Ambassador Eilts based on discussions held by him with Foreign Minister Fahmy and Mr. Hassan Kamel of the President's office. A companion schedule for Mrs. Sadat will be prepared when the main outlines of the program of President Sadat have been agreed upon.

Certain aspects of the proposed program, for example the invitation to Sadat from the National Press Club, appear to us to be fully in accord with our objectives. Other aspects, however, raise several issues on which we need decisions from you, after which we will send to Cairo a draft program for discussion by Eilts with Fahmy, who has been pressing Eilts in this regard. These issues as they occur according to the schedule are as follows:

1. You have indicated that you want the Sadat visit to receive special treatment and not be considered a routine state visit. You have also advised that we should not try to limit the size of Sadat's party arbitrarily. Sadat's official and unofficial party may total 100 or more. Larry Eagleburger understands why and agrees that we should pay for all expenses rather than limit our support to the pattern of ordinary state visits. We estimate that the total bill may come to \$176,000. Larry only wants you to be aware that as a result of paying for all expenses, money will be very tight for future visits and he may have to come back to you later in the year requesting cutbacks.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 3 -

Recommendation:

That the U.S. Government will pay all expenses of members of the entire Sadat party while they are visiting the U.S.

Approve AK Disapprove _____

2. It is suggested that President Sadat and his party arrive in the U.S. the afternoon prior to the first day of the state visit to Washington and spend that night resting outside of Washington. The best places that come to mind are either Williamsburg or, if acceptable to President Ford, Camp David. The latter could be chilly at this time of year and does not have extensive accomodations. Williamsburg offers attractive facilities and fine examples of our colonial heritage which the Sadats have not seen. On balance we recommend Williamsburg.

Recommendation:

That Sadat spend his first night in Williamsburg.

Approve _____ Prefer Camp David _____
Other _____ *Leave to Egyptians*
CRB/HK

The questions then arise as to whether as a special gesture you would wish to greet Sadat and his party on arrival and also whether you would accompany them to their first night stop to see them settled in, and then return to Washington. If Sadat stays at Williamsburg, he can fly directly to Patrick Henry Air Base. You would have to make the half hour flight down there to meet him. If Sadat and a portion of his party stay at Camp David, they would change to helicopters at Andrews Air Force Base and you would greet Sadat at Andrews. The question might arise, however, that since Andrews is so near Washington why did President Ford himself not greet Sadat.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 4 -

Recommendation:

A. If you approve Williamsburg

i) That the Chief of Protocol meet Sadat and his party at Patrick Henry Air Base and accompany them to Williamsburg.

Approve ~~JK~~ Disapprove _____

ii) Alternatively, that you welcome the Sadats at Patrick Henry, accompany them to Williamsburg, and then return to Washington.

Approve JK Disapprove _____

B. If you choose Camp David

i) That we seek President Ford's approval for Sadat and a portion of his party to stay at Camp David.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

ii) That the Chief of Protocol meet Sadat and his party at Andrews Air Base and accompany them to Camp David.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

iii) Alternatively, that you greet the Sadats at Andrews, accompany them to Camp David and then return to Washington.

Approve JK Disapprove _____

3. We expect that President Sadat will wish a second meeting with President Ford in Washington.

Recommendation:

That we ask the White House to set aside time on Day 2 for a second meeting with President Ford.

Approve HR Disapprove _____

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 5 -

4. We believe that Vice President Rockefeller will wish to be included in the program.

Recommendation:

That we recommend to the Vice President that he call on Sadat at Blair House on Day 1 at 5 p.m.

Approve HK Disapprove _____

5. We believe you will also wish to call on Sadat for a substantive discussion. This could be done right after the Vice President's call or, alternatively, during the period we have set aside for meetings on the morning of Day 2, possibly at a 9:00 a.m. breakfast, prior to a possible second meeting with the President.

Recommendation:

That you meet with Sadat after Vice President's meeting on Day 1 _____

At 9:00 a.m. breakfast on Day 2 _____

Morning of Day 2 _____

Other time _____

Disapprove _____

*Any comment
Lund*

6. Fahmy has suggested that Sadat be invited to address a joint session of Congress on Day 2. We believe our objectives would be well served by such an event. If there is reluctance in Congress to invite Sadat, however, you may have to contact the leadership personally.

Recommendation:

That we initiate a request for President Sadat to address a joint session of Congress at noon on Day 2.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 6 -

7. We believe Mrs. Kissinger and you will wish to host a luncheon and suggest it be scheduled on Day 2. We believe such a luncheon, including ladies, could be attractively done using the representation rooms on the 8th floor, which Sadat has not seen, or perhaps even more attractively, at another location, such as the Botanical Gardens building at the foot of the Capitol.

Recommendation:

That you give a luncheon in honor of President Sadat on Day 2.

Approve JK Disapprove _____

8th Floor _____

Botanical Gardens JH/MS

Other Locale _____

S/CPR please
coordinate with NEA
and S.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 7 -

g. We believe it important to the success of the visit that President Ford attend the reciprocal dinner given by the Egyptians on Day 2.

Recommendation:

That you recommend to President Ford that he attend the return Egyptian dinner on Day 2.

Approve HK Disapprove _____

9. The U.S.-Egyptian Joint Commission has not met for over a year. As you know, Foreign Minister Fahmy and you are co-chairmen of the Joint Commission. Such a meeting would fit in with the objectives outlined earlier and provide a vehicle for an announcement summing up the work of the various Joint Working Groups, which have held meetings over the past year.

Recommendation:

That at a convenient time during the Sadat visit, a brief Joint Commission meeting be co-chaired by Fahmy and you.

Approve HK Disapprove _____

10. On departure from Washington a small departure ceremony can be held on the White House lawn. We think President Ford and you should see the party off if possible.

Recommendation:

That you recommend to President Ford that he and you attend the departure ceremony for Sadat and his party on Day 3.

Approve HK Disapprove _____

11. Eilts and Fahmy recommend that Sadat address the UNGA on Day 3. Fahmy believes it desirable that Sadat not remain overnight in New York City because of his concerns for Sadat's security. He suggests that Sadat either return to Washington the same day (which we do not recommend) or, if it can be arranged, that

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Sadat and a small number of his party overnight at a nearby location such as the Rockefeller estate in Pocantico Hills. David Rockefeller has offered to give a dinner in Sadat's honor.

Recommendation:

That we ask if the Pocantico Hills estate can be made available to President Sadat for the night of Day 3.

Approve JK Disapprove _____

12. Fahmy recalls that you had suggested that Presidents Ford and Sadat meet in Florida where Sadat will have time for a rest before leaving for the U.K. (We will send you a separate memorandum on the alternative sites available in Florida.)

Recommendation:

That you recommend to President Ford that he meet with Sadat sometime during Sadat's respite in Florida, and that you also plan to be present.

Approve JK Disapprove _____

13. Kamel has reportedly asked whether we will be presenting decorations to President Sadat and his key advisors. Sadat may bring decorations for President Ford and perhaps others, and we think the President should accept on behalf of the American People. We do not give decorations during state visits and the Egyptians know this.

Recommendation:

That we suggest President Ford accept a decoration should President Sadat wish to present one to him.

Approve JK Disapprove _____

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14. It would be fitting to end Sadat's visit to the United States with a Joint Communique. This Joint Communique might best be issued after the final meeting of Presidents Ford and Sadat in Florida.

Recommendation:

That we plan to issue a Joint Communique shortly before President Sadat departs from the United States.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

15. It is planned that the Chief of Protocol and Mrs. Catto, Ambassador and Mrs. Eilts, Assistant Chief of Protocol and Mrs. Codus and other support members of Protocol will accompany the Sadat party during their visit outside Washington. You might also wish Roy Atherton to accompany them or have Director of Egyptian Affairs Matthews do so.

Recommendation:

That you concur in these U.S. officials (Catto, Eilts, Codus and Protocol staff members) accompanying the Sadat party outside Washington.

Approve JK _____ Disapprove _____

Also wish to have Atherton accompany _____
Also wish to have Matthews accompany _____

Attachment:

Draft Program for the Visit of President Sadat

Draft:

NEA/EGY:GRBeyer:seb
9/24/75 x23003

Clearance: This memorandum has been discussed with the NSC staff which concurs in its substance subject to confirming the dates for the visit.

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PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR VISIT OF PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT

Day of Arrival

Afternoon

Arrive Patrick Henry or Andrews Air Force Base. Met by Secretary of State and/or Chief of Protocol.

Arrive Williamsburg or Camp David.

Afternoon and Evening

Private

Day 1

9:20 am

Depart Williamsburg or Camp David via helicopter.

10:25 am

Arrive Washington.

10:30 am

White House arrival ceremony.

11:00 am

Meeting with President.

12:30 am

Lunch at National Press Club.

4:00 pm

Visit Islamic Center.

5:00 pm

Vice President calls at Blair House.

6:00 pm

Possible call by the Secretary.

8:00 pm

White House state dinner.

Day 2

Morning

Possible call by the Secretary.
Possible second meeting with the President.

11:15 am

Visit Kennedy Center. Unveil Egyptian gift.

12:00 Noon

Address joint session of Congress.

1:00 pm

Luncheon hosted by Secretary Kissinger.

4:00 pm

Meet with 20 prominent editors and columnists by invitation.

5:00 pm

Meet Congressional leadership at Capitol.

- 2 -

6:00 pm Hold press conference at Blair House. Sadat announces Tutankhamun exhibition will tour U.S.

Evening Return dinner given by President and Mrs. Sadat.

Day 3

10:00 am Depart Blair House.

10:05 am Departure ceremony on White House lawn.

10:30 am Depart Andrews AFB.

11:30 am Arrive New York City.

12:00 Noon Meet with UN Secretary-General Waldheim at UN.

12:15 pm Address UNGA.

1:15 pm Attend luncheon hosted by Egyptian representative to UNGA or by Waldheim. Sadat and small number of his party arrive at Rockefellers' family estate at Pocantico Hills. (Remainder of party remains in New York City.)

Evening Private or dinner given by David Rockefeller.

Day 4

9:00 am Sadats depart Pocantico Hills.

10:30 am Full Sadat party reunited at airport.

10:45 am Depart for Chicago's O'Hare International Airport.

11:20 am Arrive Chicago. Welcomed by Mayor Daly. Drive to City Center for welcoming ceremonies.

1:00 pm Attend lunch hosted by Daly.

5:00 pm Tape "Face the Nation" or "Meet the Press".

Evening Private

- 3 -

Day 5

10:00 am Depart Chicago.
12:10 pm Arrive San Francisco.
Lunch at St. Francis Hotel - Private.
4:00 pm Drive to University of California
at Berkeley for informal meeting with
faculty and Egyptian students.
Evening Dinner hosted by Commonwealth Club.

Day 6

Morning Private
12:30 pm Lunch - Private
1:30 pm Depart San Francisco.
6:20 pm Arrive Houston. Welcoming ceremonies.
8:30 pm Dinner hosted by mayor of Houston or
Fayez Seraphim, a prominent Egyptian-
American businessman.

Day 7

9:00 am Visit Space Center.
10:00 am Visit Douglas Marshall Arabian horse
ranch.
11:00 am Depart Houston.
1:00 pm Arrive Florida.
Lunch Private
Afternoon Private
Evening Private

Day 8

Morning Private
12:00 Noon President Ford arrives.
1:00 pm Informal luncheon.

- 4 -

Evening

Informal dinner.

Day 9

Morning

Depart for London

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C O N F I D E N T I A L CATRO 9527

EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO US
REF: CAIRO 9437 AND 9389
FAHMY TELLS ME THAT PRESIDENT SADAT PLANS TO OVERNIGHT IN PARIS
ENROUTE TO THE US. IN VIEW OUR SUGGESTED LATE AFTERNOON OCT 27
ARRIVAL DATE IN WASHINGTON AREA, EGYPTIANS ARE NOW THINKING THAT THE
PRESIDENT MIGHT LEAVE FOR PARIS ON OCT 25 OR OCT 26. IT WILL BE UP
TO SADAT TO DECIDE.
EILTS
BT

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT,LL

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TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5601

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 230445

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)

SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT: PROPOSED NEW DATES FOR VISIT
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE GET IN TOUCH WITH FAHMY AND TELL HIM THAT DUE TO A COMBINATION OF MISTAKES HERE, OCTOBER 27-28 WERE ENTERED ON PRESIDENT FORD'S CALENDAR AND HE HAS SET ASIDE THESE DATES FOR PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THIS WOULD MEAN ARRIVAL IN THE US ON THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 26. THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO ATTEND PRESIDENT SADAT'S RETURN DINNER THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 28, WHICH IS UNPRECEDENTED. PRESIDENT FORD MUST BE OUT OF WASHINGTON OCTOBER 29-30, DURING WHICH TIME PRESIDENT SADAT COULD BEGIN HIS TRAVELS ELSEWHERE IN THE US. PRESIDENT FORD WOULD THEN LIKE TO MEET PRESIDENT SADAT OVER THAT WEEK-END AT A CONVENIENT PLACE OUTSIDE OF WASHINGTON FOR FURTHER TALKS. WE WILL ADVISE YOU OF OUR SUGGESTIONS ON WHERE AND WHEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS MIGHT MOST CONVENIENTLY HOLD THESE TALKS.

2. WITH RESPECT TO WHERE PRESIDENT SADAT AND HIS PARTY MIGHT REST THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 26 BEFORE BEGINNING THE WASHINGTON VISIT OCTOBER 27, THERE ARE SEVERAL VERY PLEASANT PLACES OUTSIDE OF WASHINGTON. WE HAVE IN MIND, FOR EXAMPLE, CAMP DAVID OR WILLIAMSBURG, AND WILL BE SENDING YOU INFORMATION ABOUT BOTH FOR PRESIDENT SADAT'S CONSIDERATION. WE WANT TO LEAVE TO HIM THE CHOICE OF WHERE HE WOULD PREFER TO SPEND THAT FIRST NIGHT. KISSINGER

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

HAK, SCONCROFT, LL

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SHOULD DISCUSS IT DIRECTLY WITH THE PRESIDENT OR ACCEPT FAHMY'S JUDGMENT THAT HE CAN AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME GET SADAT TO GO ALONG. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING A TELEPHONE CALL FROM FAHMY LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO COME TO SEE HIM AT 2000 AT HIS HOME, I HAD AN HOUR'S MEETING WITH HIM TO DISCUSS REFERENCE SUBJECT. I SUBSEQUENTLY HAD TO ATTEND LONG AIRPORT MOURNING SERVICES FOR DECEASED INDIAN AMBASSADOR (WHO DIED SUDDENLY EARLY YESTERDAY MORNING), WHICH DID NOT CONCLUDE UNTIL 0430 THIS MORNING WHEN AIR INDIA FINALLY ARRIVED TO PICK UP THE BODY. HENCE, I HAVE HAD TO WAIT UNTIL THIS MORNING TO SEND YOU A REPORT ON MY TALK.

2. MY PRESENTATION FOLLOWED CLOSELY POINTS SUGGESTED REFTEL. I TOLD FAHMY OBEOUR PLEASURE AT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE GENEVA WORKING GROUP TALKS AND OUR RECOGNITION OF THE TOUGH DECISIONS THEY INVOLVED FOR EGYPTIANS, WHO SHOWED GREAT FOREBEARANCE AND BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH. WE BELIEVE OUR OWN INTERVENTIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS WERE HELPFUL IN INDUCING GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR POSITIONS, AND I WAS SURE THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOTED THE CHANGES IN THE ISRAELI APPROACH AS A RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS. FAHMY READILY ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WAS SO.

3. AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED WE DO ON SENSITIVE MATTERS, I WAS NOW COMING TO HIM FOR EGYPTIAN UNDERSTANDING AND HELP ON THE MATTER OF ISRAELI CARGOES. UP TO NOW WE HAVE SUCCEEDED WITH MUCH DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING ISRAELI EFFORTS TO INSIST UPON IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF EGYPT'S INTERTAKING TO ALLOW ISRAELI NON-MILITARY CARGOES TO PASS THROUGH THE CANAL. ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WE HAVE KEPT THE ISRAELIS FROM TRYING TO FREEZE EVERYTHING UNTIL THIS HAD HAPPENDED. ISSUE STILL FESTERS, HOWEVER IN BOTH ISRAEL AND US-ISRAELI RELATIONS. IF NOT EXPEDITIOUSLY RESOLVED, IT COULD BECOME A POLITICAL ISSUE AND JEOPARDIZE ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE. EQUALLY SERIOUS, IT COULD QUICKLY BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE US, WHERE IT COULD BE SEIZED UPON BY CRITICS AND OPPONENTS OF THE RECENT AGREEMENT. IN THAT CASE, BOTH USG AND GOE WOULD BE

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VULNERABLE SINCE THE NON-MILITARY CARGO TRANSIT PROVISION IS NOW AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PUBLISHED AGREEMENT AND ITS OBSERVANCE WILL BE VIEWED AS A TEST OF THE VIABILITY OF THAT AGREEMENT. I RECALLED WE HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD ISRAELIS, ON BASIS OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S ASSURANCES, THAT A SHIP WITH ISRAELI CARGO COULD TRANSIT PRIOR TO THE KNESSET DEBATE ON THE AGREEMENT. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. THE GOOD FAITH OF THE US AND CONFIDENCE IN OUR ROLE IS AT STAKE.

4. I ASSURED FAHMY WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE UNJUSTIFIED CRITICISM TO WHICH PRESIDENT SADAT AND FAHMY ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO ON THE AGREEMENT AND FIND IT PAINFUL TO HAVE TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH OUR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS. I HAD TO TELL HIM, HOWEVER, THAT YOUR BEST JUDGEMENT, AS A FRIEND, IS THAT THIS ISSUE IS SO SERIOUS THAT, UNLESS SOON RESOLVED, IT COULD REVERSE THE PROCESS. WE ARE NOT EXAGGERATING WHEN WE SAY THIS. WE THEREFORE URGE THE PRESIDENT AND FAHMY TO RECONSIDER THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION.

5. TO MINIMIZE EMBARRASSMENT FOR EGYPT, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED WITH GREAT EFFORT IN OBTAINING ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO A PROCEDURE WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES AND OFFERS THE BEST CHANCES OF KEEPING THE ISSUE FROM BLOWING UP. SPECIFICALLY, IF GOE COULD GIVE US BEFORE COMPLETION OF US CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON US PROPOSAL AND ISRAELI SIGNING OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL A FRIM DATE FOR THE PASSAGE OF SUCH AN ISRAELI CARGO -- A DATE, SAY, WITHIN TWO WEEKS AFTER ISRAELI SIGNING -- THIS WOULD HELP. CONGRESS IS NOT LIKELY TO COMPLETE WORK ON US PROPOSAL BEFORE OCT. 2. THUS, A DATE AROUND OCT 15 OR THE DAY FAHMY HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED WOULD BE HELPFUL. THIS

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IT SO IMPORTANT, FAHMY PLEADED, TO MAKE THIS AN ISSUE NOW WHEN SADAT IS UNDER SUCH SEVER ATTACK? CARGO TRANSIT IS NOT VITAL TO THE ISRAELIS AND NEVER HAS BEEN, AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID, GOE WILL HONOR ITS OBLIGATIONS, BUT NEED TIME TO DO SO. MOREOVER, AN ISRAELI CARGO NOW MIGHT EVEN PROMPT A PALESTINIAN SABOTAGE OPERATION AGAINST IT. SADAT'S LAST INSTRUCTIONS WERE IN TWO MONTHS TIME.
HAD WE NOT TALKED TO THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THIS AFTER OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT?

8. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD DONE SO, AS I HAD JUST RELATED, AND HAD WITH SOME DIFFICULTY SUCCEEDED IN DELAYING THINGS. HOWEVER, THE ISSUE HAS COME UP AGAIN AND IS ONE THAT HAS TO BE FACED. IT IS NOT ONLY OF INTEREST IN ISRAELI BUT IN THE US AS WELL. I THEN REHEARSED AGAIN MANY OF THE POINTS WHICH I HAD ALREADY PUT TO HIM. IN THE SPIRIT OF FRANKNESS AND COOPERATION THAT CHARACTERIZES OUR RELATIONS, I SAID WE URGED THE MATTER BE RECONSIDERED. SINCE I WAS AWARE THAT FAHMY HAD PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS, I ALSO SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF I WENT TO THE PRESIDENT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT NOT ONLY FAHMY, BUT THE PRESIDENT AS WELL, APPRECIATE THE URGENCY OF FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM BEFORE IT GETS OUT OF HAND.

9. FAHMY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. HE FIRST SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS AN OCTOBER 25 DATE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. I SAID THIS WAS TOO LATE AND RECALLED HE HAD EARLIER THOUGHT TWO WEEKS BEFORE PRESIDENT DEPARTS FOR THE US. THIS WOULD BE AROUND OCTOBER 15. FAHMY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IN HIS PERTINENT PAPER TO THE PRESIDENT, HE HAD ONLY SUGGESTED A WEEK BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S DEPARTURE FOR US. WITH THIS OBVIOUSLY IN MIND, HE THEN PROPOSED OCTOBER 22. HE WOULD TAKE AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO SPEAK TO SADAT ABOUT IT AND THOUGHT THERE IS REASONABLE CHANCE THE PRESIDENT WILL IN THE LAST ANALYSIS AGREE. HOWEVER, AFTER AN INITIAL ISRAELI CARGO, THEY SHOULD LAY OFF FOR A MONTH OR TWO BEFORE SENDING CARGOES THROUGH REGULARLY. I WAS FREE TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE PRESIDENT IF I WISHED, BUT HE CAUTIONED ANY APPROACH TO SADAT NOW IS LIKELY TO ELICIT

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A NEGATIVE ANSWER. THE PRESIDENT IS UPSET ABOUT REPORTS OF POSSIBLE PERSHING AND F-16 SALES TO ISRAEL. I REMINED HIM NO DECISION REACHED ON THESE ITEMS, BUT FAHMY SAID THE PRESIDENT DEPLORES THE PUBLICITY ABOUT THEM AT THIS DELICATE JUNCTURE.

10. I ASKED IF WE COULD INFORM THE CONGRESS AND THE ISRAELIS ABOUT HIS PROPOSED OCT 22 DATE. FAHMY WAS CONCERNED ON THIS SCORE. THEY WILL LEAK IT AND UP TO NOW THE IDEA IS SOLELY HIS. IF WE WISH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIRMATION, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT THREE OR FOUR DAYS. HE WOULD TAKE IT UP WITH SADAT WHEN HE NEXT HAS A CHANCE TO TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED IN CAIRO ON SEPTEMBER 28 FOR A MAJOR ADDRESS. IF SADAT'S REACTION IS NEGATIVE, HE WOULD TELL US.

11. FAHMY EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT THE ISRAELI PENCHANT TO LEAK THIS INFORMATION. AT ONE POINT HE COMMENTED THAT IF A SHIP CARRYING ISRAELI CARGO APPEARS AT THE CANAL AT ANY TIME, IT WILL BE LET THROUGH WITHOUT QUESTION. I ASKED IF THIS MIGHT BE THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE THE MATTER. HE THOUGHT NOT BECAUSE SADAT WILL REACT THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE DELIBERATELY FLOUTING HIM, BUT STILL INSISTED SUCH A CARGO WOULD GO THROUGH. FAHMY ALSO SAID THAT IF KHAODAM TELLS YOU IN WASHINGTON THAT SYRIA IS READY TO BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAELIS AND THIS CAN BE ANNOUNCED, AN ISRAELI CARGO CAN GO THROUGH THE NEXT DAY.

12. FAHMY CAUTIONED ON ONE MATTER, HOWEVER. IF THERE IS ANY ISRAELI ABOARD THE SHIP OR ANY OTHER SHIP, THAT PERSON WILL BE ARRESTED. GOE HAS NOT SAID IT WILL PERMIT ISRAELI PERSONNEL THROUGH THE CANAL. FAHMY THEN ALLUDED TO THE RECENT ABIE NATHAN INCIDENT. EGYPTIAN NAVY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO PERMIT NATHAN'S SHIP TO ENTER EGYPTIAN WATERS. NATHAN HAD TRIED TO DO SO. EGYPTIAN NAVY HAD EXCEEDED ITS INSTRUCTIONS AND BROUGHT HIM IN. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR POLICE HAD THEREUPON COMPOUNDED THE ERROR BY BRINGING HIM TO CAIRO AS A PRISONER. FROM CAIRO HE WAS SENT TO PARIS BY AIR, WHERE HE WANTED TO GO. THE PASSAGE OF ISRAELI NATIONALS THROUGH THE

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CANAL, FAHMY REITERATED, IS A HIGHLY POLITICAL ISSUE. GOC IS NOT READY TO ALLOW IT. ISRAELIS SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF THIS IF THEY ARE NOT ALREADY SO.

13. COMMENT: IN MY JUDGMENT, GIVEN THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS, FAHMY WAS BEING AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE. WE NOW HAVE THREE CHOICES, A) ACCEPT THE OCT 22 DATE BASED ON FAHMY'S JUDGMENT; B) ASK FAHMY TO CONFIRM THE OCT 22 DATE WITH SADAT, WHICH RUNS THE RISK THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL TURN IT DOWN; OR C) GO BACK TO FAHMY AND URGE AN EARLIER OCT 15 DATE. I COULD GO DIRECTLY TO SADAT, IF YOU WISH, TO MAKE OUR PRESENTATION, BUT RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO DEPEND UPON HOW PROPITIOUS THE MOMENT IS. AFTER OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE MATTER (CAIRO 9197), FAHMY APPARENTLY ONLY SENT A PAPER TO THE PRESIDENT, WHICH THE LATTER ANNOTATED. IF FAHMY WERE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH SADAT, PEGGING IT ON MY DEMARCHE

HE SHOULD HAVE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF BRINGING THE PRESIDENT AROUND TO AN OCT 22 DATE.

14. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR WISHES.
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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI CARGOES THROUGH SUEZ CANAL

1. I WANT YOU TO GO BACK TO FAHMY AGAIN ON THE QUESTION OF FIXING A DATE FOR THE PASSAGE OF A SHIP WITH CARGO FOR ISRAEL THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL. YOUR APPROACH SHOULD BE CAST IN TERMS OF OUR FULL UNDERSTANDING FOR THE PROBLEMS THIS CAUSES THE EGYPTIANS AND SHOULD BE DONE AS HUMANLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT YOU SHOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT THIS IS AN ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL QUESTION THAT MUST BE FACED UP TO AND CANNOT BE PUT OFF ANY LONGER. IF NECESSARY AFTER YOU HAVE HAD A MEETING WITH FAHMY, YOU SHOULD ASK TO SEE SADAT AND MAKE THE SAME APPROACH DIRECTLY TO HIM. YOUR APPROACH SHOULD BE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES,

2. WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE DETAILS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT HAVE NOW BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED IN THE GENEVA WORKING GROUP. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS INVOLVED SOME TOUGH DECISIONS FOR THE EGYPTIANS AND GIVE THEM FULL CREDIT FOR THEIR FOREBEARANCE AND BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH. OUR OWN INTERVENTIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS WERE, WE BELIEVE, INSTRUMENTAL IN BRINGING ABOUT GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR POSITION IN THE WORKING GROUP, AND WE ARE CERTAIN THE EGYPTIANS NOTED THE CHANGES IN THE ISRAELI APPROACH

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THERE FOLLOWING OUR EFFORTS WITH THEM.

3. WE NOW NEED EGYPTIAN UNDERSTANDING AND HELP. UP TO NOW WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONTAINING ISRAELI EFFORTS TO INSIST UPON IMMEDIATE FULLFILLMENT OF EGYPT'S UNDERTAKING TO PERMIT NON-MILITARY ISRAELI CARGOES TO PASS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL. ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WE HAVE KEPT THE ISRAELIS FROM MAKING A DECISION TO FREEZE EVERYTHING ELSE UNTIL THIS HAPPENED. THIS ISSUE CONTINUES TO FESTER, HOWEVER, IN ISRAEL AND IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND IF NOT QUICKLY RESOLVED WILL, WE FEAR, BE BLOWN SO OUT OF PROPORTION AS A POLITICAL ISSUE IN ISRAEL THAT EVERYTHING WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED SO FAR WILL BE PLACED IN JEOPARDY. OF EQUAL SERIOUSNESS, THIS WOULD QUICKLY BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES FROM WHICH OUR CRITICS AND THE OPPONENTS OF THE RECENT AGREEMENT COULD BENEFIT. IF THIS HAPPENED, BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND WE WOULD BE IN AN EXTREMELY VULNERABLE POSITION, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS.

4. THE PASSAGE OF ISRAELI NON-MILITARY CARGOES THROUGH THE CANAL IS NOW A PART OF THE PUBLISHED AGREEMENT. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THE REALITY IS THAT OBSERVANCE OF THIS PROVISION WILL BE VIEWED AS A TEST OF THE VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT. ON THE BASIS OF ASSURANCES WE RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT SADAT, WE TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT A SHIP WITH ISRAELI CARGO COULD TRANSIT THE CANAL PRIOR TO THE KNESSET DEBATE ON THE AGREEMENT. THIS DID NOT AHPPEN, AND WHAT IS AT STAKE NOW IS ABOVE ALL THE GOOD FAITH OF THE UNITED STATES AND CONFIDENCE IN OUR ROLE. IT IS PAINFUL FOR US, AND FOR THE SECRETARY PERSONALLY, TO HAVE TO PRESS HIS FRIENDS FAHMY AND PRESIDENT SADAT ON THIS, KNOWING AS HE DOES THE AMOUNT OF CRITICISM IN THE ARAB WORLD THEY HAVE ALREADY BEEN SUBJECTED TO -- CRITICISM WHICH IS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED -- FOR THEIR FARSIGHTEDNESS AND COURAGE IN CONCLUDING THE LATEST AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY AS A FRIEND MUST GIVE THEM HIS BEST JUDGMENT, HOWEVER, THAT HAVING COME SO FAR IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY FOR THE PROCESS TO BEGIN TO BE REVERSED. THIS ISSUE IS SO SERIOUS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT COULD HAPPEN.

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, EG, IS

SUBJECT: FAHMY ON PROPOSAL FOR INFORMAL MULTILATERAL MEETING

REF: CAIRO 9504

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. PLEASE RESPOND TO FAHMY'S COMPLAINT REFTEL BY CONVEYING POINTS BELOW IN MY NAME.

2. MY COMMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES FOR PERHAPS A MORE INFORMAL MEETING THAN A RECONVENING OF THE FULL GENEVA CONFERENCE WAS IN NO WAY INTENDED TO CHANGE WHAT I HAVE SAID EARLIER ABOUT A POSSIBLE TIMETABLE FOR CONTINUING OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT. WE WERE AND REMAIN PREPARED TO RECONVENE GENEVA TOWARD THE END OF NOVEMBER. I HAVE REPORTED TO YOU. HOWEVER, MR.

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GROMYKO'S NEGATIVE COMMENTS TO ME ON THIS SCORE, THINKING THAT PERHAPS HE WAS PLAYING GAMES WITH ME, I WANTED TO THROW ANOTHER IDEA IN THE POT AND NOT LEAVE THE SOVIETS IN A POSITION TO BLOCK MATTERS WHILE PUTTING THE BLAME ON US. SHOULD SUCH AN INFORMAL MEETING MATERIALIZE, WE WOULD LOOK AT IT AS A STAGE TOWARD GENEVA, NOT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR GENEVA. IT HAS BEEN APPARENT TO ME FOR SOME TIME THAT, AS WE MOVED FORWARD TOWARD DISCUSSION OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT AT GENEVA OR THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS, WE WOULD HAVE TO FIND A WAY OF DISCUSSING WITH THE PARTIES HOW THE NEGOTIATION MIGHT BE MANAGED SO AS TO AVOID IMMEDIATE STALEMATE. WE ARE ALL KEENLY AWARE THAT FAILURE TO THINK THIS THROUGH IN ADVANCE COULD BLOCK THE NEGOTIATIONS AT AN EARLY STAGE, WHILE SOME CARE IN DEFINING AND PHASING THE AGENDA MIGHT PERMIT US TO CONTINUE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH WHILE ALSO ENJOYING THE ADVANTAGES OF SETTING OUR SIGHTS ON AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

3. AS I HAVE DEALT WITH THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE IN THE ENERGY FIELD, I HAVE COME MORE CLEARLY JUST RECENTLY TO SEE THAT THERE COULD BE ADVANTAGES IN A PLANNING GROUP OR SOMETHING OF THAT KIND TO WORK ON THE ISSUES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO RECONVENING THE FULL GENEVA CONFERENCE. THIS COULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF REFLECTING POSITIVE MOVEMENT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GIVING THE PRESENT CONVENORS AND PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITHOUT AROUSING THE EXPECTATIONS THAT A FULL CONFERENCE WOULD AROUSE BEFORE THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO BEGIN FULFILLING SOME OF THOSE EXPECTATIONS.

4. WHAT IS SAID IN MY SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIMPLY REFLECTED MY THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO FIND WAYS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THESE SUBJECTS IN A MORE CONCENTRATED AND SYSTEMATIC WAY. I HAD IN MIND NO MORE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL THAN THAT, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO THIS PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM IS AN IMPORTANT ONE, BUT THE PRESS GAVE MORE ATTENTION TO THAT ONE SENTENCE THAN IT SHOULD HAVE. THE MAIN POINT WAS THAT WE INTEND TO CONSULT OVER THE COMING WEEKS WITH ALL CONCERNED.

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5. RE CAIRO 9549, WE HAVE NOTED AL-BAZ, ON BASIS OF ALLON'S STATEMENT TO PRESS IN NEW YORK, HAS REITERATED FAHMY'S SUSPICION THAT ISRAELIS WERE CONSULTED IN ADVANCE ON "INFORMAL MEETING" IDEA AND RAISED QUESTION WHY GOE NOT CONSULTED. YOU CAN SAY THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO CONSULTATION WITH ANYONE ABOUT INCLUSION OF THIS IDEA IN MY SPEECH INDEED THAT THE FIRST REACTION OF THE ISRAELIS WAS HOSTILE. I BRIEFED ISRAELIS, THOUGH IN CONSIDERABLY LESS DETAIL THAN I DID SADAT AND FAHMY, ON MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO AND ASSUME THIS MUST BE WHAT ALLON HAD IN MIND IN HIS REMARKS TO PRESS. YOU SHOULD TELL FAHMY THAT I AM MEETING WITH KHADDAM FOR BREAKFAST TUESDAY. I SHALL SEND A REPORT IMMEDIATELY. KISSINGER

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NODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG, US

SUBJECT: PERSHING MISSILES AND EGYPTIAN CRITICISM
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. WE ARE SENDING YOU BY SEPTTEL TEXT OF HENRY TANNER STORY FROM CAIRO IN TODAY'S (SATURDAY'S) NEW YORK TIMES WHICH ATTRIBUTES TO "LEADING EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS" CRITICISM THAT I MISLED EGYPTIANS BY NOT TELLING THEM ABOUT PERSHING MISSILES, SAYS THEY DISCOUNT SUBSEQUENT U.S. REASSURANCES, AND QUOTES FAHMY BY NAME IN CRITICAL COMMENTS DIRECTED AT ISRAELI ATTITUDES SINCE AGREEMENT SIGNED.

2. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO DISCUSS THIS WITH FAHMY, MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS: I CAN UNDERSTAND EGYPTIAN SENSITIVITIES TO PUBLICITY THAT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO LEAKS ABOUT PERSHING MISSILE. THE FACT IS, HOWEVER, THAT NO MATTER WHAT THE SURFACE APPEARANCES RESULTING FROM THIS PUBLICITY MAY BE,
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IT IS TOTALLY MISLEADING. THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PERSHING IS PRECISELY THE SAME AS IT WAS PRIOR TO THE NEGOTIATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 4 AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU SHOULD CALL TO FAHMY'S ATTENTION MY

FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE PERSHING IN A CBS TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH DICK HOTTELET ON SEPTEMBER 22: "I THINK THAT THIS HAS BEEN BLOWN OUT OF ANY PROPORTION. THE PERSHING MISSILE WAS ON THE ISRAELI SHOPPING LIST WHICH WAS SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES LAST AUGUST. IT HAS BEEN BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SINCE LAST AUGUST. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING NEW ABOUT IT. THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT AGREED TO SUPPLY IT. IT HAS AGREED AGAIN, AFTER THE REASSESSMENT, TO CONTINUE THE STUDY THAT WAS ALREADY GOING ON. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMITMENT. THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID IT. I HAVE SAID IT. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAS SAID IT. AND WE HAVE ENOUGH REAL PROBLEMS NOT TO TORMENT OURSELVES WITH ARTIFICIAL ONES . . . THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY IS TO SORT OUT SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THAT ARE NOW BEING ASKED -- WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENSE OF ISRAEL, WHAT THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS WOULD BE -- AND NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE OF ANY KIND." IN THE SAME INTERVIEW, I POINTED OUT THAT MANY POLITICAL THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN BEFORE THE 1980'S, WHICH IS THE EARLIEST THE PERSHING COULD BE AVAILABLE FOR ISRAEL EVEN IF WE DECIDED TO PROVIDE IT, WHICH WE HAVE NOT DONE. I SAID THAT ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR THE PERSHING AND OTHER LONG LEAD-TIME ITEMS WHICH WE ARE STUDYING MUST BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUPPLY ARRANGEMENT THAT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME TIME AND NOT AS A DRAMATIC DECISION THAT SUDDENLY ESCALATES THE LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS.

3. YOU SHOULD TELL FAHMY THAT I CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT EGYPTIANS NOT CONTRIBUTE TO FUELING THE ARGUMENTS OF OUR CRITICS HERE. FACT IS THAT A NUMBER OF VOICES IN CONGRESS AND ELSEWHERE HAVE ON THEIR OWN SPOKEN OUT AGAINST GIVING THE PERSHING TO ISRAEL, AND I AM CONCERNED THAT EGYPTIAN CRITICISM COULD UNDERMINE THIS DOMESTIC REACTION.

4. FINALLY, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE TO FAHMY THAT, TO PUT

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S E C R E T STATE 231061

NODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, IS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI CARGO THROUGH SUEZ CANAL
REF: CAIRO 9607
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. FROM YOUR REPORT IN REFTEL, IT APPEARS THAT YOU HAVE EFFECTIVELY SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING FAHMY AROUND TO RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR AN EARLY POSITIVE DECISION ON A DATE FOR AN ISRAELI CARGO TO TRANSIT THE SUEZ CANAL. I THINK IT WOULD NOW BE BEST TO ACCEPT FAHMY'S JUDGMENT AND LEAVE IT TO HIM TO BRING PRESIDENT SADAT AROUND ALTHOUGH, IF HE DOES NOT SUCCEED, WE MAY STILL HAVE TO ASK YOU TO APPROACH SADAT DIRECTLY. WE SIMPLY MUST STAY WITH THIS ONE AND GET IT BEHIND US. I BELIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE NOW IS TO PIN DOWN THE OCTOBER 22 RPT OCTOBER 22 DATE PRIOR TO FINAL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE US PROPOSAL AND THE ISRAELI SIGNATURE OF THE PROTOCOL, WHICH WE ARE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK. THE THREE OR FOUR DAYS THAT FAHMY ESTIMATES WILL BE NECESSARY FOR PRESIDENTIAL

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CONFIRMATION FALL WITHIN THIS TIME FRAME, AND I WOULD PREFER NOT TO GO TO THE ISRAELIS WITH THE OCTOBER 22 DATE UNTIL WE ARE CERTAIN IT WILL STICK. FROM PAST EXPERIENCE, WE CAN ONLY BE CERTAIN OF THIS WHEN PRESIDENT SADAT CONFIRMS IT.

2. FYI YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE COME TO US WITH A NEW PROPOSITION -- NAMELY THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH THE FIRST STEP OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON OCTOBER 5 UNDER THE TIMETABLE WORKED OUT BY THE WORKING GROUP IN GENEVA EVEN IF -THEY-HAVE NOT SIGNED THE PROTOCOL BY THAT DATE IF A SHIP WITH ISRAELI CARGO CAN GO THROUGH THE CANAL BETWEEN OCTOBER 10 AND 13. MY JUDGMENT IS THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD REACT NEGATIVELY TO THIS SINCE THEY DO NOT ACCEPT ISRAEL'S LINKING THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE US PROPOSAL. I AM THEREFORE NOT ASKING YOU TO PUT THIS IDEA TO FAHMY, BUT IF YOU HAVE ANY DIFFERENT JUDGMENT OF HOW HE WOULD REACT, PLEASE LET ME KNOW. END FYI.
KISSINGER

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THERE FOLLOWING OUR EFFORTS WITH THEM.

3. WE NOW NEED EGYPTIAN UNDERSTANDING AND HELP. UP TO NOW WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONTAINING ISRAELI EFFORTS TO INSIST UPON IMMEDIATE FULLFILLMENT OF EGYPT'S UNDERTAKING TO PERMIT NON-MILITARY ISKRAELI CARGOES TO PASS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL. ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WE HAVE KEPT THE ISKRAELIS FROM MAKING A DECISION TO FREEZE EVERYTHING ELSE UNTIL THIS HAPPENED. THIS ISSUE CONTINUES TO FESTER, HOWEVER, IN ISRAEL AND IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND IF NOT QUICKLY RESOLVED WILL, WE FEAR, BE BLOWN SO OUT OF PROPORTION AS A POLITICAL ISSUE IN ISRAEL THAT EVERYTHING WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED SO FAR WILL BE PLACED IN JEDPARDY. OF EQUAL SERIOUSNESS, THIS WOULD QUICKLY BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES FROM WHICH OUR CRITICS AND THE OPPONENTS OF THE RECENT AGREEMENT COULD BENEFIT. IF THIS HAPPENED, BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND WE WOULD BE IN AN EXTREMELY VULNERABLE POSITION, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS.

4. THE PASSAGE OF ISRAELI NON-MILITARY CARGOES THROUGH THE CANAL IS NOW A PART OF THE PUBLISHED AGREEMENT. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THE REALITY IS THAT OBSERVANCE OF THIS PROVISION WILL BE VIEWED AS A TEST OF THE VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT. ON THE BASIS OF ASSURANCES WE RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT SADAT, WE TOLD THE ISKRAELIS THAT A SHIP WITH ISRAELI CARGO COULD TRANSIT THE CANAL PRIOR TO THE KNESSET DEBATE ON THE AGREEMENT. THIS DID NOT AHPPEN, AND WHAT IS AT STAKE NOW IS ABOVE ALL THE GOOD FAITH OF THE UNITED STATES AND CONFIDENCE IN OUR ROLE. IT IS PAINFUL FOR US, AND FOR THE SECRETARY PERSONALLY, TO HAVE TO PRESS HIS FRIENDS FAHMY AND PRESIDENT SADAT ON THIS, KNOWING AS HE DOES THE AMOUNT OF CRITICISM IN THE ARAB WORLD THEY HAVE ALREADY BEEN SUBJECTED TO -- CRITICISM WHICH IS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED -- FOR THEIR FARSIGHTEDNESS AND COURAGE IN CONCLUDING THE LATEST AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY AS A FRIEND MUST GIVE THEM HIS BEST JUDGMENT, HOWEVER, THAT HAVING COME SO FAR IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY FOR THE PROCESS TO BEGIN TO BE REVERSED. THIS ISSUE IS SO SERIOUS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT COULD HAPPEN.

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5. WITH GREAT EFFORT WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE WHICH, IN OUR JUDGMENT, OFFERS THE BEST CHANCE OF RESOLVING THE CANAL TRANSIT QUESTION BEFORE IT BLOWS UP. WE NEED FROM EGYPT BEFORE COMPLETION OF US CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE US PROPOSAL ON THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AND ISRAELI SIGNING OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL A FIRM DATE ON WHICH A SHIP WITH ISRAELI CARGO CAN TRANSIT THE CANAL. THE ACTUAL TRANSIT DOES NOT NEED TO OCCUR WITHIN THIS PERIOD, BUT SHOULD BE FIXED NOW FOR A DATE WITHIN TWO WEEKS AFTER ISRAELI SIGNATURE, SINCE CONGRESS IS NOT LIKELY TO COMPLETE ITS WORK BEFORE OCTOBER 2. WE THEREFORE NEED TO BE GIVEN A DATE NOW FOR A TRANSIT AROUND OCTOBER 15 OR THE DATE PROPOSED BY FAHMY IN THE FIRST PLACE. THIS WOULD, IN FACT, BE ABOUT ONE MONTH AFTER THE TIME WHEN, BASED ON WHAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD TOLD US, WE HAD ASSURED ISRAEL THAT A CARGO COULD PASS, AND IT IS CLOSE TO THE TIME FAHMY AT ONE POINT RECENTLY INDICATED TO US THAT SUCH PASSAGE COULD TAKE PLACE.

6. AS WE HAVE SAID, WE ARE ASKING FOR EGYPT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION WE ARE IN AND ITS HELP IN MAINTAINING OUR OWN BONA FIDES AT THIS POINT.
KISSINGER

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C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 9638

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)
SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT: PROPOSED SCHEDULE
REF: STATE 231075

1. DURING MY MEETING WITH FAHMY TODAY, I GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT AS CITED REPTEL. IN DOING SO, I STRESSED IT IS A TENTATIVE SCHEDULE INTENDED SOLELY FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES AT THIS TIME AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE DEPENDING UPON THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES AND PRESIDENT FORD'S APPROVAL. FAHMY WENT THROUGH IT QUICKLY AND MADE A FEW PRELIMINARY COMMENTS.

2. HE GRUMBLED ABOUT THE KENNEDY CENTER VASE UNVEILING, WHICH HE VIEWED AS A GHORBAL SUGGESTION. RE OCTOBER 28, HE QUESTIONED THE NEED TO MEET WITH 20 PROMINENT EDITORS AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT BLAIR HOUSE. ONE SUCH MEETING SHOULD SUFFICE, IN HIS VIEW, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB LUNCHEON ADDRESS THE PREVIOUS DAY. SO FAR AS UNGA IS CONCERNED, HE WILL WORK THIS OUT WITH SYG WALDHEIM, IT WILL BE SYG WHO WILL HOST LUNCHEON.

3. HE ASKED WHERE THE REST PLACE WILL BE LOCATED? I TOLD HIM THIS IS STILL BEING WORKED OUT. HE RECALLED THE SECRETARY HAD MENTIONED A PLACE IN FLORIDA. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE NICE IF SOME PLACE THAT HAS SOME GREENERY AND OPEN AIR COULD BE FOUND BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT RELAXES MORE EASILY IN SUCH SURROUNDINGS. WHILE HE WANTS THE PRESIDENT TO GO TO HOUSTON, HE WAS NOT HAPPY THAT IT IS THE LAST ITINERARY STOP SINCE HE THINKS AN EIGHT-HOUR FLIGHT TO LONDON IS A LITTLE MORE THAN PRESIDENT SADAT WILL LIKE. THINKING OUT LOUD, HE WONDERED IF SADAT COULD NOT LEAVE FROM NEW YORK OR WASHINGTON.

4. HIS BIG QUESTION WAS WHAT ABOUT ADDRESSING A JOINT SESSION

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OF CONGRESS? PER REFERENCE INSTRUCTIONS, I TOLD HIM THIS IS STILL BEING EXPLORED. HE WAS IMMEDIATELY SUSPICIOUS. WHAT WAS THE OBJECTION TO SUCH AN IDEA? I REPEATED THAT ALL I COULD TELL HIM IS THAT THE MATTER IS STILL BEING EXPLORED.

5. FAHMY INDICATED HIS OBSERVATIONS ARE TENTATIVE. HE WILL DISCUSS THE DRAFT WITH PRESIDENT SADAT, PROBABLY TONIGHT, AND LET US HAVE THE PRESIDENT'S REACTIONS ASAP.

6. RE PARA 2, STATE 231074, I DID NOT RPT NOT MENTION TO FAHMY THAT WE WILL PAY ALL EXPENSES OF ENTIRE SADAT PARTY WHILE THEY ARE IN THE US. BEFORE DOING SO, I WANT TO BE SURE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT BOTH OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL PARTY, WHICH MAY TOTAL 100 OR MORE. PLEASE CLARIFY.

7. I HAVE NOT RPT NOT YET HAD CHANCE TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH HASSAN KAMEL, WHO IS IN LONDON MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SADAT'S TRIP TO THE UK. KAMEL IS NOT EXPECTED BACK UNTIL TUESDAY. I WILL FILL HIM IN IN DUE COURSE.

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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI CARGO THROUGH SUEZ CANAL

REF: STATE 231061

1. I MET WITH FAHMY TODAY TO THANK HIM FOR HIS UNDERSTANDING AND CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION ON THE ISRAELI CARGO ISSUE. I TOLD HIM WE ACCEPT HIS JUDGMENT AND LEAVE IT TO HIM TO BRING PRESIDENT SADAT AROUND. SHOULD IT SEEM NECESSARY, YOU MIGHT STILL WISH ME TO TALK TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE MATTER. WE CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT TO PIN DOWN OCT 22 DATE PRIOR TO US CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON US PROPOSAL AND ISRAELI SIGNATURE OF THE PROTOCOL, WHICH WE ARE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK. I RECALLED HE HAD SAID THAT, IF WE WISH, HE WOULD TAKE THE MATTER TO THE PRESIDENT AND TRY TO OBTAIN HIS APPROVAL AND THAT THIS MIGHT TAKE THREE OR FOUR DAYS. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HE DID SO.

2. FAHMY REAFFIRMED HIS PROPOSED OCT 22 DATE. HE SAID HE WILL DISCUSS IT WITH THE PRESIDENT TONIGHT, PRIOR TO OR AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S MAJOR POLICY ADDRESS. HE WOULD LET US KNOW ASAP.

3. FAHMY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE OCT 22 DATE, IF APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT, MIGHT BE GIVEN TO THE CONGRESS. THEY WILL LEAK IT. SO FAR AS GIVING IT TO THE ISRAELIS, HE THOUGHT THIS OUGHT NOT TO

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BE DONE UNTIL AROUND OCT 7 OR SO. EVEN THEN, THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE ASKED NOT TO LEAK THE DATE. IF IT LEAKS PREMATURELY, THERE IS NO TELLING HOW SADAT MIGHT REACT. HE MIGHT CANCEL THE ARRANGEMENT.

4. RE PARA 2 REFTTEL, I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT EGYPTIAN REACTION TO ISRAELI PROPOSITION WOULD BE NEGATIVE--AT LEAST RIGHT NOW--AND DID NOT RPT NOT RAISE IT.
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SPOKEN OUT AGAINST PROVIDING ISRAEL WITH THE PERSHING AND EMPHASIZED YOUR CONCERN THAT EGYPTIAN PUBLIC CRITICISM COULD UNDERMINE THIS DOMESTIC REACTION.

3. FAHMY SAID HE HAD NOT RPT NOT SEEN THE TANNER ARTICLE. I THEREFORE READ IT TO HIM AND, AT HIS REQUEST, GAVE HIM A COPY. HE EXPRESSED ANNOYANCE AT SAYYID MAREI'S STATEMENTS AND SAID HE WILL COMPLAIN ABOUT THEM TO THE PRESIDENT THIS EVENING. SO FAR AS STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM ARE CONCERNED, HE NOTED WITH SOME ANNOYANCE THAT HIS TALK WITH TANNER HAD BEEN OFF THE RECORD AND NOT RPT NOT FOR PUBLICATION. TANNER HAD APPARENTLY VIOLATED THIS RULE BECAUSE OF WHAT FAHMY REGARDS AS TANNER'S ADVERSE ATTITUDE TOWARD YOU. FAHMY DENIED HE HAD CRITICIZED THE US AS TANNER ALLEGES. HE HAD INDEED MADE COMMENTS ABOUT ISRAEL'S TACTICS.


4. FAHMY AGREED THAT EGYPT SHOULD DO NOTHING TO ADD FUEL TO THE FIRE, BUT SAID HE ALSO WANTED TO MAKE A FEW POINTS. FIRST, YOU HAD NEVER AT ANY TIME MENTIONED THE PERSHING TO SADAT OR TO HIM OR TO ANY SENIOR EGYPTIAN. THE LANCES, YES, BUT NOT THE PERSHING. THUS, WHEN THE NEWS BROKE ABOUT THE PERSHING, IT WAS A STUNNING SURPRISE TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO HIM. SADAT CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY, IF THE PERSHING WAS ON ISRAEL'S LAST AUGUST SHOPPING LIST, SOMETHING HAD NOT RPT NOT AT LEAST BEEN SAID TO HIM ABOUT IT. SECOND, WHILE HE WAS GLAD TO HAVE REAFFIRMED WHAT I HAD EARLIER TOLD HIM THAT NO RPT NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE ABOUT THE PERSHING, WE SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT SO LONG AS THERE IS ANY SUGGESTION THAT IT WILL EVENTUALLY BE SOLD TO THE ISRAELIS, EGYPTIANS AS WELL AS OTHER ARABS WILL BE AGITATED. THERE WILL BE PRESSURES TO OBTAIN SIMILAR WEAPONS JUST IN CASE WE ULTIMATELY DECIDE TO SELL THE PERSHING TO ISRAELIS. THIRD, THE ISSUE IS NOT RPT NOT LIKELY TO DIE DOWN. AS WE PROBABLY KNEW, THE ARAB FONMINS OR DEPUTIES MEETING N NEW YORK HAVE ISSUED A STATEMENT DENOUNCING POSSIBLE US PERSHING SALES TO ISRAEL AND ARAB LEAGUE SYG MAHMOUD RIAD OR ONE OF THE ARAB FONMINS WILL DOUBTLESS TAKE IT UP WITH YOU.

5. GOE UNDERSTANDS OUR POSITION AND WILL NOT RPT NOT, ON ITS PART, DELIBERATLY FAN THE BLAZE. HOWEVER, WE

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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 116521 GDS
TAGSI OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)
SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT; EGYPTIAN EXPECTATIONS

1. AS WAS BOUND TO HAPPEN, FAHMY TACKLED ME YESTERDAY TO KNOW WHAT MATERIAL THINGS WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO GIVE SADAT IN ASSISTANCE DURING PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING VISIT. SADAT, HE NOTED, IS UNDER SEVERE ATTACK FROM ARAB WORLD AFTER SIGNING SINAI II. SOVIETS ARE ALREADY SHOWING THEIR DISPLEASURE BY HOLDING UP NEEDED SUPPORT. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR SADAT, FAHMY ARGUED, THAT HE COME BACK FROM THE US WITH PROMISES OF SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL HELP. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN HE JUSTIFY POLICY ON WHICH HE HAS EMBARKED.

2. SPECIFICALLY, FAHMY SAID, SADAT NEEDS US AGREEMENT TO SELL DEFENSIVE ARMS TO EGYPT, FINALIZATION OF AGREEMENT ON EGYPTIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR, SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AID ALONG THE LINES OF THE LIST HE HAD GIVEN US (CAIRO 8814), SOMETHING TANGIBLE ON US-ORGANIZED MULTILATERAL EMERGENCY AID FOR EGYPT AND ANY OTHER SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ITEMS WE MIGHT DEVISE. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHERE WE STAND ON THESE MATTERS. IN CONNECTION WITH ARMS, HE DWELT AT SOME LENGTH ON PRESIDENT FORD'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING ARMS SALES TO EGYPT. HE HOPED THIS IS THE CASE, SINCE EGYPTIAN ARMY'S CONTINUED SUPPORT OF SADAT COULD DEPEND UPON THIS.

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3. I TOLD HIM I HAD NO INFORMATION ON ARMS. ON THE ATOMIC ENERGY REACTOR, THE BALL WAS IN THE EGYPTIAN COURT ON A TECHNICAL PROBLEM. I UNDERTOOK TO GET THE PAPERS TOGETHER AND DISCUSS WITH HIM IN DETAIL WHERE WE STAND. ON EMERGENCY AID FOR EGYPT, I HAD A FEW DAYS AGO GIVE HIM FINANCE ABU ISMAIL A STATUS REPORT AND WOULD ALSO GIVE FAHMY A COPY. ON ECONOMIC AID, HE ALREADY KNEW WHAT WE PROPOSE FOR FY 176, BUT WHETHER ANNOUNCEMENT IS POSSIBLE DURING SADAT VISIT WILL DEPEND UPON CONGRESSIONAL ACTION.

4. I ASSURED FAHMY THAT WE REGARD UPCOMING SADAT VISIT AS A MAJOR EVENT AND WILL DO EVERYTHING FEASIBLE TO MAKE IT A SUCCESS FOR THE PRESIDENT AND FOR US. AS HE SHOULD KNOW, A MEETING BETWEEN OUR TWO PRESIDENTS IS A MAJOR EVENT IN ITSELF WITH FAR-REACHING POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THIS ASPECT OF THE VISIT SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT IT DESERVES.

5. AM SENDING BY SEPTTEL STATUS REPORT AS WE UNDERSTAND IT HERE ON VARIOUS SPECIFIC ITEMS MENTIONED BY FAHMY AND OTHERS LIKELY TO BE RAISED. ASSUME WE ARE ALREADY WORKING ON THESE ITEMS.
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Egypt

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6806

S E C R E T CAIRO 9677

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)
SUBJECT: SOME MAJOR SUBJECTS LIKELY TO ARISE DURING SADAT VISIT

1. EGYPTIANS MAY BE EXPECTED WANT ACHIEVE MAXIMUM IMPACT FROM UPCOMING SADAT VISIT IN TERMS OF OBTAINING PROMISES OF SUBSTANTIAL USG SUPPORT. LISTED BELOW ARE SUBJECTS WHICH WE WOULD EXPECT TO COME UP AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT STATUS OF EACH.

A. ARMS: SADAT HAS DISCUSSED WITH VARIOUS RECENT VISITING CONGRESSIONAL GROUPS HIS HOPE THAT USG WILL SELL RPT SELL HIM SOME DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. HE HAS POINTED OUT THAT, AS A RESULT OF HIS POLICY SHIFT TOWARD USG, SOVIET ARMS HAVE STOPPED. FRENCH AND BRITISH SOURCES UNABLE PROVIDE SOME EQUIPMENT EGYPTIAN ARMY WOULD LIKE. HE HAS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED TOWS, F-5S, CY-130S AND SOME NAVAL EQUIPMENT. IN WAKE SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, HE HOPES DOOR MAY NOW BE OPENED TO SUCH ARMS PURCHASES. EGYPTIANS WERE GRATIFIED AT PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENT THAT USG STUDYING POSSIBILITY OF ARMS SALES TO EGYPT AND FERVENTLY HOPE THIS WILL MATERIALIZE. THIS IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO SADAT.

B. NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR: GOE IS ANXIOUS TO PROCEED WITH SIGNING OF LONG-PROMISED NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND WOULD LIKE TO ANNOUNCE FINALIZATION DURING SADAT'S VISIT. SOME TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS, THE LATTER INVOLVING SAFEGUARDS, REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE INITIALING COULD TAKE PLACE. EGYPTIAN REPLIES TO OUR LATEST NOTE ON TECHNICAL POINTS WERE SENT CAIRO 9195 AND FURTHER PERTINENT DISCUSSIONS WITH DIRECTOR OF EGYPTIAN ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT WERE REPORTED VIENNA 8258. THIS IS ANOTHER MAJOR ITEM ON SADAT'S DOCKET AND EGYPTIAN SIGNING OR INITIALING DURING UPCOMING VISIT WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE IMPACT. PLEASE ADVISE IF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS CAN BE SORTED OUT IN NEXT FEW WEEKS, IF NECESSARY BY SENDING ERDA TEAM HERE. ON POLITICAL SIDE, FANMY HAD EARLIER AGREED SAFEGUARDS DID NOT HAVE TO BE RETROACTIVE IN CASE OF ISRAEL TO COVER DIMONA, BUT IS UNDER IMPRESSION WE ARE TYRING TO MAKE

***** WWSR COMMENT *****

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THEM RETROACTIVE IN THE CASE OF EGYPT, IT IS FAHMY'S UNDERSTANDING, BASED ON WHAT HE PREVIOUSLY TOLD HIM, THAT PERTINENT AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL BE IDENTICAL SO FAR AS SAFEGUARDS AND TECHNICAL POSITIONS ARE CONCERNED, PLEASE CLARIFY THESE TWO POLITICAL POINTS. RE A RELATED ITEM, EGYPTIANS MAY ALSO BE EXPECTED WANT TO DISCUSS FINANCING FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.

C. US ECONOMIC AID: SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND SADAT'S CONTINUING PUBLIC ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN ARE LIKELY TO STOP ANY APPRECIABLE SOVIET ECONOMIC HELP. HE HAS ALREADY PUT US ON NOTICE THAT USG SHOULD ASSIST TO MEET SHORTFALLS. HE KNOWS OUR TENTATIVELY PLANNED ASSISTANCE FIGURE FOR FY 176, BUT EGYPTIANS MAY ALSO RAISE MORE EXTENSIVE COMMODITY AND PROJECT AID AS SET FORTH IN THEIR PAPER REPORTED CAIRO 8814. SADAT MAY ALSO ASK FOR COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE NEEDED WHEREWITHALL TO PERMIT SOVIET-BUILT FACTORIES LIKE HELWAN IRON AND STEEL WORKS AND NAG HAMMADI ALUMINUM PLANT TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE IF SOVIETS STOP SUPPORT. EGYPTIANS WILL WANT SOME KIND OF PUBLIC STATEMENT RE EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC AID.

D. EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAM FOR EGYPT: CURRENT STATUS OF OUR EFFORT SET FORTH STATE 218988, SUBSTANCE OF WHICH GIVEN TO ABU ISMAIL AND FAHMY. PREDICTABLY, ABU ISMAIL NOTED OUR DOLS 1 BILLION TARGET FIGURE INADEQUATE TO MEET EGYPT'S IMPORT DEFICIT REQUIREMENTS. SADAT MAY BE EXPECTED RECALL THAT AT SALZBURG HE INDICATED DOLS 3 BILLION DEFICIT, HALF OF WHICH ARABS AND HALF OF WHICH WESTERN COUNTRIES, I.E. US, EUROPE, AND JAPAN, SHOULD PROVIDE, AS REPORTED CAIRO 8558, ABU ISMAIL SAYS HE IS VIRTUALLY BROKE FOR THIS CALENDAR YEAR, LET ALONE HIS REQUIREMENTS FOR NEXT YEAR. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED OFFER CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE, BUT SHOULD ALSO SEIZE THE OCCASION TO AGAIN IMPRESS UPON EGYPTIANS NEED TO INSTITUTE RIGOROUS ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM. THIS WILL BE TOUGH.

E. FAITH AND HOPE SOCIETY HOSPITAL: THIS IS MRS. SADAT'S FAVORITE CHARITY TO WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY CONTRIBUTED EQUIVALENT OF DOLS 18 MILLION IN EGYPTIAN POUNDS. HER INTEREST IN OBTAINING FURTHER USG FINANCIAL HELP CONTINUES AND SHE RECENTLY SENT MIN SOCIAL AFFAIRS 'AISHA RATED TO US TO SUGGEST POSSIBILITY OF AID HELP "IN KIND" FOR HOSPITAL. (SEE STATE 223189.) SHE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE USG UNDERWRITE ALL OR AT LEAST PART OF HOSPITAL COSTS AND WILL INDICATE AMERICAN ARCHITECTURAL FIRMS BEING CONSIDERED TO DO DESIGNING WORK. AS YET, SOCIETY HAS BEEN UNABLE USE OUR EARLIER MONEY FOR AN IDENTIFIABLE US COMPONENT, PARTLY BECAUSE PROJECT IS MOVING ALONG RATHER SLOWLY. DESPITE MRS. SADAT'S INVOLVEMENT, PROJECT IS PRIVATE AND THERE IS NO INDICATION GOE ACCORDS IT HIGH PRIORITY IN ALLOCATION OF AID FUNDS. SOME TANGIBLE HELP WILL BE EXPECTED OF US.

F. CAIRO OPERA HOUSE: HAVING BEEN INCLUDED IN NIXON-SADAT COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 1974, CAIRO OPERA HOUSE MAY AGAIN RISE. EGYPTIANS DO NOT CONSIDER LIMITED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WE HAVE PROVIDED UP TO NOW IN FORM OF FEW EXPERS AND US FINANCED TRIPS TO REPRESENTATIVE PERFORMING ARTS CENTERS AS MEETING OBLIGATION. THEY WANT USG

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FINANCIAL HELP TO REBUILD OPERA HOUSE.

G. USE OF US-HELD EGYPTIAN POUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: WE HAVE SOME FEELERS THAT EGYPTIANS MIGHT LIKE TO RAISE POSSIBLE USE OF PL 480 POUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. THIS IS A HARDY PERENNIAL WHICH COMES UP FROM TIME TO TIME. EGYPTIANS WOULD, OF COURSE, LIKE THIS TO BE SEPARATE FROM AID DOLLAR ASSISTANCE.

H. DEBT RESCHEDULING: ALTHOUGH EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT RECENTLY RAISED ISSUE, WE CANNOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY RAISE DESIRABILITY OF RESCHEDULING OF EGYPTIAN DEBT TO US. THIS WOULD IN FACT AFFORD THEM LITTLE RELIEF FROM THEIR PRESENT LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, THEY MAY BELIEVE PRINCIPLE OF US AGREEMENT TO SUCH US DEBT RESCHEDULING WOULD BE HELPFUL WITH OTHERS. WE BELIEVE THIS CAN AND SHOULD BE PARRIED.

I. JWG ACTIVITIES: EGYPTIANS ARE CURRENTLY SURVEYING STATUS OF VARIOUS JWG ACTIVITIES TO IDENTIFY WHERE US HAS BEEN DELINQUENT. IN CONTEXT THEIR "YOU GIVE, WE TAKE" ATTITUDE, THEY MAY WELL PRESS FOR MORE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF JWG PROJETS AS WELL AS GREATER WILLINGNESS FINANCE PROJECTS DEVELOPED IN SUCH JWGS. THEY ARE THEMSELVES DELINQUENT ON MANY OBLIGATIONS, BUT WE WILL BE WELL ADVISED TO TAKE STEPS BRING UP TO DATE OUR OWN UNDER VARIOUS JWG CATEGORIES.

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Identical letters to
Mansfield, Sparkman, Scott, Case
Morgan, Rhodes + Broomfield

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am writing to emphasize the importance of a Congressional decision in the coming week on U.S. participation in the Early Warning System which is an integral part of the Agreement signed between the Governments of Egypt and Israel on September 4 in Geneva.

Over the past two years, our Government has played an essential role in helping defuse the tensions in the Middle East. We have chosen this course because we recognized, as has every American Administration over the past 30 years, that the issues involved in that troubled area are central to the American national interest.

The September 4 agreement, like the two preceding disengagement agreements, was negotiated with the assistance of the United States. The parties themselves have described it as a significant step towards peace in the Middle East. It will reduce the risks of war, create new opportunities for negotiating peace, and help provide a stable environment in which global economic dislocations can be avoided. This Agreement is in the overall national interest of the United States.

There would have been no Agreement without provision for American participation in the Early Warning System. That System is designed to reduce the danger of surprise attack, and the parties to the Agreement were able to agree to entrust the System only to the United States. The special American role was the only one in which both sides had adequate confidence.

I want to be certain that the leaders of the Congress fully understand the consequences of further delay in acting on this important matter.


The first step in the implementation of the basic Agreement under the timetable negotiated and agreed to by Egypt and Israel in Geneva on September 22 is scheduled to be taken October 5. This process will not begin, however, until the

Congress has acted on the proposed United States role in the Early Warning System. Delay in Congressional action will, therefore, delay implementation of the basic Agreement. It will risk causing the lengthy and difficult negotiations on the entire five-month implementing timetable to be reopened. It will prevent a lessening of the risks of war. If for any reason the agreement should fail, the responsibility would be heavy indeed.

The issue before the Congress now is whether the Congress will approve acceptance by the United States of the role that has been proposed for it. There are other issues which the Congress must eventually consider in connection with our continuing relations, policies, and programs in the Middle East -- particularly our programs of military and economic assistance there. The Congress will want to consider those carefully at the appropriate time, but they are not integral to the implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Voting in favor of the U.S. role in the Early Warning System will not commit anyone to take a position one way or another on these issues.

In summary, I met with the leadership three weeks ago to describe what was involved in the new Agreement between Egypt and Israel and to request urgent approval of U.S. participation in its implementation. This question has been under intensive discussion in the Congress for nearly three weeks. All relevant papers and all U.S. commitments related to the Agreement have been submitted to the appropriate committees of the Congress. If action is not completed in the coming week, the United States will be in the position of holding up implementation of an Agreement which two key Middle Eastern countries have signed as a significant step towards peace. The Middle East is an area where American policy has long had broad bipartisan support. The issue presently before the Congress offers an opportunity to reaffirm that tradition and to demonstrate how the Executive and Legislative branches can work together on a foreign policy matter of high importance to the national interest and for the benefit of world peace. I, therefore, urge strongly that action be completed as early as possible and no later than Friday, October 3.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
The Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515



Department of State

TELEGRAM

U.S. Mission to the U.N.

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY
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CONFIDENTIAL

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RECD: 9-29-75 11:26 AM

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 231142 TOSEC 140016

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EXDIS

FOL SENT ACTION TO SECSTATE SEPT 29, 1975 FROM CAIRO

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 9644

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR EG

SUBJECT: HONORARY GEORGETOWN DEGREE FOR SADAT

REF: SECTO 14006

1. I HAVE ALREADY HAD SOME EARLIER DISCUSSIONS ABOUT HONORARY DEGREES FOR SADAT, EGYPTIANS, THROUGH GHORBAL, UNDERSTAND GEORGETOWN, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA AND PRINCETON WANT TO DO SO.

2. WHEN DISCUSSING TENTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS A FEW DAYS AGO (PARA 7 CAIRO 9389), FAHMY TOLD ME THE PRESIDENT, "UNLIKE THE SHAH OF IRAN", IS NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN SUCH HONORARY DEGREES. IF ONE COULD BE ARRANGED AND CONFERRED IN A DIGNIFIED MANNER, HE THOUGHT SADAT WOULD BE WILLING RECEIVE ONE. BUT IT IS NOT A HIGH PRIORITY ITEM SO FAR AS EGYPTIANS ARE CONCERNED.

3. IF GEORGETOWN HONORARY DEGREE COULD BE OBTAINED WITHOUT IT CREATING AN INTRA-FACULTY FUROR, WHICH MIGHT SPILL OVER INTO THE PRESS OR CREATE EMBARRASSING WALK-OUT SCENE, I THINK IT WOULD NICE TO ARRANGE IT. IF INTRA-FACULTY DISPUTE ON THE MATTER IS LIKELY TO BREAK-OUT IN A MANNER THAT MARS THE DIGNITY OF THE VISIT, I WOULD DROP IT. YOU ARE BEST ABLE TO JUDGE WHAT PROSPECTS ARE LIKELY TO BE.

4. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE VISIT THAT WE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO CONTAIN POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE ANTI-SADAT DEMONSTRATIONS, ALTHOUGH I ALSO BELIEVE THAT A JDL DEMONSTRATION, IF IT CAN BE CONTROLLED, MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN REFUTING CURRENT ARAB CHARGES IMPUGNING SADAT'S ARABISM. THIS IS, OF COURSE, A TRICKY AFFAIR AND HAS RISKS WHICH YOU ARE BETTER ABLE TO JUDGE FROM STATESIDE VANTAGE POINT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

U.S. Mission to the U.N.

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Classification

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SECRET STATE 231159 TOSEC 140018

NODIS
CHEROKEE

FOL SENT ACTION TO SECSTATE SEPT 29, 1975 FROM CAIRO

QUOTE SECRET CAIRO 9646

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)
SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT: EGYPTIAN EXPECTATIONS

1. AS WAS BOUND TO HAPPEN, FAHMY TACKLED ME YESTERDAY TO KNOW WHAT MATERIAL THINGS WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO GIVE SADAT IN ASSISTANCE DURING PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING VISIT. SADAT, HE NOTED, IS UNDER SEVERE ATTACK FROM ARAB WORLD AFTER SIGNING SINAI II. SOVIETS ARE ALREADY SHOWING THEIR DISPLEASURE BY HOLDING UP NEEDED SUPPORT. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR SADAT, FAHMY ARGUED, THAT HE COME BACK FROM THE US WITH PROMISES OF SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL HELP. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN HE JUSTIFY POLICY ON WHICH HE HAS EMBARKED.

2. SPECIFICALLY, FAHMY SAID, SADAT NEEDS US AGREEMENT TO SELL DEFENSIVE ARMS TO EGYPT, FINALIZATION OF AGREEMENT ON EGYPTIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR, SUBSTANTIAL AID ALONG THE LINES OF THE LIST HE HAD GIVEN US (CAIRO 8814), SOMETHING TANGIBLE ON US-ORGANIZED MULTILATERAL EMERGENCY AID FOR EGYPT AND ANY OTHER SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ITEMS WE MIGHT DEVISE. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHERE WE STAND ON THESE MATTERS. IN CONNECTION WPTH ARMS, HE DWELT AT SOME ON PRESIDENT FORD'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING ARMS SALES TO EGYPT. HE HOPED THIS IS THE CASE, SINCE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF SADAT COULD DEPEND

UPON THIS.

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3. I TOLD HIM I HAD NO INFORMATION ON ARMS. ON THE ATOMIC ENERGY REACTOR, THE BALL WAS IN THE EGYPTIAN COURT ON A TECHNICAL PROBLEM. I UNDERTOOK TO GET THE PAPERS TOGETHER AND DISCUSS WITH HIM IN DETAIL WHERE WE STAND. ON EMERGENCY AID FOR EGYPT, I HAD A FEW DAYS AGO GIVE MIN FINANCE ABU ISMAIL A STATUS REPORT AND WOULD ALSO GIVE FAHMY A COPY. ON ECONOMIC AID, HE ALREADY KNEW WHAT WE PROPOSE FOR FY '76, BUT WHETHER ANNOUNCEMENT IS POSSIBLE DURING SADAT VISIT WILL DEPEND UPON CONGRESSIONAL ACTION.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

U.S. Mission to the U.N.

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
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SECRET

CONTROL: TOSEC 140021
RECD NY: 9-29-75 2:45 PM

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DIST: S/S

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 9677 ACTION SECSTATE SEP 29.

QUOTE: SECRET CAIRO 9677

Egypt

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)
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Department of State ⁰⁰⁷⁶²⁰ **TELEGRAM**

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APPROVED BY P:JJSISCO
S/S - MR. ORTIZ

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 231389

NODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, US

SUBJECT: PERSHING MISSILES
REFERENCE: CAIRO 9640
FOR AMB. EILTS FROM SISCO

1. SECRETARY FEELS IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR YOU TO RETURN FOR CONSULTATIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE UPCOMING SADAT TRIP AS WELL AS OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH EGYPTIANS IN LIGHT OF CONTINUING ARAB ATTACKS ON SADAT, CONTINUING NATURE OF FAHMY'S QUESTIONING OF OUR POLICY, I.E., PERSHING'S, QUESTIONS OF CARGOS, ETC. SECRETARY THEREFORE WOULD LIKE YOU TO BE BACK TO WASHINGTON BY THURSDAY SO THAT HE CAN HAVE A SESSION WITH YOU ON FRIDAY OF THIS WEEK.
2. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE SEE FAHMY AND INFORM HIM THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ASKED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON, REASON BEING TO GIVE YOU A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE UPCOMING SADAT TRIP TO U.S.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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3. SECRETARY WANTS YOU TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO RETURN TO QUESTION OF PERSHING'S WITH FAHMY AS REPORTED IN PARA 4 OF CAIRO 9640. YOU SHOULD TELL FAHMY THAT IT IS TRUE,

AS HE SAYS, THAT SECRETARY DID MENTION LANCES, BUT NOT PERSHING'S. REASON IS A VERY SIMPLE ONE, AS INDICATED IN THE PREVIOUS TELEGRAM, WHICH YOU RECEIVED ON THIS MATTER. ONLY COMMITMENT THAT HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH RESPECT TO PERSHING'S IS TO STUDY MATTER, WHEREAS LANCE WAS A SPECIFIC UNDERTAKING. IMPORTANT THING FOR FAHMY TO REALIZE IS THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION ON OUR PART TO HIDE ANYTHING OR DISSEMBLE WITH HIM. WE APPRECIATE AMOUNT OF PUBLICITY ON PERSHING'S HAS CONTRIBUTED TO AGITATION IN ARAB WORLD. YOU MIGHT MENTION ONE THING IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AS SOMEWHAT OF A SILVER LINING. PUBLICITY ON PERSHING'S HAS NOT ONLY LED TO MORE SEARCHING CONGRESSIONAL REFLECTION ON DETAILS OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL BUT HAS CONTRIBUTED SOME PERSPECTIVE ON QUESTION OF FUTURE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT. IT IS INTERESTING TO US THAT SATURDAY MORNING NEW YORK TIMES CARRIED A FIRST PAGE STORY WHICH REFLECTED WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. WOULD CONSIDER EGYPT'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND THERE HAS NOT BEEN THE OUTCRY THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. IN SAYING THIS, HOWEVER, PLEASE AVOID ANY IMPLICATION THAT THIS NECESSARILY FORESHADOWS A FAVORABLE DECISION. POINT TO MAKE IS SIMPLY THAT ATMOSPHERE IN CONGRESS IN AFTERMATH OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON ARMS ASSISTANCE FOR EGYPT HAS IMPROVED TO POINT WHERE IT CAN BE SUBJECT FOR RATIONAL DISCUSSION. INGERSOLL

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6830

SECRET CAIRO 9713

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR UNGA EG IS
SUBJECT: FAHMY ON PROPOSAL FOR INFORMAL MULTILATERAL MEETING

REF: STATE 231016

1. WHEN MEETING WITH FAHMY TODAY, I CONVEYED POINTS MADE REFTEL IN YOUR BEHALF. FAHMY WAS APPRECIATIVE AND SAID HE HAD SUSPECTED YOUR INITIATIVE HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH SOVIET PARTICIPATION. HE PICKED UP THE POINT ON GROMYKO'S NEGATIVE COMMENTS TO YOU RE RECONVENING GENEVA AND NOTED THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO GROMYKO'S RECENT UNGA SPEECH CALLING FOR GENEVA. HE WONDERED IF THERE ARE SOME NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SYRIAN FRONT WHICH MAY HAVE CAUSED A SOVIET CHANGE OF HEART.

2. FAHMY SEEMED PUZZLED ABOUT SYRIAN ATTITUDES. ADVERTING TO OUR EARLIER EXCHANGES ABOUT A POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND ASAD SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE, HE ASKED IF THIS IDEA HAD INITIALLY BEEN FLOATED BY THE SYRIANS OR BY US? IS IT WE OR THEY WHO ARE TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO TRY TO GET SOME MOVEMENT? I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAVE SEVERAL TIMES, BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY, TOLD THE SYRIANS WE ARE READY TO TRY TO HELP TO WORK

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OUT SOMETHING ON GOLAN IF THE PARTIES WISH. I AGAIN INVITED HIS ATTENTION TO ALLON'S STATEMENT, AFTER THE LATTER'S MEETING WITH YOU, THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO HOLD SUCH TALKS WITHOUT CONDITIONS. I THOUGHT WE HAD SHOWN IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE OUR DESIRE TO ENCOURAGE SUCH TALKS.

3. FAHMY AGREED, BUT NOTED SYRIAN PUBLIC INSISTENCE THAT THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN OFFERED ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON GOLAN. HE WAS SURE THE SYRIANS ARE ENGAGING IN SOPHISTRY, BUT IT IS THIS PUBLIC SYRIAN DENIAL WHICH CREATES PROBLEMS FOR THE EGYPTIANS. SADAT AND HE HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID GOE WAS ASSURED DURING SECOND DISENGAGEMENT TALKS THAT USG WOULD ALSO TRY TO MOVE AHEAD ON SYRIAN FRONT. I TOLD HIM HE WAS ABSOLUTELY RIGHT ON THIS POINT. AS HE KNEW, WE HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE THE POINT OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO HELP IF THE PARTIES WISH.

4. FAHMY SAID HE FULLY BELIEVES WHAT WE HAVE TOLD EGYPTIANS, BUT REMAINS PUZZLED ABOUT SYRIAN ATTITUDES. HE LOOKS FORWARD TO THE REPORT ON YOUR MEETING WITH KHADDAM. THIS MAY ENABLE HIM TO COME UP WITH SOME HELPFUL IDEAS ON HOW YOUR INFORMAL MULTILATERAL CONCEPT MIGHT BE WORKED OUT. THE SYRIANS, IN HIS VIEW, DESPITE THEIR APPARENT STANDOFF ATTITUDE, WANT A

SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND DONOT WANT TO CLOSE THE DOOR TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PERTINENT TALKS TO ACHIEVE ONE.
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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 09720 301433Z

HAVE A REPORT ON YOUR MEETING WITH KHADDAM. ARABS ARE LIKELY SPECULATE MY TRIP HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH SYRIAN FONMIN'S VISIT, POSSIBLE GOLAN NEGOTIATIONS AND SYRIAN ATTACKS ON EGYPT.

4. I NOW HAVE AIR RESERVATIONS FOR COMING THURSDAY. SHOULD I NOT GET SADAT'S REPLIES TOMORROW, PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY IF I SHOULD SLIP MY DEPARTURE BY A DAY OR SO.
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Department of State

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U.S. Mission to the U.N.

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NODIS
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FOL SENT ACTION TO SECSTATE SEPT 30, 1975 FROM CAIRO

QUOTE S E C R E T CAIRO 9720

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG US
SUBJECT: MY RETURN

REF: STATE 231389 - T-140026

1. WHEN I MET WITH FAHMY TODAY, I TOLD HIM THAT SECRETARY HAS ASKED ME TO COME BACK TO DISCUSS UPCOMING SADAT VISIT. I PLANNED TO DEPART THURSDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 2. A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR FIRDAY. I DID NOT KNOW HOW LONG I WOULD BE AWAY, BUT THOUGHT PERHAPS FOUR OR FIVE DAYS.

2. FAHMY IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED THAT I SHOULD NOT RPT NOT LEAVE UNTIL WE HAVE SADAT'S ANSWERS ON THE ISRAELI CARGO TRANSIT ISSUE AND ON THE TENTATIVE SCHEDULE. HE HAD GIVEN PAPERS TO SADAT ON THESE MATTERS TWO EVENINGS AGO, BUT HAS HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THEM WITH THE PRESIDNET. HE HOPED SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY WOULD ARISE IN NEXT FEW DAYS. PERHAPS WE WILL HAVE REPLIES TOMORROW, WEDNESDAY. HOWEVER, IF NOT, HE URGED THAT I DELAY MY DEPARTURE BY A DAY OR SO. I SHOULD HAVE THIS INFORMATION BEFORE I GO BACK.

3. FAHMY SAID ANOTHER REASON FOR DELAYING A DAY OR SO, IF NECESSARY, IS THAT SADAT AND HE SHOULD FIRST HAVE A REPORT ON YOUR MEETING WITH KHADDAM. ARABS ARE KIKELY SPECULATE MY TRIP HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH SYRIAN FONMIN'S VISIT. POSSIBLE GOLAN NEGOTIATIONS AND SYRAIN

4. I NOW HAVE AIR RESERVATIONS FOR COMING THURSDAY.
SHOULD I NOT GET SADAT'S REPLIES TOMORROW, PLEASE ADVISE
URGENTLY IF I SHOULD SLIP MY DEPARTURE BY A DAY OR
SO.


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TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
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USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 223626

NODIS

E,D. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XF, EG, IS, US

SUBJECT: INITIALING OF PROTOCOL IN GENEVA WORKING GROUP

FOR AMBASSADOR

GENEVA FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS

1. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRIME MINISTER RABIN, ISRAELI MINISTER SHALEV RELAYED FOLLOWING TODAY TO UNDER SECRETARY SISCO. ISRAELIS BELIEVE PROTOCOL WILL BE READY FOR SIGNING IN GENEVA BY EARLY NEXT WEEK. RABIN INTENDS TO OBTAIN CABINET APPROVAL AT SUNDAY CABINET MEETING FOR INITIALING PROTOCOL WHEN IT IS AGREED UPON, WITH FULL SIGNATURES TO FOLLOW U.S. CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL RE U.S. ROLE IN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM. RABIN WOULD LIKE USG TO SEEK EGYPTIAN CONCURRENCE IN THIS PROCEDURE.

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2. YOU SHOULD SEE FANNY AND DESCRIBE PROCEDURE OUTLINED ABOVE WHICH ISRAELIS ARE SUGGESTING. YOU SHOULD TELL HIM THAT THIS SEEMS TO BE PRACTICAL WAY OF HANDLING PROBLEM, THAT WE ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE COMPLETED CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

HERE BEFORE PROTOCOL IS COMPLETED AND SUGGEST, IF HE ALSO SEES NO PROBLEMS WITH THIS, THAT EGYPTIAN DELEGATION IN GENEVA BE INSTRUCTED ACCORDINGLY. KISSINGER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6578

SECRET CAIRO 9312

NODIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR XF EG IS US
SUBJECT: HANDLING OF PROTOCOL IN GENEVA WORKING GROUP

REF: STATE 223626

1. I CALLED FAHMY THIS MORNING TO RAISE WITH HIM INITIALING/SIGNING PROCEDURE AS SUGGESTED BY THE ISRAELIS. I TOLD HIM THAT WE REGARD THE PROPOSED SEQUENTIAL PROCEDURE AS A PRACTICAL WAY TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM, SINCE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE WILL HAVE COMPLETED CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BEFORE THE PROTOCOL IS READY EARLY NEXT WEEK. I ASKED FOR HIS CONCURRENCE THAT THAT EGYPTIAN DELEGATION IN GENEVA BE SO INSTRUCTED.

2. FAHMY'S REACTION WAS NEGATIVE. HE HAD HEARD ABOUT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL YESTERDAY IN A MESSAGE FROM THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION IN GENEVA. HE SEES THIS RABIN PROPOSAL AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF AN ISRAELI DESIRE TO STALL. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD WARNED THE SECRETARY DURING THE ALEXANDRIA SHUTTLE THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN AND HAD STRESSED GOW WILL INSIST UPON EXPEDITIOUS SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL.

3. FAHMY CONTENDED THAT SIGNING THE PROTOCOL SHOULD BE TOTALLY INDEPENDENT OF ACTION ON THE US PROPOSAL. THE PROTOCOL SHOULD BE SIGNED AS SOON

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AS IT IS READY AND HE ARGUED THE PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE OF THE ANNEX SUPPORTS THIS. THERE IS NO NEED FOR A PRELIMINARY INITIALING STEP PENDING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE US PROPOSAL. THE AGREEMENT AND ANNEX SHOULD AND COULD STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET.

4. I REMINDED HIM THAT, AS HE KNEW, THE ISRAELIS HAVE MADE THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT CONDITIONAL UPON AN AMERICAN PRESENCE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND INDICATED GOE ALSO WANTS AN AMERICAN PRESENCE. GOE, HOWEVER CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT IMPLEMENTATION OR CONTINUATION OF THE AGREEMENT IS CONDITIONED UPON AN AMERICAN PRESENCE. HE RECALLED PARA 8 OF THE US PROPOSAL ALLOWS FOR THE CONTINGENCY THAT THE USG MAY AT SOME TIME WITHDRAW THE AMERICANS IN WHICH CASE "ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS" WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. JUDGING FROM ALL REPORTS, HE ASSUMED THE CONGRESS WILL APPROVE THE US PROPOSAL, BUT EVEN IF THERE IS A "5 PERCENT" CHANCE THAT IT WILL NOT, GOE CANNOT ACCEPT ANY INTERPRETATION SUGGESTING THAT IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY THE AGREEMENT IS INVALID. SHOULD THERE BE CONGRESSIONAL REJECTION, HE ARGUED, IT WOULD THEN BE UP TO THE USG TO SO ADVISE THE PARTIES UNDER PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE US PROPOSAL SO THEY CAN MAKE THE "ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS" MENTIONED THEREIN. SINCE THIS CONTINGENCY HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, HE COULD NOT AGREE THAT SIGNING MUST AWAIT APPROVAL.

5. I POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT TWO SEPARATE THINGS -- INITIAL FINALIZATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF AT SOME FUTURE DATE THE USG FELT IT HAD TO WITHDRAW ITS PEOPLE. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE AGREEMENT OR ANNEX ABOUT "ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS". THUS, HIS CONTENTION COULD HARDLY BE SUSTAINED. HE INSISTED ON HIS POSITION AND THAT GOE WANTS SIGNING TO TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS THE PROTOCOL IS FINISHED.

6. FAHMY ALSO RECALLED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD

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NO DISSEMINATION



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TOLD PRESIDENT SADAT AND HIM IN ALEXANDRIA THAT WE BELIEVE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE TIME THE PROTOCOL IS READY. SINCE WE HAVE NOW APPARENTLY CHANGED THIS ESTIMATE, HE WONDERED WHEN CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS LIKELY TO BE COMPLETED.

7. COMMENT: FAHMY'S REACTION WAS PREDICTABLE AND REFLECTS (A) GOE ANXIETY TO GET SIGNING OUT OF THE WAY, AND (B) CONTINUING MISTRUST OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS. EGYPTIAN CASE IS WEAK, BUT WE MAY EXPECT THEM TO PUSH STRONGLY FOR IT. OUR SIDING WITH ISRAELIS WILL SIT BADLY HERE AND BE VIEWED AS US SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI DESIRE TO STAVE OFF IMPLEMENTATION AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. BEST WAY TO GET EGYPTIANS TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROBLEM, WITHOUT IMPUGNING OUR MOTIVES, IS IF WE CAN GIVE THEM SOME ASSURANCE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WILL BE COMPLETED IN WEEK OR SO AFTER PROTOCOL COMPLETED. I DO NOT, OF COURSE, KNOW IF WE CAN MAKE SUCH ESTIMATE.

8. SUGGEST DEPT PASS THIS MESSAGE TO TEL AVIV AND GENEVA FOR SAUNDERS.
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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6579

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 9313

NODIS

FOR SISCO AND ATHERTON FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, EG, US, IS
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT
AGREEMENT: OIL FIELD TAKEOVER

REF: STATE 222715 (REPEATED GENEVA 7151)

1. IN CONNECTION WITH HAL SAUNDER'S EXCELLENT TELEGRAM FROM GENEVA, I SHOULD TELL YOU THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE EGYPTIAN SITUATION IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. ONE OF MY EMBASSY OFFICERS HAS HAD TALKS WITH BOTH SPIELMAN OF MOBIL AND MUSTAFA AL AYUTI, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF EGPC AND THE MAN DESIGNATED BY GOE TO COORDINATE SINAI OIL FIELD RECOVERY PLANS HERE IN CAIRO. THESE HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN CAIRO 9123 AND 9133 RESPECTIVELY. TO SUMMARIZE A FEW PERTINENT POINTS AS SEEN FROM HERE:

A. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT AN EGYPTIAN TECHNICAL FORCE IS IN FACT STANDING BY READY TO GO BACK INTO SINAI. WE KNOW THAT FORMER TECHNICIANS WHO WORKED AT SINAI FIELDS ARE STILL BEING PAID BY MOBIL AND THE EGYPTIAN PETROLEUM COMPANY, BUT THERE IS NO RPT NO INDICATION THAT A TASK FORCE IS BEING ROUNDED UP TO MOVE IN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE ISRAELIS DEPART. AYUTI HAS TOLD DON SPIELMAN OF MOBIL THAT FOREIGN TECHNICIANS WILL MAN THE FIELDS "UNTIL THE EGYPTIANS ARRIVE", WHENEVER THIS MIGHT BE. AT ONE POINT AYUTI MENTIONED THIS MIGHT BE AS LONG AS A MONTH.

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
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR XF EG IS US
SUBJECT: HANDLING OF PROTOCOL IN GENEVA WORKING GROUP
REF: CAIRO 9312

GENEVA FOR SAUNDERS
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD GO BACK TO FAHMY AND TELL HIM I MUST ASK THAT HE RECONSIDER THE POSITION HE TOOK IN YOUR CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL. BY THE TERMS OF THE BASIC AGREEMENT, IT IS TO ENTER INTO FORCE UPON "THE SIGNATURE" OF THE PROTOCOL. GIVEN FACT THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF U.S. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TO THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT AND THAT THIS PROPOSAL REQUIRES U.S. CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, THE AGREEMENT BY DEFINITION CANNOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL SUCH APPROVAL HAS BEEN OBTAINED. QUITE APART FROM WHAT EVER THE ISRAELIS MAY HAVE SUGGESTED, THIS IS A U.S. PROBLEM AND WE MUST ASK FOR FAHMY'S UNDERSTANDING. IT IS

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U.S. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, WHICH WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING TO EXPEDITE, AND NOT THE ISRAELIS WHICH IS THE REASON FOR THIS SLIGHT DELAY.

2. OUR PRESENT ESTIMATE IS THAT FINAL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE PROPOSAL WILL COME DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 29, AFTER WHICH SIGNATURE AND THE ENTRY INTO FORCE WOULD TAKE PLACE PROMPTLY. IT SEEMS TO US THAT IDEA OF INITIALLYING THE PROTOCOL WHEN COMPLETED, THUS FREEZING THE TEXT, IS A PRACTICAL WAY TO DEAL WITH WHAT WE ANTICIPATE WILL BE A SHORT INTERVAL BETWEEN COMPLETION OF THE PROTOCOL AND COMPLETION OF OUR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. AFTER FAHMY HAS HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW THIS PROBLEM IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, WE HOPE WE CAN EXPECT HIS AGREEMENT.

3. FOR FILTS: WE NEED EARLIEST POSSIBLE REPORT OF FAHMY'S REACTION SINCE GENEVA WORKING GROUP NEGOTIATIONS APPEAR TO BE APPROACHING A CONCLUSION ON SCHEDULE. KISSINGER

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 STATE 225007

PREPARED TO RECONVENE IT.

4. IN ALL, THE TALKS ARE GOING AS WE HAD PLANNED AND THE SOVIETS ARE SHOWING A HEALTHY DEGREE OF RESTRAINT. I WILL SEND FAHMY A FURTHER, MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR DISCUSSIONS. KISSINGER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6612

SECRET CAIRO 9362

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, GE, IS, US
SUBJECT: HANDLING OF PROTOCOL IN GENEVA WORKING GROUP

REF: STATE 224933

1. SUMMARY. MADE PRESENTATION REFTEL ABOUT INITIALING/SIGNING OF PROTOCOL AND ASKED FAHMY TO RECONSIDER. HE WAS ADAMANT. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING US PROPOSAL IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF AGREEMENT, HE DENIED THAT THIS MEANS THAT PROTOCOL CANNOT BE SIGNED UNTIL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TAKES PLACE. PROTOCOL SHOULD BE SIGNED WHEN COMPLETED AND IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BEGIN WITHOUT DELAY. HE INSTRUCTED COL. UKAIDI, NOW HERE FROM GENEVA, THAT THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION IS TO SIGN THE PROTOCOL AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED EVEN IF THE ISRAELIS ONLY INITIAL. IN THAT EVENT, EGYPTIANS WILL NOT GO BACK TO SIGN AGAIN AFTER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, AND SILAASVUO WILL HAVE TO TAKE IT TO THE ISRAELIS TO SIGN. I POINTED OUT UNILATERAL EGYPTIAN SIGNING WILL NOT CAUSE THE AGREEMENT TO GO INTO FORCE AND WILL ONLY SPOTLIGHT PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCE. FAHMY REMAINED UNMOVED AND HAD GAMASY REITERATE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS TO UKAIDI. END SUMMARY.

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2. AS REPORTED IN ANOTHER TELEGRAM, I RAN INTO A HORNET'S NEST THIS MORNING WITH FAHMY, GAMASY AND SOME OF THEIR STAFFS IN CONNECTION WITH THE GENEVA TALKS. AT THE END OF THEIR OUTRAGED PRESENTATION TO ME, I SAID I HAD TO RAISE THE MATTER OF THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL THAT FAHMY AND I HAD DISCUSSED YESTERDAY. I POINTED OUT THAT THE TERMS OF THE BASIC AGREEMENT STIPULATE IT WILL ENTER INTO FORCE UPON SIGNATURE OF THE PROTOCOL. SINCE THE ASSIGNMENT OF US CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TO THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM UNDER THE US PROPOSAL IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT, AND THE US PROPOSAL REQUIRES US CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, IT FOLLOWS THAT THE AGREEMENT CANNOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL SUCH APPROVAL HAS BEEN OBTAINED. I STRESSED THAT, QUITE APART FROM WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE SUGGESTED, THIS IS A US PROBLEM. IT IS LACK OF US CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, NOT THE ISRAELIS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SLIGHT DELAY. I GAVE OUR PRESENT ESTIMATE THAT FINAL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE PROPOSAL WILL TAKE PLACE DURING WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 29, AFTER WHICH SIGNATURE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE CAN TAKE PLACE PROMPTLY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE IDEA OF INITIALING THE PROTOCOL WHEN COMPLETED, AND THEREBY FREEZING THE TEXT, IS A PRACTICAL WAY TO DEAL WITH WHAT WE ANTICIPATE WILL BE NO MORE THAN A SHORT INTERVAL BETWEEN COMPLETION OF THE PROTOCOL AND OF OUR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. I URGED FAHMY TO RECONSIDER THE PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT I SAID AND CONCUR IN THE PROPOSED INITIALING PROCEDURE.

3. GAMASY GROANED THAT HERE WAS MORE DELAY. FAHMY REMAINED ADAMANT. WHILE HE AGREED THAT THE US PROPOSAL IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT, HE INSISTED THAT THIS DOES NOT MEAN EVERYTHING HAS TO STAND STILL BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THAT PROPOSAL. GOE CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT THIS MEANS NOTHING CAN PROCEED. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE BASIC AGREEMENT OR THE ANNEX, HE INSISTED, THAT SAYS SIGNATURE OF THE PROTOCOL CANNOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE US PROPOSAL IS FINALIZED. THE REFERENCE IN THE AGREEMENT TO THE

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EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IS NOT CONDITIONAL. WE ARE SIDING WITH THE ISRAELIS, HE CHARGED, WHOSE SOLE PURPOSE AS WE WELL KNOW IS TO DELAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE, ALL OF THIS HAPPENS WHEN STRIDENT SYRIAN, PALESTINIAN AND RADICAL ARAB CRITICISM OF SADAT CONTINUES UNABATED. THE PROTOCOL, HE INSISTED, SHOULD BE SIGNED WHEN IT IS COMPLETED REGARDLESS OF THE STATUS OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AT THAT TIME.

4. I TOLD FAHMY THAT IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT DO SO UNTIL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE US PROPOSAL IS COMPLETED. THE ISRAELI POSITION IS REASONABLE, AND, WHILE WE REGRET THE DELAY, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD NOT BE MORE THAN A WEEK OR SO. I URGED THAT HE RECONSIDER. FAHMY RESPONDED THAT HE ACCEPTS OUR WORD THAT FAVORABLE ACTION WILL EVENTUALLY BE TAKEN BY THE CONGRESS ON THE US PROPOSAL. THERE IS NO REASON WHY ISRAEL, WITH ITS GREAT INFLUENCE IN THE CONGRESS AND ABILITY TO MANIPULATE THE JEWISH LOBBY TO MAKE THE CONGRESS BEND TO ITS WILL, SHOULD NOT DO THE SAME. HE RECALLED THE CONCERN HE HAD EXPRESSED TO YOU THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL ALLOW EVERYTHING TO BE COMPLETED AND THEN WORK ON THE CONGRESS TO DISAPPROVE THE US PROPOSAL SO AS TO DELAY THINGS MORE. I TOLD FAHMY THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST ANY SUCH ISRAELI INTENTION, NOR SHOULD HE BELIEVE THE CONGRESS WILL SIMPLY DO ISRAELIS BIDDING, ALTHOUGH IN THIS CASE AS HE KNEW THE ISRAELIS WANT THE US MANNED-STATIONS BADLY AND SUPPORT THE CONCEPT.

5. FAHMY WOULD NOT BUDGE. HE INSTRUCTED COL. UWAIQI, WHO IS GOING BACK TO GENEVA THIS EVENING, THAT GENERAL MAGHDUB IS TO SIGN RPT SIGN THE PROTOCOL WHEN IT IS COMPLETED REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE ISRAELIS DO. IF THE ISRAELIS SIMPLY WANT TO INITIAL, THAT IS THEIR BUSINESS. THE EGYPTIANS WILL NOT RPT NOT SIGN AGAIN ONCE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS COMPLETED. SILAASVUD CAN THEREAFTER TAKE THE DOCUMENT TO THE ISRAELIS FOR THEIR SIGNATURE. I REMINDED HIM THAT

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ANY UNILATERAL EGYPTIAN SIGNING WILL NOT MEAN THAT THE AGREEMENT IS IN FORCE. BOTH SIDES MUST SIGN BEFORE THIS IS THE CASE. GOE WILL NOT BE ACCELERATING IMPLEMENTATION BY SUCH ACTION, BUT WILL SIMPLY SPOTLIGHT A PROCEDURAL DISAGREEMENT. FARMY WOULD NOT BE MOVED. IF THE ISRAELIS DELAY IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT, HE STATED, EGYPT WILL LET IT BE KNOWN. IN ANY CASE, EGYPT'S SIGNING WILL DEMONSTRATE GOE'S DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD. CONVERSELY, ISRAELIS' FAILURE TO DO SO WILL DEMONSTRATE HER DESIRE TO DELAY. GAMASY REPEATED THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO UWAIFI.

6. COMMENT: THE EGYPTIANS ARE BEING FOOLISH, BUT THEIR CONCERN IS PROMPTED BY AN OVERWHELMING SUSPICION THAT THE ISRAELIS MEAN TO DELAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. HAD THERE BEEN A LITTLE MORE ISRAELI FORTHCOMINGNESS AT THE GENEVA TALKS, THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A LITTLE MORE RECEPTIVITY HERE. UNFORTUNATELY, AFTER UWAIFI'S REPORT, THE EGYPTIANS ARE SO SOURED THAT THEY VIEW EVERY ISRAELI SUGGESTION AS GUILE. HE COULD GO OVER FARMY'S AND GAMASY'S HEADS AND APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT I DOUBT THAT HIS RESPONSE WILL BE DIFFERENT. HE, TOO, IS FED UP AND TENSE BECAUSE OF ARAB ATTACKS. HE WANTS TO GET IT ALL OUT OF THE WAY. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT SEEMS TO ME WE HAVE THE CHOICE OF (A) ASKING THE ISRAELIS ALSO TO SIGN ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT FAVORABLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS EXPECTED SOON AND THAT THE FIRST IMPLEMENTATION STEPS ARE IN ANY CASE NOT SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, OR (B) LETTING THE EGYPTIANS SIGN AND THE ISRAELIS INITIAL WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT GO INTO FORCE UNTIL BOTH SIDES HAVE SIGNED.

7. SUGGEST THIS MESSAGE BE PASSED TO GENEVA FOR HAL SAUNDERS.
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NO019

EO 11652: GDS
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SUBJECT: FAHMY/GAMASY ON GENEVA TALKS

Egypt

SUMMARY: FAHMY, GAMASY, HILAL AND AIDES MET TODAY TO CONSIDER UHAIDI'S REPORT ABOUT GENEVA TALKS. I WAS RECEIVED IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS OUTRAGED CONCLAVE. ON FAHMY'S INSTRUCTIONS, HILAL RECALLED GOE UNDERSTANDING OIL FIELDS WOULD BE RETURNED WITH NEEDED INFRASTRUCTURE TO PERMIT CONTINUED OPERATION. ISRAELIS HAVE NOW GIVEN EGYPTIANS A LIST OF EQUIPMENT THEY INTEND TO TAKE OUT. IF THEY DO, GOE CANNOT OPERATE FIELDS. MOREOVER, MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT WAS THERE BEFORE 1967. FAHMY INSISTED US CREDIBILITY IS INVOLVED IN PREVENTING ISRAEL FROM DOING THIS. HILAL ALSO SPOKE OF FOUR OIL WELLS OUTSIDE OF EGYPTIAN AREA, WHICH ISRAELIS HAVE NOW SAID THEY WILL NOT USE. FAHMY INSISTED THIS IS NOT ENOUGH AND THERE SHOULD BE A REDRAWING OF THE LINE IN THOSE AREAS, THROUGH AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES, TO INCLUDE THESE WELLS IN EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. HE ARGUED THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH US PROMISE THAT OIL FIELDS WOULD BE RETURNED AND THAT US RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS OMISSION BECAUSE HE FAILED PROVIDE MAP UNTIL LAST MINUTE. EGYPTIANS ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT ISRAELI PROPOSAL RE EGYPTIAN TAKEOVER OF RAS AL-SIDR, AND BELAYIM FIELDS. GAMASY SPOKE OF UNSATISFACTORY NATURE OF PROPOSED MILITARY REDEPLOYMENT IN NORTH WITH NO ISRAELI MOVEMENT UNTIL

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FEBRUARY. BOTH HE AND FAHMY STRONGLY OBJECTED TO ISRAELI SUGGESTION THAT JOINT COMMISSION BE INSTITUTIONALIZED WITH REGULAR MEETINGS, PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS AND WHAT WOULD IN EFFECT BE AN ISRAELI VETO COMMISSION SHOULD MEET AS NEEDED, NEEDS NO PERMANENT STAFF OR BUILDING, AND SHOULD DECIDE ON BASIS MAJORITY NOT UNANIMITY. GAMASY WANTS NOTHING IN THE PROTOCOL ABOUT THE COMMISSION. GAMASY AND FAHMY ALSO OBJECTED TO ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO PERMIT BOTH PARTIES TO USE THE GIDI ROAD TO GET TO THE SURVEILLANCE STATIONS. EGYPTIAN UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN NEITHER PARTY SHOULD USE IT AND EACH SHOULD USE ITS OWN ROAD TO ITS INSTALLATION. ISRAELI PROPOSAL, EGYPTIANS ARGUED, WOULD MEAN THEY ARE STILL IN THE PASSES AND CONTRAVENES PARA 2(B) OF US PROPOSAL. FAHMY ASKED THAT SECRETARY CONSIDER THESE POINTS AND TALK TO ISRAELIS. UWAIDI INSTRUCTED KEEP IN TOUCH WITH SAUNDERS ABOUT OUR REACTION AND SADAT. FAHMY AND GAMASY ALSO WISH TO KNOW WHAT ACTION WE MAY DECIDE TO TAKE. END SUMMARY

1. IN RESPONSE MY REQUEST TO SEE FAHMY ON THE PROTOCOL SIGNING ISSUE (SEPTTEL) I WAS ASKED TO COME BY AT NOON TODAY. I WALKED INTO A HORNET'S NEST. IN ADDITION TO FAHMY, GENERAL GAMASY, MINPET HILAL, COL UWAIDI AND OSAMA AL-BAZ WERE PRESENT. THEY HAD APPARENTLY BEEN MEETING FOR AN HOURS OR SO TO HEAR UWAIDI'S REPORT OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE GENEVA TALKS. THE EGYPTIANS WERE TENSE AND OUTRAGED ABOUT WHAT HAD BEEN REPORTED TO THEM. FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES MY TWO AND A HALF HOUR, OFTEN STORMY SESSION.

2. OIL FIELDS:

(A) INFRASTRUCTURE:

AT FAHMY'S REQUEST, HILAL STATED GOE HAD UNDERSTOOD IT WAS TO BE GIVEN THE OIL FIELDS IN WORKING CONDITION TO PERMIT CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS. READING PARA 3(C) OF THE ANNEX, HE

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STATED, IT HAD BEEN GOE'S UNDERSTANDING FROM TALKS WITH US THAT INFRASTRUCTURE REFERRED TO IN THAT PARAGRAPH INCLUDED REQUIRED TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT, RIGS AND EVERYTHING IN THE FIELDS. LAST NIGHT ISRAELIS HAD GIVEN UWAIDI A LIST OF ITEMS WHICH THEY INTEND TO WITHDRAW. IF THEY DO SO HILAL ASSERTED, GOE CANNOT RPT CANNOT OPERATE THE FIELDS. IT WILL TAKE TWO YEARS FOR EGYPT TO PUT THEM BACK INTO OPERATION. MORE- OVER HILAL CONTENDED, MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT THAT ISRAEL CLAIMS IT BROUGHT INTO THE OIL FIELDS IS REALLY EQUIPMENT THAT WAS ALREADY THERE WHEN THEY SEIZED THE FIELDS IN 1967. HE THEN SHOWED ME THE LIST WHICH UWAIDI HAD BROUGHT AND MADE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS.

(1) IN REFERRING TO A "JACK-UP BARGE", (PRESUMABLY THE LEPELAAR), USED AS A FLOATING RIG TO REPAIR OIL WELLS, HILAL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BARGE HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN BY THE ISRAELIS, BUT INSISTED THE RIG WAS EGYPTIAN. THE BARGE, HE SAID, IS NEEDED IF THE FIELDS ARE TO CONTINUE OPERATION.

(2) SO FAR AS THE SUPPLY SHIP AND THE FOUR DIVER BOATS, HILAL INSISTED THERE HAD BEEN MORE SUCH VESSELS THERE IN 1967. THEY SHOULD THEREFORE BE LEFT BEHIND.

(3) ON THE HELICOPTERS, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SAID THEY WILL LEAVE ON OUT OF FOUR. GAMASY INTERJECTED GOE WANTS NONE.

(4) ISRAELIS HAVE SAID THEY WILL LEAVE ONE OF THE TWO DC-3S HERE. AGAIN GAMASY SAID GOE WANTS NONE.

(5) ON THE VEHICLES, HILAL NOTED THE ISRAELIS WANT TO TAKE OUT 80 AND LEAVE 5. WHEN THEY TOOK THE FIELDS, HE INSISTED, THERE WERE 150 EGYPTIAN VEHICLES. FANMY INTERJECTED HE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE ISRAELIS ARE "STEALING" PROPERTY THAT PROPERLY

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BELONGS TO EGYPTIANS.

(6) THE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS THEY PROPOSE TO TAKE, HILAL INSISTED, HAD BEEN THERE IN 1967. THEY, TOO, ARE NEEDED AND SHOULD BE LEFT BEHIND.

(7) THE SY-711 DRILLING RIG AND CARAVANS, HILAL INSISTED, WAS ONE OF FIVE RIGS WHICH THE EGYPTIANS HAD LEFT. THE RIG SHOULD STAY.

(8) THE FRANKS DRILLING RIG WAS ALSO ONE OF FIVE WHICH HAD BEEN THERE. IT IS NEEDED AND SHOULD BE LEFT BEHIND.

(9) DRILLING, CEMENTING AND LOGGING EQUIPMENT IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IF THE FIELDS ARE TO BE KEPT IN CONTINUOUS OPERATION AND SHOULD BE LEFT.

(10) SO ARE WATER SUPPLY PUMPS, GENERATORS AND PIPES WHICH THE ISRAELIS SAY THEY WILL TAKE OUT.

(11) ON GENERAL STORES AND INVENTORY, HILAL INDICATED THESE ALSO CONTAIN NEEDED SPARE PARTS.

(12) THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE EYLAT BARGE AND CARAVANS. IT IS NEEDED FOR OPERATIONS.

FAHMY THEN TOOK OVER TO RECALL HE HAS A LETTER FROM US THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT TAKE ANYTHING NEEDED TO OPERATE THE FIELDS AND WILL LEAVE THE FIELDS INTACT. HE ECHOED HILAL'S CONTENTION THAT THE ITEMS MENTIONED FIT INTO THE CATEGORY OF "CURRENTLY EXISTING EQUIPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE". IN VIEW OF OUR LETTER, FAHMY ARGUED, US CREDIBILITY IS AT STAKE IN THIS MATTER. GOE LOOKS TO USG TO OBJECT TO SUCH "UNACCEPTABLE, UNETHICAL METHODS", AND DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT. WE SHOULD EITHER TELL THE ISRAELIS TO LEAVE EVERYTHING THAT THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO LEAVE OR DEDUCT THE VALUE FROM OUR AID TO ISRAEL.

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(B) MATAARMA-ASL WELLS: FAHMY THEN ASKED HILAL TO SHOW ME ON THE MAP FOUR OIL WELLS WHICH, IT TURNS OUT, ARE OUTSIDE OF THE EGYPTIAN AREA. THREE ARE JUST ACROSS THE LINE IN THE MATAARMA AREA AND ONE IN THE ASL (ASL 27) AREA. THE ISRAELIS HAD DECEIVED GOE BY TALKING ABOUT RETURNING ALL THE FIELDS, BUT DRAWING A LINE WHICH EXCLUDED SOME OF THE WELLS. THIS LED TO A LONG DIATRIBE ABOUT HOW GAMASY HAD REPEATEDLY ASKED FOR THE MAP, BUT HAD NOT

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BEEN GIVEN IT BY US UNTIL THE FINAL DAY. THIS WAS THE SAME TACTIC WE HAD FOLLOWED WITH THE FIRST DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION. I SAID I COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS, AS HE SHOULD KNOW BETTER THAN ANYONE, WE HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. THE MAP HAD BEEN SHOWN AS SOON AS IT WAS AVAILABLE. AS HE ALSO KNEW, I HAD GIVEN SEVERAL MAPS TO THE EGYPTIANS AS WE MOVED TOWARD THE SHUTTLE. HOW WAS IT THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE NOT AWARE OF THESE WELLS? HILAL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE KNEW ABOUT THEM. I THEN POINTEDLY ASKED FAHMY WHY, IN THAT CASE, HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THEM AT THE TIME OF THE ALEXANDRIA TALKS? HAD THERE BEEN NO COORDINATION BETWEEN THEM? GAMASY SHOOK HIS HEAD SADLY AND EVEN FAHMY WINCED A BIT. GAMASY RECALLED THAT THE ISRAELI "EXCUSE" FOR DRAWING THE LINE WHERE IT IS WAS THE ROAD, ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THE ROAD IS SOME DISTANCE FROM THE FOUR WELLS IN QUESTION. THE ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION IN GENEVA THAT THEY WILL NOT USE THESE WELLS. FAHMY INSISTED THIS IS NOT ENOUGH. THE SITUATION HAS TO BE CORRECTED. WE HAD ASSURED GOE IT WOULD GET THE OIL FIELDS BACK. THAT MEANS ALL OF THE WELLS. THE LINE SHOULD BE CHANGED IN THE TWO AREAS. FAHMY PROPOSED, BY A HALF OR ONE KILOMETER. THIS COULD BE DONE BY MUTUAL CONSENT THROUGH AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES. GAMASY CLAIMED THAT SUCH AN

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ALTERATION WOULD HAVE NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

(C) ABU RUDAYS:BELAYINI:UWAIDI EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT, GIVEN THE WAY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA, THEY WILL IN FACT ARRANGE TO REMOVE EQUIPMENT FROM THIS AREA. HE HAD NO TRUST IN THE ISRAELI WORD AND WAS FEARFUL THAT THEY WOULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT THE PROPOSED CLOSE-DOWN WAS PROPERLY DONE. THIS CAUSED A LENGTHY DISCUSSION AMONG THE EGYPTIANS PRESENT ABOUT THE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE NEEDED IN THE SOUTHERN FIELDS TO KEEP THEM OPERATING AND ENI'S INABILITY TO PROVIDE MORE THAN 20 OR 30. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HILAL SAID, HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ARRANGE A CONTROLLED CLOSE DOWN. FAHMY INSTRUCTED HILAL TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ITALIANS FOR MORE PEOPLE SO THE FIELDS CAN BE KEPT OPERATING, AS A FINAL FALLBACK, HOWEVER, HE AUTHORIZED HIM TO DEPLOY THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF EGYPTIANS (PERHAPS AS HIGH AS 70) TO BE SENT WITH THE ITALIANS WHEN THE LATTER GO IN SO THE FIELDS CAN CONTINUE TO OPERATE. UWAIDI WAS INSTRUCTED NOT TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THIS TO THE ISRAELIS. INSTEAD, HE IS TO SAY THAT EGYPT WANTS TO KEEP THE FIELDS OPERATING AND WILL BRING IN SUCH THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AS MAY BE NEEDED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

(D) RAS AL-SIDR: GAMASY EXPLAINED THAT MOBIL IS SUPPOSED TO GO INTO THAT FIELD ON OCT 5 AND TEN DAYS AFTERWARDS THE EGYPTIANS WILL COME IN. THE ISRAELIS NOW WANT NO EGYPTIANS TO COME IN UNTIL NOV 16. THIS WILL MEAN A LAP OF SIX WEEKS OR MORE. THE ISRAELI INTENTION, SAID GAMASY, IS TO CREATE A SITUATION WHERE ISRAEL IS PUMPING OIL TO EGYPTIAN BARGES. IF THE ISRAELIS INSIST ON THIS SCHEDULE, GAMASY SAID, THESE DATES WILL BE PUT INTO THE PROTOCOL, BUT EGYPT WILL NOT SEND BARGES UNTIL THE ISRAELIS ARE OUT. GAMASY AUTHORIZED HILAL TO PUT MOBIL PEOPLE INTO THE FIELDS WHENEVER THE LATTER WANTS TO DO SO.

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3. MILITARY: AFTER HILAL LEFT, GAMASY SAID HE HAD SOME MILITARY ISSUES TO RAISE, SPECIFICALLY:

A. REDEPLOYMENT: UP TO NOW THE ISRAELIS REFUSE TO MAKE ANY SUCCESSIVE, PHASED WITHDRAWALS FROM THEIR POSITIONS IN THE NORTH UNTIL FEBRUARY 1, 1976. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WILL BE MINOR MOVES OF THE EGYPTIAN TROOPS IN WHAT HE CALLED THE "OLD BUFFER ZONE" BETWEEN THE TIME THE AGREEMENT GOES INTO FORCE AND FEBRUARY. HE WAS DRAWING THIS TO OUR ATTENTION. FROM AN IMAGE POINT OF VIEW, IT IS BAD AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT.

B. JOINT COMMISSION: AFTER FIRST ASKING UHAIDI TO READ THE LANGUAGE ON THE JOINT COMMISSION IN ARTICLE 6 OF THE AGREEMENT, FARMY RECOUNTED THE HISTORY OF THE IDEA. HE RECALLED ISRAEL HAD REFUSED TO MAKE THIS NEW COMMISSION SIMILAR TO THE ARMISTICE COMMITTEE BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN THE PARTY WHO KILLED THE LATTER. THE COMMISSION, IN FARMY'S VIEW, WAS CREATED TO BEGIN, FUNCTIONING AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. IF THERE IS A VIOLATION BY EITHER PARTY, IT CAN GO TO THE COORDINATOR AND COMPLAIN. HOWEVER, THIS FUNCTION DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE GROUP HAVE A FIXED, PERMANENT CHARACTER, IT DOES NOT NEED A BUILDING FOR PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS, PERMANENT STAFF, PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES, OR REGULAR MEETINGS. GOE DOES NOT OBJECT THAT IT MEET AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER OF THE PARTIES OR THE UN COORDINATOR TO CONSIDER PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE AGREEMENT. IN SUCH INSTANCES, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE COMMISSION MIGHT MEET AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS IN THE BUFFER ZONE AT A PLACE TO BE DECIDED BY THE COORDINATOR DEPENDING UPON THE VIOLATION. A TENT WILL SUFFICE.

THE ISRAELIS, GAMASY EXPLAINED, WANT THE COMMISSION TO BE PERMANENT, HAVE A FIXED HEADQUARTERS, 24 HOUR A DAY REPRESENTATION FROM BOTH SIDES AND

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MAKE DECISIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE CONSENT OF THE TWO PARTIES. THIS IS IN EFFECT DEMANDING A VETO RIGHT, SINCE IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE TWO PARTIES WOULD EVER AGREE ON A VIOLATION. ISRAELIS ALSO WANT THE COMMITTEE TO MEET REGULARLY WITH BOTH PARTIES ATTENDING ALL THE MEETINGS. THIS WOULD CREATE A NEW LEGAL INSTITUTION, WHICH GOE CANNOT ACCEPT.

GAMASY STRESSED THAT HIS MAIN CONCERN IS THAT THERE RE NOTHING IN A PUBLIC DOCUMENT, SUCH AS THE PROTOCOL, TO SUGGEST SUCH A PERMANENT INSTITUTION. FAHMY ARGUED HIS MAIN CONCERN IS LESS THE PUBLICITY AND MAINLY THE VETO RIGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT TO BUILD INTO THE GROUP. THIS WILL EFFECTIVELY MEAN ITS HANDS ARE TIED. WE SHOULD PRESS THE ISRAELIS TO ADOPT A MORE REASONABLE POSITION.

C. GIDI ROAD: GAMASY NEXT REFERRED TO THE ISRAELI EARLY WARNING STATION AT UMM AL-KHUSHAIB AND TO THE PROPOSED EGYPTIAN STATION IN THE GIDI AREA. IT HAD BEEN HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISREALIS WOULD USE A SEPARATE ROAD WHICH COMES IN FROM THE NORTH AND EGYPTIANS WOULD ALSO USE THEIR OWN ROAD. THE ISRAELIS, HOWEVER, ARE INSISTING THAT THEIR PEOPLE USE THE GIDI ROAD TO GO TO UMM AL-KHUSHAIB. THE GIDI ROAD, GAMASY ARGUED, SHOULD BE BANNED TO BOTH SIDES. FAHMY INTERJECTED THAT IF THE ISRAELIS USE THE GIDI ROAD, IT MEANS THAT THEY HAVE NOT REALLY WITHDRAWN FROM THE GIDI PASS AREA. CITING PARA 2(B) OF THE US PROPOSAL, FAHMY CONTENDED THIS SUPPORTS THE EGYPTIAN POSITION THAT NEIGHER SIDE SHOULD USE THE PASSES. I TOLD FAHMY AND GAMASY THAT I DID NOT READ PARA (2)B) OF THE US PROPOSAL AS AUTOMATICALLY PROHIBITING FORCES FROM EITHER SIDE TO USE THE GIDI AND MITLA ROADS. ALL THAT PARAGRAPH SAYS IS THAT THE US PERSONNEL WILL IMMEDIATELY REPORT ANY SUCH MOVEMENT TO THE PARTIES AND TO UNEF. SUCH A CONCEPT CERTAINLY DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USE OF THE ROADS BY BOTH PARTIES FOR PURPOSE OF REACHING

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THEIR EARLY WARNING STATIONS UNDER WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS THE PARTIES DECIDE UPON AT GENEVA. THESE, I UNDERSTAND, HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AT GENEVA. UWAIDI LOOKED EMBARRASSED. NEITHER FAHMY NOR GAMASY WOULD ACCEPT THIS. THEY ASKED THAT THIS POINT, ALONG WITH THE OTHERS, BE BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO THE SECRETARY'S ATTENTION WITH THE REQUEST THAT HE INTERVENE WITH THE ISREALIS. GAMASY HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD USE THEIR OWN ROAD IN THE NORTH.

4. I TOLD FAHMY AND GAMASY I WOULD AT ONCE REPORT THEIR COMMENTS. GAMASY SAID UWAIDI WILL GO BACK TONIGHT WITH NEW INSTRUCTIONS. HE ASSUMED SAUNDERS WILL RECEIVE WASHINGTON'S REACTIONS AND UWAIDI WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE NO STEPS UNTIL HE HAS HEARD FROM SAUNDERS. FAHMY ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT, GAMASY AND HE WILL ALSO WANT TO BE APPRISED OF OUR REACTION AND ANY STEPS WE MAY TAKE.

8. SUGGEST DEPT PASS THIS MESSAGE TO GENEVA FOR SAUNDERS.
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DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PEACE PROCESS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION OBJECTS TO WHAT HE HAS CHARACTERIZED THE SEPARATE AMERICAN EFFORT WHICH HAS

RESULTED IN THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, BEARING IN MIND THAT IN MY EARLIER MEETING I HAD WARNED HIM FIRMLY AGAINST ANY UNTOWARD INTERFERENCE IN THE ON-GOING PROCESS OR THE AGREEMENT ITSELF AND THAT SUCH INTERFERENCE COULD AFFECT OUR OVERALL RELATIONS, I NOTED IN PARTICULAR AT LAST NIGHT'S MEETING HIS INDICATION THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT INTEND TO OBSTRUCT WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

WHILE THE DISCUSSION LAST NIGHT ON THE MIDDLE EAST WAS EXTENSIVE, IT WAS, AS YOU MIGHT EXPECT, A VERY INCONCLUSIVE ONE. GROMYKO HAD NO SPECIFIC IDEAS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED. HIS DUAL EMPHASIS WAS THAT THEY HAD BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND THEY WISH TO QUOTE ACT JOINTLY UNQUOTE WITH THE US ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE HAS NO CLEAR IDEA HOW TO DO THIS. HE SAID THAT NEITHER SYRIA NOR THE PLO ARE INTERESTED IN GOING TO A GENEVA CONFERENCE AT THIS TIME AND THAT THE SOVIETS THEREFORE WOULD NOT ATTEND A GENEVA CONFERENCE. HE SAID THAT THIS VIEW WAS BASED ON QUOTE CONTACTS WITH SYRIA UNQUOTE AND HE INSISTED ON PLO PARTICIPATION AT THE OUTSET.

MR. PRESIDENT, I EXPLAINED THE AMERICAN POSITION TO HIM IN TERMS WHICH WILL BE VERY FAMILIAR TO YOU. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD INFORMED THE SYRIANS, ISRAELIS, EGYPT AND OTHER ARAB STATES THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, EITHER IN A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL SETTING. I TOLD HIM THAT WE DO NOT SEE THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL AGREEMENT AS AN END IN ITSELF BUT AS A STEP TOWARDS AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, AND THAT I WAS CONFIDENT THAT IT WAS NEITHER OUR DESIRE NOR YOURS TO STAND STILL AND TO DIVIDE THE ARAB WORLD. I SAID THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, CONSIDER THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, OR CONSIDER A MIX OF SUCH CONSULTATIONS, I ALSO STRESSED CANDIDLY

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THAT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS INSISTENCE ON PLO PARTICIPATION AT THE OUTSET WOULD LIKELY KILL THE CONFERENCE OR PRECLUDE ITS CONVENING. I SAID THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WAYS TO HAVE THE CONFERENCE CON- VENE IF THIS WAS THE DESIRE OF THE STATES CONCERNED, AND THAT WAYS MIGHT BE EXPLORED FOR PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION AT SUCH A CONFERENCE AT SOME LATER PHASE. FINALLY, I ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE WILLING TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS AND CONTINUE OUR FURTHER EX- CHANGES OF VIEWS.

MR PRESIDENT, THESE ARE THE ESSENTIAL FACTS. NOW I WANT TO GIVE YOU MY JUDGMENT ON THE SOVIET POSITION. THEY SEEM CONFUSED WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAVE NO CLEAR CUT STRATEGY. THE CONCERTED STRATEGY OF EGYPT AND THE US TOGETHER HAS THROWN THEM OFF BALANCE. GROMYKO WANTS THE SOVIETS IN ON THE PROCESS OF PEACE, BUT HE HAS NO CLEAR CUT IDEAS ON HOW THIS CAN BE DONE. I DETECTED CONTINUING CONCERN ON HIS PART THAT SYRIA MIGHT INDICATE TO US A WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL UNDER US AEGIS, AS WE HAVE DONE ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL AGREEMENT, AND THAT THIS WOULD LEAVE THE SOVIETS OUT. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION ALSO HE HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DISCOURAGING THE SYRIANS FROM EITHER GOING TO GENEVA OR OF GIVING POSITIVE IN- DICATIONS TO US ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA UNDER US AUSPICES. THIS IS ONLY AN IMPRESSION, AND I WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR JUDGMENT IN THIS REGARD. IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING WITH ASSAD I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I INTEND TO REPORT TO HIM DIRECTLY -- THOUGH IN A MUCH MORE ABBREVIATED FORM -- JUST WHAT GROMYKO HAS SAID TO US AND WHAT OUR POSITION IS IN THIS REGARD.

I KNOW, MR PRESIDENT, THAT WE AND YOU HAVE GONE THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS SINCE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT. I HAVE ADMIRERD FROM AFAR HOW MAGNIFICENTLY YOU HAVE HANDLED THE VERBAL ATTACKS THAT HAVE COME FROM CERTAIN QUARTERS IN THE ARAB WORLD -- ATTACKS WHICH IN PART HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE SOVIET UNION. BUT I AM ENCOURAGED, AND I HOPE YOU ARE,

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THAT THE WORKING GROUP IN GENEVA SEEMS TO BE CONCLUDING ITS DELIBERATIONS SUCCESSFULLY, AND I WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE THAT OUR TIMELY INTERVENTION A FEW DAYS AGO HAS HAD A CONSTRUCTIVE IMPACT ON THE ISRAELI POSITION,

FOR THE FIRST TIME, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF MY TALKS WITH PERES HERE, I GET THE FEELING THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF THEY CAN SHOW SOME GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CURRENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD, OF YOUR POSITION IN THE AREA, OF THE WISE AND COURAGEOUS WAY IN WHICH YOU ARE LEADING BOTH EGYPT AND THE ARABS TOWARDS MODERATION AND PEACEFUL PURSUITS--THAT INDEED THE RECENT AGREEMENT MAY VERY WELL BE THE TURNING POINT WHICH YOU AND WE HAVE WANTED. WE ARE BOTH REALISTIC, MR PRESIDENT. WE KNOW THIS WILL TAKE TIME AND THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO THE

SYRIAN-ISRAELI ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, WILL TAKE TIME. BUT I AM MORE CONVINCED TODAY MORE THAN EVER THAT WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE AND THAT MOVING TOGETHER WE CAN ACHIEVE OUR COMMON GOALS.

JUST A WORD ON THE PERES VISIT. FRANKLY, IT WAS A BETTER VISIT THAN I HAD REASON TO EXPECT. THE REASON I SAY THIS IS THAT PERES SEEMS TO BE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF TRYING TO GET ISRAEL TO ADOPT A REASONABLE POSITION ON THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. HE SAID PUBLICLY AFTER MY MEETING THAT ISRAEL IS READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.

INSOFAR AS THE ONGOING MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.S., HERE ARE MAIN FACTS. DURING THE REASSESSMENT, WE HELD UP, AS YOU KNOW, ON SOME ITEMS.

WE HAVE LIFTED THE BAN ON THESE. MOREOVER, THERE WAS A LIST, LONG IN EXISTENCE, OF SOME OTHER ITEMS OF A LESS SIGNIFICANT CHARACTER WHICH WE WILL NOW RELEASE AS PART OF THE NORMAL ONGOING MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP. AS TO OTHER ITEMS WHICH ISRAEL IS INTERESTED

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IN, SUCH AS THE PERSHING MISSILES, THESE REMAIN IN THE STUDY CATEGORY AND NO COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE.

FINALLY, MR PRESIDENT, I WANT TO TELL YOU HOW MUCH PRESIDENT FORD LOOKS FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT. WE HAVE BEGUN IN EARNEST THE PREPARATIONS WITH A VIEW TO ASSURING THAT IT WILL BE FRUITFUL AND PRODUCTIVE FOR BOTH OF US. I AM ANXIOUS THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE COME TO KNOW YOU AS WE DO AS A STATESMAN OF GREAT COURAGE AND VISION, AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL GET A FEEL OF THE PULSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO SUPPORT STRONGLY THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRESENT POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH NOW IS NO LONGER ONE SIDED BUT SEEKS TO PROTECT THE OVERALL NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE US IN THE AREA -- A POLICY THAT RETAINS THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.S. BUT IS EQUALLY DETERMINED TO STRENGTHEN THE BOND OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN AMERICA AND

THE ARAB WORLD. IN ALL OF THIS YOU ARE IN INDISPENSABLE KEY.

WARMEST REGARDS,
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR XF GE IS EG US
SUBJECT: SIGNING OF PROTOCOL; EGYPTIAN COMPLAINTS ABOUT
GENEVA WORKING GROUP

REFS: (A) CAIRO 9362; (B) CAIRO 9363

GENEVA FOR SAUNDERS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. FYI. ON SECRETARY'S INSTRUCTIONS ATHERTON CALLED
DINITZ AND TOLD HIM FAHMY'S REACTION (REFTEL A) TO PROPOSAL
FOR INITIALLING AGREEMENT WHEN COMPLETED AND SIGNING WHEN
U.S. CONGRESS HAS ACTED ON U.S. PROPOSAL. ATHERTON SAID,
SINCE FAHMY WAS ADAMANT THAT EGYPT WOULD SIGN REPEAT SIGN
AGREEMENT WHEN COMPLETED WHETHER ISRAEL DID OR NOT, THIS
WAS PERHAPS BEST WAY OUT OF IMPASSE. FOR OUR PART, WE
HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THIS PROCEDURE--I.E., EGYPT SIGNING
AND ISRAEL INITIALLING, WITH ISRAELI SIGNING TO FOLLOW
U.S. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. DINITZ SAID HE WOULD REPORT
AND LET US HAVE GOI REACTION. END FYI.

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2. FOR CAIRO: AMBASSADOR SHOULD TELL FAHMY THAT WE HAVE CONVEYED HIS POSITION TO ISRAELIS AND HAVE INDICATED THAT, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, PERHAPS ANSWER TO THIS PROBLEM IS FOR EGYPT TO SIGN WHEN PROTOCOL IS COMPLETED AND ISRAEL TO INITIAL, WITH ITS SIGNING TO FOLLOW CONGRESSIONAL

APPROVAL OF U.S. PROPOSAL.

3. FYI. ATHERTON THEN GAVE DINITZ SUBSTANCE OF EGYPTIAN COMPLAINTS REPORTED CAIRO 9363. HE SAID WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE THE MERITS OF THESE BUT WANTED ISRAELIS TO HAVE A SENSE OF THE MOOD IN CAIRO AND OF THE KIND OF PROBLEMS WE WERE BEING PRESENTED. WE WERE ASKING SAUNDERS FOR ANY LIGHT HE COULD THROW ON THESE MATTERS. MEANWHILE, ATHERTON ASKED THAT DINITZ PASS THIS ALONG TO JERUSALEM. WE WERE NOT TELLING ISRAELIS WHAT WE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD DO IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, BUT SUGGESTED THEY MIGHT HAVE LOOK AT EGYPTIAN COMPLAINTS AND SEE WHETHER THERE WERE ANY PARTICULAR ONES WHERE THERE WAS A GESTURE THEY COULD MAKE WHICH WOULD HAVE BENEFICIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT--E.G., PERHAPS WITH REGARD TO SOME OF THE OIL FIELD EQUIPMENT IF IT WAS IN FACT NECESSARY FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS AND ISRAEL DID NOT HAVE IMMEDIATE NEED OF IT. DINITZ SAID HE WOULD REPORT AND ONLY HOPED THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON EVE OF CABINET MEETING. ATHERTON SAID HE SAW NO NEED TO REPORT SUCH DETAILS TO THE CABINET AND HOPED THIS WOULD NOT BE DONE. END FYI.

4. FOR CAIRO: AMBASSADOR SHOULD TELL FAHMY WE HAVE TAKEN UP QUESTIONS RAISED REFTEL B WITH ISRAELIS AND THAT WE URGE THAT MEANWHILE EGYPTIANS CONTINUE EFFORTS IN GENEVA WORKING GROUP TO SORT THESE MATTERS OUT.

5. FOR GENEVA: WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS SAUNDERS CAN GIVE US THAT WOULD HELP US JUDGE MERITS AND SERIOUSNESS OF PROBLEMS EGYPTIANS HAVE RAISED AND WHETHER THERE ARE ANY ON WHICH WE SHOULD PARTICULARLY FOCUS. KISSINGER

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NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY