

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: Cuba

Recent reports of internal political and economic changes in Cuba, and of growing Soviet influence in that country, suggest that an intelligence estimate on Cuba might be desirable at this time. In particular, it would be useful to have the intelligence community's assessment of:

- the relative power positions of the various political elites in Cuban society, and their attitudes on key domestic and foreign policy issues;
- the prospects for Fidel Castro's continuing leadership;
- Cuban-Soviet relations, including the role of the Soviet Union in internal Cuban power relationships, as well as its influence on Cuban economic and foreign policy;
- the current status and prospects of the Cuban economy;
- the implications of these factors for Cuban domestic and foreign policies over the next two-three years.

Therefore, a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba should be initiated, including consideration of but not necessarily limited to the points mentioned above. The Estimate should be completed by May 1, 1971

NSS/NSC Review Completed.


Henry A. Kissinger

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION
March 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Arnold Nachmanoff
SUBJECT: Possible Power Shift in Cuba

Attached at Tab A is an interesting report

[Redacted]

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-- An abrupt shift in the techniques used to carry out the sugar harvest in Cuba in the middle of the harvest season. The shift is from labor intensive to machinery intensive harvesting methods.

-- A change in Castro's personal style to one in which he speaks less and only the highlights of his speeches are reported in the press, which used to report him verbatim. He has also taken to traveling about the country with what [Redacted] describes as a "traveling circus" of the Cuban leadership.

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From this admittedly slender evidence he concludes that:

-- There has been some kind of manpower crisis probably arising from reluctance on the part of the populace to participate wholeheartedly in the sugar harvest.

-- Castro may be under pressure from the Russian-backed technical and administrative elite of the Government because of the deteriorating economic picture as well as basic differences in outlook.

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This analysis is consistent with that presented by Pete Vaky in his memorandum to you of last November (Tab B) which essentially predicted the power struggle [Redacted] suggests is now going on. However, the Vaky analysis and the British report differ slightly in their conclusion regarding the probable outcome of such a power struggle. Vaky thought it was quite possible that those in favor of Russian-style bureaucratic Communist rule might win and succeed in shunting Castro to the sidelines. He argued that this probably would not

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be in our long run interests. [redacted] on the other hand, feels that Castro still has enough popular support to withstand a challenge from the other camp, though he may well be under sufficient pressure so that he feels constrained to adopt a more collective form of leadership, at least for a time.

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In his memorandum Pete Vaky suggested that a new policy study on Cuba be called for. You indicated that you wanted to hold on this for the present. It might be useful, before considering a new policy study, to have an updated intelligence estimate on the internal situation in Cuba and Cuban-Soviet relations. A special NIE might be the best vehicle to get such an assessment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you request a special NIE on Cuba.

Approve

Disapprove

MAR 18 1971

Attachments:

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Tab A - [redacted]

Tab B - Memo from Vaky

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