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Chinese Opposition to DRV Hegemony in Indochina

China analysts and many others tend to believe that the PRC is basically opposed to North Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina. This paper is intended to present evidence for the contrary view that China is either resigned to, unconcerned about or even desires eventual North Vietnamese domination of Indochina.

China Opposes DRV Hegemony

The case for China's opposition to DRV domination over Indochina rests on the following arguments:

-- China fears that Hanoi and the area it controls could someday fall under Soviet influence.

-- China also fears that a Hanoi-controlled Indochina might become a rival in Southeast Asia, or at least promote actions that would affect PRC security -- such as provoking the Thais to lean on "outsiders" for security. By implication, the PRC is concerned that it cannot force its will on the DRV and that Hanoi -- like Belgrade -- will be able to assert an independent position which could be contrary to Chinese interests in the area. The North Vietnamese in the past have flouted Chinese advice, and in any event their nationalism and historic anti-Chinese attitude could be hostile to PRC interests.

SECRET



Authority EO 12958  
By ANARA Date 7/31

2

-- China therefore desires to limit Hanoi's expansion in Indochina, to preserve viable, fairly autonomous states (at least in Laos and Cambodia) and itself to play the primary power role in the region.

-- To promote its policy of a balkanized Indochina dependent on the PRC, Peking has counseled restraint in South Vietnam and has championed Sihanouk in Cambodia. In Laos it has maintained correct but distant relations with Souvanna Phouma and has built its own extensive road systems in the northern part of the country. Apparently different Chinese perceptions of the situation in Indochina reportedly have given rise to some frictions with Hanoi -- as evidenced during Le Duan's visit to Peking in June 1973.

### China Favors DRV Hegemony

The case that China in fact favors or is indifferent to Hanoi's eventual domination of Indochina rests in the following considerations:

-- North Vietnamese hegemony is a far stronger bulwark to Soviet penetration of Indochina than a fragmented region ruled by a collection of autonomous governments, each susceptible to Moscow's influence. The xenophobic North Vietnamese traditionally have kept a tight reign on all foreigners -- including the Russians. Despite its heavy dependency on the Soviet Union since 1965, Hanoi has not allowed the Soviets to gain a position in North Vietnam which would be in any way inimical to Chinese interests. Indeed, the North Vietnamese still appear ideologically more compatible with their Chinese neighbors than with the Soviets who have provided Hanoi with the bulk of its heavy and expensive equipment. Presumably China's nightmare -- and Moscow's dream -- would be a North Vietnamese grant of base rights to the Soviets. Considering Hanoi's experiences with western bases in Indochina, the proximity of China and the dictates of third world imagery, it would appear extremely unlikely that the DRV would accept Soviet bases under any circumstances and that therefore China knows it need not worry too much on this score.

-- By itself, North Vietnamese domination of Indochina could not seriously compromise Chinese interests. China's power position vis-a-vis Hanoi is overwhelming. (However, possible Soviet reaction and other factors would greatly inhibit direct application of this power against Hanoi.) The DRV shares a long border with China, and the Chinese still enjoy treaty rights enabling them to use rail lines and roads leading from Kwangsi Province through Hanoi to Yunnan Province. (The PRC in fact stationed over 50,000 engineer and AAA troops along this route during the 1965-1968 bombing period.) The PRC's ultimate leverage over Hanoi was highlighted during the mining of the DRV's ports last year when Peking enjoyed a stranglehold over all imports into North Vietnam. Quite apart from this,

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By SNARA Date 7/31

SECRET

3

China and the DRV have been compatible neighbors with no lasting differences. Moreover, North Vietnam has never sought to emulate Yugoslavia, which it long regarded as a renegade and traitor to international Communism.

-- Realistically, Peking cannot hope to play a dominant role directly in each Indochinese state because it is Hanoi -- not Peking -- which created, nurtured, encadred and now sustains all three insurgencies in the area. The leadership of the Khmer Rouge and the Pathet Lao are loyal first to the DRV. Consequently, China has few wholly reliable assets of its own on the ground and thus has little choice but to direct its influence through Hanoi rather than build rival "apparats" in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

-- Evidence suggesting Chinese opposition to a DRV hegemony can support the equally plausible contention that Peking is concerned more with the timing and tactics of DRV ascendancy than in the goal of hegemony itself. The critical element in Chinese thinking is their perception of United States policy in Indochina and the extent to which we link detente with untoward DRV actions in Indochina. China's advice to Hanoi thus appears more in the nature of "go slow for the present" rather than accept an indefinite freeze on the current status quo. The by-play in Peking during Le Duan's visit last June did not involve fundamental DRV goals -- which China overtly endorses -- but rather differing assessments of the situation in Indochina (e. g. U. S. and Soviet intentions, status of the Agreement's implementation).

-- Particular items of evidence cited as examples of Chinese opposition to DRV hegemony are in fact ambiguous. For example:

. Chinese road building in Laos indirectly supports DRV interests by extending North Vietnamese -- as well as Chinese -- road connections into north Laos and by relieving the NVA of the burden to garrison that section of the country. (It is significant that Hanoi-controlled Pathet Lao forces have closely supported this Chinese operation.) Also, the Chinese road network can be seen as a ploy directed primarily at Thailand, either to pressure the RTG into concessions or to provide greater logistics capability to Chinese supported insurgents in the northeast (and in Burma). (There is, incidentally, good reason to believe Hanoi and Peking are cooperating in supporting the Thai insurgency.)

. Similarly, in Cambodia, China's support for Sihanouk can be interpreted as aimed at embarrassing Soviet policy and attracting third world sympathies which Sihanouk had cultivated. Despite the cosmetic attention which China lavishes on Sihanouk, China's patronage has not been carried to the extreme of seriously jeopardizing DRV interests in the insurgency or of pushing Sihanouk at the insurgents'

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4

deal which we have good reason to believe Peking offered the GKR following Sihanouk's ouster: The PRG would deny Sihanouk asylum and recognize the new government if the GKR would give the North Vietnamese a free hand in Cambodia! Since the events of March 1970, Chinese and North Vietnamese policy pronouncements in Cambodia have been basically similar (e. g., support for an "independent and neutral" Cambodia, ritualistic support for Sihanouk, the "5 points" and opposition to foreign intervention). The Chinese, moreover, have tolerated the actions of Ieng Sary, Hanoi's chief watchdog on Sihanouk and the man whom Sihanouk has described as being his "worst enemy." Indeed, the Chinese have bolstered Sary's position by according him protocol precedence over the GRUNK ministers, although he has no clearly defined role in the GRUNK.

Finally, even China's protocol treatment of Sihanouk seems recently to have waned. For example, Premier Chou did not attend Sihanouk's banquets on the Prince's return from the Non-Aligned Conference and North Korea. Also NCNA heavily edited its coverage of Sihanouk's major addresses at Pyongyang and Algiers.

Further, if the Chinese really supported Sihanouk as a counter to the Hanoi-controlled insurgents, why should Sihanouk go to the extreme of publicly threatening to resign if the Khmer Communists do not accept his return and that of the exiled GRUNK ministry. Presumably, China has sufficient leverage in Hanoi to persuade the North Vietnamese and their Khmer subsidiaries to allow Sihanouk's return.

. In Vietnam, there is no evidence that the Chinese have ever objected to Hanoi's basic objectives in the South. The Chinese have consistently supported Hanoi's policies and the PRG's position. For example, the DRV-PRC Joint Communique of July 11 contains assurances of Chinese support for the PRC's six point political proposal of April 25, 1973 and Chinese reference to the PRG as the "only authentic representative" of the Southern people. (In contrast, the Soviet-DRV Communique of July 1973 omits references of Soviet support for the PRG's political offer and employs the awkward description of the PRG as the group which "alone genuinely expresses the aspirations of the South Vietnamese population." The Chinese promptly signed economic and military aid agreements with Hanoi and the PRG during the past summer, while the Soviet agreement was delayed nearly one month and no accord was signed with the PRG. On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that the Chinese have not always agreed with Hanoi's strategy. There is, for example, evidence that at times the Chinese felt the DRV was unwisely departing from sound Maoist military orthodoxy and that they questioned the timing of the 1968 negotiations with the United States.

-- The Soviets' own actions in Indochina do not support the view that they

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the chief rationale for the theory China opposes DRV hegemony. If Moscow regarded Hanoi as a reliable channel for Soviet influence, the Russians logically should be more enthusiastic over the DRV's military/political enterprise in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. To the contrary, Soviet actions -- far more than Chinese -- appear to be aimed at obstructing DRV hegemony with a view towards a balkanized Indochina more susceptible to Soviet penetration. Thus, in Cambodia, the Soviets crossed DRV and Chinese policy by spurning Sihanouk, recognizing the GKR and providing no aid to the Hanoi-inspired insurgency. In Laos, Moscow has maintained more candid relations with Souvanna than have the Chinese (who have not yet replaced their Ambassador in Vientiane); and the Soviets have downplayed support for the LPF. For example, the Joint Communiqué in Moscow last July did not even refer to the LPF. Also, Moscow's public statements on Indochina (such as Brezhnev's speech October 26 to World Conference of Peace) emphasize the sovereign rights of all countries in the area.

-- The history of the association between Chinese and North Vietnamese Communist parties indicates a long-standing DRV-PRC cooperation in Southeast Asia and Chinese support for DRV aims.

Hanoi-Peking Cooperation in Southeast Asia

The Chinese have long been aware that for over 40 years the Vietnamese Communist leaders ultimately intend to dominate all of Indochina. The Vietnamese Communist leadership has been quite open in their espousal of this objective. The Party founded by Ho in 1930 was, after all, the Indochinese Communist Party, not the Vietnamese Communist Party. Until as late as 1949 these leaders were opening advocating the formation of an "Indochina People's Republic." For political and diplomatic reasons, the Politburo decided in 1951 to take a different public position and created separate overt parties and movements for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia -- and in 1960 for South Vietnam. Privately, however, the Politburo's objectives remained unchanged, a fact which has certainly been known to the Chinese. Despite -- or perhaps because of -- these objectives the Chinese have provided the Vietnamese Communists with essential military and economic support from 1950 (when Mao had extended his control to the North Vietnamese border) to the present. It is, for example, doubtful that the North Vietnamese could have succeeded in defeating the French at Dien Bien Phu without large scale Chinese assistance. In fact, without this assistance they might not have been able to have defeated the French

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6

at all. At this time, it should be borne in mind, Ho's "Viet Minh" forces were fighting all over Indochina. Moreover, Hanoi, and probably the Chinese, expected Hanoi-controlled elements to prevail throughout Indochina despite the Geneva Accords of 1954. Of course it should be remembered that in this earlier period the Communist world was relatively monolithic. At least up to 1954, the Chinese and the Soviets probably pursued a common policy in respect to Southeast Asia. It later became increasingly evident that Khrushchev was pursuing policies (i. e., de-Stalinization and detente with the West) which were inimical to the interests of both China and the Vietnamese Communists. From 1957 on, both the Chinese and their Vietnamese allies became increasingly disenchanted with the Soviet Union for largely the same reasons (i. e., the application of Soviet policies was causing internal problems for both China and North Vietnam). While the Chinese eventually made an open break with the Soviets, the more international-minded North Vietnamese opposed overt Communist disunity and, moreover, did not want to lose Soviet support and assistance. Accordingly, they did not openly side with the Chinese, but clearly shared their concerns about the evolution of Soviet policies. Since then, the North Vietnamese have been closer to the Chinese both politically and ideologically than to the Soviets. While Hanoi has had some ideological and other differences with the Chinese (most recently in respect to Sino-U. S. detente policies), the North Vietnamese have, since 1957, had more problems with the Soviets. The Chinese, for example, have been more constant in their support for "wars of liberation" than have the Russians. Peking has, therefore, provided more ideological support for Hanoi's objectives in Indochina than has Moscow.

In recent years, particularly, China has strongly supported the concept of Indochinese unity. This was particularly evident in China's hosting of the Indochinese Summit Conference of April 1970 in which all Indochinese participants, except for Sihanouk, belonged to movements under Hanoi's control. The Chinese have echoed Hanoi's call for close cooperation among elements in Indochina under Hanoi's control. If China wanted a balkanized Indochina, it would certainly not be advocating this kind of unity. Rather, it would be supporting those elements in Indochina which were resisting Hanoi's efforts to extend its domination over the whole area. This has never happened. China has only supported those parties in Indochina which are essentially under Hanoi's domination.

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19.

~~appears to be how to satisfy his desire for revenge against GKR leaders without undoing the countervailing GKR structure he needs to balance the Communists. His other dilemma is how to induce the insurgents into accepting negotiations and a settlement which will preserve a viable GKR remnant. We have little doubt that Sihanouk will try to resolve these dilemmas and subtly promote himself as the peacemaker in the current stalemate. However, Sihanouk's effort, we believe, will be lost unless the insurgents' principal backers and controllers, the Vietnamese, acquiesce in an early peace.~~

#### F. Chinese Position and Perspective

Chou En-lai has apparently been a friend of Sihanouk since the 1955 Bandung Conference and Sihanouk's subsequent denunciation of the SEATO umbrella. The Chinese were no doubt pleased that Sihanouk chose Peking, rather than Moscow, as his place of exile after his 1970 deposal; however, shortly after the Prince's arrival in Peking, the Chinese reportedly offered the new Phnom Penh government a deal whereby the Chinese would deny Sihanouk exile in the PRC if Phnom Penh would not interfere with NVA/VC operations in Cambodia. This offer was refused.

The Chinese have gone out of their way to make Sihanouk and his entourage comfortable in Peking and to honor Sihanouk at diplomatic and public functions.

China has bankrolled a GRUNK worldwide diplomatic effort. It supported the GRUNK at the Georgetown Non-aligned Conference and at the recent NAC in Algiers, and was prominent in the successful effort to inscribe the pro-Sihanouk Cambodian representation item on this year's UNGA agenda. Both Ch'iao Kuan-hua in his major policy speeches at UNGA and Huang Hua in the inscription debate on October 16 left no doubt of China's firm public backing for GRUNK's legitimacy. Huang Hua, moreover, made a sharp attack on the U.S., including the charge that we instigated the Lon Nol coup and were now the only source of outside interference in Cambodia's affairs.

Points of emphasis vary in Peking's behind-the-scenes approach to Cambodian issues. In your October 3 conversation with Ch'iao Kuan-hua in New York, the latter refrained from expressing all-out support for Sihanouk and

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By SPNARA Date 7/31

SECRET/NODIS

20.

urged that the Khmer should be left alone to settle their own problems. But while the September 14, 1973 joint communique on Pompidou's trip to China stated "Both sides believed that the Cambodian issue should be settled by the Cambodian people without foreign intervention," Chou En-lai reportedly pressed Pompidou to recognize Sihanouk before the Soviet Union does. Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei reportedly told the New Zealand Ambassador that the U.S. should stop supporting Lon Nol and let the Cambodians work things out among themselves.

Speeches at the UN excepted, Peking has in public largely soft-pedaled Sihanouk's criticisms of the U.S. and its allies, while predictably giving full play to his attacks on the Soviet Union. Peking has not commented on the recent Soviet moves to switch support to Sihanouk.

Given Sihanouk's acknowledged differences with the Khmer Rouge, China's continued strong support for the Prince might suggest PRC goals somewhat at variance with those of Hanoi or the insurgents. There is the theory that China seeks to gain influence, at Hanoi's expense, in Cambodia through a restoration of Sihanouk. If, on the other hand, China is seeking to play off Sihanouk against Hanoi, it is difficult to understand why China tolerates the presence of Hanoi's watchdog on Sihanouk, Ieng Sary (whom Sihanouk actively dislikes).

To what degree China's position on Cambodia agrees with or diverges from that of the DRV is not really known. In both their public and private statements, the Chinese take basically the same line as the North Vietnamese-- i.e., Cambodia should remain independent and neutral, and Sihanouk's GRUNK should come to power. These vague formulations are open to opposite interpretations, especially in view of Hanoi's ill-disguised designs on Cambodia.

Also, China likely views its support of Sihanouk partly in terms of enhancing Chinese influence in the third world. That Sihanouk chose Peking instead of Moscow was certainly a feather in China's cap from an international point of view.

SECRET/NODIS

Authority E-012958  
By SNARA Date 7/31

SECRET/NODIS

21.

A predictable bone of contention between Hanoi and Peking would be the treatment of Sihanouk if and when he returns to Cambodia. Hanoi and the insurgents would like to minimize his role in every respect; whereas the Chinese would probably not want to see their former honored guest humiliated, whether he had any real power or not.

6. Soviet Position

The USSR on October 10 announced that it formally acknowledged its support of the GRUNK and Sihanouk as the legal regime in Cambodia and would so instruct its UN delegation (however, it still is not clear whether the Soviets have formally recognized the GRUNK). This move had been earlier signalled by Soviet press commentary and appears partly to be in response to violent criticism in the last several months by Sihanouk about the lack of direct Soviet support and continued recognition of the Phnom Penh government, partly to placate Hanoi, partly in fear of a separate U.S.-PRC arrangement, but most of all it is an effort to hedge Soviet bets in case the insurgents win. The Soviets and their eastern European allies (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany) have retained embassies, but without ambassadors, in Phnom Penh since Sihanouk's overthrow. Though embarrassing in the Socialist/political context, the Soviet Bloc wished to retain their foothold, and some potential influence, in Cambodia, particularly since it was uncertain that the Communist forces could win given U.S. combat air support of the Lon Nol regime. Moreover, the Soviets have traditionally been reluctant to sever relations with governments in power in favor of governments in exile. Soviet refusal to recognize the GRUNK and to break with the Lon Nol regime has no doubt been a major bone of contention between Hanoi and Moscow.

Until their recent announcement concerning the GRUNK and Sihanouk, the Soviets continued to take the line with us that the Khmer parties should be free to settle their differences even though both sides appeared intransigent. The USSR over recent months professed to have no influence with the Khmer Communists and refused

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Authority 6012958  
 By ANARA Date 7/31

SECRET/NODIS

24.

and diplomatic arena. On the other hand, he remains an unpredictable and sometimes uncontrollable free spirit whose public utterances are often an embarrassment both to Hanoi and the insurgents. In 1971, Hanoi assigned Teng Sary to keep tabs on Sihanouk and to accompany him wherever he goes. This, however, has not kept Sihanouk completely under control. Hanoi repeatedly voices public support for Sihanouk as "head of state" and "the legitimate, genuine and consistent representative of the state of Cambodia"; but Hanoi would want to see his role severely restricted should he ever return to Cambodia. Hanoi also has consistently demanded that the U.S. cease all "interference" in Cambodia and that the Cambodian problem be settled on terms formally announced by Sihanouk and CRUNK (e.g. Sihanouk's Five Points).

#### I. Material Aid to Cambodia

The United States, this fiscal year in Cambodia, plans to spend \$75 million from the AID budget and approximately \$80 million in PL-480 funds. Our earlier plans for FY 74 Cambodian military assistance called for about 180 million dollars worth of ammunition, supplies and almost \$6 million for training. The end of US bombing and ammunition expenditures of between \$600,000 and \$800,000 daily have now resulted in projected military and requirements for this fiscal year of \$310 to \$320 million. Total USG FY 74 expenditures (if all funds are obtained) would therefore be approximately \$475 million.

US military aid is designed to enable the GKR to field a 220,000 man light infantry force with a 30,000 man supporting staff. We are concentrating on basic defense needs and discouraging massive military programs. Attrition of material and ammunition expenditures will account for more than 80% of MAP expenses.

Our economic help basically supplies foreign exchange for essential imports to shore up the government until its economy can return to normal conditions.

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By SNARA Date 7/31

SECRET/NODIS

25.

The other major expense is humanitarian aid for the increasing refugee program expected to cost about \$8 million this fiscal year.

#### Diplomatic Support

Diplomatically, the United States has strongly and persistently supported and advanced the GKR's claim to legitimacy and viability in all available forums and in its bilateral discussions around the world. We have encouraged multilateral participation in programs to meet Cambodian economic and humanitarian needs and discreetly supported friendly Asian statements and initiatives supporting the GKR and a negotiated solution in Cambodia. US representatives have simultaneously resisted the counter-claims of Sihanouk's government. Additionally, we have guided and encouraged the GKR's own initiatives in behalf of these objectives. Our intervention with South Vietnam and Thailand has helped the GKR in resupply and rice purchasing.

The sharpest test of US diplomatic support for the GKR is now underway in the United Nations General Assembly. We are in close contact with the GKR and other appropriate delegations to resist the claim of Sihanouk's government to the Cambodian UN seat. Politically, the US has supported the Government of the Khmer Republic in contrast to any one group or person and implicitly linked our continuing assistance to the GKR to an eventual political resolution of Khmer problems by all Cambodian parties.

#### Limitations of US Aid

In carrying out our programs and objectives, the US is sharply restricted in the size and nature of its support to the GKR. The US mission cannot have more than 200 US citizens partially or wholly paid by the USG) inside Cambodia at one time nor employ in-country more than 85 citizens of countries other

SECRET/NODIS

Authority EO 12958  
By ANARA Date 7/31

SECRET/NODIS

26.

than the US or Cambodia. US airlifts and unarmed reconnaissance constitute our air support. No US units or individuals can take part in combat activities or serve as advisors to the Cambodian military. About 120 US military and 80 civilians make up the US mission in Phnom Penh. A total expenditure ceiling (exclusive of US air operations) of \$341,000,000 per year remains in the legislative language on Cambodia, but whether its effects are governing under a continuing resolution and with the end of US bombing has not been established.

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By SNARA Date 7/31SECRET/NODIS27.

## II. Current Issues

### A. Likely Chinese Position

This is described above, in the Background portion of this paper. The major elements are: a general desire to see some solution in Cambodia; a specific desire that Sihanouk should be an important factor in that solution; but also a disinclination to play an active role in manipulating a solution. Publicly and privately the PRC has supported Sihanouk's announced policies, and urged the US to stop supporting the Lon Nol Government.

### B. US Position

The most feasible US objective currently in prospect is a negotiated solution in Cambodia that prevents the communists from gaining sole control of the country. Other more desirable outcomes seem unachievable. -- Strong and continued US support of the Phnom Penh government is essential if a military equilibrium is to be reached that causes the other side to abandon its policy of military conquest and to start talks that could lead to a coalition settlement. Your trip to Peking gives an opportunity to test whether the Chinese will be willing to play any role at all in promoting talks between the Khmer parties that could lead to negotiation. The Chinese desire for Sihanouk to have a part in any future government of Cambodia might be utilized to stimulate a more active role on the part of the PRC.

### C. Your Objectives

-- To convince the PRC that the USG will not stop supporting the Phnom Penh Government because we believe that a negotiated settlement will be facilitated by the continued viability of that government.

-- To convince the PRC that the KI are not going to achieve a military victory, and that the PRC's own interests (including their hopes for Sihanouk) dictate that negotiations should begin as soon as possible.

SECRET/NODIS

Authority EO 12958By STANARA Date 7/31SECRET/NODIS

28.

-- To find out whether the PRC is willing to help start negotiations and if so, how.

-- Induce the Chinese to encourage the DRV to comply with Article 20, both in Cambodia and in Laos.

-- To seek to tone down the vigor with which the PRC lobbies in the UN on the Khmer representation issue.

### III. Talking Points

-- There are obvious differences between US and PRC positions on Cambodia. However we share a desire to see an independent, peaceful and neutral Cambodia that is not caught up in international rivalries. We also share a desire to prevent domination of the region by any one power. The US Government is not committed to any particular form of government in Cambodia. We hope the PRC shares our view that an essential first step is to stop the fighting and open negotiations among the Khmer.

-- We do not see how a debate in the UN on Khmer representation can possibly contribute to peace in Cambodia. We realize that Chinese principles may require PRC support of the Sihanouk resolution in the UN, but we hope that abrasive rhetoric can be avoided.

-- We view Sihanouk as more of a passive than an active factor in the situation at this time. However, it is possible that he might play a role in influencing the Khmer insurgents, who are the actual determinants of any cease-fire and negotiations.

-- We think the time may now be appropriate for an additional effort to get negotiations started. The Government is standing firm and the military situation is nearing equilibrium. A change in KI attitude toward negotiations is more likely now than at any previous time. The Phnom Penh Government is willing to begin negotiations at any level and at any location. We recognize that the PRC does not want to be involved directly, but we hope the PRC will

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By ANARA DEL 7/31

SECRET/NODIS

29.

use its influence on the insurgents, through Sihanouk or otherwise, to promote talks between Khmer factions.

-- Sihanouk has said he will not talk to us, and we are not anxious to talk to him. However if he has any proposals he wants to make to Phnom Penh, or through us to Phnom Penh, we would be willing to examine the proposals carefully and sympathetically.

-- If the other side refuses to negotiate we will have to let events take their course.

-- IF THE CHINESE OFFER TO PUT YOU OR A MEMBER OF YOUR PARTY IN TOUCH WITH SIHANOUK: Before any US official can be in touch with Sihanouk, we would need to know whether he is likely to advance workable proposals or whether he is solely interested in reiterating his public stands.

-- IF THE CHINESE SAY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SIHANOUK TO TALK WITH ANY USG OFFICIALS: We are ready to serve as a passive channel of secure communication between Sihanouk and any elements of the Phnom Penh Government that he may wish to be in touch with. This can be accomplished at any time through our U.S. Liaison Office in Peking.

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SIHANOUK SAYS 'CAMBODIA WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE'

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(TEXT) PEKING, APRIL 13, 1973 (HSINHUA)--CAMBODIAN HEAD OF STATE SAMDECH NORODOM SIHANOUK STRESSED AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE HERE THIS EVENING: "CAMBODIA WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE, NOR COMPROMISE. IF THE USA DOES NOT STOP ITS INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA WE WILL GO ON FIGHTING."

THE SAMDECH SAID, TWO MONTHS AGO HE PROPOSED OFFICIALLY ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION OF CAMBODIA THAT HE MIGHT HAVE, WITHOUT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS, SOME CONTACT WITH THE U.S. SIDE, TO STUDY TOGETHER A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA. HE SAID, "WE SHOULD BE READY TO FORGET ALL THE BOMBING AND SUFFERINGS IMPOSED ON OUR PEOPLE BY THE USA. WE PROPOSED TO HAVE A RECONCILIATION WITH THE USA," "BUT WE MAINTAIN THAT THE USA MUST PUT AN END TO ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CAMBODIA, BUT AN END TO AIDING LON NOL, AND CEASE ITS INTERFERENCE IN OUR AFFAIRS."

HOWEVER THE U.S. SIDE WAS NOT READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH US, SAMDECH SIHANOUK POINTED OUT, SO WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE OUR ARMED RESISTANCE.

THE SAMDECH WENT ON TO SAY: "WHEN WE SPEAK OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE USA, WE MEAN TO NEGOTIATE THE QUESTION OF ENDING U.S. INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA, NOT THE QUESTION OF CEASE-FIRE. THEY ARE TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. FOR, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, CEASE-FIRE MEANS SPLITTING OUR COUNTRY, MEANS RECOGNITION OF THE LON NOL-CONTROLLED ZONE. AND THIS IS DANGEROUS. INSTEAD OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA, IT WILL PROLONG THE WAR. IF THE USA CEASES ITS INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA, THE TRAITOROUS LON NOL REGIME WILL QUICKLY COLLAPSE. THEN, THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA WILL BE EASILY SOLVED."

SAMDECH SIHANOUK STRESSED: "WE NOW CONTROL NINE-TENTHS OF THE TERRITORY OF OUR COUNTRY. OUR PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION ARE STRONGER THAN EVER. THE BOMBING BY U.S. PLANES CANNOT MAKE US RETREAT. INSTEAD IT WILL URGE US TO PRESS FORWARD. THE USA CANNOT DEFEAT US. WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE, NOR COMPROMISE. WE DO NOT LIKE WAR. WE LOVE PEACE, BUT WE HAVE NO CHOICE."

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Arthur Hummel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
Far Eastern Affairs  
Winston Lord, NSC Senior Staff

Huang Hua, PRC Representative to the United Nations  
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter  
Mr. Kuo, Notetaker

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, September 26, 1973  
12:30 - 1:20 p. m.

PLACE:

Secretary of State's Suite, The Waldorf Towers  
New York City

There were some opening pleasantries during which Secretary Kissinger expressed concern about Ambassador Huang's back condition. He also joked that the United States had postponed his trip to China until he had completed negotiations with Mr. Lord aimed at bringing him back on the staff.

Amb. Huang: Have you received the dates for the visit?

Sec. Kissinger: Yes, I believe we answered yesterday. [to Mr. Lord:] Is that correct?

Mr. Lord: I believe so, but I am not sure.

Sec. Kissinger: Your side said October 26 to 29 and I wanted to be sure whether this meant that we should arrive on the afternoon of the 26th and spend the 27th, 28th and 29th in China and then leave on the 30th. Is this what you want? Or is the intention that we should leave on the 29th for the message says from October 26 to 29. Frankly, we didn't know whether you meant us to arrive on the 25th and leave on the 29th or arrive on the 26th and leave on the 30th. We can ask Ambassador Han Hsu.

Amb. Huang: You will get a reply from Han Hsu.

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-7-

be admitted to the United Nations -- but up till now there has been no such expression -- If that is done, then we can study this question. In this context it is impossible for us to take part in any action aimed at the perpetuation of the division of Korea.

Sec. Kissinger: Except that it is difficult to argue that the two sides show restraint toward each other and that we should talk to North Korea if you are not prepared to talk to South Korea.

Amb. Huang: On the Cambodia question, there is a telegram to the Secretary General on September 10th but up till now the United Nations has not circulated this document yet.

Mr. Kuo: It's from Prince Sihanouk to the Secretary General.

Sec. Kissinger: I suppose it's because he has no official standing in the United Nations. He gives me much publicity.

Amb. Huang: I think you probably know that at the summit conference of the non-aligned they have adopted a resolution on the Cambodian question. That resolution recognizes the Royal Government of National Union under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk as the sole legitimate government of Cambodia and calls upon all non-aligned countries and other countries to render recognition and support to the just position of the Royal Government of National Union for the restoration of their seat at the United Nations and other international organizations.

Sec. Kissinger: As you know, we can't agree with this either. We stated our view on the Cambodian question on many occasions to the Chinese Government. The basic ideas we expressed to your side in May or June are still our ideas, and within that framework we are willing to proceed. But if Prince Sihanouk finds those unacceptable, the best solution really is to let events take their course in Cambodia.

We think our interests and those of the People's Republic from the overall point of view on Cambodia are not so different. We don't want Cambodia to be part of a big power system; under what particular domestic structure it is, that is not our principal concern. [There was some discussion of the translation among the Chinese.]

In this connection, you should know that we were told by Thailand this morning that there seems to be new activity in connection with the collective security idea. We pointed out that we were not in favor of it.

Amb. Huang: The Thai themselves have published some proposal in this

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-8-

connection in their papers. I don't know what you refer to.

Sec. Kissinger: The Soviet proposal on collective security.

Amb. Huang: We have consistently held that the Cambodian question should be settled by the Cambodians themselves free from any foreign interference. The situation in Cambodia now is very delicate and China will not get itself involved. During your past visits to Peking, you discussed the Cambodian question with the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister stated China's position.

Sec. Kissinger: I understand your position. We thought that what we discussed in May and June was consistent with your position and our necessity. Since then, of course, there have been many developments not foreseeable then. Of course, when I come to Peking if the Prime Minister wishes to discuss this, I will be happy to. Or if the Vice Minister wants to discuss it next week.

Who is coming to dinner from your side next week? How many people? We can get the technical people to work this out. Let's see -- should we get in touch with your Mission of the United Nations or in Washington?

Mr. Hummel: It's probably better here.

Sec. Kissinger: You should contact our Mission here for details. It is up to you. We will bring Mr. Hummel and Mr. Lord. It is entirely up to you, whatever you wish.

I look forward to that, and I will see you tonight.

Amb. Huang: At the Secretary General's home. I've already kept you almost an hour.

Sec. Kissinger: It is always a joy to see you.

[There were then some concluding pleasantries as Secretary Kissinger escorted the Chinese to the elevator. Secretary Kissinger remarked to the Ambassador that the Chinese have a better appreciation of European defense needs than the Europeans do.]

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