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ROOMAN

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SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

*FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION
TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S 1971 REPORT
ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S*

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4 March 1971

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FBI'S REACTION REPORT
4 MARCH 1971

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FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S REPORT ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S

S U M M A R Y

NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

WEST EUROPE: The principal British papers welcome the President's report in general as evidence of continued U.S. commitment to world peace, although the TIMES perceives certain elements of "self-righteousness." West German reaction too is mostly favorable, with commentators seeing a close identity between the views of Bonn and Washington, especially in regard to Chancellor Brandt's Eastern policy. Paris' LE MONDE, however, condemns what it sees as a general hardening of line in comparison with last year's report and concludes that the President has decided to seek a military victory in Indochina.

MIDDLE EAST: Among the Arab states, Jordan's reaction is the most affirmative. Its commentators welcome some of the statements on the Middle East, albeit with reservations and requests for clarification. Cairo's comment overall is more negative, but AL-AHRAM finds "new signs deserving attention" and says this "important document" will be studied with care before the regime comments officially. Other Arab observers mostly regard the report as another indication of U.S. sympathy with Israeli viewpoints. Tel Aviv's reaction is mixed; there is approval of the U.S. position on negotiations and determination of borders within the framework of a peace agreement, but adamant opposition to the "Rogers plan" on final borders.

AFRICA: North African commentators, concentrating on the Middle East section of the report, for the most part see nothing that is new. One Tunisian paper welcomes the reference to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians. A Johannesburg broadcast sees some merit in the report's opposition to enforced changes in the white regimes of southern Africa, while a Nigerian commentator terms opposition to violence against apartheid "disgraceful."

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ASIA: Japanese observers, less complimentary than last year, draw unfavorable comparisons between this year's report and its 1970 counterpart. Several see undue emphasis on military strength. Observers in Nationalist China express disagreement with the President's statements on Communist China, while welcoming his reassurance regarding continued U.S. commitments to Taipei. Some Indian critics object to the section on Indochina, while others hail signs of "a more coherent policy" on Indo-Pakistani issues.

LATIN AMERICA: Reaction from Chile and Peru is mostly critical, with spokesmen taking special exception to sections of the report dealing with the establishment of Chilean-Cuban ties and withdrawal of U.S. aid from unremittingly hostile states. A Brazilian paper, on the other hand, praises the report as indicative of a new realism in U.S. policy vis-a-vis Latin America.

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

THE USSR: Picturing widespread favorable reaction to the Soviet Government statement denouncing the operation in Laos, which Moscow issued the day the President's report was released, Soviet media have carried only limited, low-level comment on the report. An "international review" article in PRAVDA, asking how the United States can speak of a new course aimed at peace when it has moved to widen the "aggression" in Indochina, is the most authoritative Soviet comment to date. TASS' account of the report notes that it "gives certain space" to U.S.-Soviet relations but asks how one can reconcile statements about a new approach to relations with the USSR and the socialist countries with the intention "proclaimed in" the report "to continue subversive activities against the socialist countries." With respect to the sections on both Indochina and the Middle East, Moscow concludes that the report augurs no change in U.S. policy. TASS' account of the report ignores the portion on China, but a Soviet broadcast to Chinese listeners remarked on the "friendly and harmonious tone" of the passages on China--"a signal inviting China to collude with the United States."

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EAST EUROPE: East European reactions include notably restrained criticism from Poland in the third month of the Gierk regime, balanced by a discernment of some positive features in the report. By contrast, voluminous and largely stereotyped comment from Czechoslovakia, reflecting the increasingly conservative tenor of Prague propaganda, is virtually unrelieved in its negative appraisal of the report. Along with Bulgarian comment, as usual seconding Moscow, and East German comment that typically outdoes Moscow in abusiveness, Czechoslovakia's is the harshest to issue from Moscow's East European allies.

Romania's reaction takes the form of a highly authoritative article in the party daily SCINTEIA which treats the report in more than usually harsh terms but registers a hope for continued development of Romanian-U.S. cooperation despite differences on such issues as European security.

Yugoslavia's comment, taking note of the announcement in the President's report that Tito has accepted an invitation to pay a return visit to the United States, balances restrained criticism of the report with mild praise.

Characteristically hostile comment in Tirana's ZERI I POPULLIT includes the inevitable swipe at alleged Soviet "revisionist" collusion with the United States.

THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS: Hanoi's reaction is highlighted by a 2 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement which alleges that the President merely repeated old arguments about Vietnamization that "have been completely refuted by reality." Other Vietnamese communist reaction includes statements issued by the DRV and PRG spokesmen in Paris--on 25 and 26 February, respectively--and criticism by the deputy heads of the two communist delegations at the Paris session on 4 March. Hanoi's first press comment came in a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 3d, the same day the press carried the foreign ministry statement.

The propaganda for the most part glosses over the details of the President's remarks and reiterates long-standing themes: the Nixon Doctrine is merely a tool to pursue colonialism, to make Indochinese fight Indochinese and puppet soldiers die in the place of Americans; the President's refusal to agree to a timetable for the withdrawal of all troops and to abandon support of the Thieu-Ky regime shows that he does not want a negotiated

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settlement; following the incursions into Cambodia and Laos, the Administration is "threatening" the DRV and planning "new military adventures" against it; and the President has not given up hope for a military victory.

CHINA: PRC media have publicized some hostile Pyongyang and Tirana comment and reported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement but have mentioned the report only briefly and in passing in original comment. Peking has ignored the President's statement of policy toward the PRC but cites a Pyongyang attack on U.S. intent to "permanently 'guarantee' the status of the Chiang Kai-shek clique" in the United Nations.

NORTH KOREA: Typically intemperate comment from Pyongyang is replete with the usual rhetoric about U.S. "unbounded aggressive ambitions." The party organ NODONG SINMUN dwells on charges of U.S. schemes to dominate Asia, and Pyongyang repeats its chronic complaint that the United States is engaging in "war preparations against" North Korea.

CUBA: Havana questions the President's sincerity in speaking of respect for Latin American governments regardless of their ideologies, finding a "contradiction" in his "warning" that the United States "would discontinue aid to Latin American nations which show continued hostility toward it." Stating that the President "reasserted the old policy of hostility and isolation" with respect to Cuba, Havana reiterates Castro's line that Cuba is not interested in "rejoining the so-called inter-American system" as represented by the OAS.

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I. NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

WEST EUROPE

BRITAIN The major British newspapers gave prominent news coverage to the President's report and in general welcomed it editorially. The DAILY TELEGRAPH calls it "encouraging" because it shows "a clear determination to maintain America's strength as a factor for peace." The paper notes President Nixon's intention to present a low profile overseas while continuing to honor treaty commitments and maintain a nuclear shield. "This is about as satisfactory a formula as could be reasonably hoped for," the paper concludes.

The FINANCIAL TIMES sees the President's intention to fight the "dangerous" trend toward isolationism as the "saving grace" of the report and particularly welcomes the affirmation that U.S. forces in Europe will not be cut back unilaterally. It says the emphasis of American foreign policy continues to lie with the "firm warning" to Moscow not to seek "exclusive or predominant positions" in the world. The paper terms all this a "heartening assurance of a sustained U.S. commitment to the maintenance of international security."

The TIMES describes the report as "detailed and sincere in its aspirations for world peace" but criticizes the President for sticking to a definition of the legitimate interests of both sides in the Indochina conflict that has been "consistently rejected by the North Vietnamese ever since the Paris talks began." It contrasts this position with President Nixon's handling of the Soviets and Chinese, which has "more clarity and a better awareness of where the conflicts lie." The paper says that by acknowledging China as one of the great powers in Asia, the President "goes a long way to bury the containment of the past." It notes that he had some "reasonable and statesmanlike things" to say to the Russians but doubts whether he is "capable of appreciating the Soviet point of view," observing that the report is "infused with elements of the self-righteousness which he attributes to the Russians." The paper concludes that if there is to be a general understanding, Mr. Nixon must "at least acknowledge those elements of Soviet foreign policy which are shaped largely by insecurity and the desire to equal the United States as a global power."

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The SUNDAY TELEGRAPH notes that while the report shows that America will avoid "crusading interventionism," this "emphatically does not mean that America intends to disengage." The TELEGRAPH suggests that the whole report is premised on the satisfactory conclusion of the Vietnam war and declares that it would be "tragic if any crushing new setback in Vietnam were to undermine the foundations of this carefully constructed and impressive diplomatic structure."

In his OBSERVER column, William Millinship says the President put a "marked accent on toughness and determination, betraying an anxiety to reassure America's allies and to warn her adversaries against interpreting the Nixon Doctrine as a cloak for opting out of America's responsibility abroad." Henry Brandon, writing in the SUNDAY TIMES, makes a similar point, saying that the President's "prime concern in foreign affairs is the growing isolationism" in the United States. The President's "courageous" decision to maintain U.S. troop levels in Europe, Brandon says, is an indication that he is not "rigidly adhering" to the formula of doing no more abroad than domestic opinion would sustain.

FRANCE The report was given brief factual treatment in monitored Paris broadcasts, and available editorial comment is limited. The report "differs appreciably from that of last year," LE MONDE says editorially, being in effect "a series of warnings aimed equally at the USSR and at North Vietnam." LE MONDE expresses regret that the President "appears to have decided to seek a military victory in Indochina"; it claims that this hardening of line on Indochina "is found again in U.S.-Soviet relations and even, to a certain extent, in relations among the allies."

The communist L'HUMANITE published a short item summarizing the main themes of the message, with the terse comment that "it does not differ appreciably from that of last year," and an article by Yves Moreau criticizing the President's concept of regional associations. In Vietnam, Moreau says, association means Vietnamization, which has not only prolonged the war but extended it to Laos and Cambodia and now risks the launching of a massive attack against North Vietnam. President Nixon's concept of association in Europe, Moreau contends, would limit freedom of action "within the framework of an Atlantic world."

WEST GERMANY The West German press and radio widely summarized highlights of the President's message, but editorial reaction is not extensive. There is widespread publicity for a DPA dispatch quoting "Bonn government quarters" for the

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conclusion that the report indicates a "remarkable unison" between U.S. and West German policy. Also according to DPA, "a government spokesman" has said the report confirms "the full measure of agreement" reached in the discussions between the West German Foreign Minister and top U.S. officials.

An editorial in FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG says the report makes it clear that there is no such thing as a new U.S. isolationism. Europe should take note, the paper declares, of Washington's intention to look again at the possibilities for a fairer distribution of burdens and responsibilities; the Americans have gone further on the road to partnership thinking than the European, who instead of mocking must recognize that the ball is in his court.

NEUE RUHR ZEITUNG claims that the report unequivocally supports Chancellor Brandt's Eastern policy. President Nixon's statement of confidence, the paper says, is linked to concrete measures, for the United States will not withdraw its troops from Europe without compensatory action by the East. Similarly, a Hamburg TV commentator affirmed that the passages in the report on Bonn's Ostpolitik may be interpreted as clear backing for the Federal Government's position. But even here, the commentator declared, the report makes it clear that Washington considers itself directly involved.

OTHER COUNTRIES Elsewhere in West Europe, available editorial comment is slight. The Rome radio, reviewing the main points of the message, expressed the opinion that the report contains "no new ideas worthy of great note, but rather veiled comments on which the attention of observers is now centered." The Italian paper IL MESSAGGERO views the report, in conjunction with the recent Soviet statement on Indochina, as a "precise indication of the general deterioration of East-West relations, particularly Soviet-American relations."

The Madrid paper YA, while agreeing that Southeast Asia must be of prime concern to the President, argues that "Nixon was stronger when he focused on other international problems such as cooperation with Europe, Africa, and Latin America on bases that are highly respected by these blocs." NOTICIERO concludes that the President "has added nothing new to his well-known political theories and continues to consider Europe his country's most important ally."

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A Radio Lisbon press review reports an EPOCA editorial that claims the President "almost confesses the guilt of American policy as regards Africa." The report, EPOCA says, indirectly condemns the "intense and odious propaganda drive" of recent years against South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese presence in Africa. The paper observes unhappily that this implicit condemnation was balanced by the announcement that Washington would continue the arms embargo against South Africa and tighten economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

THE MIDDLE EAST

THE UAR Egyptian media have given the report substantial coverage, with comment varying from AL-AHRAM's remark that it is an important document deserving close study to the Cairo radio Voice of the Arabs' view that the President drew no closer to the Arab position.

Cairo radio says the President again declared U.S. support for Israel's expansionist aims; although he emphasized the U.S. desire to establish better relations with the Arabs, he "took Israel's side" on the questions of borders and negotiations. The President, Cairo adds, sees no contradiction between the principle of Israel's return of the territories and the "so-called slight alteration" of the border. The radio says the President attacked "the Soviet Union's call for imposing the Security Council resolution" to solve the crisis; in his opinion, Cairo notes, the Soviet Union is trying to impose a solution and is demanding that the big powers work to establish peace, while the United States supports negotiations between the sides concerned. Cairo also notes the President's expression of regret that the continuing tension in the Middle East is preventing the United States from establishing fruitful relations with all the Arab states.

UAR media list Mr. Nixon's four principles to be considered in a settlement, two of which are singled out by AL-AHRAM as "new signs deserving attention." For the first time, the paper says, Mr. Nixon "admitted" that the Arab states will not accept any settlement not providing for the return of the territory occupied in 1967, and for the first time he referred to the Palestinian people's legitimate aspirations. Also for the first time, AL-AHRAM says, the President used the expression "minor adjustments"; it points out that France has used this phrase to mean actual administrative adjustments "on the Jordanian border."

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An AL-AKHBAR editorial, noting that President Nixon said he does not believe the Arabs will surrender any of their land, asks what he, the United Nations, and the major powers intend to do. AKHBAR AL-YAWM suggests that a peaceful solution may be achieved if the President puts pressure on Israel to "put into effect what he said" in his statement. But the paper adds that he might go back on his statement, "as he has done before," and then fighting will have to be resumed.

A Voice of the Arabs commentary does acknowledge the President's statements on Palestinian aspirations and Arab desire to recover the lost territory, but says that in spite of such remarks the report "expresses a view identical to that of Israel's." Taking issue with Mr. Nixon's "demand for borders through negotiations" and his opposition to "borders stipulated by the big powers," the commentary charges that this attitude "demolishes" the Security Council resolution.

JORDAN Amman expresses appreciation of the President's statement of principles regarding return of territory and recognition of Palestinian rights, but has reservations with regard to his views on implementation of these principles. Voicing these opinions, Foreign Minister 'Abdallah Salah, in remarks reported by Amman radio, praises the President as one of the world's figures who best understands the Middle East situation and desires to find a settlement. But he notes that the President's reference to negotiation of final borders by the sides concerned "is close to the viewpoint of Israel." The foreign minister wonders if Mr. Nixon's remarks on the Palestinians are a hint at establishment of a "weakling Palestinian state."

An Amman radio commentary welcomes the President's comments concerning the Palestinians, but asks for clarification. Like the foreign minister, the radio declares that restitution of the injustice done the Palestinians must not mean committing a further injustice at the expense of more Arab land.

The Amman paper AD-DUSTUR feels that the United States is capable of pursuing a more positive role of forcing Israel to withdraw, which it calls the most important point in the crisis. AD-DUSTUR believes Washington could change its image in the Arab world a great deal if it were to adopt a firm, positive stand insuring implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and complete Israeli withdrawal. In another commentary, the paper wonders about Washington's intentions toward the Arab world in view of Israeli

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Deputy Prime Minister Alon's "hardened stand" on withdrawal. Amman radio also reviews an AL-URDUN article which notes that Mr. Nixon pointed out that the four powers view the Middle East situation in light of their own interests--as, the paper adds, does Israel; the Arab countries, it says, are the only party not working in accordance with national interests, due to lack of unity of action.

SYRIA Critical Damascus reaction is typified by AL-BA'TH's comment that the President's report indicated that the United States "only works at increasing tension" and that it reconfirmed "hardline" U.S. policy. And ATH-THAWRAH declares that the report reaffirms U.S. support for Israel's expansionist aims. Radio reportage, citing news agency accounts, points out that while the President described the Middle East situation as extremely dangerous and said both sides must make concessions, he "did not offer any new proposals," thereby indicating an indecisive U.S. policy. A Damascus radio commentary on the Persian Gulf, summing up the President's comments on that area, says he defined U.S. policy toward the gulf as "based on encouraging the amirate rulers to establish a suspect federation" which would serve as a substitute for the British after the "partial withdrawal" of British troops.

IRAQ The only available comment from Iraq is an AL-JUMHURIYAH article, reported in Baghdad radio's press review on the 27th, which predictably assails U.S. policy and the idea of a political solution of the Mideast problem. The President "excelled in playing with words and creating pretenses" that the United States has recognized the principle of Israeli withdrawal, the paper says, but he coupled this recognition with a condition which completely undermined it by emphasizing border arrangements. Listing the President's four principles, AL-JUMHURIYAH says "the most ridiculous thing" is that each of them undermines the other. With regard to the third point, on guarantees, the paper claims that what is intended is provision of international guarantees for Israel and "nonrecognition of the Palestinian right to liberate" the homeland. As for the fourth point, on Palestinian aspirations, AL-JUMHURIYAH says this does not go beyond compensation in U.S. dollars or "Arabization of the Zionist occupation of Gaza and the West Bank by establishing a Palestinian state which will be tantamount to an Israeli colony."

It appears, the paper says, that Mr. Nixon has "brought nothing new and has not wanted to detract anything" from Israel's demands for recognition, peace, and guarantees for secure borders after "cutting away what conforms to its new map." AL-JUMHURIYAH says

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that what is new in the statement is that the President explained all these matters frankly for the first time, asserting what has been clear from the beginning--that the real meaning of a peaceful solution is "surrender and submission to the Israeli and U.S. demands."

LEBANON Beirut radio says the President accused the Soviet Union of "rejecting" his proposals for controlling the arms race in the Middle East. The radio reports UAR and Jordanian press comment as well as the Jordanian Foreign Minister's reaction to the report, but originates no comment.

The diverse Beirut press is reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) as "unanimous in the belief" that the President's report was "biased toward Israel, supported Israel, and adopted Israel's viewpoint" on a settlement. AN-NAHAR, according to MENA, is not impressed by the reference to Palestinian rights, calling it "general talk" and saying the United States has made similar statements on dozens of occasions. The President's report proves, AN-NAHAR says, that the United States has changed its position on the basic issue: it previously supported Resolution 242 which provides for withdrawal first, but it has now adopted Israel's position on changing borders first. The paper says what the Arabs want is for the United States to implement the UN resolutions rather than to "indulge in mere talk as others have been doing."

AL-ANWAR accuses the United States of duplicity in its attitude to the Middle East, "pretending" that it is anxious to achieve peace while doing everything possible to encourage Israeli intransigence. In its customary vein, AL-MUHARRIR charges that the President has frustrated all international efforts to eliminate the "Israeli aggression" and has "obstructed further moves" by Jarring, the Security Council, and the Big Four.

AL-HAYAH observes regretfully that the report as a whole does not indicate a U.S. desire to take effective steps to solve the crisis. The paper feels that the President's statement on solving the border question through negotiations detracts from the importance of his reference to Israeli withdrawal; this statement alone, the paper says, is sufficient to maintain the deadlock. Describing the President's stress on the dangerous character of the crisis as even more important, AL-HAYAH notes his statement that the United States does not seek a dominating position in the Middle East and will not allow others to achieve such a position. The paper calls this "American threat" an indication that Mr. Nixon does not see an early end to the crisis. Citing his call to the

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Soviet Union to halt the arms race, AL-HAYAH observes that the world, as seen by Mr. Nixon, is not headed for peace and he therefore wants to put the blame on the USSR.

FEDAYEEN COMMENT Palestinian fedayeen broadcast comment is predictably negative. The clandestine Fatah Radio refers to President Nixon's "hostile statements" and dismisses Zionist efforts to "appear disturbed" as only an attempt to conceal collusion. At the same time, it is critical of "certain Arab quarters" which welcomed the President's statement.

The Voice of the PLO Central Committee, broadcast from Baghdad, ostensibly reflects the views of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but Cairo's AL-AHRAM on 25 February reported the PLO Central Committee as announcing that statements broadcast by this radio express only the views of the Iraqi Government. A typically vituperative commentary carried on this program assails "Nixon the Zionist" as aiming at perpetuating the Zionist presence in Palestine, but is equally vociferous in denouncing "hireling radios and officials"--not identified, but meaning Jordanian--for praising the "mighty efforts and deep understanding of this filthy Yankee."

The Voice of the Storm, broadcast from Algiers, also purports to express Palestinian opinions but probably reflects as well the views of the host government. A commentary carried by the Voice of the Storm lists the four requirements for peace in the Middle East set out in the President's report and declares that they are the "very points around which the American-Zionist game has been played since the beginning of last January." It adds that the call for big-power guarantees is meant to "stabilize Israel's gains." The commentary goes on to say that the U.S. bias in favor of Israel is not transient but is based on a coincidence of interests. Instead of proceeding on the basis of an "imaginary change" in U.S. policy, the commentary concludes, it would be more appropriate for the Arab states to put all their resources on the road toward battle.

ISRAEL Israeli comment is mixed, Jerusalem radio stressing that political circles there reacted favorably to two points in the President's report--his support for the principle of negotiations and the need for the parties themselves to determine borders. But the Israeli Forces Radio observes that U.S.-Israeli relations are characterized by mutual disappointment, with Washington regretting Israel's latest note to Jarring and

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Tel Aviv viewing the President's foreign policy statement as disappointing. Israel's "bitterness" regarding the timing of the President's report is no less than its bitterness regarding the content, the radio says: The very fact that Mr. Nixon reiterated his support for the principles of the Rogers plan limited the negotiations before they have even begun.

Taking the more optimistic approach, Foreign Minister Eban, in an interview carried on the Forces Radio on the 26th, underlined the President's "vehement and telling stress" on agreement and negotiation. He found one stress that is "perhaps slightly new" in the President's remarks about Soviet policy in the area; there is a hint here, Eban said, that if the USSR wants to reach agreement or coexistence it must make a "comprehensive alteration" of its policy.

Other Israeli political figures are reported as setting forth their opposition to the "Rogers plan"--Secretary Rogers' December 1969 address in which he stated the U.S. belief that any changes in pre-existing boundaries should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations. Thus Tourism Minister Kol is reported as saying Washington must be made to realize that the Rogers plan will not be the basis for peace. Knesset member Menahem Begin is said to have called for a public campaign in the United States against the Rogers plan and against Mr. Nixon's remarks calling for recognition of the Palestinian aspirations, asserting that the U.S. Administration is "intervening limitlessly in our national life and actually trying to dictate to us." Herut leader Ezer Weizman believes the report proves that "the Nixon plan, the Rogers plan, and the withdrawal plan are all one and the same."

Deputy Prime Minister Alon, in a Jerusalem radio interview on the 27th, did not rule out sharper confrontations with the United States while progressing toward a political solution. Asked if there is any doubt, after the President's report, that the United States is "still confronting Israel" with the Rogers plan, Alon said there has never been any doubt that this is the plan of the U.S. Government, and "it has worried us particularly since it was brought to the attention of the world and us." Alon expressed the opposition of the whole government to the "Rogers map," but added that in contacts with the U.S. Government in general and President Nixon in particular, Israel had received clarifications and commitments which give enough guarantees that there will not be an imposed peace and therefore imposed insecure borders. He did

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not rule out the possibility that Israel can convince the United States to abandon the Rogers plan as unjust to Israel.

Jerusalem radio's press review notes that the papers received the President's report with mixed feelings. HAARETZ welcomes the statement that agreement on final borders must be within the framework of a peace agreement, but sees his reiteration of the Rogers plan as strengthening Israel's enemies and indirectly the Soviet Union. HAARETZ later says the President "rejected Israel's demand for secure borders" and remarks that "this spells the beginning of confrontation with the United States." The paper adds that Mr. Nixon is "disregarding his promise that the United States will not pressure Israel into accepting unsatisfactory borders." LAMERHAV believes the U.S. position remained close to Israel's on the nature of peace but is closer to the Arab position on the territorial question.

The Jerusalem POST comments that President Nixon's report is open to varying interpretations. The POST disagrees with Alon that it will be possible to persuade the United States to withdraw from the Rogers plan, arguing that Israel must convince both the United States and Egypt that it will not agree to any plan opposed to its interests. HATZOFE finds positive elements in the U.S. policy of checking Soviet domination in the Middle East as well as in the trend toward an undictated peace agreement, while also acknowledging U.S.-Israeli differences of opinion on the border issue.

GREECE, CYPRUS, No comment has been monitored from the radios
TURKEY, IRAN of Athens, Nicosia, Ankara, or Teheran on the
President's report. All these radios gave the
document moderate news coverage, Athens radio noting that the Greek
papers reported it prominently.

AFRICA

NORTH AFRICA Little coverage or comment is available from
North African and Sudanese media. Khartoum's
reaction is represented only by a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report
that Sudanese Deputy Prime Minister 'Awadallah, arriving in Cairo,
said the President had changed only his "tone," not his thinking.

Libyan coverage has included short news items and comment by UAR
and Lebanese papers. A Bayda radio commentary notes that the
report contained a number of points reflecting partiality for

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Israel but at the same time supported Secretary Rogers' plan for a political settlement. Bayda points out that the President said a settlement requires restoration of Arab territory with minor border adjustments if necessary. It takes exception to the statement that future borders must be negotiated between Israel and the Arabs, observing that this contradicts Security Council Resolution 242 and the Rogers plan. The radio notes U.S. acknowledgment of Soviet interests in the Middle East, adding that the President was cautious about "what he called any effort by a big power" to insure a dominating position in the area.

The Tunis news agency TAP reviews an article in the Socialist Destour Party paper L'ACTION which terms Mr. Nixon's recognition of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians a "favorable change" which is bound to have an impact on Israel's attitude toward the Palestinians. The paper AS-SABAH, on the other hand, sees no new elements in the U.S. attitude toward the Palestinians. In an article also reviewed by TAP, the paper considers it unlikely that the United States would support the Palestinians in recovering sovereignty over their homeland, in view of its known position concerning the existence of Israel. Thus, it says, "there has been no progress in the problem."

Algiers radio asserts that the report contains nothing new and indeed once again endorses Tel Aviv's "expansionist" aims. In a brief, editorialized report on the section on Indochina, the radio says the President declared that his only objective, "as he put it," is to end the war in Indochina and adds that "he alleged" that it is the DRV which forces him to continue the war.

No comment is available from Moroccan media.

SOUTH AFRICA, The Johannesburg and Salisbury radios factually
RHODESIA reported the President's references to Africa.
 Johannesburg comments that the U.S. policy seems
to be one of noninterference in Africa with the exception of
southern Africa, where he feels morally obliged to foster change.
But Johannesburg also says President Nixon has gone on record
in opposition to attempts to isolate the white governments of
southern Africa.

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OTHER COUNTRIES Other monitored sources have reported on the message, particularly those aspects that deal with Africa, but there is little substantive comment. A Nigerian radio commentary complains that the President said the United States will observe the UN embargo on arms sales to South Africa but will not accept violent revolution against the apartheid system. The commentary goes on to call it a "downright disgrace" for a world power to reject violence against "cruel and inhuman" systems, while at the same time accepting "the legitimacy of violence against the people of Vietnam and Indochina." This is both "uncivilized and subhuman," the commentary says.

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ASIA

JAPAN The President's report has drawn considerable reportage and comment in the news media but little public reaction from government officials. The English-language JAPAN TIMES reports that Foreign Ministry "sources" informally noted that President Nixon "regarded Japan officially for the first time as one of the 'big four powers' in the Pacific region." The "sources" believe the reference to the unchanged status of U.S. bases on Okinawa after reversion was intended to put at ease those Congressmen concerned about U.S. security requirements in the Far East, and they "paid special attention" to the reference to friendly and competitive U.S.-Japanese relations and the desire for settlement of the textile issue. On the China issue, Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi said in the Diet in reference to the President's report that he did not think the United States had shaped a new China policy yet, according to KYODO. Aichi noted in response to a questioner that the report did not spell out a two-Chinas formula but rather refrained, wisely, from presenting a clearcut stand on the matter.

Japanese editorial reaction is less complimentary than last year, and indeed several papers draw explicit unfavorable comparisons between this report and its 1970 counterpart. The English-language YOMIURI, for example, says last year's report furnished "hope for a transition from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation," but this year "in general the tone of the message tended to place more weight on the politics of power." The English-language ASAHI EVENING NEWS argues similarly that last year's message led one to believe Washington's diplomacy might "finally succeed in disengaging itself from a policy of overreliance on military strength." But the latest message, the paper says, is "completely the opposite."

TOKYO SHIMBUN, concentrating on changing Japan-U.S. relations, asserts: "The United States is no longer the leader country but just one of the major powers, with many agonies. The United States' 'days of glory' are over, yet it has so far not been able to come up with a new vision to strive for." An economic commentator told JOZ television viewers that the emphasis on U.S. trade based on "mutual benefits" means that "U.S. status on the international stage has been lowered and reflects the current difficult situation faced by the United States."

SANKEI says the message underscores a belief that peace can be maintained only by the logic of strength. "What has come to the

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fore again is the image of the old hawkish Nixon who held communist countries in deep distrust," it says. Seeing no likelihood of a U.S.-China rapprochement in the near future, SANKEI concludes that "Japan should cope prudently with the China problem on the basis of the long-term outlook." The economic daily NIHON KEIZAI says the report indicates that "Japan will be forced to bear new economic responsibilities in the future, and the scope of those responsibilities will be far greater than those previously assigned under the Nixon Doctrine."

Japanese newspaper correspondents stationed in Washington have given their own views: NIHON KEIZAI's correspondent Kokuho--"It can be said that the people of the world have been disappointed by Nixon's message, which avoided touching on a clear policy for peace." ASAHI correspondent Koto--"The theory running through the Nixon message, which emphasizes the Nixon Doctrine, can in summary be termed a 'theory of balance' favorable only to the United States." MAINICHI correspondent Ishimaru--"Nixon's message this year has shown the figure of the old Nixon, who belongs to the hawks, and has suggested the future of the Nixon diplomacy--that it will grow more conservative." SANKEI correspondent Abe--"The need for Japan to establish its independent policy has become more important."

The Japan Communist Party carries comment critical of the message in its daily AKAHATA. The editorial says that although last year's message presented the Nixon Doctrine under a peace-loving cloak, this year's brought to the fore the "position-of-strength" policy. The emphasis on Japan's role in Asia shows that "the Nixon Doctrine expects Japan, as 'a major power,' to play a more positive role in gathering Asian puppet regimes together into an anticommunist force in line with the U.S. policy of aggression," the paper says.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA Official spokesman and editorialists in Nationalist China express disagreement with the President's statements on Communist China, but at the same time welcome his reassurances regarding continued U.S. commitments to Taipei. A Foreign Ministry spokesman argued that it is futile for the United States to try to change the hostile attitude of the Chinese Communists by a unilateral show of favors.

The paper LIEN HO PAO asserted in its initial comment that President Nixon "is making a terrible mistake in pursuing a 'two Chinas' policy; he will only invite more trouble through contacts

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with Peiping." His reiteration of U.S. commitments to the Republic of China is welcomed nonetheless, the editorial said. A few days later, the same paper was sharply critical of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs--"insensitive" and "cowardly"--for limiting itself to mild expressions of disagreement. The ministry failed even to register a formal protest, the paper complained, as the State Department itself expected.

INDIA The New Delhi radio says most Indian papers have commented on the report. The NATIONAL HERALD is quoted as observing that President Nixon is "probably entirely sincere" when he reflects on his failure to make peace and that he has something to say on each of the vexing questions troubling the American conscience but "nothing that promises a new angle."

President Nixon's statement on the prosecution and extradition of all plane hijackers is interpreted by Radio New Delhi as supporting India's demand for the return of the hijackers of an Indian plane. The radio observes that the President did not specifically mention Pakistan's complicity, but "what he said vindicates India's stand."

According to the radio, the leftwing DAILY PATRIOT urges the President to immediately withdraw American forces from Indochina, while the HINDUSTAN TIMES observes that the extent of U.S. air support in Vietnam poses "new dangers."

The TIMES OF INDIA editorially welcomes the President's "new sense of realism" and observes that "Nixon is finally evolving a more coherent policy for the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent." The paper praises the President for taking "a more mature approach" when he said his Administration could not press for a closer relationship with either India or Pakistan than their own interests led them to desire. The paper expresses the hope that with the revised statement of U.S. policy objectives in South Asia, the "strains that became noticeable in the relations between New Delhi and Washington will ease."

The AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA of Calcutta sees "ominous" signs in the President's words. The paper observes that Mr. Nixon "shed tears over his failure to bring about peace" in Vietnam, but argues that it is difficult to accept his sincerity because he wishes to achieve something as a "precondition" for peace. The paper asserts that since all his attempts have proved abortive, the President has turned to increasing pressures on Hanoi, and this cannot be seen as anything but "a policy of desperation, which usually ends in defeat."

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PAKISTAN The only available comment appears in a Bengali-language broadcast over the Karachi radio, which describes the message as "quite significant from various angles and points of view" and praises the President for explaining U.S. foreign policy in detail. The broadcast warns: "The time has now come for the United States to realize its many responsibilities as the biggest power on earth. If from now on the United States does not give a rethinking to all matters and make necessary changes in its basic foreign policy, the prospects of establishing peace in the world will further deteriorate."

THAILAND The report has been given prompt but moderate coverage by the Bangkok press and radio-TV, which almost unanimously agree that it "contained little that was new." Most of the press headlines stress President Nixon's disappointment at failing to restore peace in Vietnam and his appeal for mutual concessions to achieve peace in the Middle East.

Comment in Bangkok's vernacular press is scant, with most papers relying solely on U.S. sources for reports on the message, which was publicized under various headings over a period of three days. Thai leaders have made no response to the President's praise for Thailand's role in the development of regional organizations and in providing support for the effort to repel North Vietnamese aggression. Only the English-language BANGKOK POST features this reference to Thailand on its front page.

An editorial in the other English-language daily, the BANGKOK WORLD, observes that the President's expectations are "finely balanced" on the hope that regional groupings can supersede outside powers in the roles they have played in the East Asia area. Stressing that no nation in Asia has been more active in supporting regional projects than has Thailand, the editorial expresses a "sense of frustration" over the slow development of these projects. It concludes: "Mr. Nixon may well feel that the pressures at home make his doctrine of indirect involvement more pertinent than would ordinarily be the case, but it hardly seems appropriate to create the image that a substitute already exists."

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OTHER COUNTRIES Available comment from other noncommunist Asian nations is sparse. The STRAITS TIMES of Kuala Lumpur publishes an editorial hailing the message as "a clear enunciation of America's foreign policy aims" and "an effective answer to critics who see the South Vietnamese offensive in Laos with American air support as Washington's challenge to Peking." A Seoul radio broadcast highlights the fact that the report characterized South Korea as an excellent example of the progress of the Nixon Doctrine. The Saigon radio and press appear to have made no comment on the report--as was also the case last year.

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LATIN AMERICA

CHILE In a speech reported promptly by Havana's PRENSA LATINA, President Allende responded to three points raised in the President's message: Chilean relations with Cuba, Chilean relations with the United States, and the status of the inter-American system. Allende denied that Chile's establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba can be interpreted as "a challenge to the inter-American system," contending that Chile reestablished relations with Cuba because "it had the moral and political obligation to redress an injustice committed in the name of interests and ideologies which were not Chile's or its people's." He pointed out that Mexico did not break with Cuba.

On the subject of Chilean-U.S. relations, Allende reportedly stated that the Chilean Government "wants friendly relations with the most powerful country of the hemisphere, as long as it allows Chile to differ and disagree and negotiate from different points of view." He noted that "nothing that may imply undue criticism has come forth from the Government of Chile" and that "we have sought the possibility of dialog."

Allende also took issue with President Nixon's interpretation of the May 1969 Vina del Mar conference, contending that the consensus there was that "Latin America and the United States had divergent interests as the result of the former's dependence on the latter." Noting the President's statement that Allende's election had "deep implications" for the "inter-American system," Allende said Chile's attitude is "constructive" as exemplified by the fact that "despite our criticism of the OAS system, we remain members of that organization to set forth our viewpoints in its midst with the hope that dialog will impose itself" and open the way to "a new concept in inter-American relations."

Sharper criticism appears in an editorial in the Chilean Government newspaper LA NACION. It says that Latin America and the world "continue to wait for some consistency between the North American President's expressions of peace, nonintervention, and sensible partnership and his actions." Asserting that the President's report contains "nothing new" and is "simply a restatement of earlier definitions," LA NACION complains that only 11 pages of the 180-page document are devoted to Latin America—a fact "which demonstrates once more the small place hemisphere policy occupies in the overall concerns of the United States." In support of the same point it notes the "absence of an undersecretariat for Latin American affairs after more than 70 years of pan-Americanism."

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PERU Available Peruvian reaction is largely critical. According to REUTERS, the Peruvian ambassador to Mexico responded in an interview to the warning that nations hostile to the United States may be deprived of U.S. aid. "What does Mr. Nixon consider hostile acts, and to what aid does he make references?" he asked; "is he by chance making reference to the myth of foreign aid through the so-called investments by the U.S. firms" which "remit to the United States triple the amount of their investment in dividends and interest?" In the same context, Housing Minister Luis Vargas Caballero stated: "A free and sovereign country like Peru should neither fear nor accept threats from anyone--large or small."

An editorial in the official government newspaper EXPRESO calls the President's Latin American policy statements "infamous threats" and "the policy of the big stick." The paper says that "the vagueness of the terms used to determine the possible cause for the suspension of aid will allow the United States to continue to feel authorized to suspend aid in the event of any conflict which may come up between the imperialist companies and the countries in which they operate."

An editorial in LA CRONICA calls the President's remarks on suspension of aid "inaccurate and evil-minded." Denying that the Peruvian Government has engaged in "a witch-hunt policy against foreign companies," the editorial asserts that on the contrary, "it has always encouraged their establishment and dynamic growth within the framework of respect of the laws so long as they benefit the community." As for the fishing dispute, the editorial asks: "Is it 'harassment' when a free and sovereign country enforces its laws to punish owners of pirate vessels trying to fish indiscriminately in its territorial waters?"

In a more conciliatory vein, the conservative newspaper EL COMERCIO editorializes: "President Nixon's proposals on preferential tariffs and aid to foreign countries which respects their national dignity are correct." The paper finds the threat to suspend aid to hostile countries "contradictory and unfortunate," but it points out that North and South America have a common destiny in many areas and that "there is not, nor can there be in Latin America a condition wherein hostility against the United States is implicitly presumed."

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BRAZIL Limited radio reaction reports without comment the President's remarks on the possible repercussions that Chile's recognition of Cuba may have on the inter-American system. Brazilian radios have also prominently featured reportage on the statements on a worldwide agreement on air piracy and the forecast of intensified cooperation to prevent kidnaping of diplomats.

The Rio de Janeiro paper O GLOBO welcomes the report as a sign of a new realism in U.S. policy toward Latin America--brought about, the paper says, largely by President Allende's election in Chile. In the short term, the paper warns, "the long period of omission will give the Castro-Allende team solid advantages, and the realism proclaimed yesterday will suffer the consequences of the day-before-yesterday's lack of realism."

OTHER COUNTRIES Monitored radios in other Latin American countries have reported fairly fully on the message, but little comment is available. Buenos Aires' independent newspaper CLARIN, in the only monitored Argentine comment, welcomes the fact that the President's report "rules out the danger of the mistakes to which the past messianism led." But the paper regrets that "U.S. Government policy toward Latin American development persists in a mistaken focus, because if there were any clear ideas on the matter many of the conflicts would disappear immediately."

A columnist in the Panama City paper EL PANAMA AMERICA observes that the U.S. Government is decreasing its military expenditures at the cost of very serious domestic labor problems. "Evidently the communists do not believe in the veracity of these cuts or are blinded by their own warlike fury," he declares, and thus "it is logical that under these conditions President Nixon should convey to his people and to world opinion his concern over the possibility of new clashes."

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II. COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

THE USSR

On the day the President's report was released, Moscow issued its first, belated protest against the Laos operation announced two and a half weeks earlier by South Vietnamese President Thieu. Wide publicity for the Soviet Government statement and meager propaganda reaction to the President's report reinforce the possibility that the release of the statement may have been timed in part to offset the impact of the report. Soviet reaction to the report has been confined largely to news items and routine, low-level comment, the most authoritative being an "international review" article by Bragin in the 28 February PRAVDA which asks rhetorically how it is possible to speak of a new course aimed at peace when the United States has embarked on new steps toward widening the "aggression" in Indochina. By contrast, last year's report on U.S. foreign policy occasioned an article in IZVESTIYA by the paper's authoritative commentator Matveyev two days after its release.

The initial TASS account of the President's report on the 25th, carried the next day in the central press, said Mr. Nixon "pretentiously announced" that it was the intention of the United States to play a new role for peace in the world and to search for new ways leading to peace. But, TASS continued, "the Republican Administration has no intention of introducing any corrections in its foreign policy course, which will continue to be founded on the 'Nixon Doctrine.'" This conclusion was echoed on the 28th by a panelist in the domestic service commentators' roundtable show, who contrasted the President's words with U.S. actions in Indochina and asserted that the message "is not directed toward a search for peace, toward the goal of peace in Indochina" or elsewhere.

A TASS dispatch on the 26th said the New York TIMES has observed that the document "contains no new ideas or proposals." TASS cited the Washington POST for the observation that the message is "formulated in the propagandistic spirit [which] more resembles a platform for the forthcoming contention for the Presidency in 1972 than a government document on U.S. policy in the 1970's." And a domestic service report on the 26th said the message was received "with no special enthusiasm by the American public." While it was "saturated with words about peace and the so-called peace-loving aspirations" of the Administration, the broadcast asserted, it has to all appearances not misled the public.

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The Indochina and Middle East portions of the foreign policy report predictably are given the most attention in available Soviet propaganda, while other key issues -- notably U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S. policy in Europe -- are treated largely in passing.

INDOCHINA Featuring numerous reports and roundups to portray worldwide favorable reaction to the 25 February Soviet Government statement, Moscow depicts the President's report as arousing widespread criticism. A Washington-dated dispatch in PRAVDA on the 27th emphasizes domestic criticism, focusing on adverse congressional reaction to the President's comments on Indochina and observing that the report has given new impetus to the antiwar movement in the United States. Beyond reaction reports of this kind, Soviet comment on the Indochina portion of the report has been scattered and minimal.

A brief Radio Moscow account of the President's report on the 25th said it indicates that "the Republican Administration apparently does not intend to make any amendments to its foreign-political course, which, as before, is based on the Nixon doctrine." The radio added that "the American President continues to insist on his 'right' to organize armed intrusions into such neutral countries as Cambodia and Laos."

A panelist in Radio Moscow's weekly domestic service roundtable program on the 28th made the point that it is necessary to distinguish between the President's report "and what the United States is doing in Indochina." He added that "despite all the dodges, the President does not promise total withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam and Indochina; he once again puts forward his old theories, his old positions . . . on mutual withdrawal of troops."

MIDDLE EAST Moscow's response to the Middle East portion of the President's report has thus far been generally confined to carping remarks by commentators that the report reveals no change in Washington's pro-Israeli policy. The Soviet Government statement on the Middle East, issued two days after the President's report, does not explicitly refer to the message. A commentary in Arabic on the 28th does link a charge in the government statement with the President's report; quoting the statement's assertion that the United States recognizes Arab rights in words but supports Israel in deeds, the commentary says that "this was once more confirmed by Nixon's message to Congress."

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In the 28 February domestic service commentators' roundtable, panelists complained of the President's omissions, remarking that he made only passing reference to the Jarring mission--although it is the "most important means of reaching a peaceful settlement"--and paid scant attention to the UN decisions. One panelist went on to say that the President in effect "appears as an advocate of Israel," placing the entire burden of reaching a settlement on direct talks "between the aggressor and the victims of aggression"--the "persistent leitmotif" of Israel's policy.

An Arabic-language commentary on 26 February, giving virtually no indication of the content of the report, asserted that every line indicated that U.S. policy in the Middle East remains unchanged. Singling out the President's "reference to the preservation of military balance in the Middle East," the commentary said this meant increased supply of weapons and loans to Israel, and could only be interpreted as demonstrating that Tel Aviv will remain the "tool of U.S. imperialism." It asked rhetorically how, in the light of the President's message, one could assess U.S. statements that Washington is putting pressure on Israel to reach a solution, and it concluded that America's "pro-Israel and openly anti-Arab course" is set out in the President's report.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS The 25 February TASS report on the message acknowledged that it "gives certain space" to relations between Washington and Moscow. TASS said that the President, in "admitting the necessity of negotiations on questions dividing" the two countries, repeated the remarks he had made in the UN General Assembly last October. Unfortunately, TASS observed, these remarks "have so far not found any confirmation in concrete deeds." TASS went on to ask rhetorically how one can reconcile the President's remarks about a new approach to relations with the USSR and the socialist countries with Washington's intention, "proclaimed in the present message, to continue subversive activities against the socialist countries."

On the 26th, a Kozyakov commentary broadcast to North America complained about State Department spokesman McCloskey's remarks on the U.S. stand regarding the position of Jews in the Soviet Union. His statement of the 24th "shed a different light" on the President's remarks about U.S.-Soviet relations, Kozyakov said: While the foreign policy report says the United States would like a new approach to relations with the USSR and seeks to improve them, McCloskey's statement proves that "the Republican Administration's policy remains unchanged." This approach, the commentator added, "reeks strongly of the cold war spirit."

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None of the available Soviet comment to date has mentioned the President's remarks on strategic balance or the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) scheduled to open in Vienna on 15 March. Without reference to the report, however, a broadcast to North America on 27 February, routinely charging the United States with stepping up the arms race, said that Secretaries Laird and Rogers and President Nixon have professed the Administration's intention "to gain military superiority at any cost."

EUROPE AND NATO The TASS account of the report as well as a briefer domestic service summary noted that the President emphasized the need to build up NATO's strength. The TASS account additionally mentioned the President's observation that the Administration has been under pressure to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe, but that despite this the United States will retain and strengthen its forces there.

The TASS account further touched on the proposal for a European security conference--a proposal which it says has been supported by broad European public circles. According to TASS, the President maintained that the United States is prepared to conduct negotiations with the East at any forum, but that he "in essence contradicted his own statement" in suggesting that a conference will be of little use "as long as its agenda is restricted, in Nixon's opinion, by very general themes." A 1 March TASS dispatch, pointing up the alleged wide support for a conference, observes that the President in his message "tried to dampen interest" in the proposal.

RELATIONS While the TASS account ignored the passages on
WITH CHINA U.S.-Chinese relations, a 2 March commentary in Mandarin over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress touches on this issue for Chinese listeners. According to the broadcast, the tone of these passages was "so friendly and harmonious that one couldn't help but recognize that it was a signal inviting China to collude with the United States, although the U.S. President would be against the use of the term 'collusion.'" The commentary asserts that the President, in "raving that he wants to improve relations with Peking, had not a single word to say" on the key question of Taiwan. Suggesting that there "is something significant about this," the commentary concludes that the "imperialists hope that Peking will forsake its stand on Taiwan and other questions."

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A Radio Moscow broadcast to China on the 26th, noting that in the foreign policy report "Nixon emphasized that we are prepared to hold bilateral talks with Peking," adds: "The United States is trying to make use of the nationalistic trends in the Chinese leadership's policy, play on the anti-Soviet nature of their foreign policy, and reap big profits from their policy of splitting the world revolutionary and national liberation movement."

AFRICA AND
LATIN AMERICA

As in their treatment of last year's message, both Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress have tailored some material for audiences in Africa and Latin America. A 26 February Radio Peace and Progress commentary broadcast in English to Africa, for example, says the message will "undoubtedly come in for sharp criticism in Africa" since it is "demagogy from beginning to end." It goes on routinely to assail U.S. economic and military policies in Africa, including the alleged supplying of weapons to Portuguese "colonialists" for use against guerrilla forces.

A Radio Moscow commentary for Brazilian audiences, also broadcast on the 26th, says the portion of the message dealing with Latin America gives the impression that the United States "does not wish to acknowledge the important transformations taking place in South America."

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EAST EUROPE

Diversified reactions from Moscow's East European allies are harshest from East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. The comment from Czechoslovakia, by far the most voluminous, accords with the increasingly conservative tenor of Prague propaganda in its rigidly stereotyped emphasis on the theme that the President's report offered "no change" in U.S. foreign policy. By contrast, the reaction from Poland in the third month of the Gierek regime has been noticeably restrained, with critical comment balanced by a discernment of some redeeming features. Budapest's comment is meager and moderate, accompanying largely reportorial coverage. Bucharest's, notable for its appearance in an authoritative commentary in the party daily SCINTEIA, is also notable for a more than usually critical cast, though with qualifying expressions of a desire for bilateral cooperation to continue despite U.S.-Romanian differences.

Commentaries from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary all bring up the Soviet Government statement issued the same day as the President's report, a Warsaw radio talk on the 25th remarking that it was "probably no accident" that "only an hour separated the publication" of the two documents. An article in the 28 February issue of the Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET, the most sharply critical of the Hungarian commentaries, asks if "the Moscow message is correctly interpreted in Washington." And the Bratislava PRAVDA, in an article reported by the Prague CTK on 27 February, contrasts the President's report with the "serious" Soviet statement and comments that the U.S. document shows that "nothing is changing in the most burning problem of American policy, Indochina," despite the "many flexible words."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Most of the voluminous commentaries in Czechoslovak media play the "no change" theme in their opening sallies and, unlike the Polish and Hungarian comment, find little of a redeeming nature in the President's report. There is predictable, pro forma censure of U.S. policy in Indochina and a considerable focus on Europe and NATO.

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A talk entitled "Nixon and Europe," broadcast in the domestic service on 2 March, stresses a picture of NATO disunity and observes that the President "tries to unite the endeavors of the capitalist world for projects without any conflicts, such as the struggle against the contamination of the atmosphere and others." This is the only monitored East European reference to the proposals on cooperation against air pollution. Playing the "no change" theme, the commentary concludes that in fact "some passages are harsher" than those in last year's report, "particularly with regard to the socialist countries."

The Czechoslovak comment widely cites the President's statement that while a war in Europe is not considered imminent, "we must take into account the possibility that it might happen." The 2 March TV commentary sees in the call for a more autonomous Europe an attempt to create a "buffer zone" militarily dependent on the United States. In this connection the commentary scores the report's stress on maintenance of "sufficient" military force in Europe. The initial account of the report carried in the party daily RUDE PRAVO, a CTK dispatch published on the 26th, had been more objective in noting that the President "suggested" negotiations on reduction of the strength of units in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact "through a method similar to the approach used" for SALT--first fundamental questions, then concrete proposals.

The same dispatch, in the only reference to Peking noted in the Czechoslovak comment, injected critical comment on "the two-faced attitude toward the PRC" spelled out in the document. The United States, it said, "wants to improve its relationship with the PRC but will not allow it to take its place in the United Nations."

POLAND Warsaw's reaction has taken the form of a restrained dialog, featuring critical observations couched in far less categorical terms than those of the Czechoslovak comment. The initial Polish reaction, a talk by commentator Kalabinski broadcast domestically on the 25th, took note of the document's "calm" and "rather reporter-like tone." It criticized Vietnamization as amounting to "the well-known thesis" of letting Asians fight Asians, but only after reviewing at some length the President's own concept of the Nixon Doctrine. Stating that the report gives "relatively little space" to Indochina, Kalabinski disputed the thesis

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that the Middle East is "the most dangerous" problem: The President, the commentator said, "wanted to belittle the significance of the Indochina conflict not only in the eyes of his citizens but also in the eyes of the world, above all the USSR, but the facts we learn daily from Indochina will not let us forget the dangers threatened by that conflict."

An editorial in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on the 28th, entitled "'New Style' of Nixon's Doctrine," concedes that the Nixon Doctrine, as presented in the President's report, means "a modification of the style of U.S. involvement in world affairs" and credits the report with taking "new realities" into account. But it adds that "the whole doctrine is nevertheless subordinated to the idea of maintaining American leadership, waging policy from a position of strength or, as in the case of Indochina, a policy of war." The article contends that "in this context, the Nixon Doctrine is neither new nor does it modify the essence of American foreign policy."

Citing remarks by Senator Javits and Washington press comment to the effect that the message represents no change in policy, TRYBUNA LUDU comments that "in this light the President's more realistic attitude toward the question of solving the Middle East conflict raises doubt whether it was not dictated by tactical considerations and whether his words will be followed by diplomatic practice." An editorial in the 27-28 February issue of the Catholic daily SLOWO POWSZECHNE comments more favorably that "Nixon's remarks on the Near East contain the most specific new elements," which "may strengthen the prospects of the Jarring mission and a peaceful settlement."

With respect to Europe, the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 2 March interprets the President's remarks on the need to reach agreement in NATO as an admission of disagreement, commenting that this is "the first confirmation by the American side that the postwar period has come to an end on the European continent." The article, by editorial staff member Ryszard Wojna, highlights the 12 August 1970 Soviet-West German treaty as exemplifying U.S. inability to stem the process of detente and the preparation of a European security conference.

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A brief comment on the President's treatment of China appears in the Catholic SLOWO POWSZECHNE editorial--a bitter passing remark to the effect that in contrast to his tough stance toward the USSR, the President "was much warmer toward China."

HUNGARY Budapest has treated the document chiefly in reportorial coverage, with MTI transmitting a lengthy account on 25 February that was largely devoid of any editorial interjection. MTI's Washington correspondent Tibor Koeves observed that the subject of Soviet-U.S. relations, "examined from the point of view of a balance of power, runs through the whole study like a guideline." He mentioned in passing that on the score of Soviet-Chinese differences, "the President reiterates the view that 'these developments open up new problems and new perspectives.'"

Another report, by Washington correspondent Peter Vajda published in the party daily NEPSZABADSAG on the 26th, includes generally restrained observations to the effect that the message contains "misgivings about detente," a desire to "set the pace of relaxation in Europe and to prevent some countries from getting out of line," and a China policy "waiting for Peking to take the next step." It adds that while the message discerns "a possibility of further progress" in SALT, "it advocates further expansion of the Safeguard antimissile system, which will open a new chapter in the arms race."

The most polemical of the relatively few Budapest commentaries is an article entitled "A False Image of the World" in the Patriotic People's Front daily MAGYAR NEMZET of 28 February. The author says that in using the phrase "Building Peace," the President "could hardly have chosen a more astonishing and ill-timed title right after the unprecedentedly hazardous expansion of the war in Southeast Asia with the invasion of Laos." The article adds that "successive defeats of elite Saigon troops" induced the President "to inform Congress only by a single vague reference to the 'Laos detour,'" and it asks rhetorically: "Who will believe the intention of improving relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC when plans of deployment are being prepared against the socialist DRV?"

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EAST GERMANY East Berlin media outdo their Soviet allies in denouncing the presidential report and play up what they term the President's warning to "his own allies" in Europe "against a policy of detente." An article in the party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 26th charges that the President painted a gloomy picture of the international situation to justify in particular his "policy of aggression" in Indochina and "measures for the further expansion of NATO." Another article in the same paper on the 27th comments: "Nixon warns his own allies in Western Europe against a policy of detente. He does not stop short of extortion and threats, . . . obviously out of fear of progress on the road to European security."

While ignoring the President's juxtaposition of a Big Four Berlin accord on the one hand and the calling of a European security conference and Bonn ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties on the other, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND says "Nixon demands that this whole question" of European security "be subjected to the dictatorship of NATO." The SED organ concludes that "the message, which is marked by a sharp anticommunist and particularly anti-Soviet tenor, is a rebuff to the policy of the USSR, of the entire socialist community of states--a policy aimed at settling conflicts politically, and at disarmament. What Nixon presented is an adventurist, dangerous version of the world which mocks all realism."

BULGARIA Sofia's comment, predictably, is uniformly negative. An article in the party organ RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 27 February says it is evident from all the solutions prescribed by the President for dealing with current acute problems that the United States is striving to establish "supremacy in the world and to dictate its will everywhere." The paper finds similarities between U.S. policies in Indochina and the Middle East, asserting that the President wants solutions in both areas leading to "the consolidation of his puppet regimes" so as to make them "future mainstays of U.S. domination" in the two regions.

In other comment on the 27th, OTECHESTVEN FRONT charges that the President continues to rely on the position-of-strength policy and says this is just as disastrous for the United States as for the world political situation. NARODNA MLADEZH emphasizes that the President is now trying to play variations on the theme of some abstract "red threat," a theme that "is obsolescent and doomed to failure." TRUD comments that while Mr. Nixon has seldom used the word "peace" with such frequency, "the explosions of American bombs and shells in Laos are not at all a suitable accompaniment for his melodramatic tirades."

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A Radio Sofia commentary on the 25th and a Washington-dated dispatch in ZEMEDELKO ZNAME on the 26th both lament that "nothing concrete" is said about European security in the President's report.

ROMANIA The Bucharest Radio was silent on the President's report until the 27th, when it broadcast a lengthy review notable for emphasis on "contradictions" between the President's words about cooperation with other nations and a "tendency of domination in international life." The official party daily SCINTEIA on the 28th carried an expanded version of the radio report on the 27th, as well as accounts of negative reactions from U.S. media and public officials and from the DRV's Paris delegation.

An authoritative Romanian assessment appears in a SCINTEIA article on 3 March signed jointly by the paper's leading foreign policy commentators Caplescu and Fintinaru. While sharply critical of the President's stand on a European security conference--of which Romania is a foremost advocate--and on NATO, the article makes it clear that Romania does not want differences between the United States and Romania to adversely affect bilateral relations. Observing that one might have expected a "positive response" from the President on speeding up the convening of an all-European security conference, the article, according to AGERPRES, adds: "Instead, positions of reserve and tendencies toward procrastination are being expressed by advance conditions" and by demands for a preconceived solution of "some complex" problems of political life of the continent. The article also expresses opposition to the President's position "on reinforcing American forces in Europe" and "strengthening the NATO bloc." But it goes on to point to the "positive" results of the exchange of visits by President Nixon and President Ceausescu and to express the wish that "profound differences of views" between the two nations "should not impede the ascending evolution" of economic, political, and other relations. It also calls upon the United States "to eliminate restrictions and discriminations" in relations with Romania and grant it "most-favored-nation" treatment.

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YUGOSLAVIA Taking note of the announcement in the President's report that President Tito has accepted an invitation to pay a return visit to the United States, Yugoslav media balance their reaction to the Presidential document with restrained criticism and mild praise. An article in the Belgrade daily BORBA on the 27th says: "As a whole, the message does not offer any great hopes for the seventies; it does not answer the basic dilemmas and problems of the present-day world, but it also does not exclude the participation of the United States in their solution." The paper adds that it sets forth "a program which also takes certain realities of the present-day world into consideration and which, accepting the changes in world relations, does not exclude a change in American policy."

The other major Belgrade daily, POLITIKA, also on the 27th, assails U.S. policy in Indochina but comments that in the Near East President Nixon's "judgment is considerably more realistic and flexible and shows the apparent two-sided aspiration of the United States to come closer to the Arab world and to prevent the eruption of a local war which could act as a detonator of a conflict between the nuclear giants."

Commenting on the President's remarks on the need to promote good relations with Yugoslavia and Romania, POLITIKA says this "undeniably deserves to be characterized as a constructive gesture of coexistence." The Yugoslav news agency, TANJUG, in reporting the President's message earlier on the 27th, singled out for quotation Mr. Nixon's statement of his intention to ask Congress for guarantees for American private investments in Yugoslavia and Romania.

ALBANIA Tirana's characteristically hostile reaction is registered on 1 March in a lengthy article in the party organ ZERI I POPULLIT which dismissed the President's report as an attempt to "legalize and instigate the policy of aggressions and imperialist wars." The paper says the document represents the first effort to give a global character to Vietnamization, a strategy "being drowned in the endless ocean of the revolutionary people's war."

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Playing the familiar Albanian theme of U.S.-Soviet collusion, ZERI I POPULLIT stresses that "Nixon did not hide his satisfaction with the extent of the development of U.S.-Soviet relations in the most diverse fields--limitation of nuclear armaments, spheres of influence in Europe, etc." Noting that the President spoke of the prospects for increased U.S. investments in Eastern Europe, it adds that "Nixon, seeking to calm his partners, the Soviet revisionists, acknowledged the main interests of their security in Eastern Europe."

Turning to the President's Asian policy, ZERI I POPULLIT decries the "dangerous and open acts of war not only against the DRV and Laos but also against the PRC, which is their closest neighbor and the one most concerned with their security and national independence." The available ATA report of the ZERI I POPULLIT article makes no mention of the President's remarks on China, but a short critical report on the message carried by the Albanian news agency on the 27th noted that "Nixon again made an effort to justify his 'two Chinas' policy."

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NORTH VIETNAM AND THE PRG

The first monitored reaction to the President's report from Vietnamese communist media was a Liberation Radio commentary broadcast at 2300 GMT on the 25th. Hanoi media's initial reaction came in a radio commentary at 0330 GMT on the 26th. Two hours later, Hanoi's news agency VNA carried the statement by the DRV spokesman in Paris which had been issued there the day before. The PRG Paris spokesman's statement was issued on the 26th and carried by Front media the following day. High-level Hanoi reaction came on 2 March in the form of a DRV Foreign Ministry statement--a vehicle that has been used to comment on important Presidential pronouncements on Indochina since President Nixon's 3 November 1969 speech on Vietnamization policy. Somewhat surprisingly, to date there has been no official PRG statement on the report; Front statements frequently follow DRV statements on Administration policy by a day or two.

The propaganda does not rebut--or even acknowledge--specific points in the President's report, instead falling back on personal vituperation of the President and broad attacks on the Nixon Doctrine as a device to pursue "neocolonialism." A notably prominent theme throughout the comment is the claim that the President again "threatened" the DRV and that the United States is planning "new military adventures" against it--a line that has been conspicuous in both routine and elite propaganda since rumors of the allied operation in Laos began circulating at the end of January. This line is given new, high-level prominence in the DRV Foreign Ministry statement of 3 March which protests "increasingly serious acts of war" against North Vietnam since the massive air strikes last November.

HANOI The statement issued by the DRV spokesman in Paris on the 25th claimed that the President tried "to make black white," and as documentation it singled out three "lies" by the President--"pretending" he wants a peaceful settlement, claiming that the DRV had expanded the war to all of Indochina, and insisting he wants negotiations while failing to respond to the PRG initiatives at the Paris conference and in fact "nurturing illusions of military victory."

The reaction for the most part glosses over the substance of the President's remarks on Indochina, instead taking the occasion to repeat the usual attack on the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization as tools to pursue neocolonialism. A VNA commentary on the 26th said that "Nixon's lengthy report did not offer any novelty; he

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tried by inflated rhetoric to cover up his extremely reactionary bellicose colonialist policy." And the initial Hanoi radio commentary said that "Nixon brazenly emphasized that the Indochina problem is a manifestation, a concrete example of his doctrine," adding that "while Nixon boastfully reiterated his theme that Vietnamization is a path which may lead to peace," it is in fact a plan of "having puppets die in place of Americans."

The 2 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement says that in the part of his report dealing with Indochina the President tried to prove that Vietnamization was "correct and successful"; that he tried to "justify" U.S. expansion of the war to Cambodia and Laos; and that he "also uttered threats of war against the DRV"--a claim also made in the routine comment.* The statement refers four separate times to "new military adventures against the DRV."

The DRV statement says the President "actually just repeated the old arguments that have been frequently reiterated since he came to power--arguments that have been completely refuted by reality." It then argues routinely that the purpose of Vietnamization is not to end the war or withdraw all U.S. troops and that the Nixon Doctrine "is merely an extremely insidious and cruel policy designed to use Indochinese to fight Indochinese in order to promote the Americans' neocolonialist interests." It claims that Vietnamization has "gradually failed and is faced with the danger of bankruptcy" and that it was in this "defeated situation" that troops were sent to invade Cambodia and Laos. It asserts that "obviously the Americans do not want to end the war through negotiations" as the President has stated but are prolonging and expanding the war.

The statement gives some prominence to domestic and world opposition to the Nixon policy. Declaring that partial troop withdrawal and "deceitful peace tricks" have not covered up the "warlike, aggressive nature" of the Nixon Administration, it says "this is why the Americans and world peoples, including

* This is apparently an allusion to the President's statement that in the process of withdrawing U.S. troops under the Vietnamization policy if North Vietnam took or tried to take advantage of redeployments by building up its strength in the South and launching new attacks, "I have made clear on a dozen occasions that I would take strong and effective measures to prevent the enemy from jeopardizing our remaining forces."

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some American politicians, have vehemently protested against" the Vietnamization policy. It adds that "the world's peoples, including the American people, demand" that an end be put to the aggression. The statement also observes that the President again "tried to plead" for his policy, "faced with the American people's crisis of confidence in the U.S. Administration and the profound indignation of world public opinion."

The first Hanoi press comment came in a NHAN DAN Commentator article on 3 March, the same day the papers published the foreign ministry statement. Neither VNA nor Hanoi radio carried the text of the article, but VNA prefaced its excerpts with the statement that the paper's commentary on the President's report said:

The U.S. aggression in Vietnam and Indochina as a whole is a series of miscalculations, a process of escalation of war and lies on the one hand and of a headlong slide into the pitfall of defeats on the other. Such is the tragedy of the U.S. aggressors in this peninsula ablaze with revolutionary war, and the "Nixon Doctrine" is but one act of it.

As reviewed by VNA, the Commentator article says the United States has resorted to the "most savage war acts"--raining on Vietnam and Indochina more bombs than the United States used in World War II. It adds that "no violence can shake the Vietnamese people. The U.S. war has only resulted in the aggressors' bogging down in South Vietnam and in Cambodia and Laos as well." The article declares categorically that in Indochina the whole world has witnessed the failure of all U.S. strategies and tactics, all modern weapons, and the most seasoned armed forces--a failure which "has to some extent helped upset global strategy and proved that the strength of U.S. imperialism is limited, although its ambition is boundless."

THE FRONT Comment from Front media follows the general outline of Hanoi's, with particular criticism of the President's support for the Thieu-Ky regime. Thus, the statement by the PRG spokesman in Paris, carried by LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) on 27 February, takes issue with the President's declaration that the United States would not "let down its friends," the Saigon administration. The statement also scores the President for "flagrantly and cynically misconstruing" the present situation in Indochina and at the

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Paris conference, saying he "shamelessly alleged that Hanoi does not want to seriously negotiate, that Hanoi 'has made this war an Indochina conflict.'"

A Liberation Radio commentary on the 25th says the President "repeated his threats toward the peoples in the Indochinese countries," but adds that "he can intimidate no one." An LPA commentary on the 27th says that the "gist" of the President's report is his emphasis on an intention to "broaden the conflict and increase American aid and air support to the Saigon and other aggressor forces in Indochina."

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THE PRC AND NORTH KOREA

PEKING Peking media have yet to devote a commentary to the President's report, reacting to it chiefly through the proxy of hostile North Korean and Albanian comment. The first Chinese reactions were passing mentions: A 25 February NCNA attack on the British decision to sell aircraft to South Africa castigated the report for opposing "the attempt to isolate South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonialists"; and a 28 February NCNA report claiming U.S. defeats in Laos made an apparent allusion to the report in stating that "Nixon recently moaned that the United States . . . would have 'more hard choices ahead' in Indochina." A specific reference to the report appears in a 2 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which charges the United States with trying to "provoke a new war with the DPRK." Saying that the President referred "to 'progress' in the implementation of the 'Nixon Doctrine' in Korea" in his report, the article concludes that this exposes the doctrine as "neocolonialism."

On 3 March NCNA carried reports from the DPRK and Albanian press as well as the DRV Foreign Ministry statement denouncing the President's report. Peking's summary of the DRV statement notes that it says "the United States does not seek 'to end the war through negotiations' as Nixon has claimed" and that "war Vietnamization" is "bound to end in a complete fiasco." The statement, NCNA points out, emphasized the unity and "iron will" of the three Indochinese peoples in opposition to U.S. goals. NCNA sums up the Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN's view of the report as "a codification of the highly arrogant U.S. imperialist foreign policy line of aggression" and "a new heinous challenge and naked threat and blackmail to the progressive peoples of the whole world." And it quotes passages from the Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT which ridicule the President's remarks on Indochina. NCNA also notes the Tirana paper's remark that the Arab-Israeli conflict "is fraught with considerable danger to the two superpowers."

There is no acknowledgment in Peking media of the President's statement of policy toward the PRC. The NCNA account of Pyongyang's reaction does, however, reproduce NODONG SINMUN's attack on the President's "pledge to permanently 'guarantee' the status of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in the United Nations."

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PYONGYANG The North Koreans reacted promptly with a NCNA commentary on 26 February and a Commentator article in the party organ NODONG SINMUN the following day. Both play customary themes accusing the United States of aggressive intentions through application of the Nixon Doctrine. In typically intemperate language, NODONG SINMUN describes the report as "full of unbounded aggressive ambition of the U.S. imperialists for world domination" and as revealing "in all nakedness the heinous nature, brutality, shamelessness, craftiness, and ferociousness of U.S. imperialism, the aggressor."

Both commentaries denounce the report's effort to "justify" the expansion of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina by placing the blame on the DRV. NODONG SINMUN denounces Vietnamization and the "invasion" of Cambodia and Laos as the greatest "crimes" committed under the cloak of the Nixon Doctrine. U.S. designs for further "aggression," it says, are exposed by references in the report to a need for continued "high levels of American assistance and air operations" to guarantee the safety of American troops and facilitate their withdrawal. KCNA claims that the report says troops "will not be withdrawn from South Vietnam if a single U.S. prisoner is detained in North Vietnam," thus proving that Vietnamization is merely an "artifice" and that the United States has no intention of pulling out of Vietnam.

Both commentaries criticize the report for urging the "Japanese militarists" to "discharge their responsibilities" in Asia, thereby encouraging Japanese expansionist ambitions and using Japan as a "striking force" for U.S. aggression in Asia. The commentaries routinely charge that the report reveals President Nixon's "sinister design to speed up war preparations against the DPRK," KCNA referring in this context to plans to give more military aid to South Korea and speed up modernization of the ROK Army "under cover of" the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea. NODONG SINMUN also charges that a U.S. ambition to dominate Asian countries is expressed in the report's pledge "to permanently 'guarantee' the status of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in the United Nations."

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CUBA

With emphasis on the Western Hemisphere portion of the President's report, Havana comment plays up alleged internal contradictions in the document, points to "contradictions between Nixon's promises and the true facts," and snipes at the very fact that a U.S. President has issued a report on "the state of the world." One commentator, on Havana television on 2 March, characterized the document as "180 pages of obscure language" and "the longest message ever"; several commentaries said there was "nothing new" in the portion dealing with Latin America; and one called the report full of "cheap demogagy and ridiculous contradictions," a "repetition of old deceptive words which adorn a policy of imposition and force."

Citing the view of "several U.S. congressmen" that the President's Latin American policy has been "a continuous failure interrupted by occasional disasters," a radio commentary broadcast to the Americas on 2 March contended that the "only concrete" developments in U.S.-Latin American relations during the past two years have been "increased deterioration, increased strangulation of the underdeveloped countries of the region, new imperialist threats, and old unfulfilled promises."

Cuban comment pays particular attention to the President's comments on Chile and its relations with Cuba and the United States, questioning whether he is sincerely "prepared to respect all continental governments regardless of their ideologies or is ready to admit only those governments which are submissive to Washington." Havana sees a contradiction between his promise of respect for ideological diversity and his "warning" that the United States "would discontinue aid to Latin American nations which show continued hostility toward it."

On the issue of U.S.-Cuban relations, Havana media charge that in "reasserting the old policy of hostility and isolation" with respect to Cuba the President "persists in his aggressive policy against Cuba." Commenting on his position that Cuba's attitude--its encouragement and support of revolution and its military ties to the Soviet Union--has kept it outside the inter-American system, a Havana radio commentary on 26 February rejoined that Cuba has repeatedly said "it is not interested in rejoining the so-called inter-American system as represented by the OAS, from which it was unlawfully excluded in 1961 by U.S. pressure." The commentator added that Cuba is willing to establish relations "on the basis of equality" with all Latin American governments which "are willing to

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oppose U.S. blackmail." On the specific issue of Cuban-Soviet military ties, the commentator recalled Castro's statement last year that Cuba would not "commit the error of renouncing its military ties with the Soviet Union but that, on the contrary, such ties would be strengthened"--an apparent reference to the Cuban leader's Lenin Day speech in April.

President Nixon's remarks on inter-American trade relations also come under Cuban attack, with one commentary contending that he "again committed himself to apply a series of measures which he promised two years ago but has not fulfilled." Another Havana radio commentary, beamed to the Americas on 2 March and dwelling at length on this portion of the Western Hemisphere section, charged that the President's references to liberalizing and expanding trade and to abolishing tariffs and granting preferential treatment to Latin American imports were contradicted by his actions of the past two years, during which "he has employed many dilatory tricks to evade lifting" trade barriers and Latin American trade with the United States has dropped significantly. "Nixon has not only failed to offer solutions," the commentary continued, "but has rejected those broached by the Latin American countries, cut foreign aid projects, and issued new threats and pressures that have hurt inter-American trade." Particularly singled out were the "so-called Mills bill" and the "new sugar quota law that, under the proposed amendments, would seriously hurt most of the Latin American countries."

Minimal comment of a reportorial nature gratuitously criticizes the portions of the message dealing with U.S. policies in the Middle East and Indochina, pointing to alleged flagrant contradictions between the President's words and U.S. policies in those areas.

Monitored Cuban comment has predictably failed to directly acknowledge the President's enumeration of steps which the United States has taken in the past two years to extend less-restricted assistance and to increase Latin America's role in inter-American activities. It did take note of his recommendation that Congress establish the office of Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, "as if this new post would somehow change the situation."

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