DOS REVIEWED 26-Sep-2011: NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED

NSA REVIEWED 13-Sep-2011: NSA REVIEW COMPLETED

INFORMATION

REFER TO DOS

SHORET NODIS

March 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DE. KISSINGER

FROM:

Harold H. Saunders ...

SUBJECT: Message from Sadat

You will have seen the attached from Bergus saying that Sadat spent March 1 and 2 in Muscow, will not renew the cease-fire and will turn over to the UAR military the decision on resuming fire.

25x3

Fuller thoughts on our options will have to wait till we see what we are dealing with.

My preliminary thoughts are two:

- Now is the time to respond to Nosygin. We could note not only his letter to the President but the fact that Sadat's decision comes in the wake, he says, of secret talks in Moscow. The message to the Soviets would be that the cease-fire must continue if there are to be negotiations and negotiations take time. The Soviets will bear responsibility for resumption of shooting.
- 2. In response to Sadat, we would have to say that the ceaselire is assential to negotiations, and negotiations will take time. We might even say that we cannot believe that so important a decision would be anyone's but the President's. We should not appear to panic; Sadat is using scare tactics and we should not react.

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SECRET/NODB

HHSaunders:tmt 3/5/71

