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DEPARTMENT OF STATE STAFFING PATTERN
UNITED STATES LIAISON OFFICE, PEKING

Chief		Bruce, David K. E.
Deputy Chief	FSO-01	Jenkins, Alfred le S.
Deputy Chief	FSO-01	Holdridge, John H.
Special Assistant	FSO-06	McKinley, Brunson
Secretary	FS -03	Jones, Ray E.
Secretary	FS -04	Brooks, Barbara A.

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Political Officer	FSO-03	Platt, Nicholas
Political Officer	FSO-04	Anderson, Donald M.
Political Officer	FSR-04	Lilley, James R.
Secretary	FS -05	Zaelit, Lucille

Economic/Commercial Section

Econ/Commercial Officer	FSO-03	Horowitz, Herbert E.
Econ/Commercial Officer	FSO-04	Rope, William F.
Secretary	FS -06	Andros, Elizabeth M.

Administrative Section

Administrative Officer	FSO-03	Blackburn, Robert R., Jr.
Secretary	FSO-06	Herrera, Delia L.

GSO

General Services Officer	FSO-06	Morin, Emile F.

Budget and Fiscal

Budget, Fiscal and Distribution Officer	FSO-04	Schafer, M. Virginia

Communications

Comm. and Records Officer	FS-03	Lucas, Robert T.
Comm. and Records Officer	FSS-05	Riley, Albert D.
Comm. and Records Officer	FS -06	Ustaski, Walter
Comm. and Records Officer	FSR-06	Peterson, Robert D.

There are also six marine guards and one resident CB.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 70
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS TO THE NATION ANNOUNCING HIS ACCEPTANCE OF AN INVITATION FROM PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI TO VISIT CHINA. BROADCASTED FROM NBC STUDIOS, BURBANK, CALIF. ON JULY 15, 1971.

...As I have pointed out on a number of occasions over the past 3 years, there can be no stable and enduring peace without the participation of the People's Republic of China and its 750 million people. That is why I have undertaken initiatives in several areas to open the door for more normal relations between our two countries.

In pursuance of that goal, I sent Dr. Kissinger, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, to Peking during his recent world tour for the purpose of having talks with Premier Chou En-lai.

The announcement I shall now read is being issued simultaneously in Peking and in the United States:

> "Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China on an appropriate date before May 1972.
>
> "President Nixon has accepted the invitation with pleasure.
>
> "The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides."

In anticipation of the inevitable speculation which will follow this announcement, I want to put our policy in the clearest possible context. Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends.

It is not directed against any other nation. We seek friendly relations with all nations. Any nation can be our friend without being any other nation's enemy.

I have taken this action because of my profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China..

It is in this spirit that I will undertake what I deeply hope will become a journey for peace, peace not just for our generation but for future generations on this earth we share together.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 71
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL SPEAKING AT PRESS BACKGROUND, SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA, JULY 16, 1971

Q. A few months ago the President publicly cautioned against expecting the improvement in relations to move along rapidly, and here, in a relatively short period of time, a major step has been taken. What happened?

A. Well, we have had a difficult problem with maintaining a public posture on this issue. The relationships with the People's Republic have gone in essentially two phases: (1) In the first year and a half of the Administration, there was a general attempt on our part to communicate to Peking that we were prepared to have a serious dialogue, and that we were not prisoners of history.

We also took, in addition, a series of unilateral steps that were public that symbolized this. Then, starting this spring, about concurrently with the visible manifestation of the ping-pong diplomacy, the manifestations having been in a general framework of trying to express a general attitude, both sides moved into a more concrete phase.

On the other hand, there are a number of really interesting aspects. When you have not been in touch with a country for 25 years, it is amazing how technically difficult it is to simply find out where you should talk, and with whom. That is something that we don't teach in textbooks on diplomacy.

When you are nursing a rather tenuous dialogue, you don't want to create excessive expectations of how it might go. Even after we knew for example, that a visit by the American envoy in Peking would be welcome, there still remained a lot to be discussed about how to work it out; what should be discussed; what the objective should be.

The President felt that until we knew that it would be best not to raise undue expectations, excessive speculation, for each side to take a public position that it might then regret, and if it turned out that a later moment would be more propitious, we could then do it without embarrassment or without a sense of failure.

We have moved on a schedule that was essentially set in April, and we have not deviated from the schedule, nor has the other side. There has been no acceleration of that process from that time on.

Nixon

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 76
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 4, 1971

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us any more about your forthcoming trip to China, when it is likely to occur, and can you give us your assessment of what effect you think this will have on ending the war in Vietnam?

A. As far as the timing is concerned, I cannot add to what I said in the original announcement. It will be before May 1. The time will be worked out sometime within the next 2 to 3 months, I would assume, and a considerable amount of preparatory activity must take place, setting up the agenda, setting up the numbers in the official party.

These are matters, of course, that must be discussed and worked out before the time of the visit is finally announced.

Second, and I know a number of you are interested in who is going, that is a matter still to be decided. It was raised by Dr. Kissinger and by Premier Chou En-lai in their conversation, and will be worked out by mutual agreement.

As far as our party is concerned, it will be a small working party. the only ones that presently are definitely going are, of course, the Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger and myself. Beyond that, whatever others will be added will be determined by mutual agreement between the parties concerned.

Now, as to the effect the visit will have and the conversations will have on Vietnam, I will not speculate on that subject. I will only say that as the joint announcement indicated, this will be a wide-ranging discussion of issues concerning both governments. It is not a discussion that is going to lead to instant detente.

What it really is, is moving, as we have moved, I believe, in the situation with regard to the Soviet Union, from an era of confrontation without communication to an era of negotiations with discussion. It does not mean that we go into these meetings on either side with any illusions about the wide differences that we have. Our interest are very different, and both sides recognize this, in the talks that Dr. Kissinger had, very extended talks he had with Premier Chou En-lai. We do not expect that these talks will settle all of those differences.

What is important is that we will have opened communication to see where our differences are irreconcilable to see that they can be settled peacefully, and to find those areas where the United States

which today is the most powerful nation in the world, can find an agreement with the most populous nation in the world which potentially in the future could become the most powerful nation in the world.

As we look at the peace in the world for the balance of this century, and for that matter the next century, we must recognize that there cannot be world peace on which all the peoples in the world can rely, and in which they have such a great stake, unless there is communication between and some negotiation between these two great superpowers, the Peoples Republic and the United States.

I have put this in general terms because that is the understanding of the People's Republic, Premier Chou En-lai, and it is our understanding that our agenda will be worked out at a later point; before the trip it will be very carefully worked out so that the discussions will deal with the hard problems as well as the easy ones.

We expect to make some progress, but to speculate about what progress will be made on any particular issue, to speculate, for example, as to what effect this might have on Vietnam, would not serve the interests of constructive talks.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 86
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1971 WASHINGTON, D.C.

Q. Mr. President, on the subject of the United Nations debate over China, some critics of your new policy on the U.N., and I refer specifically to Dr. Walter Judd who made a statement yesterday, are saying that the expulsion of the Nationalist Government would not be legal under the Charter without a vote of the Security Council making such a recommendation to the General Assembly.

Now, recognizing that we hope they will not be expelled, can you address yourself to the legalities of the question, what the administration's position is on that?

A. We spent many months looking into the legality of the situation, and in fairness to Dr. Judd, I should say that there are different legal opinions that you can get with regard to what action is needed for purposes of expulsion and whether Security Council action is required as well as the other.

We however, have reached the conclusion that the position we presently take, which has been stated by the Secretary of State and by Ambassador Bush, is the legally sustainable one.

To put also our policy in clear perspective, we favor the admission and will vote for the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations and that will mean, of course, obtaining a Security Council seat.

We will vote against the expulsion of the Republic of China and we will work as effectively as we can to accomplish that goal.

Beyond, that, I would have no further comment at this point.

Q. May I follow up just with one point on that?

A. Sure.

Q. When you say you favor the obtaining of a Security Council seat by the People's Republic, that implies that the Republic of China would be removed from the Security Council.

A. Our analysis indicates that this is really a moot question. In the event that the People's Republic is a admitted to the United Nations, the seat in the Security Council would go to the People's Republic and that, of course, would mean the removal of the Republic of China from the Security Council seat.

The statement that was made yesterday simply reflected the realities of the situation in the United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

Q. A two-part question.

A. Sure.

Q. Have you decided in your own mind when you are going to China; if now, why not? That's only the first half. Do you want to take that first?

A. No; no. I want to see what comes later.

Q. The second half is: Can you tell us your plans?

A. First, I am going to China. Second, as far as the date of the trip is concerned, and the agenda, the arrangements, are concerned, all of those will be announced at an appropriate time.

Beyond that, however, I do not think it would be helpful at this point to discuss the date than may be under consideration, the agenda that may be under consideration, and the rest. All I can say is that the plans for the trip are going forward on schedule, and you gentlemen will be the first to know.

Q. Mr. President, have you decided in your own mind when you are going?

A. That is a mutual decision, and we are working it out in a satisfactory way. In a case like this, where two governments are involved, one doesn't pick a date and another pick a date. It is not that kind of operation. It is going very well.

Q. Mr. President, on this China trip, Premier Chou En-lai has done quite a bit of talking since you announced your visit was going to take place, particularly in his interview with Mr. Reston of the New York Times. He was quite hard-line and quite firm on a lot of agenda issues or obvious issues that we all assume are going to come up.

I would like to ask you (a) to comment on the fact that he took a hard stand on a number of things, like two Chinas, like entrance into the U.N., like the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia, your reaction to that hard line; and secondly, did he tell Mr. Reston anything that was a surprise or news to you?

A. No. there was nothing in the Reston piece that he had not already told Dr. Kissinger in much greater detail.

Second, for that reason we were not surprised at all at the Reston piece. I think one of the reasons that these talks may be productive is that Premier Chou En-lai, both publicly and privately, doesn't take the usual naive sentimental idea, and neither do I, that, well, if we just get to know each other all of our differences are going to evaporate.

He recognizes and I recognize that there are very great differences between the People's Republic and the United States of America. He recognizes and I recognize that at this point it might serve our mutual interest to discuss those differences.

I reiterate, however, as he has reiterated to us, both privately and then repeated in his interview with Mr. Reston in less detail, that while there are differences, that we must recognize that we have agreed to discuss the differences. That is all that has been agreed. There are no other conditions.

Now that, in my view, is the proper way to begin a conference between two countries that have not had any diplomatic relations.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 92
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

REMARKS OF PRESIDENT NIXON AT THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF DETROIT, SEPTEMBER 23, 1971

Q. Mr. President, is the development of the news from Mainland China going to change any of your travel plans? And the second part of the question: Just what do you hope to realize from your proposed visit to Mainland China?

A. I would not expect the current developments to change our travel plans, and those plans will be announced incidentally at an appropriate time in due course.

With regard to what we intend to accomplish, I think it is important for us to put in in the context of what we cannot accomplish and do not expect. Some people have assumed that because I was going to Mainland China, that the differences between Mainland China and its 800 million people and its government and that of the United States -- those differences will evaporate. They will not.

There are very deep differences between the United States and the government of Mainland China, These were recognized by Premier Chou En-lai in his private meetings with Dr. Kissinger. Those differences now, however, will be discussed.

They will be discussed by the President of the United States and the leader of the Peoples Republic of China. There have been no condition on eithr side, but we have agreed to talk about those differences.

Now, let me tell you why I think that is important. Ten or fifteeen years from now, there will be between 900 million and one billion people in Mainland China. Ten or fifteen years from now they will be a very significant nuclear power.

For Mainland China and its 900 million or one billion people at that time to be out of the family nations, isolated from the rest of the world, would be a danger to the rest of the world which any man who is President of the United States at this time should try to avert if he can. What I am trying to do is simply to open a dialogue and move toward normal relations, so that these differences which will continue to exist between our two countries -- so that we will talk about them and not fight about them, now or 15 years from now.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 93
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS TO NORTHWEST EDITORS, PUBLISHERS, AND BROADCAST EXECUTIVES MEDIA BRIEFING, PORTLAND, OREGON SEPTEMBER 25, 1971

Q. Mr. President, do you know what is happening in Mainland China at the present time?

A. It would be presumptuous for me to contend that we know what is happening on the mainland of China at this time. I will only say, however, that whatever is happening we are proceeding with the plans for the trip that I will be taking to the People's Republic of China.

Those plans will be announced at an appropriate time, and in that context you can surmise anything you want as to what is happening.

Q. Will your meeting in China be with Chou En-lai?

A. In any meetings that occur with a leader of a Communist country, a meeting must occur not only with the head of government, which in this case would be Chou En-lai, the Premier, but it must also occur with the Chairman of the Communist Party in that country.

Putting it in another context, if a meeting were to be held in the Soviet Union, the meeting would be between the President of the United States and Mr. Kosygin, and also a meeting between the President of the United States and Mr. Brezhnev.

Now, as far as the meetings in China re concerned, they will be announced, and those who participate in the, at an appropriate time. It would be naturally assumed that when the trip is planned, that a meeting would be planned, a meeting or meetings, with the head of government and with the Chairman of the Communist Party of the People's Republic.

MAJOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON CHINA

By U.S. Officials

January - August 1972

Fourth Supplement

Compiled by IEA & IOR/L

September 1972

OFFICIALS QUOTED

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A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 132
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S INTERVIEW BY DAN RATHER, CBS TELEVISION AND RADIO
JANUARY 2, 1972

Q. ...I am sorry to interrupt you and I was going to ask whether there would be something on your agenda in Peking and Moscow, and you have answered the question in your answer saying so.

A. It* will be on the agenda, I emphasize, provided it is still a live question, because we are, naturally, hoping that in both of these cases we can go forward.

Now, let me point out, we should not give the impression that because we raised the subject with the Chinese, that we raised it with the Soviet Union, that that is going to mean action, because we have raised it at other levels already.

I would point out one slightly hopeful note: the fact that the Chinese, after holding two Americans prisoner for many years, released them, as you know, about 2 or 3 weeks ago. At least their attitude toward prisoners seem to be much more civilized than that of the North Vietnamese. Whether they can influence the North Vietnamese toward a similar attitude, however, remains to be seen.

Q. You have raised the subject of China, and I am sure it comes as no surprise to you that I would like to talk with you about that.

Is all of this coincidental, the timing, or is it, as some of even your friends say, some of the timing must be politically motivated?

A. Now, the Chinese summit is one that I, as you may recall, wrote about in 1967. You may not recall it, because in 1967 there weren't many who thought I would be sitting here now, and certainly I wasn't sure.

Q. Frankly, I didn't think that you would be.

A. And that makes you not a bad prophet, either. But looking at the situation in 1967, I wrote an article for Foreign Affairs. As you know, I traveled very extensively while I was out of office, and much more freely than I can travel now. But in that article, I raised the lid on what many think was the biggest surprise in history when I made the 90-second announcement that we were going to go to China.

I said then that the United States, looking to the future, had to find a way to open communications with the leaders of 750 million people who live in Mainland China, and so the long process began.

* [Prisoner of War Negotiations]

If we could have had it in 1969 or 1970, if it could have been properly prepared, we would have done so, but I can assure you it wasn't delayed because I was thinking, "Well, if I could just have it before the New Hampshire primary, in the year 1972, what a coup."

And the other side of that is, you see, it takes two to work out this neat little conspiracy that someone set up. Does anybody suggest the Soviet Union is interested in my reelection; that the Chinese would set their summit so that I could do well at that time of year?

Q. Well, I don't know---

A. The answer, of course, is that I would doubt if that were the case. I don't mean that they would be against my reelection; but I am simply suggesting that those of us who make decisions in offices like this, certainly we think politically. We have that responsibility. We are leaders of our party; we are leaders of our country. But the country comes first.

I can assure you ending the war in Vietnam, building a lasting peace through opening to China, limiting tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union--those decisions have no political connotations whatever. If we could have done it earlier, we would have done it. And if this is not the right time to do it, we would have postponed it.

Q. Well, that raises the question, Mr. President, that has always bothered me about summitry and I know from your writings before you became President, just before you came to this office, about the dangers of summitry. Doesn't it give the Communists in both capitals, Peking and Moscow, a bargaining advantage to bargain with you at the summit in the middle of an American election year? Wouldn't it have been better to say we either have the summits in both cases before our election year starts or postpone them a few months until after the election so as to give the Communists this bargaining advantage?

A. Well, first peace is too important to postpone, and I will elaborate on that for just a moment if I can, after I cover the second part of the question. The second part of the question deals with the whole problem of summitry and whether or not it is a good idea. You raised that point and I think I should respond to it. Summits which are held for the sake of having summits are a very bad idea, but when you are dealing with governments which have basically one-man rule--and that is true of the Soviet Union, it is true of the People's Republic of China--then for the major decisions summitry sometimes becomes a necessity, I became convinced that with regard to China and with regard to the Soviet Union that it would serve our interests and their interests in avoiding those confrontations that might lead to war, in building a world of peace, to meet, and the

timing was such that it had to be now. To postpone it might have meant that something could have occurred in between so it would not be held at all. And as I have already pointed out, we could not arrange to have it earlier.

Now, second, with regard to the bargaining position, let me make one thing--It seems to me in that connection is very possibly a misunderstanding. Let me get that misunderstanding out of the way. When I go to meet with the leaders of the People's Republic of China, with Mr. Chou En-lai, Mr. Mao Tse-tung, and later on with Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin, I can assure you that there is not going to be any bargaining advantage due to my desire to affect our election campaign. And I say that not to be sanctimonious, not to be pious, but because I know what is riding. What is riding here is the future for generations to come, and the wrong kind of an agreement with the Soviet Union, one, for example, in the arms control field that would give them an advantage and make us the second strongest nation in the world, the wrong kind of an agreement with the Chinese, one that would discourage our friends in non-Communist Asia, that kind of an agreement, and so forth, could be one that simply would not be worth making.

Let me say, any President--it would not be just me, any President--would not want to win an election at that cost, and I certainly will not. I am going into these meetings, I can assure you, well prepared, and I will go well prepared and I will go there to defend the interest of the United States, to negotiate as well as I can, to reduce the differences, recognizing that there are basic philosophical differences between us and the two Communist powers. But unless we talk about those differences eventually we may end up fighting about them, and that will be the end of civilization as we know it.

Q. Mr. President, one other question about China, and I would again like to refer to a direct quotation. As late as March of 1971 you said, and I quote, "Under no circumstances will we proceed with the policy of normalizing relations with Communist China if the cost of that policy is to expel Taiwan from the family of nations."

Now we have proceeded with the policy of normalizing relations with China; Taiwan has been expelled from the United Nations. Isn't that a contradiction?

A. It is a contradiction, but not the way we planned it. As far as our normalizing of relations is concerned, I should point out they are not yet normalized. I should also point out that when we do have our meeting in February, beginning on February 21, in the People's Republic of China, that recognition in the conventional sense will not be one of the results. They do not expect that. We do not expect that. The reason it cannot be one of the results is that as long as we continue to recognize Taiwan, which we do, as long

as we continue to have our defense treaty with Taiwan, which we will, the People's Republic will not have diplomatic relations in the conventional sense with that country. So we are not going to have that kind of normalization. However, we will have normalization--because it is fair, and I know this is certainly the intent with which you ask the questions--we will have normalization in terms of setting up some method of communication better than we currently have, because nations that do not have diplomatic relations in the conventional sense can have relations and that is one thing that we will be able to do.

Now, as far as our having that kind of normalization, at the time that Taiwan was expelled from the community of nations is concerned, we fought hard to avoid Taiwan being expelled. We thought it was a mistake, but being a member of the community of nations, we believed that we had to accept the verdict. Under the circumstances, however, we will go to the People's Republic, we will have this relationship normalized on the basis that I have just described, but we will continue our defense agreement.

Q. Are we beginning to withdraw American forces from Taiwan?

A. Not at this point?

Q. Why is it necessary--

A. I know, incidentally that that question is raised because there have been reports to the effect, because when Dr. Kissinger was there--I didn't want you to raise the question without pointing up that I knew there was good reason to--that when Dr. Kissinger was there, that he had made some deal with Mr. Chou En-lai that if we had the meeting in China, that we would withdraw some forces before I got there. Let me just set the record straight.

He has said, and I have said it, I can say it, too-- and I have read every word of the transcript of those long, long sessions he had with Mr. Chou En-lai, as I am sure Chou En-lai has read them-- there were no conditions on our side and no conditions on their side.

This will be tough, hard bargaining between people who have very great differences, but people who have one thing in common, and that is that we had better talk about differences or we may end up fighting about them.

Let me just point up one other thing, too, in that respect. We have been talking about Vietnam. I think many of our viewers may not realize that in the two terribly difficult wars, little wars they call them, that the United States has been engaged in in the last 20 years, both of them are wars in the rimland of Asia. Both of them are wars in which the Chinese were involved: directly in Korea, where, as you know, there were thousands of Chinese volunteers involved in fighting Americans; and, indirectly, in

South Vietnam where the Chinese militarily, insofar as supplies are concerned, are supporting the North Vietnamese.

So, as you look at the past history where the United States in 20 years has had to fight in two wars, where the People's Republic of China was involved on the other side, and you look at the possibilities of the future when the People's Republic, which is now a weak nuclear power, compared to us, would be a very substantial nuclear power 15 or 20 years from now, it is imperative that we find a way to settle our differences better than we have had in the past.

That is why the communication must come. And anyone who sits in this office at this time cannot just think of the next 2 years, the problems--and there are many problems that are caused by this move toward China, problems with our friends, causes them concern--but hanging over the United States for the future this great danger of the most populous nation in the world becoming a major nuclear power and outside the world community, with no contact with the United States of America.

That is why I made the decision to go to China, and this trip, of course, will have as its major purpose setting up that long dialogue which may avert what would otherwise be an inevitable clash.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 133
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS INTERVIEWED BY HOWARD K. SMITH AND TED KOPPEL OF ABC TELEVISION JANUARY 5, 1972

Q. ...The President said the other night on television that you shouldn't have a summit meeting until the ground has been laid for some kind of an agreement, and he mentioned in the case of his visit to Moscow the Berlin Agreement. Now, what kind of agreement can you hope for from the Chinese summit meeting? If you could have the maximum you wanted from it, what would you like to have, just a trade agreement or an agreement to neutralize Southeast Asia, or what?

A. Well, I don't think there is any point in speculating on what we would like to achieve. I think we have to consider what we think is possible to achieve. And I think the President made it clear that he differentiates between the trip to Peking and the trip to Moscow. Because no American has ever visited Communist China, no American President. And for that reason the mere fact of the visit itself will be of tremendous importance to the world, and important to our relations with Communist China. We would hope that we can set up a system that will provide for continuing contacts, greater communication with the PRC, exchanges of persons, scholars--

Q. With the People's Republic of China.

A. That is right, Communist China. And some trade, although I think the possibilities of trade are less than they might appear at first. I think they are minimal to begin with.

Q. When the United States began its latest round of bombing over North Vietnam there was an obvious danger that China might react somewhat violently, at least in terms of possibly cancelling President's Nixon's proposed trip to Peking. Was there any prior consultation with Peking before we began our bombing?

A. No, there was not, but we have not suggested to the Chinese that we were going to change our foreign policy. There was no agreement made with the People's Republic of China in order to work out the arrangements for the visit. So we have indicated to them that we are going to continue our foreign policy, and they have indicated to us that they are going to continue their foreign policy. We have very serious differences, obviously, and they will continue But we think the fact that we are going to make this visit and will have the opportunity to talk with them, to discuss common problems, will be helpful in achieving peace in the future.

Q. Since the President first announced his trip, preparations seem to have proceeded with scarcely a ripple, and yet we know now that there has been some considerable political turmoil inside China. How can you be sure, how can the President be sure that when you go to Peking you will actually be talking to the people who are in control of the Chinese Government?

A. We don't really have much doubt about that. I think the facts speak for themselves. I mean we have had, now, two groups of Americans who have gone there to make arrangements for the visit There is no doubt about the fact that the people we are dealing with is the Government, so we have no fears along that line.

Q. Do you have any more than just surface assurances? I mean you have admitted in the past that we haven't really known what has been going on in a political sense inside China. Are you confident now that we are aware of what is going on inside China?

A. Well, no, we haven't made any great effort to find out about these internal problems that they have. We are completely satisfied that the Government that we are dealing with is in complete control, and we have every reason to think, and we have no doubt about it at all, that the visit is going to take place on schedule.

I don't think it would be wise for us to start attempting to find out what happened politically in the People's Republic of China. The important thing is that we are dealing with the leadership that is governing that nation.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 134
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS JANUARY 20, 1972

...As you know, I will soon be visiting the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. I go there with no illusions. We have great differences with both powers. We shall continue to have great differences. But peace depends on the ability of great powers to live together on the same planet despite their differences.

We would not be true to our obligation to generations yet unborn if we failed to seize this moment to do everything in our power to insure that we will be able to talk about those differences, rather than to fight about them, in the future.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 135
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS REMARKS BEFORE A NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY HELD AT DEPARTMENT OF STATE JANUARY 27, 1972

...We are going to attempt to lay a foundation for peace which will be lasting--not just to deal with these problems which are of such importance at the moment but to establish a foundation which will provide for peace for a generation.

And I don't think that the idea of a generation of peace, which has been announced and proposed as a goal by the President, is unrealistic. I think it's quite possible we could live the rest of this century without a major war.

The President's initiative in going to Peking is such a dramatic step. It has been applauded throughout the world and by most Americans. The decision by the President thereafter to go to the Soviet Union is a very important constructive step. We have recently met, as you know, with the leaders of many of the European nations, and will meet with others in the future, to make it clear that these efforts on the part of this administration to bring about peace in the world are not going to be at the expense of our friends and allies.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 136
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS AT THE BREAKFAST AT THE WASHINGTON HILTON HOTEL FEBRUARY 1, 1972

...Mention has been made of the fact that I shall be traveling on two long journeys with Mrs. Nixon, one to Peking and one to Moscow. And all of the people in this room are aware of the fact that while these journeys have never before been undertaken by a President of the United States, this does not mean that we are going to find that instant peace will follow from them.

We have to realize that we have great differences, differences between our Government and that of the Government of Mainland China, the People's Republic of China, differences between our Government and the Government of the Soviet Union, and it is naive to think, or even to suggest, that those differences will evaporate if we just get to know each other better. I wish it were so, but it is not so; it has never been so.

In fact, the differences that we have with those great powers, their governments that is, is not because we do not know them or they know us, but because we do know them and they know us. The philosophic gulf is enormous. It will continue.

But there is, on the other hand, another factor, a very pragmatic one, which brings us together. We all realize that because of the new sources of power that have been unleashed in the world that we all must learn either to live together or we shall die together.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 137
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S RADIO ADDRESS TO THE NATION UPON TRANSMITTING HIS REPORT UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's FEBRUARY 9, 1972

...For the first time in a generation, the most powerful nation in the world and the most populous nation in the world, the United States and the People's Republic of China, have begun a process of communication.

...When it came to dealing with the People's Republic of China, 25 years of hostility stood in the way. Accordingly, I began what is now 3 years of the most painstaking and necessarily discreet preparation for an opening to the world's most populous nation.

In 2 weeks, I shall begin my journey for peace to Peking. The agreement to meet, and the mutual trust needed to make the arrangements for the first American state visit to the People's Republic of China is a breakthrough of great importance.

We do not expect instant solutions to deep-seated differences. But the visit is a beginning. Now, in the relations between our countries, the old exchange of denunciations can be replaced with a constructive exchange of views.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 138
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's: THE EMERGING STRUCTURE
FEBRUARY 9, 1972

...We have ended a 25-year period of implacable hostility, mutually embraced as a central feature of national policy. Fragile as it is, the rapprochement between the most populous nation and the most powerful nation of the world could have greater significance for future generations than any other measure we have taken this year.

This initiative was the fruit of almost three years of the most painstaking meticulous, and necessarily discreet preparation. It is an essential step in tempering animosities which have their roots in the past and which stand in the way of our hopes for the future.

My visit to Peking in February will certainly not bring a quick resolution of the deep differences which divide us from the People's Republic of China. But it will be a beginning, and it will signal the end of a sterile and barren interlude in the relationship between two great peoples. Finally, it will represent a necessary and giant step toward the creation of a stable structure of world peace.

...Few events can be called historic. The announcement which I read on July 15 merits that term:

> "Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972.
>
> "President Nixon has accepted the invitation with pleasure. "The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides."

This announcement could have the most profound significance for future generations. The course leading up to it was carefully navigated; the opening we have made is still fragile; the immediate concrete achievements may be limited. But our purpose, and now our potential, is to establish contact between the world's most powerful nation and the world's most populous nation, and to confine our future confrontations to the conference

table. Contact now might help avert a disastrous catastrophe later. It should serve to enrich the lives of our two peoples. And it could lead to cooperative ventures between our countries in the future.

My meetings with the leaders of the People's Republic of China will be unprecedented.

The earliest Sino-American contacts developed in the early 1800's. At that time the ancient Chinese empire, secure and preeminent, was just beginning the painful process of adapting itself to the outside world. With the world's longest history of self-government, and as the dominant political and cultural force in their region, the Chinese were self-confident and self-contained as the "Middle Kingdom" of the world. Nevertheless they were exploited by technologically superior foreign powers. The United States--isolationist and bending its energies to national development--favored the territorial integrity of China; but our "open door" doctrine of equal treatment for all foreigners carried ambiguity in Chinese eyes.

The Communist leaders thus inherited a tradition marked by both pride and humiliation; the Chinese experience had not been one of dealing with the outside world as equals but one of either Chinese superiority or foreign exploitation. In recent years China has passed through a period of domestic turmoil and shifts in external relationships. China's leaders have decided to break the isolation that was partly self-chosen, to explore more normal relations with other countries, and to take their place in the international dialogue.

While the Chinese Revolution ran its long and tortured course the United States ended a long history of isolationism and plunged with zeal and idealism into worldwide responsibilities. We alone among the major powers emerged relatively unscathed from the Second World War. We provided the bulk of both the plans and resources for security and development around the globe. And we perceived the Communist countries, including China, as a monolithic bloc with central direction.

Today, two and a half decades after the war, new realities are reflected in a new American approach to foreign policy. The growing strength and self-confidence of others allow them to assume greater responsibilities and us to shift to a more restrained role. And with the time long past when one nation could speak for all Communist countries, we deal with individual nations on the basis of their foreign, and not their domestic policy.

Thus, in February of 1972, after many vicissitudes, many achievements and our separate evolution, the U.S. and China enter this dialogue on a fresh foundation of national equality and mutual respect. We are both turning a new page in our histories.

Despite the hopeful beginning, we remain separated by profound differences in principle and the suspicions of decades. Until 1971 we had had little meaningful contact for most of a generation. The People's Republic's

critical public statements and interpretations of history are well known to us. We have also made our position clear.

It serves no purpose to gloss over these sources of division. Neither side pretended during preparations for my journey, and neither will pretend afterwards, that we have solved our basic problems. We can expect our talks to be marked by the directness and candor which best serve leaders whose differences are deep but whose policies are rooted in realism.

My journey to the People's Republic of China marks both an end and a beginning. It is the culmination of three years of patient mutual effort to pierce the isolation of decades. And it represents the launching of a new process.

The July 15, 1971 statement on my trip was sudden and dramatic, but it was preceded and produced by a carefully developed series of steps. In fact, no other U.S. foreign policy move in the past three has been approached more meticulously.

As far back as October 1967, I had written in the journal Foreign Affairs that "any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China," while pointing out that bold new initiatives without preparation were inappropriate.

In January 1969 I entered office convinced that a new policy toward the People's Republic of China was an essential component of a new American foreign policy. I was, of course, fully aware of the profound ideological and political differences between our countries, and of the hostility and suspicion to be overcome. But I believed also that in this era we could not afford to be cut off from a quarter of the world's population. We had an obligation to try to establish contact, to define our positions, and perhaps move on to greater understanding.

Recalling our historical experience and comtemplating tomorrow's world, I saw the present period as a unique moment. The shifting tides in international relations, our new foreign policy perspectives, the changing face of China--these were the factors, at work in Peking as well as Washington, that beckoned our two nations toward a dialogue.

The following considerations shaped this Administration's approach to the People's Republic of China.

- Peace in Asian and peace in the world require that we exchange views, not so much despite our differences as because of them. A clearer grasp of each other's purposes is essential in an age of turmoil and nuclear weapons.
- It is in America's interest, and the world's interest, that the People's Republic of China play its appropriate role in shaping international arrangements that affect its concerns. Only then will that great nation have a stake in such arrangements; only then will they endure.

- No one nation should be the sole voice for a bloc of states. We will deal with all countries on the basis of specific issues and external behavior, not abstract theory.
- Both Chinese and American policies could be much less rigid if we had no need to consider each other permanent enemies. Over the longer term there need be no clashes between our fundamental national concerns.
- China and the United States share many parallel interests and can do much together to enrich the lives of peoples. It is no accident that the Chinese and American peoples have such a long history of friendship.

On the basis we decided that a careful search for a new relationship should be undertaken. We believed that the Chinese could be engaged in such an effort.

Both political and technical problems lay in the way of such a search. When this Administration assumed responsibility, there had been virtually no contact between mainland China and the American people for two decades. This was true for our governments as well, although sterile talks in Geneva and Warsaw had dragged on intermittently since 1955. A deep gulf of mistrust and noncommunication separated us.

We faced two major questions. First, how to convey our views privately to the authorities in Peking? Second, what public steps would demonstrate our willingness to set a new direction in our relations?

Within two weeks of my inauguration we moved on both of these fronts. I ordered that efforts be undertaken to communicate our new attitude through private channels, and to seek contact with the People's Republic of China.

This process turned out to be delicate and complex. It is extremely difficult to establish even rudimentary communications between two governments which have been completely isolated from one another for twenty years. Neither technical nor diplomatic means of direct contact existed. It was necessary to find an intermediary country which had the full trust of both nations, and could be relied upon to promote the dialogue with discretion, restraint, and diplomatic skill.

The two sides began clarifying their general intentions through mutually friendly countries. After a period of cautious exploration and gathering confidence, we settled upon a reliable means of communication between Washington and Peking.

In February 1969, I also directed that a comprehensive National Security Council study be made of our policy toward China, setting in motion a policy review process which has continued throughout these past three years. We addressed both the broader ramifications of a new approach and the specific steps to carry it out.

Drawing on this analysis, we began to implement a phased sequence of unilateral measures to indicate the direction in which this Administration was prepared to move. We believed that these practical steps, progressively

relaxing trade and travel restrictions, would make clear to the Chinese leaders over time that we were prepared for a serious dialogue. We had no illusion that we could bargain for Chinese good will. Because of the difficulties in communication we deliberately chose initiatives that could be ignored or quietly accepted; since they required no Chinese actions, they were difficult to reject. We purposely avoided dramatic moves which could invoke dramatic rebukes and set back the whole carefully nurtured process.

Through 1969 and 1970 we underlined our willingness to have a more constructive relationship.

- In July 1969, we permitted noncommercial purchases of Chinese goods without special authorization by American tourists, museums and others. We also broadened the categories of U.S. citizens whose passports would be validated automatically for travel to China.
- In December 1969, we allowed subsidiaries of American firms abroad to engage in commerce between mainland China and third countries.
- In January and February 1970, the two sides held Ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw, which in turn had been set through private exchanges. These sessions underlined the handicaps of this formal discourse. The two sides' representatives had minimum flexibility; they could do little more than read prepared statements and refer back to their capitals for instructions for the next meeting. This cumbersome exchange between wary adversaries reinforced the need for a new approach.
- In March 1970, we announced that U.S. passports would be validated for travel to mainland China for any legitimate purpose.
- In April 1970, we authorized selective licensing of non-strategic U.S. goods for export to mainland China.
- In August 1970, we lifted certain restrictions on American oil companies operating abroad so that most foreign ships could use American-owned bunkering facilities on trips to and from mainland Chinese ports.

By the end of 1970, therefore, we had laid out a careful record of unilateral initiatives. Throughout these two years we had accompanied these steps with a series of public statements which delineated our general attitude.

- Secretary Rogers in a speech in Canberra, Australia on August 8, 1969, noted the barriers between our countries but added, "We nonetheless look forward to a time when we can enter into a useful dialogue and to a reduction of tensions."
- In my February 1970 Foreign Policy Report, I stated that "... it is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking. . . . we will seek to promote understandings which we can establish a new pattern of mutually beneficial actions."
- On October 26, 1970, in a toast of visiting President Ceausescu of Romania, I deliberately used Peking's official title, "the People's Republic of China." This was the first time an American President has ever done so.

By the time of my second Foreign Policy Report in February 1971, we had reason to believe that our moves were being noted and evaluated by the Chinese. In that Report, I cited the importance of China's participation in world affairs, reiterated that we were ready for a dialogue with Peking, and stated that we hoped to see the People's Republic of China assume a constructive role in the family of nations. I looked toward the immediate future:

> "In the coming year, I will carefully examine what further steps we might take to create broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese and American peoples, and how we might remove needless obstacles to the realization of these opportunities. We hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of, reciprocity."

By the fall of 1970, in private and reliable diplomatic channels, the Chinese began to respond. Both sides were now working to launch a process. The spring of 1971 saw a series of orchestrated public and private steps which culminated in Dr. Kissinger's July trip to Peking and the agreement for me to meet with the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

- On March 15, 1971 we announced that U.S. passports no longer needed special validation for travel to mainland China.
- On April 6, 1971, in Nagoya, Japan the U.S. table tennis team competing in the world championships received an invitation from the Chinese team to visit mainland China. This was accepted the next day. The Chinese also granted visas to seven Western newsmen to cover the team's tour. The U.S. team traveled extensively in China, and was received on April 14 by Prime Minister Chou En-lai, who told them: "With your acceptance of our invitation, you have opened a new page in the relations of the Chinese and American people."
- On that same day, we moved to further the momentum that had clearly developed. I decided on the following measures which had been under governmental study since December 1970:
  - We would expedite visas for visitors from the PRC;
  - U.S. currency controls would be relaxed to permit the PRC to use dollars;
  - Restrictions on U.S. oil companies providing fuel to ships or aircraft en route to or from China (except those bound to or from North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba) were eliminated;
  - U.S. vessels or aircraft would be permitted to carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports, and U.S.-owned foreign-flag carriers could call at Chinese ports; and
  - A list of items of a non-strategic nature would be compiled for direct export to the PRC.
- In the April 30 issue of LIFE magazine, the author, Edgar Snow, reported a conversation he had had earlier with Chairman Mao Tse-tung which confirmed private signals we had already received of Chinese interest in my visiting China.
- On May 7, 1971 we removed U.S. controls on dollar transactions with China (except those in previously blocked accounts) and certain controls on U.S. bunkering facilities and flagships.

- On June 10, 1971 we announced the end of the twenty-one year embargo on trade with the PRC. We issued a general export license for a long list of nonstrategic items from China and designated other items to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Restrictions on the import of Chinese goods were simultaneously lifted.

The stage was thus set for Dr. Kissinger's secret visit to Peking. From July 9 to July 11, Dr. Kissinger held very extensive and important discussions with Premier Chou En-lai which produced the agreement that I would visit China before May 1972.

From October 20 to 26, Dr. Kissinger again visited Peking to reach agreement on the major arrangements for my trip. Further lengthy talks with Prime Minister Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials produced the basic framework for my meetings with the leaders of the People's Republic of China—including the February 21, 1972 date, the duration and itinerary, the broad agenda, and the approximate composition and facilities for the accompanying party and representatives of the media. The major elements were announced at the end of November.

On December 13, 1971 the Chinese released two Americans whom they had been holding prisoner, and commuted the life sentence of a third American to five years. This welcome gesture came after Dr. Kissinger transmitted my personal concern during his two visits to Peking. It was both a concrete result of our efforts to establish a dialogue and a hopeful sign for future progress in our relations.

No major step in international relations is taken without some painful adjustments and potential costs. Indeed, the tendency is to focus on the risks that might flow from a departure from familiar patterns and to lose sight of its possible benefits. It is precisely this tendency that inhibits major initiatives and perpetuates established policies which sustain the status quo.

We undertook our initiatives toward the People's Republic of China aware of the problems as well as the opportunities. Such a dramatic move was bound to stir great changes in the world. The news of my forthcoming trip had an expectedly galvanic impact and set in motion new currents in international relations.

We were able to inform our friends only shortly before this announcement, and we understand the complications this caused for them. There were overriding reasons for keeping Dr. Kissinger's July visit secret.

We could not risk advance public disclosure of these conversations whose outcome we could not predict. This would have risked disillusionment by inflating expectations which we could not be certain of meeting. And it would have created pressures on both the Chinese and American sides, forcing both of us to take public positions which could only have frozen discussion before they began. Moreover, we knew the July discussions would not settle anything directly concerning third parties; neither we nor Peking would set or accept any preconditions.

This we have done. Since July we have consulted with interested nations, outlining our objectives and expectations, and making clear we would not negotiate to the detriment of their interests. Secretary Rogers was extremely active in explaining our China policy to Foreign Ministers and other leaders of foreign countries. Secretary Connally and Governor Reagan traveled through Asia as my personal representatives, and carried my views on our China initiative and Asian policies in general. I sent personal messages to many of our friends and allies. Our Ambassadors were instructed to explain our views and solicit those of their host governments. The prospects of my meetings in Peking and in Moscow were among the primary topics of my series of talks with allied leaders in December 1971 and January of this year.

We shall continue this process of consultation as we move forward in our relationship with the People's Republic of China. Our talks with our friends have focused on the longer term implications for U.S. policy. Questions have been raised which we have been careful to address publicly as well as privately.

...My conversations with the Chinese leaders will focus primarily on bilateral questions. Either side is free to raise any subject it wishes, and, of course, issues affecting the general peace are of bilateral concern. But we have made it clear to our Asian friends that we will maintain our commitments and that we will not negotiate on behalf of third parties. We cannot set out to build an honorable relationship of mutual respect with the PRC unless we also respect the interests of our long term friends.

Should our moves be read as shifting our priorities from Tokyo to Peking? Th y should not. With the Chinese we are at the beginning of a long process. With the Japanese we have enjoyed over two decades of the closest political and economic cooperation.

What are the implications for our longstanding ties to the Republic of China? In my address announcing my trip to Peking, and since then, I have emphasized that our new dialogue with the PRC would not be at the expense of friends.

What does our China initiative mean for our relations with the Soviet Union? Our policy is not aimed against Moscow.

Others have suggested that we should use our opening to Peking to exploit Sino-Soviet tensions. We have consistently explained to all parties that we will not attempt to do so because it would be self-dreaming and dangerous. We did not create the differences between the two Communist powers. They disagree over the proper interpretation of Communist philosophy, a subject in which we have no competence and little interest. And they dispute the lines of their common border, which can hardly be susceptible to our manipulation. In any event we will try to have better relations with both countries. In pursuing this objective we will conduct our diplomacy with both honesty and frankness.

The record of the past three years illustrates that reality, not sentimentality, has led to my journey. And reality will shape the future of our relations.

I go to Peking without illusions. But I go nevertheless committed to the improvement of relations between our two countries, for the sake of our two peoples and the people of the world. The course we and the Chinese have chosen has been produced by conviction, not by personalities or the prospect of tactical gains. We shall deal with the People's Republic of China:

--Confident that a peaceful and prospering China is in our own national interest;
--Recognizing that the talents and achievements of its people must be given their appropriate reflection in world affairs;
--Assured that peace in Asia and the fullest measure of progress and stability in Asia and in the world require China's positive contribution;
--Knowing that, like the United States, the Peoples Republic of China will not sacrifice its principles;
--Convinced that we can construct a permanent relationship with China only if we are reliable--in our relations with our friends as well as with China;
--Assuming that the People's Republic of China will shape its policy toward us with a reciprocal attitude.

These principles will guide my approach to my forthcoming conversations with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai. The tenor of these discussions and of our future relations, of course, does not depend on us alone. It will require a mutual understanding of perspectives and a mutual willingness to combine a principled approach with a respect for each other's interests.

At this point in history we need talks at the highest level. Eighteen years of desultory ambassadorial discussions in Geneva and Warsaw demonstrated that subsidiary problems could not be cleared away at lower levels. Authoritative exchanges between our leaders, however, now hold hope of genuine communication across the gulf and the setting of a new direction.

The trip to Peking is not an end in itself but the launching of a process. The historic significance of this journey lies beyond whatever formal understandings we might reach. We are talking at last. We are meeting as equals. A prominent feature of the postwar landscape will be changed. At the highest level we will close one chapter and see whether we can begin writing a new one.

Both sides can be expected to state their principles and their views with complete frankness. We will each know clearly where the other stands on the issues that divide us. We will look for ways to begin reducing our differences. We will attempt to find some common ground on which to build a more constructive relationship.

If we can accomplish these objectives, we will have made a solid beginning.

Over the longer term, we will see whether two countries--whose histories and cultures are completely different, whose recent isolation has been total, whose ideologies clash, and whose visions of the future collide--can nevertheless move from antagonism to communication to understanding.

On January 20, 1969 in my Inaugural Address, I defined our approach toward all potential adversaries:

> "After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.
> "Let all nations know that during this Administration our lines of communication will be open.
> "We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people--a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.
> "We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy."

When I spoke those lines, I had the People's Republic of China very much in mind. It is this attitude that shaped our policy from the outset and led to the July 15, 1971 announcement. It is in this spirit that I go to Peking.

...I knew that the July 15 announcement of my forthcoming visit to Peking would have a profound impact on Japan. It brought China policy and Japan's own future role in a changing Asia abruptly to the forefront of our relationship. The issue of China policy is, if anything, even more important for Japan than for the United States. Geography, culture, history, and trade potential make it a central issue in Japanese domestic politics as well as a key aspect of Japan's foreign policy. On a matter of such intrinsic importance, Japan could not fail to be disturbed at any implication that our policies, which had been so closely aligned, were diverging.

It was also clear, however, that we shared a fundamental interest in improved relations with China. We both have an enormous stake in ending the era of confrontation in Asia. Japan is already China's largest trading associate, and for some time has had not only economic ties but trade representation in the People's Republic of China.

The issue between us, then, is not whether the opening to China is desirable--but the need to harmonize our sometimes differing perspectives and interests in a common strategic conception and a shared overall goal.

For our part, we have made it clear that our aim in Peking is to establish a better mutual understanding of one another's policies. We will not seek or discuss bilateral arrangements that could adversely affect the interests of our allies. We have no interest in arrangements which would sacrifice our friendship with a long-standing ally to the need for better communication with a long-standing adversary.

...Our historic initiative toward the People's Republic of China contains the potential for a new era in which Asia's major powers can act with restraint and respect for the legitimate interests of others. Our allies know that this initiative owes much to the past success of our joint policies--and that we could not and will not build for the future at the expense of the commitments that have bolstered Asian stability for a generation. This effort to ease tensions in Asia, by working for understanding with its most populous nation, can in the long run enhance our allies' security, much as U.S. defense commitments do today. The latter, in any event, remain valid.

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Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 10, 1972

. . *The date, of course, is the 21st there and the 20th here. As you know, we cross the International Date Line on the way.

A couple of other points that I know have been raised in briefings and that I can only cover generally:

With regard to agenda, both governments have decided that we will not make any announcements on agenda items prior to the meetings. The agenda will be covered by a joint communique that will be issued at the conclusion of our talks and consequently, questions on agenda, what will be discussed and so forth, on the part of both sides, will not be answered either before we get there or during the course of the meetings, unless the two sides decide, while we are meeting, that an agenda item can properly be discussed or disclosed.

With regard to this itinerary itself, the itinerary, generally as you know, has been announced for three cities. With regard to what we do in each city, it is being kept flexible and no final decisions have been made and none will be announced at this time.

Mrs. Nixon's itinerary will be much more public than mine. And she will have an opportunity, which I hope many of you also will have, those of you who are going, to visit a number of institutions, places of interest in Peking, Hangchow, and Shanghai. She, having, as you know, traveled to perhaps more countries than any First Lady, is looking forward to this with a great deal of interest and, I think, as she demonstrated on her trip to Africa, her events, I think, will be worth covering.

One side note is that, and I am sure all of you who have been studying, as I have, will have noted this, is that one development in 20th century China that is very significant, is the enormous elevation in the status of women. Total equality is now recognized and looking back over Chinese history, that is, of course, a very significant change.

Consequently, I think Mrs. Nixon's activities will be significant for them. It will be, of course, very significant for us in the United States to see their schools and the other institutions and how they compare with ours and the other countries that we will visit.

*The arrival in Peking is scheduled for 11:30 a.m., Monday, Peking Time, which is 10:30 p.m., Sunday, EST.

As far as my agenda is concerned, there will not be a great deal of what I would call public--well, to put it perhaps rather plainly--sightseeing. There will be some. I mean actually I would hope to see some of the points of interest and the Chinese Government is arranging for some. But we have both agreed that this visit is one, taking place as it does at this time, in which first priority must be given to our talks and sightseeing and protocol must come second. And consequently, we have agreed that we will not get frozen in to any extended travel within the cities which we will be visiting, in the event that that might interfere with an extended conversation that might be taking place.

I do not want to suggest here what the length of the talks will be but, necessarily, because we are in truth at a beginning, they will be much longer, both with Mr. Chou En-lai and with Mr. Mao Tse-tung than with the leaders of other governments that we have visited, because there we are not starting at the beginning. We had the opportunity to come immediately to matters of substance.

Finally, in order to perhaps put the trip in context, you have heard me discuss it in various speeches that I have made generally. I haven't really much to add, because as I pointed out, the agenda items will be decided at the beginning of the meetings, but they will be published at the end of our meetings and by communique.

But I think we could say this: This trip should not be one which would create very great optimism or very great pessimism. It is one in which we must recognize that 20 years of hostility and virtually no communication will not be swept away by one week of discussion.

However, it will mark a watershed in the relations between the two governments; the postwar era with respect to the People's Republic of China and the United States, that chapter now comes to an end from the time that I set foot on the soil of Mainland China, and a new chapter begins.

Now, how the new chapter is written will be influenced, perhaps influenced, substantially, by the talks that will take place. On our side and we believe also on their side we hope that the new chapter will be one of more communication and that it will be a chapter that will be marked by negotiation rather than confrontation and one that will be marked by the absence of armed conflict. These are our hopes.

We, of course, will now see to what extent those hopes can be realized in this first meeting.

I will go to any other questions.

Q. Mr. President, do you look upon these talks--do you look upon your meeting with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung as dialogue or negotiation?

A. They will be primarily dialogue. Here a very subtle but definite distinction is made between the talks that will take place in Peking and the talks that will take place in Moscow.

In the talks in Moscow there are certain subjects that we have been negotiating about and those subjects, therefore, will be negotiated, although, of course, there will be dialogue as well. Dialogue is an essential part of negotiation.

In the case of Peking, there will necessarily have to be a substantial amount of dialogue before we can come to the point of negotiating on substantive matters. I should emphasize, too, that it has already been pointed out by Dr. Kissinger when he returned, that when we speak of these matters that they will be primarily bilateral matters. Beyond that, however, I will not go.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 140
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS AT THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR VOLUNTARY ACTION, FEBRUARY 10, 1972

A final thought: When I announced to the press today some of the items of the schedule that we will be undertaking in the trip to Mainland China, which will begin next Thursday, I pointed out that my schedule would necessarily be very flexible because of the extensive talks I would be having with the leaders of that government and that those talks had to take priority over protocol or seeing those points of interest that anyone would want to see in a country he had not visited before.

But I also pointed out that Mrs. Nixon will not have those inhibitions, that she would have the privilege, and it will be a privilege for her, as it was when she visited Africa just a few weeks ago, as it has been when she has visited so many countries all over the world during the years we have been in and our of public life. She will have the opportunity to, in this country, the most populous of all the nations in the world, to visit their schools, their hospitals, to see their people.

We know there are great differences in our philosophy. There are great differences between our governments and they are not going to be washed away by simply a week's discussions, particularly since there has been 20 years in which we have had hostility and virtually no communication.

But of this I am sure: If, on such a trip, there can be just the opening of communication, if the people of China could only feel that the people of America want peace with all the people in the world, that when children are concerned we care about them, no matter what their government may be, that where people are concerned, we care about them, no matter what differences we may have in foreign policy--that is what America really wants to convey to people around the world. We believe this might be possible, at least steps can be taken in that direction in the brief time we are there.

An interesting point that I have found and that any of you who have studied recent Chinese history will find, is that perhaps one of the most significant changes that has occurred in the 20th century in that huge country that we know so little about has been that women have changed insofar as their status is concerned. I am not suggesting in this respect that this would not have happened had there not been changes in government and so forth such as had occurred there, but I do say that for us in the United States to recognize that in many parts of the world women are now reaching a new state of recognition and that we on our part should demonstrate that we also have that same standard, that this is a message on a people-to-people basis that is enormously important to get across.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 141
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

WHITE HOUSE RELEASE FEBRUARY 12, 1972

Official Party for President Nixon's Trip to People's Republic of China:

The President

Mrs. Nixon

Secretary of State, William P. Rogers

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President

Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President

Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, Military Assistant to the President

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Dwight L. Chapin, Deputy Assistant to the President

John A. Scali, Special Consultant to the President

Patrick J. Buchanan, Special Assistant to the President

Rose Mary Woods, Personal Secretary to the President

Alfred leS. Jenkins, Director for Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 142
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

RONALD L. ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT NIXON STATEMENT ON TRADE WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FEBRUARY 14, 1972

Following a full review of a report by the Under Secretaries Committee on U.S. trade with the People's Republic of China, the President today announced his decision to place the People's Republic of China in Country Group Y of the Commodity Control List. The effect of this decision is to make available under general license to the People's Republic of China all commodities now available under general license to the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia are in a separate category. This also moves controls on the export to the PRC of foreign products made with U.S. technical data to the same level as those governing such exports to Eastern Europe, except those countries noted above.

In addition, the President has decided to modify remaining Foreign Assets Control Regulations pertaining to the People's Republic of China. He has directed removal of the requirements that U.S. controlled firms in countries (including Western Europe, Canada, and Japan) which are members of COCOM--the international coordinating committee on strategic trade with Communist countries--obtain a Treasury license in addition to a host country license for the export of strategic goods to the People's Republic of China. He has also directed elimination of the requirement that U.S. controlled firms abroad obtain prior Treasury licensing for the export of foreign technology to the People's Republic of China.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 143
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE EXPORT CONTROLS APPLICABLE TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FEBRUARY 15, 1972

For export control purposes, the People's Republic of China has been transferred from Country Group Z to Country Group Y. As a result, the lesser controls applicable to the Soviet Union and other Group Y countries are now applicable to the People's Republic of China. This action implements President Nixon's announcement of February 14, 1972. The following are the major revisions:

1. A greater number of commodities may now be exported in unlimited quantities to the People's Republic of China under the provisions of General License G-DEST, without the need of applying for, or obtaining, a validated export license. Therefore, any commodity on the Commodity Control List that does not include the code "Y" in the column headed "Validated License Required for Country Groups Shown Below" may now be exported to the People's Republic of China under the provisions of General License G-DEST.

2. General Licenses Gift, GTF-US, Crew, GLD, GIR, GTE, and GTDR now apply to the People's Republic of China to the same extent as they apply to Country Group Y.

3. Foreign-made products of U.S. technical data may now be exported to the People's Republic of China to the same extent that they may be exported to other destinations in Country Group Y.

4. Replacement parts may be exported or reexported to consignees in the People's Republic of China under the Service Supply License procedure.

Accordingly, a new 390.6 is established in the Export Regulations to read as follows:

390.6 Transfer of People's Republic of China from Country Group Z to Country Group Y.

Effective February 15, 1972, the People's Republic of China is transferred from Country Group Z to Country Group Y. Therefore, all export controls applicable to Country Group Y apply to the People's Republic of China.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 144
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
RELAXATION OF RESTRICTION ON TRANSACTIONS TO PRC FEBRUARY 16, 1972

Section 500.541 is being amended to authorize by certain host countries, and to remove the restriction on American-controlled firms located abroad shipping technical data from any foreign country to the People's Republic of China.

Section 500.543 is being deleted as unnecessary in view of the amendment of 500.541.

As amended, 500.541 reads:

500.541 Certain transactions by persons in foreign countries.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), (e), and (f) of this section, all transactions incident to the conduct of business activities abroad engaged in by any individual ordinarily resident in a foreign country in the authorized trade territory, or by any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization which is organized and doing business under the laws of any foreign country in the authorized trade territory, are hereby authorized.

(b) This section does not authorize any transaction involving property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as of May 6, 1971, in which there existed, or had existed at any time on or since the effective date, any direct or indirect interest of China or nationals thereof.

(c) This section does not authorize any transaction involving the purchase or sale or other transfer of:

(1) Merchandise or technical data of U.S. origin unless it is in compliance with 500.533; and,

(2) Merchandise, regardless of origin, of a type included in the Commodity Control List of the U.S. Department of Commerce set forth in 15 CFR Part 399 and followed on that list by the letter "A" in the column headed "Special Provisions List", or of a type the unauthorized exportation of which from the United States is prohibited by any of the several regulations referred to in 15 CFR 370.10, unless the transaction is in compliance with 505.31 of this chapter.

(d) Deleted.

(e) This section does not authorize the supply of petroleum products to any vessel bound to or from North Korea, North Viet Nam, or Cuba.

(f) This section does not authorize any transaction involving North Korea or North Viet Nam or their nationals, or merchandise the country of origin of which is North Korea or North Viet Nam.

500.543 Deleted

Section 500.543 is deleted.

[SEAL] Stanley L. Sommerfield, Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control. (FR Doc. 72-2537 Filed 2-16-72; 8:52 am)

PART 505--REGULATIONS PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING THE SHIPMENT OF CERTAIN MERCHANDISE BETWEEN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

General License for Offshore Transactions To Authorize Certain Shipments to People's Republic of China.

Section 505.31 of the Transaction Control Regulations is being amended to authorize shipments of certain strategic goods to the People's Republic of China.

As amended, 505.31 reads as follows:

505.31 General license for offshore transactions from certain countries.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, transactions prohibited by 500.201 of this chapter are authorized to the extent they comply with 500.541 of this chapter and this section, and all other transactions prohibited by 505.10 are hereby authorized provided:

(1) Shipment is to a country listed in the schedule of 505.10, other than North Korea or North Viet Nam; and,

(2) Shipment is made from and licensed by one of the following foreign countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, or the United Kingdom.

(b) This section does not authorize any transaction prohibited by Part 515 or Part 530 of this chapter.

[SEAL] Stanley L. Sommerfield, Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control. (FR Doc. 72-2538 Filed 2-16-72; 8:52 am)

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 145
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Thrusday, February 17

After a departure ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House, the President went by helicopter to Andrews Air Force Base for the flight to Hawaii, en route to the People's Republic of China.

Arriving at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, Oahu, Hawaii, the President and Mrs. Nixon motored to the residence of the Commanding General, First Marine Brigade, where they remained until Saturday afternoon, February 19, reading and preparing for the China visit.

Saturday, February 19--Sunday, February 20

The President and Mrs. Nixon boarded the Spirit of '76 at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station for the 8-hour flight to Guam. Crossing the International Date Line en route, they arrived at Guam International Airport shortly after 5 p.m. on Sunday, February 20, Guam time. They spent the night at Nimitz Hill, the residence of the Commander, Naval Forces, Marianas.

Monday, February 21

At 7 a.m. Guam time, the President and Mrs. Nixon left Guam International Airport for Shanghai, their first stop in the People's Republic of China. They arrived, after a 4-hour flight, at Hung Chiao (Rainbow Bridge) Airport, Shanghai, at 9 a.m., China time, where they were greeted by officials of the People's Republic, headed by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Chiao Kuan-hua. After refreshments and a tour of the terminal, the Presidential party again boarded the Spirit of '76, accompanied by Vice Minister Chiao, Chang Wen-chin and Wang Hai-jung of the Foreign Ministry, a Chinese navigator, radio operator, and three interpreters, for the final leg of the flight to Peking.

At about 11:30 a.m., China time, the party arrived at Capital Airport near Peking. Premier Chou En-lai greeted the President and members of his party, stood with the President for the playing of the national anthems of the two countries, and accompanied the President in a review of the troops.

The Premier then accompanied the President in a motorcade to Peking, to Taio Yu Tai (Angling Terrace), the guest house where the President and Mrs. Nixon would stay during their visit.

In the afternoon, the President met for an hour with Chairman Mao Tse-tung at the Chairman's residence and for an hour with Premier Chou and other officials in plenary session at the Great Hall of the People.

The President and Mrs. Nixon were guests of Premier Chou at a banquet in the Great Hall of the People in the evening.

Tuesday, February 22

After a morning of staff meetings and attention to other White House business, the President met for 4 hours with Premier Chou in the Great Hall.

The First Lady visited the kitchen of the Peking Hotel, where she toured food preparation and cooking areas, and talked with cooks and helpers. She was accompanied by Mme. Lin Chia-mei, wife of Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, Mme. Chi Peng-fei, wife of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sun Hsin-mang, head of the revolutionary committee of the hotel. During the tour, Mrs. Nixon told reporters of plans for the People's Republic to present to the people of America two giant pandas, in appreciation for the two musk oxen which are to be given to the Peking Zoo by the President and people of the United States.

In the afternoon, Mrs. Nixon visited the Summer Palace, an imperial residence and garden during the Ching Dynasty. She toured rooms used by the Empress Tzu Hsi and walked in the gardens, viewing the lake Kun Ming and Longevity Hill. She then went to the Peking Zoo and saw the zoo's pandas.

In the evening, the President and First Lady attended a cultural program with Premier and Madame Chou and Chaing Ching, the wife of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. They saw a performance of the ballet, "The Red Detachment of Women."

Wednesday, February 23

The President and Premier Chou met in the afternoon for 4 hours of discussions at the great house where the President was staying.

The First Lady visited the Evergreen People's Commune on the west edge of Peking. In her hour-long tour, she visited the commune's clinic, where she observed acupuncture treatments; second- and third-grade classrooms; a commune home; agricultural areas and greenhouses; and a dry goods store.

In the afternoon, Mrs. Nixon visited the Peking Glassware Factory and talked with workers making glass flowers and animals.

In the evening, with Premier Chou En-lai, the President and Mrs. Nixon attended a public exhibition of gymnastics, badminton, and table tennis at the Capital Gymnasium.

Thursday, February 24

The President and Mrs. Nixon, accompanied by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, drove 35 miles north of Peking for sightseeing at the Ba Da Ling portion of the Great Wall of China, and then to the tombs of the emperors of the Ming Dynasty.

In the afternoon, the President and Premier Chou met again at the Great Hall of the People for 3 hours of discussion. Participants in the meetings and Mrs. Nixon later attended an informal private dinner hosted by Premier Chou in the Great Hall.

Friday, February 25

In the morning, the President and Mrs. Nixon went to the Forbidden City, the site in Peking of the residence of the emperors for some 800 years prior to the early 20th century. They were accompanied by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission.

In the afternoon, the President met again with Premier Chou for an hour, at the Great Hall of the People.

The First Lady toured the Peking Children's Hospital.

Marking the final evening of their Peking stay, the President and the First Lady hosted a banquet honoring Premier Chou and other Chinese officials in the Great Hall.

Saturday, February 26

At the Peking Airport, the President and Premier Chou and other officials of the United States and the People's Republic met in plenary session for approximately one hour.

The President and the First Lady, with Premier Chou, then boarded the Premier's plane for the flight to Hangchow, People's Republic of China. From Hangchow Airport, they drove to a guest house on West Lake, a park and recreational site, where they were to spend the night.

In the afternoon, they joined in a walking tour of Flower Fort Park and a boat tour of West Lake, stopping briefly at the Island of Three Towers Reflecting the Moon. Mrs. Nixon also visited the Temple of the Great Buddha.

They were entertained in the evening at a banquet given by the Provincial Revloutionary Committee of Chekiang Province, headed by committee chairman Nan Ping.

Sunday, February 27

With Premier Chou, the President and the First Lady flew in the Premier's plane from Hangchow Airport to Shanghai. From Shanghai Airport, they motorcaded to the Shanghai Industrial Exhibition, where, with Premier Chou, they toured exhibits of heavy machinery and electronic equipment, handicrafts, surgical techniques, textiles, light industry, musical instruments, toys, and arts and crafts.

Mrs. Nixon also visited the Shanghai Municipal Children's Palace, where she watched demonstrations of dancing, gymnastics, a puppet show, theatrics, swordplay, and art by students at the center. Her guide was Chang Hong, a 5th-grade student.

In the late afternoon, the joint communique agreed upon by the President and Premier Chou was released.

In the evening, the President and First Lady were guests at a banquet in the Shanghai Exhibition Hall hosted by the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, headed by Chang Chun-chiao. Premier Chou and Chairman Chang then accompanied the President and Mrs. Nixon to a cultural program of acrobatics in the Exhibition Hall.

Monday, February 28

Premier Chou visited with the President for an hour at the Ching Kiang guest house and then accompanied the Presidential party to the airport for official farewells before the takeoff for the return flight at 10 a.m.

Crossing the International Date Line, the Spirit of '76 arrived at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Anchorage, Alaska, at midnight on Sunday, February 27, Alaska time. The President and the First Lady spent the night at the residence of the Commanding General and left for the final leg of the flight to Washington at 9:40 a.m. on Monday, February 28, Alaska time.

The official party arrived at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington at 9:15 p.m., e.s.t.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 146
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS AT DEPARTURE CEREMONY FOR HIS TRIP TO THE PRC
FEBRUARY 17, 1972

I want to express my very deep appreciation to all of you who have come here to send us off on this historic mission, and I particularly want to express appreciation to the bipartisan leadership of the House and Senate who are here.

Their presence and the messages that have poured in from all over the country to the White House over the past few days, wishing us well on this trip, I think, underline the statement that I made on July 15, last year, when I announced the visit.

That statement was, as you will recall, that this would be a journey for peace. We, of course, are under no illusions that 20 years of hostility between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America are going to be swept away by one week of talks that we will have there.

But as Premier Chou En-lai said in a toast that he proposed to Dr. Kissinger and the members of the advance group in October, the American people are a great people. The Chinese people are a great people. The fact that they are separated by a vast ocean and great differences in philosophy should not prevent them from finding common ground.

As we look to the future, we must recognize that the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States have had great differences. We will have differences in the future. But what we must do is find a way to see that we can have differences without being enemies in war. If we can make progress toward that goal on this trip, the world will be a much safer world and the chance particularly for all of those young children over there to grow up in a world of peace will be infinitely greater.

I would simply say in conclusion that if there is a postscript that I hope might be written with regard to this trip, it would be the words on the plaque which was left on the moon by our first astronauts when they landed there. "We came in peace for all mankind."

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 147
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

RONALD L. ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT STATEMENT AT PEKING, PRC FEBRUARY 21, 1972

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung this afternoon at Chairman Mao's residence. They held serious and frank discussions.

Taking part on the American side was Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Taking part on the Chinese side were Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai, Deputy Director of Protocol of the Foreign Ministry Wang Hai-jung and the interpreter, Tang Wen-sheng.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 148
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S TOAST AT THE BANQUET HOSTED BY PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI
FEBRUARY 21, 1972

...Mr. Prime Minister, I wish to thank you for your very gracious and eloquent remarks. At this very moment, through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world. Yet, what we say here will not be long remembered. What we do here can change the world.

As you said in your toast, the Chinese people are a great people, the American people are a great people. If our two people are enemies the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably increased.

In the spirit of frankness which I hope will characterize our talks this week, let us recognize at the outset these points: We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today. What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither of us will compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.

So, let us, in these next 5 days, start a long march together, not in lockstep, but on different roads leading to the same goal, the goal of building a world structure of peace and justice in which all may stand together with equal dignity and in which each nation, large or small, has a right to determine its own form of government, free of outside, interference or domination. The world watches. The world listens. The world waits to see what we will do. What is the world? In a personal sense, I think of my eldest daughter whose birthday is today. As I think of her, I think of all the children in the world, in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, in the Americas, most of whom were born since the date of the foundation of the People's Republic of China.

What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we had the vision to build a new world?

There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other; neither of us seeks domination over the other; neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world.

Chairman Mao has written, "So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently. The world rolls on. Time passes. Ten thousand year are too long. Seize the day, seize the hour."

This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world.

In that spirit, I ask all of you present to join me in raising your glasses to Chairman Mao, to Prime Minister Chou, and to the friendship of the Chinese and American people which can lead to friendship and peace for all people in the world.

A[redacted]TTER OF RECORD - No. 149
P[redacted]c Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS TO REPORTERS DURING HIS TOUR OF THE BA DA LING PORTION OF THE WALL FEBRUARY 24, 1972

Q. What did you think of the Wall?

A. The Great Wall stands there, the Wall going to the peak of the mountain. It runs hundreds of miles, as a matter of fact, thousands of miles over the mountains and through the valleys of this country. It was built over 2,000 years ago.

I think that you would have to conclude that this is a great wall and it had to be built by a great people. Many lives, of course, were lost building it. There was no machinery or equipment at the time. It had to all be done by hand. But under the circumstances, it is a certain symbol of what China in the past has been and of what China in the future can become. People who could build a wall like this certainly have a great past to be proud of and a people who have this kind of a past must also have a great future.

My hope is that in the future, perhaps as a result of the beginning that we have made on this journey, that many, many Americans, particularly the young Americans who like to travel so much, will have an opportunity to come here as I have come here today with Mrs. Nixon and the others in our party, that they will be able to see this Wall, that they will think back as I think back to the history of these great people and that they will have an opportunity, as we have had an opportunity, to know the Chinese people, and know them better.

What is most important is that we have an open world. As we look at this Wall, we do not want walls of any kind between peoples. I think one of the results of our trip, we hope, may be that the walls that are erected, whether they are physical walls like this or whether they are other walls, ideology or philosophy, will not divide peoples in the world; that peoples, regardless of their differences and backgrounds and their philosophies, will have an opportunity to communicate with each other, know each other, and to share with each other those particular endeavors that will mean peaceful progress in the years ahead.

So, all in all, I would say, finally, we have come a long way to be here today, 16,000 miles. Many things that have occurred on this trip have made me realize that it was worth coming, but I would say, as I look at the Wall, it is worth coming 16,000 miles just to stand here and see the Wall.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 150
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S INFORMAL REMARKS TO REPORTS DURING HIS TOUR OF THE TOMBS OF THE EMPERORS OF THE MING DYNASTY FEBRUARY 24, 1972

I have not had an opportunity, of course, to see this before. The only thing I think is comparable to it in the world is the Valley of Kings in Egypt. That is a very different time, of course, and a different country.

But when one sees these tombs, while this does not go back very far in China's history--its history goes back thousands of years rather than hundreds---it is again, of course, a reminder that they are very proud in terms of cultural development and the rest, a rich history of the Chinese people.

As I said earlier, it is worth coming 16,000 miles to see the Wall, and it is worth coming that far to see this, too.

Q. Will you be recommending that Americans apply for visas to have an opportunity to be tourists in China?

A. I won't comment on that question at this point. When we complete our meetings, we will see what kind of recommendations will be made in that respect. Certainly speaking in a general sense, I think it would be very valuable and worthwhile for Americans and, for that matter, people in all countries, to be able to visit China. It is a great and old civilization, these people who have given so much to the world in terms of culture and development in many ways.

It is important as we think of ourselves as members of the family of man, that we know them and know them better, and I would hope that in the future that my children, and their children as well, would have the opportunity to come here.

I would put it this way: that when we think of the world, most of us think of our own countries, some even our own State, and some just our cities. We should think of the whole world, and we have not known Asia well enough. And when you speak of Asia, the great country of China is a country we have not known long enough. That communication has been cut for the last 20 years, and in the future I would hope one of the developments that would occur as a result of our trip is that apart from the relations between governments, that people will be able to come here, and that, of course, Chinese people would be able to come to the United States.

I don't mean to suggest that that exchange of people solves the problems of the world or problems between governments. But it so enriches the lives of people to know other civilizations and not to live simply on their own little island.

That is why this experience, I am sure, is not only an interesting experience for us but for the members of the press. I think it reminds us that all of us must work for an open world where people of different cultures, different philosophies, and so forth, may at least have an opportunity to know each other.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 151
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S TOAST AT BANQUET HONORING PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI IN THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE, PEKING FEBRUARY 25, 1972

...Yesterday, along with hundreds of millions of viewers on television, we saw what is truly one of the wonders of the world, the Great Wall. As I walked along the Wall, I thought of the sacrifices that went into building it; I thought of what it showed about the determination of the Chinese people to retain their independence throughout their long history; I thought about the fact that the Wall tells us that China has a great history and that the people who built this Wonder of the World also have a great future.

The Great Wall is no longer a wall dividing China from the rest of the world, but it is a reminder of the fact that there are many walls still existing in the world which divide nations and people.

The Great Wall is also a reminder that for almost a generation there has been a wall between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America.

In these past 4 days we have begun the long process of removing that wall between us. We began our talks, recognizing that we have great differences but we are determined that those differences not prevent us from living together in peace.

You believe deeply in your system and we believe just as deeply in our system. It is not our common beliefs that have brought us together here, but our common interests and our common hopes, the interests that each of us has to maintain our independence and the security of our peoples and the hope that each of us has to build a new world order in which nations and peoples with different systems and different values can live together in peace, respecting one another while disagreeing with one another, letting history rather than the battlefield be the judge of their different ideas.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have noted that the plane which brought us here is named the Spirit of '76. Just this week, we have celebrated in America the birth of George Washington, the Father of our Country, who led America to independence in our Revolution and served as our first President.

He bade farewell at the close of his term with these words to his countrymen: "Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all."

It is in that spirit, the spirit of '76, that I ask you to rise and join me in a toast to Chairman Mao, to Premier Chou, to the people of our two countries, and to the hope of our children that peace and harmony can be the legacy of our generation to theirs.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 152
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S TOAST AT BANQUET GIVEN AT HANGCHOW HOTEL, HANGCHOW, CHINA FEBRUARY 26, 1972

...When we were planning the schedule for our visit to the People's Republic of China, the Prime Minister determined what cities we would visit. Our time would only permit Peking, of course, and two other cities in this great country. The Prime Minister naturally said one city must be Shanghai, the biggest city in China. And then, out of all the other great cities in China, he said the other city must be Hangchow.

Now that we have been here, now that we have seen the splendor of this city, we realize why it has been said that heaven is above and beneath are Hangchow and Soochow. I am sure that the proud citizens of this province would say that Peking is the head of China, but Hangchow is the heart of China.

Tonight I wish to express appreciation on behalf of all of our party for this wonderful banquet and particularly for the beautiful decorations that we see here and on these tables which are a tribute to the great sense of beauty for which Hangchow is famous all over the world.

I think that since we have applauded the Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee and others, that all of us, too, would like to join in applause for those who prepared this wonderful banquet, who prepared these beautiful decorations, and who served us so beautifully tonight.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Prime Minister, I propose tonight a toast to the health of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, to the health of Premier Chou, to the friendship between the Chinese people and the American people, and to our children and their children. May their future be as bright as the beauty of Hangchow.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 153
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, SHANGHI, CHINA FEBRUARY 27, 1972

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, US Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculations or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a

negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own side of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

--progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
--both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
--neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
--neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial.

Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 154
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, AND MARSHALL GREEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS NEWS CONFERENCE, SHANGHAI, CHINA FEBRUARY 27, 1972

...Let me make a few preliminary observations before we go to your questions. Let me do it in two parts: the process, and there is obviously the communique produced, and secondly, what does it mean in general terms. Then I believe that I will be prepared to answer questions.

First, how was the communique produced? From the beginning of our contacts with the People's Republic of China, there were some obvious general considerations of what the outcome of a meeting between the President and the leaders of the People's Republic might be.

During the interim visit there was some exploratory conversation of an outcome in the conventional sense in which both sides tend to state general positions which they afterwards choose to interpret, each in their own way.

It was, therefore, decided early in the meetings on this occasion between the President and Prime Minister that such an approach would make no sense. It would not be worthy of the purposes that were attempted to be served.

It was therefore decided that each side would state its position on issues in a section which it would produce more or less independent of the other. It would not pretend to an agreement which did not exist and which would have to be interpreted away in subsequent implementations. Therefore, the beginning part of the communique represents, in effect, a statement by each side of some of its general principles.

On our side, they were deliberately not phrased in a contentious way. While in discussions some of the arguments made by the Chinese side were, of course, rebutted, we did not feel that this was the appropriate vehicle to do so, but rather to state what our positive view was.

For that matter, the Chinese side did not rebut arguments which we made in our section that they did not particularly agree with.

In order to present these two views on an equal basis, it had been decided that in the text issued by the American Government, the U.S. position would be stated first, and in the text to be issued by the Chinese Government, the Chinese version would be stated first.

I mention this only so that you will not be surprised if the Chinese version follows a different sequence from the American version. This is by agreement. Both versions are official and are being put out on the basis of this agreement.

The procedure that was followed here was that issues of general principle were first discussed in the meetings between the President and the Prime Minister. They were then, after they had been explored for some time, transferred to the meetings chaired by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China. Then, if any additional issues arose, they might be referred back to the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister.

In drafting the communique, various sections were produced by various elements of the American side. I played the role of go-between on our side and the Vice Foreign Minister, whose name I despair of ever learning to pronounce, on the Chinese side.

In this manner, as we put together the various paragraphs that were supplied to us on our side by various individuals, if we reached a point at which agreement seemed near or possible, we would then go back to our principals and to the Secretary of State. Through this process, the communique was finally achieved.

For example, some of the sessions were quite prolonged. The last few nights the sessions wenton until the early hours of the morning with the President. In Peking, the Chinese delegation had a house in the guest complex, and most of the sessions took place in that house. As a paragraph was finished, it would typically go back then to the President who was in the next house, and this went on Friday night until about 5 in the morning.

So much for the process. Let me say something about the content. Obviously neither side would have written this communique this way if it had been able tc draft it entirely by itself. Therefore, it represented an attempt by two countries that had been out of contact for a long time to find a basis to convey first some immediate understandings, but beyond that, to start a process by which they could bring about a closer relationship over a period of time and by which they could, where interests converged, act in a more nearly parallel fashion and where interests differed, to mitigate the consequences of those disagreements.

So the communique ought to be seen in two aspects: first, in terms of the specific principles and conclusions it states, and secondly, in terms of the direction to which it seeks to point. It is on that basis that we are presenting it to the American people and on which the People's Republic is presenting it as well.

Now, this is all that I want to say by way of introduction. I wonder whether Marshall Green would like to add a few words, and then we will be glad to answer questions.

I have just a few words. First of all with regard to the P.R.C. authority with whom Dr. Kissinger was maintaining the discussions, it was Chia Kuanhua--just to clarify that point.

I don't think I really have much to add. Our talks under Secretary Rogers on our side, and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei for the People's Republic of

China, extended over, I believe, 10 hours all together.

But it was not just the talks themselves. We had frequent occasion, as you could imagine with all the fine food you have eaten--occasionally waiting to have that fine food to have extensive talks also, and a number of matters could be discussed in that context.

Also, it was not just that, but the Secretary did have a chance to meet on a number of occasions with the Prime Minister. Most recently, coming down on the plane, he had an hour and a half from Peking to Hangchow. And then today the Prime Minister called on him in his hotel room for about 40 minutes.

I would say that the talks and the counterpart meetings were characterized by candor, friendliness, and courtesy and hospitality, as I am sure you have all seen, on the part of our Chinese hosts. There was no pulling of punches, not physically, of course. They were outspoken, no effort to cover up or paper over differences, but to have it out. It is good for the system. I think in so doing one has a much better appreciation of the other person's point of view.

As far as the specifics are concerned, in the talks, I really can't say much more than what already appears in the communique itself, although some of the points there may raise questions.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the possibility is mentioned of the United States sending a representative to Peking from time to time. Is there any likelihood that this process might be reversed and Peking might send a representative to Washington?

A. The situation of the two sides is not exactly equal in this respect because in Washington there is a Chinese representation different from that that would be sent under the hypothesis which you mention. However, what we envisage is the establishment of a contact point, to begin with, in which the discussions about the exchanges and trade that are mentioned in the preceding paragraphs will be formally conducted and as soon as this contact point has been established, it will be announced and the visit of a U.S. representative to Peking would take place as the need arises, and as particular issues of great importance need to be discussed. This, however, is not to the exclusion of any other possibility.

Q. What do you mean by "a contact point"?

A. For example, there existed for a while, and formally still exists, a forum in Warsaw where U.S. and Chinese officials met--something of this kind. As soon as that is established, which we expect will be in the reasonably near future, we will announce it.

Q. Can you point to anything in this document in which the People's Republic of China goes any significant step beyond its position at the time of the first ping pong exchanges.

A. Let me say two things: We are not approaching this from the point of view of a scoreboard of seeing who scored how many points on which issue. At the time of the first ping pong exchange, if I understand the position of the People's Republic of China, it was that some very low-level people-to-people exchanges would occur.

The formalization of exchanges encouraged by the two governments, the opening of trade encouraged by the two governments, the establishment of diplomatic mechanisms for continued contact, the joint statement of some general principles of international relations, the joint statement of some basic approaches to the view of the world with respect to, for example, the section which includes the reference to hegemony--these, I believe, are matters that most of us would have considered unthinkable at the time of the invitation to the ping pong team.

But I would put them on the basis of mutuality rather than of any unilateral movement on the part of the People's Republic of China.

Q. Is this the first time that a President of the United States has formally picked up the language of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence?

A. I have to say I am simply not sure. All I would reply, again, would be an answer in the same terms as I did to Mr. Frankel. The question is not who put forward the proposals. The question is: Does it contain principles that we can live by and since we have said we are prepared to apply these principles during the next one on the non-use of force, and since both sides have stated this, it does not really make a crucial difference who put it forward first.

Q. How much progress was there made in advancing the ball, in response to the question asked by George Ball on the trips, "is this necessary?" How much further did we go than in your original discussions with Premier Chou?

A. The character of the discussions inevitably is entirely different when the President of the United States talks than when an assistant talks who cannot make any definitive statement. The basic objective of this trip was to set in motion a train of events and an evolution in the policy of our two countries which both sides recognized would be slow at first and present many difficulties and in which a great deal depended on the assessment by each side of the understanding by the other of what was involved in this process and of the assessment by each side of the reliability of the other in being able to pursue this for the amount of time necessary to see it prevail.

In this sense it almost had to be conducted by the heads of the two governments and in this sense I would say that in the depth and seriouness of the discussion it went, obviously, beyond what has been discussed in my visits and beyond our expectations.

Q. Did Chairman Mao participate? Did his participation go to the detailed substance of this matter or was it largely philosophical and general?

A. I don't believe that it would be appropriate for me to go into detail about the content of the conversation with Chairman Mao. I may say, however, that Chairman Mao and the President discussed each of the essential categories in a general way and we have every reason to believe that the Prime Minister checked with the Chairman at every step along the way. But it was not just a vague philosophical discussion.

Q. Can you tell us whether there is any timetable under which you are going to undertake to facilitate the contacts and exchanges in the cultural, sports, and journalistic areas?

A. There is no precise timetable, Walter but I think it is correct to say that both sides understand that this will be pursued with some dispatch.

Q. Where the communique states, "Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest," was that a result of your talks about Sino-Soviet tensions or was the Soviet Union involved in the talks? Does this refer to how the United States views the relationship between China and the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

A. We have said on many occasions, and I will say it again here, that as far as the United States is concerned, our relationship with the People's Republic of China is not directed against the Soviet Union, and while the People's Republic is well able to speak for itself, and my megalomania has not reached the point where I believe that I can speak for it, I believe that it is clear to us that neither is the policy of the People's Republic of China in its relations with us directed against the Soviet Union.

We are pursuing our policy with the People's Republic of China on the ground that a stable peace in the world is difficult to envisage if 800 million people are excluded from a dialogue with the most powerful nation in the world and we are conducting our discussions with the People's Republic entirely on the merits of that relationship.

The paragraph on hegemony will arise only if any country should seek it, but we had no particular country in mind when it was being drafted.

Q. The President said in a television interview the beginning of January that he would bring up the question of American prisoners of war in Vietnam when he came to China. Can you tell us if it came up and what the reaction was?

A. Obviously, as the communique makes clear the issue of Vietnam was discussed and it is also clear that we would not discuss it without mentioning our concern with respect to the prisoners. The position of the People's Republic is as stated in the communique that it supports the the seven-point proposal made by the Provisional Government--by the PRG, and I think it is a fair characterization of the basic positions.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 155
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

STATEMENT BY RONALD L. ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE SHANGHI: JOINT COMMUNIQUE SHANGHAI, CHINA FEBRUARY 27, 1972

President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai have reached agreement on a joint communique. This communique reflects the position of the United States and the People's Republic of China on various bilateral and international issues which were discussed during President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China.

The day President Nixon arrived in Peking he met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs. During the President's 7-day visit to the People's Republic of China extensive, frank, and honest discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The discussions were held on the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

The two leaders participated in over 15 hours of formal talks. In addition, Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Che Pang-fei held discussions in the same spirit and participated in about 15 hours of formal discussions.

So the communique reflects over 30 hours of formal discussions between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The vary fact of the joint communique between the two governments is symbolic of the greater understanding produced through the face-to-face discussions that have been held.

It is President Nixon's hope that this historic beginning to improve communications between the United States and the People's Republic of China will significantly contribute to a more stable structure of peace in the world.

The Communique honestly reflects the differences that both sides recognize exist and states those areas where both sides found common views and have agreed to take specific steps to further improve their relationship. The communique, in stating its general attitude, says, "The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues."

The communique goes on to say: "There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other

states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use of threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations."

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 156
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S TOAST AT THE BANQUET IN THE SHANGHAI EXHIBITION HALL
SHANGHAI, CHINA FEBRUARY 27, 1972

...This magnificent banquet marks the end of our stay in the People's Republic of China. We have been here a week. This was the week that changed the world.

As we look back over this week, we think of the boundless hospitality that has been extended to all of us by our Chinese friends.

We have, today, seen the progress of modern times. We have seen the matchless wonders of ancient times. We have seen also the beauty of the countryside, the vibrancy of a great city, Shanghai. All of this we have enjoyed enormously.

What was most important was the fact that we had the opportunity to have talks with Chairman Mao, with Prime Minister Chou En-lai, with the Foreign Minister and other people in the government.

The joint communique which we have issued today summarizes the results of our talks. That communique will make headlines around the world tomorrow. But what we have said in that communique is not nearly as important as what we will do in the years ahead to build a bridge across 16,000 miles and 22 years of hostility which have divided us in the past.

What we have said today is that we shall build that bridge. And because the Chinese people and the American people, as the Prime Minister has said, are a great people, we can build that long bridge.

To do so requires more than the letters, the words of communique. The letters and the words are a beginning, but the actions that follow must be in the spirit that characterized our talks.

With Chairman Mao, with the Prime Minister, and with others with whom we have met, our talks have been characterized by frankness, by honesty, by determination, and above all, by mutual respect.

Our communique indicates, as it should, some areas of difference. It also indicates some areas of agreement. To mention only one that is particularly appropriate here in Shanghai, is the fact that this great city, over the past, has on many occasions been the victim of foreign aggression and foreign occupation. And we join the Chinese people, we the American people, in our dedication to this principle: That never again shall foreign domination, foreign occupation, be visited upon this city or any part of China or any independent country in this world.

Mr. Prime Minister, our two peoples tonight hold the future of the world in our hands. As we think of that future, we are dedicated to the principle that we can build a new world, a world of peace, a world of justice, a world of independence for all nations.

If we succeed in working together where we can find common ground, if we can find common ground on which we can both stand, where we can build the bridge between us and build a new world, generations in the years ahead will look back and thank us for this meeting that we have held in this past week. Let the Chinese people and the great American people be worthy of the hopes and ideals of the world, for peace and justice and progress for all.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 157
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON AND VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW REMARKS FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL AT ANDREW AIR FORCE BASE, MARYLAND FEBRUARY 28, 1972

Vice-President Agnew:

For more than a week we have witnessed through the miracle of satellite television, the sights and sounds of a society that has been closed to Americans for over two decades. We have been made aware of many new things in that society through this visit, Mr. President. We have witnessed much of what you have done with feelings of pride and pleasure and an immense curiosity that has certainly not been diminished by the amount of attention paid by the media to this visit.

I must confess that we have been surprised to some extent by your facility with chopsticks, Mr. President, and by the equal facility of the Chinese orchestra which rendered "America The Beautiful."

But I will say that the week's undertakings were intensively covered--I think that is the understatement of this week, Mr. President--and we enjoyed every minute of it as we watched with pride and approval the way you and the members of your party and our gracious First Lady conducted yourselves.

Speaking of our First Lady, I don't think I can let this occasion pass without reminding you that I predicted what a tremendous asset she would be in the future of American diplomacy and she didn't let me down a bit. As a matter of fact, she did an absolutely outstanding job under the most difficult, unpredictable circumstances.

Mr. President, just before you left to go to China, you stated that although the Chinese and the American people were separated by a vast ocean and by great differences of philosophy, there was no reason why with effort we could not undertake to diminish the tensions between our countries. I believe you have crossed that ocean in a successful effort to do just that.

Because of your visit, the Chinese and the American people stand further removed from the kind of confrontation that the world has feared for many decades. And we, the American people, are tremendously grateful for that effort on your part.

With due regard to the lateness of the hour and the fatigue that you must feel after so much intensive discussion, preparation, and the time changes and the long flight, I think I can close by simply saying that we are glad to have you back, and we feel easier tonight because of the trip that you took.

President Nixon:

I want to express my very deep appreciation, and the appreciation of all of us, for this wonderfully warm welcome that you have given us and for the support that we have had on the trip that we have just completed from Americans of both political parties and all walks of life across this land.

Because of the superb efforts of the hardworking members of the press who accompanied us--they got even less sleep than I did--millions of Americans in this past week have seen more of China than I did. Consequently, tonight I would like to talk to you not about what we saw but above what we did, to sum up the results of the trip and to put it in perspective.

When I announced this trip last July, I described it as a journey for peace. In the last 30 years, Americans have in three different wars gone off by the hundreds of thousands to fight, and some to die, in Asia and in the Pacific. One of the central motives behind my journey to China was to prevent that from happening a fourth time to another generation of Americans.

As I have often said, peace means more than the mere absence of war. In a technical sense, we were at peace with the People's Republic of China before this trip, but a gulf of almost 12,000 miles and 22 years of noncommunication and hostility separated the United States of American from the 750 millions people who live in the People's Republic of China, and that is one-fourth of all the people in the world.

As a result of this trip, we have started the long process of building a bridge across that gulf, and even now we have something better than the mere absence of war. Not only have we completed a week of intensive talks at the highest levels, we have set up a procedure whereby we can continue to have discussions in the future. We have demonstrated that nations with very deep and fundamental differences can learn to discuss those differences calmly, rationally, and frankly, without compromising their principles. This is the basis of a structure for peace, where we can talk about differences rather than fight about them.

The primary goal of this trip was to reestablish communication with the People's Republic of China after a generation of hostility. We achieved that goal. Let me turn now to our joint communique.

We did not bring back any written or unwritten agreements that will guarantee peace in our time. We did not bring home any magic formula which will make unnecessary the efforts of the American people to continue to maintain the strength so that we can continue to be free.

We made some necessary and important beginnings, however, in several areas. We entered into agreements to expand cultural, educational, and journalistic contacts between the Chinese and the American people. We agreed to work to begin and broaden trade between our two countries. We have agreed that the communications that have now been established between our governments will be strengthened and expanded.

Most important, we have agreed on some rules of international conduct which will reduce the risk of confrontation and war in Asia and in the Pacific.

We agree that we are opposed to domination of the Pacific area by any one power. We agreed that international disputes should be settled without the use of the threat of force and we agreed that we are prepared to apply this principle to our mutual relations.

With respect to Taiwan, we stated our established policy that our forces overseas will be reduced gradually as tensions ease, and that our ultimate objective is to withdraw our forces as a peaceful settlement is achieved.

We have agreed that we will not negotiate the fate of other nations behind their backs, and we did not do so at Peking. There were no secret deals of any kind. We have done all this without giving up any United States commitment to any other country.

In our talks, the talks that I had with the leaders of the People's Republic and that the Secretary of State had with the office of the Government of the People's Republic in the foreign affairs area, we both realized that a bridge of understanding that spans almost 12,000 miles and 22 years of hostility can't be built in one week of discussions. But we have agreed to begin to build that bridge, recognizing that our work will require years of patient effort. We made no attempt to pretend that major differences did not exist between our two governments, because they do exist.

This communique was unique in honestly setting forth differences rather than trying to cover them up with diplomatic doubletalk.

One of the gifts that we left behind in Hangchow was a planted sapling of the American redwood tree. As all Californians know, and as most Americans know, redwoods grow from saplings into the giants of the forest. But the process is not one of days or even years, it is a process of centuries.

Just as we hope that those saplings, those tiny saplings that we left in China, will grow one day into mighty redwoods, so we hope, too, that the seeds planted on this journey for peace will grow and prosper into a more enduring structure for peace and security in the Western Pacific.

But peace is too urgent to wait for centuries. We must seize the moment to move toward that goal now, and this is what we have done on this journey.

As I am sure you realize, it was a great experience for us to see the timeless wonders of ancient China, the changes that are being made in modern China. And one fact stands out, among many others, from my talks with the Chinese leaders. It is their total belief, their total dedication, to their system of government. That is their right, just as it is the right of any country to choose the kind of government it wants.

But as I return from this trip, just as has been the case on my return from other trips abroad which have taken me to over 80 countries, I come back to America with an even stronger faith in our system of government.

As I flew across America today, all the way from Alaska, over the Rockies, the Plains, and then on to Washington, I thought of the greatness of our country and, most of all, I thought of the freedom, the opportunity, the progress that 200 million Americans are privileged to enjoy. I realized again this is a beautiful country. And tonight my prayer and my hope is that as a result of this trip, our children will have a better chance to grow up in a peaceful world.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 158
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS AT THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS CONGRESSIONAL BANQUET SHERATON-PARK HOTEL. MARCH 7, 1972

The Commander has referred to the fact that I have returned from a journey. That journey, to many people, meant perhaps more than a realist would recognize that it should mean, and that is that because a trip has been taken, because the leader of a very powerful nation, the United States of America, was meeting with a leader of the most populous nation of the world, that this meant that peace was going to be something that we could assume, something that now made it no longer necessary for us to maintain the strength, the strength in arms, even more important, the strength in character which America has had in the past and which it needs at the present time.

Let me put that trip, perhaps, in its proper perspective in just a moment. The trip was necessary, necessary because, as we look at the history of this organization, I think of the fact that most of us who are members were veterans of World War II. I think of the fact that for the veterans of World War II, their younger brothers fought in Korea and their sons fought in Vietnam, and the great question of our time is simply this: Are their grandchildren, are those who sit here, these winners, are they and their children going to fight in another war?

We look at those wars: World War II, Korea, Vietnam. It is most significant to note that each of them, for the United States, came from the Pacific. World War II began in the Pacific for America. Korea came from the Pacific, and Vietnam, of course, came from the Pacific. So the great question is: Can we, those of us who have positions of leadership, develop a new policy, a new relationship, which will not guarantee peace, because that can never be sure, but which will provide a better chance that we can have peace in the future?

As I said over and over again on this recent journey, there is no question about the differences that we have with the leaders of the most populous nation in the world, differences that are deep in philisophy, and very deep in terms of our views about the world. But there is also no question about this: that is, that if the most populous nation in the world, and the nation at the present time that is the most powerful nation in the world, if they do not communicate, the chances of our having peace in the Pacific and peace in the world is very dim.

If, on the other hand, we can establish a process by which we can talk about our differences, rather than fight about our differences, the chance that these young people in front of us can grow up in a period which we did not enjoy, a generation of peace, is infinitely better. That is why the trip was necessary, and that is why we took it.

I do not hold out any false hopes. I would only say that in this period when we are entering negotiations with those who could be our enemies, not only there but in other parts of the world, the need for the United States of America to maintain its strength--its military strength, its economic strength, and above all its moral and spiritual strength, its faith in this country, its belief in America--has never been greater, because if we are to have peace in this period ahead, it will not come if America, with all of its power and all of its wealth, withdraws into itself and refuses to play the role that it must play, play it not for purposes of conquest and not for purposes of domination, but for purposes of using our power so that the world may be one in which nations and peoples with different philosophies can live together, rather than die together.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 159
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS' NEW CONFERENCE MARCH 7, 1972

...The President's visit to the People's Republic of China has already established a solid foundation on which to build. As the year progresses, we hope to make concrete progress in pursuing the development of communications--communications and contacts--agreed on in the communique; in particular, exchanges in such fields as culture, science, technology, sports, journalism, and in the development of trade relations.

Q. Sir, one of the items that you mentioned in connection with the agreement with China was an exchange of journalists.

A. Yes.

Q. Could you say how we stand in the agreement to facilitate that exchange and what those who have been waiting so far in vain to get into China should do?

A. Well, you notice that President Nixon in his remarks at Andrews made reference to this fact. We are going to do what we can to facilitate exchanges, and that includes journalists. However, all these exchanges are going to be on a person-to-person basis; they will not be a government-to-government exchange. So I think that the best advice that I can give to anyone is to attempt to apply for whatever it is you want to apply for, and the government will attempt to facilitate the result that you seek.

Q. There has been some considerable comment, as you are probably aware, of your absence in the top-level meetings with the Chinese leaders. Could you comment on that for us?

A. Well, I will, for a moment. I don't want to go into it in great depth. Let me just say that this was the fifth summit meeting that I have attended recently. This is the first summit meeting where I have spent so much time with a head of government myself, by myself. I spent an hour and a half with him, with the Premier, on his airplane, and I spent almost an hour in my suite in Shanghai when he came to call on me. Also we took part in two plenary sessions to open the meetings, and we had a plenary session in Peking, before we left Peking, of some duration. Now, that is the way we have--in the past we have always had the heads at the summit meet and the foreign ministers meet, and we did the same thing here. The significant thing, from my standpoint, was that I had much more time with the head of government than I have ever had before. At my meetings with the French and the British and the Germans and the Japanese, I spent little or no time with the head of the government.

Now, the only meeting that I did not attend was the Mao meeting. That was called on short notice, and the President responded to the invitation. And although I realize it seem very significant--as far as all of us who were there are concerned, we understood it. So I didn't feel excluded at all. I am not dispirited. And I think that the meetings that we had were very successful. Not only that. Can I say--I don't think that the American people much care about things like this. What they care about is, is our foreign policy successful? And I think it is a very successful foreign policy. And I think the State Department plays an essential and important role in the formulation and the execution of that foreign policy. And if any of you have the patience to read this report--and I am not sure that many of you will; I'm sure a lot of others will--you will see that the State Department has played a very essential, vital role in the conduct of foreign policy, and I think the foreign policy of this country under President Nixon has been extremely successful by all standards.

Q. On the whole China trip, now, with a little perspective, could you tell us in specific terms what the President's presence there accomplished that you or some other envoy might not have accomplished?

A. Well, I think that has been pretty well covered by the media. It is quite clear, it seems to me--and I think it has been quite well acknowledged by the media--that the dramatic nature of the visit, the elaborate preparations that were made by the Chinese to make the visit successful, the atmosphere in which the talks occurred, and so forth, greatly enhanced the prospects for better relations between our two countries.

Now, if anyone else had attempted to do that, it would have occurred much more slowly and with less effectiveness. And I think that the President deserves a good deal of credit for making this kind of a move. It had a good many risks, obviously. And it was one of those things that I think a cautious man would have said, or a timid man would have said to himself, "I won't do it." But on balance and in retrospect, I believe that the American people strongly support the initiative the President took, the fact that he was courageous and bold in making this decision, and I think it will serve our national interests well in the years ahead.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 160
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS' INTRODUCTORY COMMENT TO THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1971: A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
MARCH 8,11972

No framework for peace can be stable if it excludes significant centers of world power and influence. This belief is at the heart of our China policy. The striking progress in that policy during 1971 grew out of the President's inaugural statement that we seek "a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation."

The People's Republic of China has been increasingly interested in playing a role in world affairs commensurate with its emergence as a major power. We have been interested in reducing misunderstanding and tension which had grown up between us over two decades, and in restoring the traditional close ties between our two countries. Now was the time to begin direct and forthright discussions of the issues which have too long divided us. The restoration of traditional contacts will serve the interests of both our peoples. It will also serve the interests of all who share our desire for a full generation of peace.

The President's recent visit to China has established a solid foundation on which longstanding differences are being dealt with in honesty and candor. We share Premier Chou En-lai's hope, expressed in his toast in Peking, that a new start can be made in the relations between our two countries." As the President said in reply, "If we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably increased." We are now confident that those differences can be reduced. Most importantly, the two sides, through this visit and as expressed in the communique, have shown that despite deep disagreement and long isolation they are prepared to talk about their differences rather than fight about them and will seek increasingly to find common ground. We have both subscribed to a series of principles which we believe should guide or conduct.

Both sides have also agreed to expand communication and contacts so as to build for the future. We will continue direct official contacts through various channels, including consultations in the capital of a third country and visits by senior U.S. officials to Peking from time to time. We will both facilitate promotion of exchanges in such fields as culture, science, technology, sports, and journalism. We will work together to develop mutually beneficial trade between our two countries. These efforts will be assisted by a concerted effort to provide an opportunity for more Americans to learn Chinese and for more Chinese to learn to speak our language. The cumulative impact of the trip, the communique, and resulting further contacts should increase the chances for growing peace, stability, and understanding in Asia and the world.

In seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China we have constantly kept in mind the interests of our friends. We have not negotiated behind their backs. There were no secret agreements. We stand firmly by all our treaty commitments.

My conclusion is that the President's visit will reduce tensions in the world and make for greater mutual understanding between the People's Republic of China and the United States. It will serve the common interests of our friends and allies in the Pacific. It will improve the prospects for peace in this generation. And, I firmly believe, it will serve the best interests of mankind.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 161
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1971: A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS MARCH 8, 1972

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The dramatic announcement on July 15, 1971, of the President's acceptance of an invitation to visit Peking was the culmination of a series of steps begun shortly after this Administration came into office. On the one hand, we began exploring the possibilities for a reliable means of communication with Peking. On the other hand, we took a series of limited unilateral initiatives that would demonstrate the seriousness of our intent to construct a new mutually beneficial relationship. These initiatives came at a time when the People's Republic of China (PRC) was beginning to seek renewed contacts with the international community.

Beginning early in 1971, the United States took a number of additional steps further relaxing travel and trade restrictions:

---On March 15 we eliminated the restriction on the use of U.S. passports for travel to the PRC.
---On April 14 President Nixon announced that (1) the United States would expedite visas for visitors from the PRC; (2) U.S. currency controls would be relaxed to permit the PRC use of dollars; (3) restrictions would be eliminated on U.S. oil companies providing fuel to ships or aircraft enroute to or from China (except those bound to or from North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba); (4) U.S. vessels or aircraft would be permitted to carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports and U.S.-owned foreign-flag carriers could call at Chinese ports; (5) a list of items of a nonstrategic nature would be authorized for direct export to the PRC; and (6) imports from the PRC would be authorized.
---On May 7 the Treasury Department removed all controls on dollar transactions with the PRC (except previously blocked accounts). The Departments of Commerce and Transportation removed certain controls on bundering and carriers.
---On June 10 the White House announced the end of the 21-year embargo on trade with the PRC. A general license was issued for export to China of a long list of nonstrategic items. Other items would be considered for validated licensing on a case-by-case basis. Restrictions on the import of Chinese goods were simultaneously lifted.

In April 1971, the first clear public response came from Peking. The Chinese invited the U.S. Table Tennis Team to visit China and allowed U.S. newsmen to accompany the team to cover its activities. Subsequently, more than 200 Americans, including newsmen, scientists, and physicians, have visited the PRC. A move by the PRC welcomed by the American

people was the release on December 13, 1971, of two American prisoners, Richard G. Fecteau and Mary Ann Harbert. The Chinese on the same date also announced the commutation of John T. Downey's life sentence to five years from the date of commutation.

In July, President Nixon made the announcement of his trip to the PRC. He revealed that Dr. Henry Kissinger, his Assistant for National Security Affairs, had gone secretly to Peking for talks with Premier Chou En-lai that led to the invitation to the President. The President stated that he had accepted with pleasure and would go some time prior to May 1972. On November 29, it was announced that the President's visit would begin on February 21, 1972.

The President explained in his July 15 announcement that the purpose of the meeting would be to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and to undertake an exchange of views on questions of mutual concern. He pointed out that he had accepted the invitation for these talks because of his profound conviction "that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China."

Soon after the President's statement, on August 2, Secretary Rogers announced a new U.S. policy regarding Chinese representation in the United Nations--that the United States would support action to seat the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and to transfer the Chinese seat in the Security Council to it. At the same time, the United States would seek to preserve representation for the Government of the Republic of China.

Our decision to vote to seat Peking came after long deliberation. We recognized that many problems of international concern--disarmament, peacekeeping, environment--would benefit from the constructive participation of representatives of one quarter of mankind. Despite our best efforts and those of a number of our friends, we were not successful in our effort to preserve a place for the Republic of China, an outcome of great regret and concern to us. A resolution was passed, seating the PRC in the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council as the sole representative of China and excluding the representatives of the Republic of China.

On November 14, PRC representatives presented their credentials to U.N. Secretariat officials and took their place in the General Assembly on November 15. The U.S. Representative, Ambassador Bush, joined in the welcome stating that: "The issues of principle that divided the General Assembly in recent weeks were deeply felt and hard fought. Those differences should not obscure the proposition on which nearly all of us, including the United States, agreed: that the moment in history has arrived for the People's Republic of China to be in the United Nations."

The PRC preceded its entry into the United Nations with a vigorous campaign to establish diplomatic relations with a number of countries in the 12 months prior to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly. In most cases Peking has insisted that countries wishing to establish relations must recognize the PRC's claim to be the sole legitimate government of China. By the end of the year, relations had been established with a total of 65 countries.

Around the world there was a favorable reaction to the initiatives we took in search of a new relationship with the PRC. The President's decision to visit Peking for talks with the Chinese leaders was particularly well received. In Asia, his visit was seen as leading to a lessening of tensions in that part of the world. It raised hopes for a new era in which the nations of Asia might pursue their national interests under conditions of stability and peace.

But we are under no illusions regarding the difficulties that lie ahead. There is a wide range of complex problems still to be resolved. In that process, we intend to maintain our commitments to our friends and allies in Asia. The new relationship we seek with the PRC will not be at the expense of our friends. Neither will it be directed against the interests of any other country. Rather, we seek a general reduction of tensions and a new structure in Asia in which the interests of all concerned will be protected.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 162
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MARCH 8, 1972

The President's visit to China has established a solid foundation on which these differences can be dealt with in honesty and candor. The visit has already made a fundamental change in the relationship which prevailed between our two countries over the past 22 years. I am also confident that an improvement in our relations will not adversely affect the interests of our friends and allies in the Pacific.

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Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT MARCH 10, 1972

The primary channel for further communication between the United States and the People's Republic of China will be the Ambassadors of the two countries in Paris. The United States Ambassador to France is Arthur K. Watson and the People's Republic's Ambassador to France is Huang Chen.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 164
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS INTERVIEWED BY MARTIN AGRONSKY FOR THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE'S "GREAT DECISIONS 1972" PROGRAM OUR CHINA POLICY: HOW FAR AND DEEP THE THAW MARCH 21, 1972

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was your personal feeling about Chou En-lai?

A. Well, Mr. Agronsky, of course he's a particularly brilliant man who understands the Western world very well. He knows a great deal about the United States, a great deal about our policy. He has tremendous energy and was very attentive to the smallest detail. It was clear that he'd decided to do everything he could to make the President's visit to the People's Republic of China a success, and he was able to do that. Although he is 73, 74 years old, you would never know it, because he is a very energetic, able individual.

Q. One hears so much about the "inscrutable oriental." How was Chou En-lai in that sense? Did you have a feeling of frankness and openness with him?

A. Yes. He gave you a feeling of complete openness and frankness, and he had a very attractive manner, a good sense of humor; he was a good listener. As I say, he understood the positions that our government has taken in the foreign policy field, and altogether I think he was one of the most impressive world leaders that I have met.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you make that point, that he understood the United States. Do you really feel, then, that they have a sophisticated understanding of our country and its policies?

A. Well, you were asking about the Premier, Chou En-lai. I think that what I've said about him would not necessarily apply to all the leaders, because a lot of the leaders in the People's Republic of China have not traveled very much; so I think it's difficult to generalize. But certainly in his case, he has a very good understanding of the positions of the United States and, I think, a very good understanding of the world picture.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that Chou En-lai had as good an understanding of the United States as you had of the People's Republic of China?

A. I think it's difficult to tell. In many ways he may have had a better understanding, because he had traveled a good deal more in the West. Although he's never been in the United States, he's been to Europe several times.

I think it's difficult to judge that. I think President Nixon had a very good understanding of the People's Republic of China. He'd done a great deal of reading on it, and I think he understood it very well.

Of course, there are a lot of things about their country that we don't know about--particularly their political leaders--because we have had so little contact in the last 22 years.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you went to China you must have had some preconceptions. Did your meetings with the Chinese leadership change your mind in any way?

A. It's pretty difficult to draw any firm conclusions, because in a trip of this kind things are pretty well programed for you. No, I wouldn't think so.

I was impressed with the fact that the people seemed to be very well fed and very well clothed and, generally speaking, seemed to have good housing.

I think that one gets an impression of tremendous capabilities in terms of manpower; in other words, abilities to produce. For example, the Great Hall of the People, which is a tremendous building, was built in 10 months. The gymnasium, where the first program was held--well, the second night actually--where the gymnastics were held, is a beautiful building and built very quickly. In fact, in Hangchow the airport had been largely constructed and the terminal had been built in 2 months, getting ready for the President's visit.

So you have the feeling that it's a country which, particularly because of the size of its population, has tremendous potential.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how valuable do you think person-to-person contact is?

A. I think it's quite valuable in many ways. For example, when you get to know leaders and have a very thorough talk with them, as the President did with Chou En-lai and as I did with the Foreign Minister, you develop a certain rapport that you didn't have before.

Furthermore, you have the opportunity to clear up some misunderstandings that were cleared up. And I think it will prove a foundation on which we can clear up further misunderstandings as we progress.

Q. Can you give me a specific instance?

A. Well, Mr. Agronsky, in one conversation I had with the Foreign Minister at one of our formal meetings, we were talking about people-to-people contacts, about Chinese coming to this country and Americans going to China. He raised an objection, and he said, "It's going to be very difficult for us because you require fingerprints on your visas, and we're opposed as a matter of principle to having our citizens fingerprinted." And he said, "That's going to be a problem; it's an obstacle."

I said, "Mr. Foreign Minister, I don't believe that's the case. My recollection is that we do not require fingerprints on visas." It happened that we had a direct phone connected with Washington, and I said, "Mr. Foreign Minister, if you will give me about 10 minutes we will make a call and find out."

So I had my assistant go outside, and he made a telephone call to Washington. It happened to be in the middle of the afternoon there, so it was in the middle of the night here. We got some people up who knew the answer, and it turned out that we do not require fingerprints on visas now. So I was able to tell him that; he said he was very glad to hear that; and obviously we cleared up a misunderstanding that might have existed for another 6 months or a year.

So it's that type of thing, I think, that communications make possible, and it was interesting. I said, "Now that we have cleared up this misunderstanding I'm sure that there are other misunderstandings that we can clear up if we have communications." And that is, of course, one of the good results of this visit. We will have communications with People's Republic of China.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we turn to policy matters? For 22 years we and the Chinese had no diplomatic contact at all in the formal sense. Why after so many years has the United States changed its policy toward the People's Republic of China?

A. We not only had no diplomatic contact, we had no contact, period. For 22 years we were total strangers. Well, it was quite evident that the world had moved on. Conditions had changed. The People's Republic of China was the government there. It represented 800 million people. (We tend to the use the figure 700 or 750 million; but in my conversations with the Chinese leaders, they tell me it's closer to 800 million--or maybe more--people.) And there is no reason why they should be isolated from the world.

President Nixon took a very bold step when he decided that the best way to overcome this problem that has plagued us for so long was to develop direct contact with the People's Republic of China, and that's why he took the visit.

Now, this doesn't mean that we won't continue to have very fundamental differences with that government, but by talking frankly about them we can resolve some of the differences. And we hope that we can reduce tensions, not only between our two countries but in the area generally.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you know why the United States wanted to alter its policy toward Communist China. Can you turn it around? Why do you think the Chinese wanted to alter their policy toward the United States?

A. Well, I want to be a little careful about how I analyze their thinking. We can't be sure, of course; they didn't tell us, and we didn't ask.

Certainly one of the motivations, I think, on their part is that they feel now that they should play a more active role in the world, and they're much more active diplomatically. That's why they were interested in becoming members of the United Nations; that's why they have diplomats now being sent to different parts of the world; and that's why they're establishing diplomatic relations with a lot of countries they didn't have them with before. So certainly one of the reasons is that they want to be more outgoing; they want to take a more important role in international affairs.

Now, whether they have other motivations or not, I'm not sure. I think one can speculate, but I wouldn't want to do that in public.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'm sure you're well aware that people, in attempting to evaluate the Peking summit and the new American relationship toward the People's Republic, feel it may be the beginning of a realignment and reappraisal, as far as the United States is concerned, of its relationship to all the superpowers. Do you see it in that way?

A. Of course any major change in foreign policy has repercussions in other areas, and I suppose that as time goes on there will be a good deal of discussion about the meaning of this change of policy.

I don't see it in terms of a realignment. I see it as a change which is a natural outgrowth of the realities that exist in the world. Foreign policy is always in a state of flux; there is no such thing as constancy. You have to adjust your foreign policy to the adjusting realities that exist in the world.

This is one of those cases, a very dramatic example of a case where 800 million people have in a sense been isolated from the rest of the world. Now they are becoming more active in the world, and it is important for the United States to improve its relations with them. I don't believe it will have any major serious or damaging impact on our relations with any other country.

Q. You don't see it, then, as a new kind of balance of power in the world, with the United States, for example, moving closer to the People's Republic of China, standing in effect closer to China and standing with China against a hostile Soviet Union?

A. Not in those simplistic terms; no, not at all. I do think, of course, it represents, as I say, the realities in the world. After World War II the world was divided into two camps, really; we thought all the communists were in one camp and other nations were in the other camp. Now we know that's not the case. We know that communism is not monolithic and there are serious problems between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. In addition we know that other nations, Japan and the European nations which have now combined into the European Community, have become very powerful--strong economic blocs.

So that you have the world--really when you look at the major factors in the world: in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the European Community. So instead of a bipolar world, you have a multi-polar world; not necessarily in terms of military alliances or one against the other, but that's the way the world is, and it's changed a good deal since World War II. Now, what President Nixon is trying to do and what we're trying to do here in the State Department is adjust our policies to the new conditions that exist in the world. And I think the most dramatic thing that could have been done has been done by the President, and that's to make the adjustment toward the People's Republic of China.

Q. How do you see the Japanese moving in Asia now in terms of their relationship with China?

A. I'm glad you asked that question, because I think the suspicion in this country--or the belief in this country--has been somehow that we have moved very quickly as far as our contact with the People's Republic of China is concerned and somehow we've outdistanced the Japanese. Well, that isn't the case.

Japan has had a lot of contacts with the People's Republic of China. As a matter of fact Japan has more trade with the People's Republic of China than all the Communist nations put together. At the last Canton Fair, Japan had 2,200 Japanese businessmen there. We had none, of course. So they've had a good deal of contact and a good deal of trade with the People's Republic of China. I think that undoubtedly as events move along, Japan will establish closer contacts with the People's Republic of China, but they've had a lot more contacts than we've had in the last 22 years.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the period since the World War, would you see this shift in American policy as perhaps being the most dramatic and the most significant change in our policy in the 26, 27 years that have elapsed since then?

A. It's always a bit dangerous to make comparisons. Certainly this is a historic event. It will go down, I think, as one of the great decisions of President Nixon. It certainly is equal in importance to any event, I think, that has occurred since World War II. I don't think it serves any useful purpose to overstate it. It's still a little early to tell all the consequences, but I have every reasonable expectation that we have established a foundation upon which we can build and, hopefully, bring about more peaceful conditions in the Pacific area.

Q. Let's carry your peaceful conditions to the rest of the world. Do you feel that the prospects for world peace have been improved by this development? And would you be specific, if you do think the answer is yes, in telling me how?

A. Well, my answer is yes, by all means. I think it has greatly increased the prospects for peace. If the People's Republic of China and the United States continue to have improved relations and the People's Republic of China, as a result or partly as a result of that, has better relations with its neighbors, it will reduce tensions in a very important area of the world, in fact an area of the world where we've fought three wars in the last 30 years. So it can have great repercussions.

Furthermore, as I say, instead of the world being divided into a bipolar world, now it becomes a multipolar world. And I think that the more interdependent the world becomes, the more nations realize that they benefit from this interdependence--by trade and exchange of ideas and exchange of tourists and so forth--the less likelihood there is that they will want to disrupt the structure that makes it possible. In other words, the incentives for war, I hope, will be reduced. And if that is the case--and we hope it is--I think this visit could go down for that reason alone as of tremendous significance.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 165
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN PACIFIC AFFAIRS MARSHALL GREEN'S STATEMENT ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR EAST ASIA AND THE LONG-RANGE U.S. INTEREST BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS MARCH 23, 1972

...Following the President's recent trip to Peking, where I accompanied him, the President asked that I visit 13 countries of East Asia to underline in his name the high value which we place upon our relationship with all our allies and friends in Asia and our commitments to them.

I believe that I helped in reassuring Asian leaders that our seeking a closer relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of their nations. On the contrary, it will be in accordance with their, and our, long-range interests. I was able to explain to them that what we seek through improved contacts with Peking is a lessening of tensions and dangers; that we did not negotiate behind the backs of our friends and that we will continue to stand by them. Indeed, I found that there is genuine and broad support for the President's policy of and expanding dialogue and relationship with the People's Republic of China.

...Meanwhile, our President has taken the initiative, while retaining close ties with the Republic of China, to reach across the great abyss of our two decades of noncommunication with Peking, across a vast chasm of misunderstanding, tensions, and opposing philosophies. His efforts have succeeded in opening a dialogue with the People's Republic of China, in establishing a point of contact in Paris, and in, hopefully, broadening contacts and exchanges between the peoples of two nations which together represent over 1 billion human beings on this planet. This is not being done at the expense of our relationships with any of our friends; on the contrary, it is being undertaken in the interests of all. Nor are our efforts for better relations with Peking aimed against Moscow or any other capital. On the contrary, the President hopes to have more productive relations with the Soviet Union.

In order to maintain and even accelerate this trend toward shared responsibilities and to derive the most benefits from the breakthrough toward peace, we must retain the confidence of our friends and provide them with adequate support. We must remain steady in our policies, enabling our allies and friends in the area to take over more and more effectively increased responsibilities for their own protection and development. The programs which we are here requesting are both necessary and appropriate for this purpose.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 166
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE MARCH 24, 1972

Q. When you went to China there were a lot of people in this country who sincerely hoped that your trip would be helpful in terms of settling the Vietnam war in some fashion or another. Did you find that trip helpful in that respect and if so, can you tell us how?

A. At the time we went to China, I indicated that the purpose of that trip was to discuss relations between the two countries, and that its purpose was not to discuss the situation with regard to other nations.

Now, as far as the discussion that did take place, the agenda did include the whole range of problems in the world in which the People's Republic of China is interested, as we are interested.

As far as Vietnam is concerned, I don't think it would be helpful to indicate what was discussed or what was not discussed. Only time will tell what is going to happen there.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 167
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MARSHAL GREEN, FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS ON THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY'S "MEET THE PRESS". INTERVIEWED BY DAVID KRASLOW OF L.A. TIMES, PETER LISAGOR OF THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, CROSBY NOYES OF THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, RICHARD VALERIANI OF NBC NEWS & LAWRENCE E. SPIVAK. MARCH 26, 1972

Q. I'd like to start the questions. President Nixon said about the China summit: "This was the week that changed the world."

Can you tell us whether the leaders of the 13 countries you visited were as enthusiastic about what happened at the summit as the President was?

A. Well, Mr. Spivak, I think I can say that the leaders and the press and the people of the countries that I visited fully support the President's initiative toward China, which they see in their interest as much as in our interest. I don't think there was any problem on that score.

Q. Did they think that the summit meeting contributed to the peace in their area?

A. Oh, I think indeed they do. Of course we still have to judge by results, but they greatly welcome the initiative the President has taken to reach across this vast chasm of suspicion and tension and opposing ideologies to see if there can't be some hope and prospect for peace. They feel the same way in their countries as we do here.

Q. When you testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs about a year ago, you said, "We are faced with a mainland China which, whatever its latest welcomed degree of seemingly greater flexibility in international affairs, has presumably not abandoned its basic objectives of greater dominance over free East Asian countries." Are you now convinced after the China summit meeting that mainland China no longer seeks dominance over the free East Asian countries?

A. Well, as I said before, I think we have to judge by the results, but I think that they do have reasons for wanting to lessen tension and certainly to avoid war. They said that in the communique, and we said it. Now, these men we are talking about, the leaders of China, are revolutionaries. Their whole life has been one of commitment to revolution, struggle--their life has been one of struggle. So I don't think they give that up. But I do think that they recognize there are limitations to this, and I do think that we can hope through better dialogue and better mutual perceptions to ease tensions and perhaps lead to a generation of peace.

Q. To pursue this question of Taiwan just a little bit further, can we really normalize our relationship with China as long as we maintain our security treaty with Taiwan?

A. Well, I just don't know. All I know is that we have a situation now where we retain our commitments to the Republic of China, we maintain our diplomatic relationships, we continue trade and investment, but at the same time we have an expanding dialogue and communication and exchanges with the People's Republic of China.

Q. You have suggested here that not much changed in Asia as a result of the President's trip, as a result of your own findings when you went around to the 13 countries, but did you not detect a review, at least, of policies toward the United States in most of the capitals in Asia that you visited, now that the President has made his trip and that our relations with the mainland have changed markedly?

A. I did not see any reevaluation of their position in terms that they were now going to go off in a different direction. On the contrary, they want to stay steady with their purposes, and they are looking to us to stay steady with our purposes. They feel, as indeed I do, that if we continue the way we are now, under the Nixon doctrine of shared responsibility, of everybody doing more on his own to help the commonweal, then we are indeed in a far better position to realize the benefits of the President's initiative toward the People's Republic of China.

Q. The cement that has held our alliances together since the war has been a containment of Communist China. Now that has been removed. Is there no crackup in the cement so far as our alliances and our relations with these other friends and allies in the Pacific and Asia are concerned?

A. Well, as you just said, those days of confrontation are over. We are not seeking to isolate China. We are seeking to have a better relationship with China, and I think the United States is in the best position to spearhead that effort and I think that the countries of the area fully appreciate that. Therefore the President's initiative toward China has not impaired our good, close working relationships one with the other. There is, however, one element that worries us. It is something that Mr. Spivak just referred to, and that is the question of American assistance. They know that we have the good will and the intention, but will we deliver on it, and they are in perilous situations, many of these countries, and they do rely on continuing assistance. So that, I think, was the problem that was perturbing them more than anything else.

Q. The name of the Soviet Union does not appear once in the communique. Is it not a fact, sir, that Chou En-lai and President Nixon spent a good bit of their time discussing the Soviet Union?

A. Well, I don't want to discuss what went on in those talks, Mr. Kraslow, but I do want to make the point that in seeking a better relationship with the People's Republic of China, this is not aimed against the Soviet Union. We are also seeking a better relationship with the Soviet Union, and I might say that I think those are both compatible objectives.

Q. Historically the United States has frequently miscalculated about China, about its ambitions, its intentions. How can you be sure now that you are not pursuing some will-o'-the-wisp in Peking at the risk of alienating our old friend and some new friends in the area, like an economic superpower like Japan?

A. Well, we are going to continue a close relationship with Japan. That is the cornerstone of peace in the whole Pacific. What we do in our relationships with China is not going to be at the expense of our relationship with Japan, which is absolutely fundamental; but as I said before, seeking a better relationship with the People's Republic of China is in Japan's interest as much as in our own and I think that they fully appreciate that.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 168
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS' STATEMENT BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, WASHINGTON, D.C. APRIL 12, 1972

...We meet, as well, at a time when substantial changes are taking place in global politics. My own government is, of course, directly engaged in some of these efforts, notably in the effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We are well aware that President Nixon's initiatives affect all of us, and I would like, therefore, to refer to them. You have already received reports from your Ambassadors about my consultation with them immediately after my return from China, so I shall be brief.

Most notable was the simple but profound fact that the visit constituted a new beginning in relations which had been interrupted for 22 years. But it also produced several specific results which are important:

--It established a set of principles to govern bilateral relations under which both countries have placed themselves on record as forgoing the use of force. They were not new principles, but they are new in the bilateral context in which they were stated. They must of course be tested in practice, but we have every expectation that they are principles on which we can build.

--It produced a public proclamation by both sides that they share a number of parallel interests. This recognition may not have changed any of Peking's basic policies, or indeed of ours, but it has made a sharp break with the more than two decade period of unbroken contention.

--It has created opportunities for travel and exchanges among our peoples and for a resumption of trade. These bilateral improvements have been and will be pursued through our contacts in Paris.

--And, in bringing adjustments on both sides toward greater realism in our policies, it has opened the door to a more reasonable and stable set of relationships within Asia.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 169
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S ADDRESS TO A JOINT MEETING OF THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OTTAWA, CANADA APRIL 14, 1972

My visit to Ottawa comes midway between my visits to Peking and Moscow.

In many respects, these journeys are very different. In the People's Republic of China we opened a new dialogue after 22 years of virtually no communication. In the Soviet Union there is an opportunity to bring a continuing dialogue to productive conclusions.

But in their central aim, these journeys to Peking and Moscow are alike. Neither visit is directed against anyone--adversary or ally. Both are for the betterment of everyone--for the peace of all mankind.

However, we must not allow the fact of summit meetings to create any unrealistic euphoria.

The responsibility for building peace rests with special weight upon the great powers. Whether the great powers fulfill that responsibility depends not on the atmospherics of their diplomacy, but on the reality of their behavior.

Great powers must not treat a period of detente as an interlude between periods of tension. Better relations among all nations require restraint by great nations--both in dealing with each other and in dealing with the rest of the world.

We can agree to limit arms. We can declare our peaceful purposes. But neither the limitation of arms nor the declaration of peaceful purposes will bring peace if directly or indirectly the aggressive use of existing weapons is encouraged.

And great powers cannot avoid responsibility for the aggressive actions of those to whom they give the means for embarking on such actions.

The great powers must use their influence to halt aggression--and not to encourage it.

The structure of world peace cannot be built unless the great powers join together to build it, and its strength will grow only as all nations of all political and social systems, come to accept its validity and sustain its vitality. This does not mean that the great powers must always agree.

We expect to continue to have profound philosophical and significant diplomatic differences with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China in a number of areas. But, through opening new lines of communication, we hope to increase the chance that in the future we can talk about our differences and not fight about them.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 170
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TABLE TENNIS TEAM, WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. APRIL 18, 1972

I am delighted to have the opportunity to welcome this team to the United States.

It is hard to realize that it was just a year ago that the American table tennis team with Mr. Steenhoven and his group, were welcomed in the People's Republic of China.

Premier Chou En-lai welcomed our American players, and as the President of the United States, on behalf of all the American people, I welcome the representatives of the Chinese team.

We know that in the course of your tour of the United States you will receive a good welcome. We know, too, that in the course of your contest there will be winners and losers. But there is one big winner, and that is more important than who wins a match in table tennis. The big winner, because of this people-to-people contact that you are initiating between our two peoples, will be friendship between the people of the United States and the people of the People's Republic of China.

Friendship between our two great peoples will mean a better chance for peace for all the world. And now we thank you for making this long journey.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 171
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS AT THE PICOSA RANCH, FLORESVILLE, TEXAS
APRIL 30, 1972

Q. What are the possibilities of trade with China and Russia, as you now see it?

A. Looking at both of these countries, we must realize--and I know that there are many here who have traveled certainly to Russia, and to other Communist countries, although very few perhaps have been to China, at least in recent years--and looking at both of these countries realistically, as far as China is concerned, while we have now opened the door for a new relationship insofar as trade is involved, realistically, the amount of trade that the United States will have with the People's Republic of China will be considerably limited over a period of time.

The Japanese, for example, have found that out. They, of course, are much closer to mainland China, and they have been trying to trade with them over a period of years, and yet they find that the amount of trade that they are able to have with the People's Republic of China is, frankly, much less than they expected when they began to open trade up.

We should not expect too much in the short range. We could expect a considerable amount further down the road.

...Realistically, however, we must recognize that where you have a Communist country dealing with a capitalist country, or non-Communist country, the possibilities of trade are seriously limited because of an inability to have a method for financing it.

I know I have heard some American businessmen say, wouldn't it be great if we could just sell just a few consumer items to 800 million Chinese. That is fine, but what are they going to sell us, and how are we going to finance it?

...I would say then these new relationships we have developed and are developing with the People's Republic of China and with the Soviet Union will certainly lead to more trade in the years ahead--trade in non-strategic items of course, so long as those countries are engaged in supporting activities such as those in Vietnam.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 172
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

MARSHALL GREEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAY 2, 1972

I welcome this opportunity to discuss relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China and the impact of recent developments on other countries in the area.

When I appeared before this committee on October 6, 1970, I said:

We consider it in everyone's interest. . . that China becomes more closely associated with attempts to solve many of the pressing problems of global concern. At the same time we would also welcome improvement in our bilateral relations with Peking.

With regard to the question of the Republic of China on Taiwan, I said:

Both our word and our national interest require that we stand by our treaty commitment to the Republic of China and continue to be associated with that government in pursuit of those goals we hold in common. We hope Peking can be persuaded, on this basis, to set aside the issue of Taiwan so that we can explore the possibilities for removing other sources of tension and improving relations between us.

As far as the dispute between Peking and Taipei is concerned, I said that we strongly believe that these issues should be resolved without resort to the use of force, that time would be required to resolve this issue, and that it should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

I have no reason to alter in any way the judgments and positions in U.S. policy quoted above. They stand. But a number of major developments have subsequently occurred in U.S.-Chinese relations, especially the recent summit meeting in Peking. My focus today will be on the significance of the President's trip to China and on the impact of that visit on the countries of East Asia, which I visited at the President's request immediately following the Peking visit.

Probably no major diplomatic move undertaken by the United States in the postwar era has met with such near-universal approval as the President's efforts to establish a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. No one doubts that in the coming decade China will play a key role in events in Asia and will have a major part in shaping its future. Indeed, its voice will increasingly be heard also in world councils.

Virtually everyone, at home and abroad, had become convinced that it was imperative, in the interest of a safer world community in the nuclear age, that the United States and China seek a relationship in which vital issues could be discussed between them in a calm and reasonable atmosphere. This has now been done.

The world has rightly viewed this development as a policy watershed so far as the United States is concerned. It is not, however, a sudden, radical shift in policy. The meeting at the summit was the culmination of a long series of carefully planned and executed steps which were initiated as soon as President Nixon took office--and which, I might add, had been, in varying degrees, long recommended by some U.S. scholars and Foreign Service professionals.

Most of these steps were openly taken, for all the world to note. Among these were the gradual relaxation or elimination of trade and travel restrictions, largely the legacy of the Korean war period; progressive elimination of polemics in public statements about the People's Republic of China and statements by high government officials of our desire for improved relations; the President's public mention of the fact that he would like at some point to visit China; and Edgar Snow's published report that Chairman Mao had said the President would be welcome.

Some of the steps in opening a meaningful dialogue were taken privately. This is understandable. After more than two decades, characterized by open hostility in the Korean war period and by inimical confrontation thereafter, each side was cautiously and dubiously testing the other. At some stages there was no assurance that contemplated next steps could in fact be taken. At the same time each side was sufficiently interested in improved relations so that neither wished to risk the reintroduction of harsh polemics which full public discussion might have engendered.

The tremendous response of the American people to the visit to China of our table tennis team indicated very clearly that they welcomed a new approach in our relations with China. They evidently agreed with their government that some of our policy assumptions of the past had been overtaken by fast-changing realities in the world, especially in Asia. The time had come to talk directly and seriously with the Chinese, in the attempt to determine to what degree their participation could be gained in the creation of a more secure world environment.

The ensuing drama is now history. We have now had summit talks with the People's Republic of China, talks that were characterized by candor and forthrightness. We found, as expected, that very fundamental differences remain between us. Those differences were not glossed over in our discussions, and they emerged starkly in the communique. But while there was no diplomatic doubletalk, there were also no polemics. Each side seemed to be abundantly aware of the serious import of the effort in which it was engaged. Neither side expects our points of disagreement, stemming as they do from fundamental differences in our societies and our ideologies, to be overcome quickly or easily. We have only started a long process.

But it is a good start. The very fact that each side stood by its principles, made clear its determination to take into account the due concerns of its friends, eschewed secret agreements, and avoided either acting on behalf of or colluding against any third party introduced a significant measure of mutual confidence. We have considerable reason to believe that this degree of confidence is genuine and reliable. However, neither side is naive. Each will judge the other primarily on its future actions.

Both sides appear to be of sufficiently serious intent so that, in addition to expressing and carefully explaining the reasons for their differences, they have also tried to clear up mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings. We believe there was progress in this regard. More than that, each side tried earnestly to find whatever common ground was possible, so that in judging each other by our actions, hopefully, we may concentrate on the more constructive and promising elements in our relationship. For our part, we have not only made the decision to talk with China; we have made the decision to try to work with China in those areas where this seems possible and mutually beneficial. We believe that the People's Republic has made the same decision, within the limitations of which we are both keenly aware.

The Shanghai communique resulting from the President's trip is a remarkable document. I believe it to be almost unique, at least between two powers with fundamental differences, in the accuracy and completeness with which it reflects what transpired in the discussions.

As I have indicated, the communique itself sets forth our differences. I need not elaborate on them; for they have received generous attention for a long, long time. Let me rather try to summarize what I believe to be the chief accomplishments of the week in China. The President early cautioned against unrealistic expectations, speaking of the trip as "not an end in itself but the launching of a process." Nevertheless, it seems to me that the achievements were very real and greater than might have been expected. I do not mean by that that we bested the Chinese in the negotiations, or vice versa. The results were to our mutual advantage. That is the way to achieve a more enduring understanding. Here are the major gains as I see them:

1. Perhaps most importantly, the two sides have shown that despite deep differences and long isolation from one another, they are prepared to talk about their differences rather than risk fighting about them and to seek increasingly through practical means to find common ground.

2. We agreed on a number of principles, spelled out in the Shanghai communique, governing the conduct of nations in international affairs.

3. We agreed to maintain contact through various channels, including direct communications in a third-country capital (Paris) and the sending of a high-level U.S. representative to Peking from time to time as required.

4. We agreed to open direct trade.

5. We agreed to try to broaden the understanding between our peoples, facilitating exchanges in such fields as culture, science, technology, journalism, and sports. We are now refining possible next steps in trade and exchanges. Progress in both of these is expected to be at a measured pace, but a reasonably promising beginning has been made. The Chinese table tennis team has just completed a successful tour of the United States, and some 30 American business concerns have been invited to attend the Canton trade fair now in progress.

Apart from improvement in U.S.-P.R.C. bilateral relations, the President's initiative may also serve to improve relations within the Asian-Pacific community as a whole. There are already some encouraging indications of this.

I spoke earlier of the rapidity of change in Asia. In recent years it is clear that important new dimensions in Asian relations are emerging. The President's moves toward China are in part a recognition of this fact and in part an attempt to exert our influence in insuring a constructive cast to these new dimensions.

We should like to see a truly Asian community evolve--in the Asian idiom and at Asian initiatives--in which we could participate in an appropriate partnership relation through the larger Asian-Pacific community. Some have spoken of an emerging balance of power in Asia, often in terms of a "quadrilateral" major-power relationship. This is misleading. What is emerging, it seems to me, is a growing realization that constructive interrelationships among all the countries in the region can be developed.

In no area of the world are the implications and effects of the President's visit liable to have greater impact, and nowhere was the visit of greater or more direct interest, than in the East Asian countries along the periphery of the People's Republic of China. Each of the nations of East Asia expressed varying degrees of hope and concern regarding our new venture in diplomacy in the months preceding it; and immediately following issuance of the Shanghai communique, reaction reached high points ranging from unqualified support to support mixed with uneasiness, except in the case of the Republic of China, where initial strong opposition mellowed to the point of better appreciating our reasons for seeking to improve relations with Peking. Under the circumstances it was essential that we explain the visit and the final communique to our friends and allies. Accordingly, the President commissioned senior NSC / National Security Council / staff member John Holdridge and me to visit the countries of the area immediately following the China trip.

In the course of visiting 13 Asian countries and talking for many hours with the top leadership in each capital, I explained the promise the President's trip gave for reduction of tensions in the area and the consequent overwhelming support which the trip had been given in the United States.

I assured the Asian leaders that the United States continues to stand behind all of its commitments, that we had made no secret deals, and that the Shanghai communique accurately and adequately reflected the essence of the negotiations. I also stressed our recognition of the need to continue support for our friends and allies throughout the area. These points were generally understood and accepted. The particular concerns and misconceptions found on arrival in each country were in most cases dispelled and in the others substantially mitigated. Leaders in all countries asked tough questions, listened intently to the answers, and with few exceptions issued positive statements to the effect that they had been reassured and that the President's trip was in the interests of their country as well as of the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Inevitably there continue to be concerns and doubts about the new U.S. China policy, particularly in some of the countries most affected. Most countries in Asia have indicated they will be watching closely the evolution of our policies and the new relationship between the United States and China to see if our assurances are borne out by actual developments.

Above all, there are concerns and doubts in East Asia as to whether the United States will be in a position to make good on its statements of support for its friends and to live up to its commitments; in short, whether the United States will stay steady in its purposes and resolves. Reassuring words can uphold the confidence of friends and allies for a time only. There is clearly a wait-and-see attitude abroad in Asia as to whether we have the will to continue our assistance to the economic progress and the security of our Asian friends. Actual fulfillment of Asia's vital assistance needs will continue to be a critical factor in determining the success of our Asian policy.

United States influence and responsibilities throughout the world make it incumbent upon us to explain carefully and continually, to the extent we can, what we are about. My consultations following the President's trip underlined for me the viability of the strong ties we have with the countries of East Asia.

My talks with Asian leaders, many of whom I have been fortunate to know for many years, convinced me again of the efficacy of quiet diplomacy and continuing consultation as a first and essential means of maintaining credibility. Frank talk between old friends is indispensable.

At the same time I left the countries of Asia still faced with internal pressures from various quarters to seek accommodation with Peking along separate paths. Continuing policy coordination and frank talk will be essential if we and our friends are to avoid estrangement in the process of rebuilding our respective relations with Peking.

In our discussions in China we found encouraging signs that the Chinese appreciate, as do we, that a new interrelationship is developing in the area and that they are prepared, as are we, to adapt to the new developments and help shape their future course.

This is true not only of China and the United States, but of virtually all of the countries, large and small, of the Asian-Pacific region--which we hope is evolving into a true community. We believe that on balance there is discernible an escalation toward peace in Asia, and in the world.. But if this trend is to be furthered and the goal eventually consummated, it must be a dynamic and not a static or passive process. Dedication to the status quo would result in retrogression. The hallmark of this century has been the constantly accelerating pace in the rate of change. For all it may be a question of accommodating to, and cooperating in fashioning the form, of, these changes or perishing; for the world truly appears to be coming to the conclusion that it cannot afford the risk of nuclear war. While there is still an element of validity and practicality in the old concept of "balance of power," this concept is increasingly inadequate and anachronistic. Just as we found in China that a gain for one side does not necessarily mean a loss for the other but may entail a distinct gain for both, so are other powers, great and small, more and more perceiving the rewards in a cooperative rather than an oppositive approach to international dealings. It is the difference between geometric pluses and the old, weary arithmetic plus-and-minus game of precarious balance. The scope of a man's friendship is not finite; nor is that of nations.

I believe that the severe limitations of an outmoded policy of seeking hegemony are becoming increasingly apparent to all the major nations. Attitudes of rigid and dogmatic confrontation are breaking down. We are all, often through costly experience, gaining a clearer perception of those priorities which may safely be pursued on a small planet.

Recent developments in U.S.-China relations have clearly been a powerful catalyst in furthering this trend. The effects are still accumulating, and will for some time. I think we, and all the world, can be thankful that someone took the initiative--and it had to be the President of the United States.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 173
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS AT A RECEPTION MARKING THE REOPENING OF THE BLUE ROOM MAY 15, 1972

...Mrs. Nixon will be here to receive you in the Blue Room, the last room to be redone, perhaps the most famous room in the house, the one where one President was married, Grover Cleveland, and the one where, incidentally--and this is a bit of historical reference--where President Rutherford Hayes received the first Chinese diplomatic representative to the United States of America.

In this year when we have attempted to open a new dialogue with the leaders of 800 million people who live in the People's Republic of China, it is significant, it seems to me, that the room where the first Chinese representative was received by an American President is the one that will be open tonight for your viewing.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 174
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

PRESIDENT NIXON'S TOAST AT A STATE DINNER AT THE NIAVARAN PALACE
TEHRAN, IRAN MAY 30, 1972

...But we also recognize that as we begin a dialogue with some nations with which we have had no dialogue at all--I refer to the visit that we paid earlier this year to the People's Republic of China--and when we begin conversations that can, and we trust will, develop a better relationship with a nation that from to time since the great World War II has been an adversary on occasion--that as we do both of these things we have not overlooked a very fundamental fact of international life, and that is that it is vital that we build our policy on the alliances and the friendships that we have had in the past, that we have now, and that we hope to have in the future.

That is one of the things that this visit symbolizes. We are proud that Iran is a friend of the United States and that the United States is a friend of Iran.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 175
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

JOHN N. IRWIN II* ADDRESS "THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT" BEFORE THE NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY CONFERENCE FOR SENIOR BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. JUNE 8, 1972

The slower development of interdependence on the part of the Communist countries will be one of the most difficult problems of the transition period ahead. The Soviet Union and China are the most autarchically inclined countries of any size in the world today. Soviet and Chinese autarchic proclivities are in large part due to the requirement for tight control in their domestic systems, perhaps in some part to their historical memories of negative experiences with the outside world.

I doubt that we will see more than a modest liberalization of the Chinese and Soviet domestic systems by 1980, but there may be a substantial improvement in their view of the external threat. At the same time they should perceive increasing advantages to cooperating in such fields as science and technology, trade, and arms control. Already, as an indication, both Soviet and Chinese trade is growing faster with capitalist countries than with other Communist countries. Both the Soviet Union and China will probably be increasingly concerned about being left out of a developing international system and may be willing to reach a significantly higher level of interaction with the non-Communist world.

By 1980 China and the Soviet Union are quite likely to consider one another, rather than the United States, their principal antagonist, if indeed they do not do so already. The issues between them--the border, disputed leadership of the world's "progressive forces," and the traditional state-to-state rivalry of neighboring powers--are likely to persist. Relations are likely to continue to be competitive and tense with cooperation only in isolated fields.

Both China and the Soviet Union seem to be basing their actions on pragmatic assessments of their national interests and capabilities. This should lead to gradual improvement in their relations with the United States. While ideology seems at times to be waning in both countries, it can be expected to wane slowly, so that by 1980 U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese relations will probably still retain a sharply competitive edge.

The commitment of the two Communist powers to leftward movements in the world will remain an important factor in international relations. They may, however, be less willing to take major risks solely on this account. China's capability for military actions much beyond her immediate border will probably continue to be limited through the 1970's. Her worldwide political influence, however, seems likely to increase. Even though our general bilateral relations with the two Communist powers may improve, therefore, the number of areas in which we will compete with both Chinese and Soviet influence will have increased.

* Under Secretary of State

Some of the implications of this brief look into the future for our policy toward China and the Soviet Union are clear. Their increasingly pragmatic behavior and the continuing fragmentation of the Communist world have offered us the opportunity to make them fuller participants in an interdependent world. The President's trips to Peking and Moscow were dramatic and significant achievements in this process.

Both trips were painstakingly prepared over a long period with a view toward concrete achievements. Both were designed with particular care to try to avoid exacerbating relations between the two Communist powers. They aimed at developing good relations with both powers at the expense of neither.

With China we have finally established a dialogue in which our differences are being dealt with in honesty and candor. Movement may be slow, but in the continuing consultations between our two Ambassadors in Paris both of us are at last looking for and pursuing areas of common interest. We have agreed to initiate and facilitate exchanges in such fields as culture, science, technology, sports, and journalism. We are working together to establish mutually beneficial trade.

...There is an obvious danger in trying to go too far too fast in our relations with China and the Soviet Union. In the past, moments of optimism have been shattered by subsequent Communist intransigence. In the President's recent summit meetings, however, an attempt has been made to involve the self-interest of each side in such a way as to establish a solid foundation for improved relations.

...As my earlier speculations on the future implied, improved relations with the Soviet Union and China will not lessen in any way--at least over the next decade--the need to maintain our own and our allies' economic, political, and military strength and unity of purpose.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 176
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

RONALD L. ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCEMENT
JUNE 14, 1972

In accordance with the United States-People's Republic of China joint communique of February 1972, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the United States President for National Security Affairs, will visit the People's Republic of China from June 19 to 23, 1972, for concrete consultations with Chinese leaders to further the normalization of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 177
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

JOINT STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI & OTHERS READ BY RONALD L. ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT JUNE 24, 1972

Premier Chou-En lai of the People's Republic of China and other Chinese officials held discussions with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs, and his party from June 19 to 23, 1972. The talks were extensive, earnest, and frank. They consisted of concrete consultations to promote the normalization of relations between the two countries and an exchange of views on issues of common interest.

Both sides agreed on the usefulness of these consultations which were foreseen in the Sino-U.S. joint communique of February 1972 and on the desirability of continuing them.

A MATTER OF RECORD - No. 178
Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS PRESS CONFERENCE JUNE 24, 1972

...We spent 3½ days in Peking. The discussions were conducted in two parts. There were the discussions that I held with Prime Minister Chou En-lai which, on the Chinese side, included the senior Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua; the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chang Wen-chin; the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Wang Hai-jung; and other Chinese leaders that we met from time to time at banquets, for example, the Ambassador to France, who is handling the bilateral exchanges, Huang Chen, and also the Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, who participated in the meetings in February, Yeh Chien-ying. But the formal meetings were conducted by the group that I have described.

Altogether, we spent about 18 hours in the formal meetings, and then another five to six hours at banquets with the Prime Minister, and riding in cars, in semi-formal discussions. So altogether we had about 24 hours with the Prime Minister.

Then there were other meetings that were conducted by Mr. Jenkins of the State Department, and Mr. Holdridge and Mr. Solomon of my staff, which dealt with the implementation of the bilateral exchanges in trade that were provided for in the Shanghai Communique. They were chaired on the Chinese side by Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by Ch'ien Ta-yung, the Deputy Director of the American Division of the Foreign Ministry.

We were treated with extraordinary courtesy, as those of you who have been there will remember from previous visits. It was announced that the Prime Minister gave a banquet for us, and also another dinner the night before our departure. In addition to this, there was a performance of the Shanghai Opera Company in the same room in which the President saw the cultural performance. Our host for that occasion was the Foreign Minister.

There was a trip to the Forbidden City, and another trip to a sports academy where they were teaching acrobatics and ping pong.

...These were the highlights of the trip. As the joint announcement says, both parties considered it useful and expect to continue these discussions.

Q. Did you discuss the results of the Soviet summit with Premier Chou?

A. We reviewed the entire international situation, including that.

Q. Were you able to satisfy their reported curiosity or anxiety about the proximity of our bombing to their borders, which seem to have been of interest to them?

A. I think they would have to answer as to the degree to which whatever comments I made to them on any topic were satisfactory. Any bombing that has gone on has been intended to deal only with the North Vietnamese situation. We have no interest whatever to pose a military challenge to the People's Republic of China, to infringe in any sense whatever on its sovereignty, or to suggest in the slightest degree that we are using military pressure against the People's Republic of China. Our military actions in North Vietnam will be conducted with those principles in mind.

Q. There are reports in China that the Party Chairman, Mao Tse-tung, has been ill and may be dying. Did you get any indication of this?

A. I received no such indication. On the contrary, insofar as I received indications, they were to the effect that important matters were being checked with him.

Q. Did you make any progress in arranging for any cultural exchanges or scientific ones?

A. We discussed in some detail those parts of the Shanghai Communique that dealt with cultural exchanges as well as with other exchanges. We believe, based on these conversations, that there will be steady progress, perhaps not of a spectacular nature, but steady progress over the months ahead in setting up these exchanges. It is a difficult process to find the right mechanism and to find programs that are mutually beneficial, but I believe that progress is being made.

While I was in Peking I had an opportunity to talk to Professor Fairbank of Harvard, who was there to talk about this matter with the Chinese officials in the educational field. I believe that progress is being made.

Q. What are the prospects for Chinese officials to come to the United States, and was this discussed?

A. The problem of Chinese officials is, of course, complicated by the fact that there are no formal diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, and the fact that the People's Republic of China has no formal representation in the United States. Our general approach to these exchanges is not to have exchanges for their own sake, but to have those exchanges that are useful, that can be done without strain, and that genuinely contribute to better understanding between our two peoples, and to create a contact between our two peoples, and in this context I would have thought that officials would not be the first group that would arrive here.

Q. Does that extend to trade exchanges back and forth?

A. No. As you know, there were American businessmen invited to the Canton Fair. I believe that there will be a slow but steady progress in discussion on trade.

Q. As a final question, looking ahead, will any decision on agreements be made at the regular contacts between the United States and the People's Republic in Paris or will it take another trip by somebody to go back to Peking?

A. As you know, in the Shanghai Communique it was foreseen that there will be visits at appropriate times by senior officials to Peking. There is no plan for the immediate future. In the nature of things, these visits have to take place at their regular intervals and spaced some distance in time apart. The detailed discussion will take place in Paris.

As I pointed out, we expect slow, but steady progress.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's

SHAPING A DURABLE PEACE

A Report To The Congress

By

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States

May 3, 1973

INTRODUCTION

In January 1969, America needed to change the philosophy and practice of its foreign policy.

Whoever took office four years ago would have faced this challenge. After a generation, the postwar world had been transformed and demanded a fresh approach. It was not a question of our previous policies having failed; indeed, in many areas they had been very successful. It was rather that new conditions, many of them achievements of our policies, summoned new perspectives.

The World We Found

The international environment was dominated by seemingly intractable confrontation between the two major nuclear powers. Throughout the nuclear age both the fears of war and hopes for peace revolved around our relations with the Soviet Union. Our growing nuclear arsenals were largely directed at each other. We alone had the capacity to wreak catastrophic damage across the planet. Our ideologies clashed. We both had global interests, and this produced many friction points. We each led and dominated a coalition of opposing states.

As a result, our relationship was generally hostile. There were positive interludes, but these were often atmospheric and did not get at the roots of tension. Accords were reached on particular questions, but there was no broad momentum in our relationship. Improvements in the climate were quickly replaced by confrontation and, occasionally, crisis. The basic pattern was a tense jockeying for tactical advantage around the globe.

This was dangerous and unsatisfactory. The threat of a major conflict between us hung over the world. This in turn exacerbated local and regional tensions. And our two countries not only risked collision but were constrained from working positively on common problems.

The weight of China rested outside the international framework. This was due partly to its own attitude and its preoccupation with internal problems, and partly to the policies of the outside world, most importantly the United States. In any event, this Administration inherited two decades of mutual estrangement and hostility. Here the problem was not one of a fluctuating relationship but rather of having no relationship at all. The

People's Republic of China was separated not only from us but essentially from the world as a whole.

China also exemplified the great changes that had occurred in the Communist world. For years our guiding principle was containment of what we considered a monolithic challenge. In the 1960's the forces of nationalism dissolved Communist unity into divergent centers of power and doctrine, and our foreign policy began to differentiate among the Communist capitals. But this process could not be truly effective so long as we were cut off from one-quarter of the globe's people. China in turn was emerging from its isolation and might be more receptive to overtures from foreign countries.

The gulf between China and the world distorted the international landscape. We could not effectively reduce tensions in Asia without talking to Peking. China's isolation compounded its own sense of insecurity. There could not be a stable world order with a major power remaining outside and hostile to it.

Our principal alliances with Western Europe and Japan needed adjustment. After the devastation of the Second World War we had helped allies and former adversaries alike. Fueled by our assistance and secure behind our military shield, they regained their economic vigor and political confidence.

Throughout the postwar period our bonds with Europe had rested on American prescriptions as well as resources. We provided much of the leadership and planning for common defense. We took the diplomatic lead. The dollar was unchallenged. But by the time this Administration took office, the tide was flowing toward greater economic and political assertiveness by our allies. European unity which we had always encouraged, was raising new issues in Atlantic relations. The economic revival of Europe was straining the Atlantic monetary and commercial framework. The relaxation of tensions with the Communist world was generating new doctrines of defense and diplomacy.

The imperatives of change were equally evident in our Pacific partnership with Japan. Its recovery of strength and self-assurance carried political and psychological implications for our relationship. Its spectacular economic growth had made it the world's third industrial power; our entire economic relationship was undergoing transformation. The earlier paternalism of U.S.-Japanese relations no longer suited either partner.

The Vietnam war dominated our attention and was sapping our self-confidence. Our role and our costs had steadily grown without decisive impact on the conflict. The outlook at the conference table

front, believing that progress in one area would induce progress in others. Through the gathering momentum of individual accords we would seek to create vested interests on both sides in restraint and the strengthening of peace. But this process would require a reduction in tactical maneuvering at each other's expense in favor of our shared interest in avoiding calamitous collision, in profiting from cooperation, and in building a more stable world.

Peace could not exclude a fourth of humanity. The longer-term prospects for peace required a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. Only if China's weight was reflected in the international system would it have the incentive, and sense of shared responsibility, to maintain the peace. Furthermore, the time was past when one nation could claim to speak for a bloc of states; we would deal with countries on the basis of their actions, not abstract ideological formulas. Our own policies could be more flexible if we did not assume the permanent enmity of China. The United States had a traditional interest in an independent and peaceful China. We seemed to have no fundamental interests that need collide in the longer sweep of history. There was, indeed, rich potential benefit for our two peoples in a more normal relationship.

So we launched a careful process of private diplomacy and public steps to engage the People's Republic of China with us and involve it more fully in the world. We did so, confident that a strong, independent China was in our national interest; resolved that such a process need not—and would not—be aimed at any other country; and looking for a reciprocal attitude on the part of the Chinese.

Peace must draw upon the vitality of our friends. Our alliances with Western Europe and Japan would continue as major pillars of our foreign policy, but they had not kept pace with the changed international environment. We thus sought to forge more equal partnerships based on a more balanced contribution of both resources and plans.

America had been the automatic source of political leadership and economic power. Now we needed new modes of action that would accommodate our partners' new dynamism. The challenge was to reconcile traditional unity with new diversity. While complete integration of policy was impossible, pure unilateralism would be destructive.

Before, we were allied in containment of a unified Communist danger. Now Communism had taken various forms; our alliances had stabilized the European and Northeast Asian environments; and we had laid the foundations for negotiation. We had to decide together not only what we were against, but what we were for.

and psychologically, to a new form of American participation in the world.

"Precipitate shrinking of the American role would not bring peace. It would not reduce America's stake in a turbulent world. It would not solve our problems, either abroad or at home."

Peace had a domestic dimension. Steadiness abroad required steadiness at home. America could continue to make its vital contribution in the world only if Americans understood the need and supported the effort to do so. But understanding and support for a responsible foreign policy were in serious jeopardy in 1969. Years of burdens, Cold War tensions, and a difficult war threatened to undermine our constancy.

While new policies were required to meet transformed conditions abroad, they were equally imperative because of the changing climate at home. Americans needed a new positive vision of the world and our place in it. In order to continue to do what only America could, we had to demonstrate that our friends were doing more. While maintaining strong defenses, we also had to seek national security through negotiations with adversaries. And where American families were most directly affected, we had to gain a peace with honor to win domestic support for our new foreign policy as well as to make it credible abroad.

We have thus paid great attention, as in these Reports, to the articulation, as well as the implementation, of our new role in the world.

The Past Year

My previous Reports chronicled our progress during the first three years of this Administration. Despite shifting currents, and recognizing that the calendar cannot draw neat dividing lines, there has been a positive evolution.

In 1969, we defined our basic approach, drawing the blueprint of a new strategy for peace.

In 1970, we implemented new policies, building toward peace.

In 1971, we made essential breakthroughs, and a global structure of peace emerged.

This past year we realized major results from our previous efforts. Together they are shaping a durable peace.

—Three years of careful groundwork produced an historic turning point in our relations with the *People's Republic of China*. My conversations with Chinese leaders in February 1972 reestablished contact between the world's most powerful and the world's most populous countries, thereby transforming the postwar landscape.

The journey to Peking launched a process with immense potential for the betterment of our peoples and the building of peace in Asia and the world. Since then we have moved to concrete measures which are improving relations and creating more positive conditions in the region. China is becoming fully engaged with us and the world. The process is not inexorable, however. Both countries will have to continue to exercise restraint and contribute to a more stable environment.

—The May 1972 summit meeting with the leadership of the *Soviet Union* achieved a broad range of significant agreements. Negotiations across a wide front, which set the stage for the meeting, were successfully concluded in Moscow. Progress in one area reinforced progress in others. For the first time two nations agreed to limit the strategic weapons that are the heart of their national survival. We launched cooperative ventures in several fields. We agreed on basic principles to govern our relations. Future areas of cooperation and negotiation were opened up. There has been, in sum, major movement toward a steadier and more constructive relationship. On the other hand, areas of tension and potential conflict remain, and certain patterns of Soviet behavior continue to cause concern.

—The attainment of an honorable settlement in *Vietnam* was the most satisfying development of this past year. Successful Vietnamization and intensive negotiations culminated in the Agreement signed on January 27, 1973. This was quickly followed by a settlement in neighboring Laos in February. The steady courage and patience of Americans who supported our policy through the years were echoed in the moving salutes of our returning men. But the coals of war still glow in Vietnam and Laos, and a ceasefire remains elusive altogether in Cambodia. Much work remains to consolidate peace in Indochina.

—In *Western Europe* the inevitable strains of readjustment persisted as we moved from American predomiance to balanced partnerships. Generally these were healthy manifestations of the growing strength of countries who share common values and objectives. With less fanfare, but no less dedication, than in our negotiations with adversaries, we consulted closely with our friends. Such a process may not be as susceptible to dramatic advances, but we believe that we have paved the way for substantial progress in Atlantic relations in the coming months. Major political, security and economic negotiations are on the agenda. They will test the wisdom and adaptability of our Alliance.

CHINA

In this Administration we have begun a new chapter in American-Chinese relations, and as a result the international landscape has been fundamentally changed.

For two decades our two countries stared at each other icily across a gulf of hostility and suspicion. Misunderstanding was assured. Miscalculation was a constant danger. And constructing a permanent peace was impossible.

This estrangement had global ramifications that went far beyond our bilateral relationship. So long as we were not dealing with the People's Republic of China, our foreign policy could not truly reflect the emerging multipolar world. The isolation of one-fourth of the human race, partly self-imposed and partly the result of the policies of others, distorted the international scene. It also tended to reinforce China's own sense of insecurity. There could be no stable world order if one of the major powers remained outside it and antagonistic toward it.

In the past four years this situation has been transformed. Bilaterally, deep differences in ideology and policy remain; neither we nor the Chinese leaders have illusions that our discussions will convert each other. But extensive and frank dialogue has greatly increased mutual understanding. The risk of confrontation therefore has been sharply reduced, and in any event it should no longer flow from miscalculation. Without either side abandoning its principles, we now have the potential for positive enterprises.

There are concrete manifestations of this new chapter in our relationship.

Before, there was no dialogue at all between our governments, except for desultory meetings in third countries. Now we have held hundreds of hours of direct talks at the highest levels. Liaison Offices are being established in Peking and Washington.

Before, there was virtually no contact between a quarter of the world's population and the American people. Now there is a significant exchange of groups and persons in a wide spectrum of fields. This will increase substantially.

Before, our bilateral trade was miniscule. Now it is reaching very substantial levels. There will be further expansion.

This process in turn has helped to create new possibilities on a global scale. Our own diplomacy has been broadened; we can more effectively promote an inclusive peace. The People's Republic of China has become more fully engaged in the world scene; much more than before, it is making its contributions to shaping the international order.

The turning point came at the summit in February 1972 when the leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States met and put their personal imprint on a new direction for our two nations, and with it new contours for the world.

The Road to the Summit

Three years of meticulous preparation preceded my trip to Peking.

When I took office, I was determined to reestablish contact between the most populous and most powerful countries in the world. The following considerations prompted us and served as policy guidelines:

—We could not build toward a global structure of peace while excluding 800 million people. A more stable international system had to reflect the massive weight and potential of China.

—Changes in the world generally, and in the Communist world particularly, called for a broader American approach. Having recovered from the ravages of World War II, our allies began asserting their autonomy. Independent voices began to be heard in the once solid Socialist community. The international environment had become multipolar; it was time our diplomacy did too.

—The United States has had a traditional interest in a peaceful, independent, and self-reliant China. This remained a more positive prospect than a China that felt isolated or threatened.

—There were many potential areas where bilateral contact could enrich the lives of our two peoples.

—There did not seem to be major clashes of national interest between our two countries over the longer term. Our policies could be less rigid if we and the Chinese did not treat each other as permanent adversaries.

—A new approach was not to be directed against other countries. Indeed it could serve to broaden the horizons of international dialogue and accommodation.

—We believed that the People's Republic of China might be receptive to our approach.

So the times called for a fresh approach to China. But formidable obstacles, technical as well as political, lay in the way. In last year's Report I described the problems and the policies we employed to overcome

them. Against a twenty-year backdrop of non-communication and sterile mutual recrimination, our task was twofold: to convey privately our views to the Chinese leadership and to indicate publicly the direction of our policy.

We had to find discreet and reliable means to transmit our views to Peking and get authoritative Chinese responses. We began this effort during the first weeks of my Administration. Up until the summer of 1971, we engaged in a delicate diplomatic minuet during which mutual confidence gradually increased and mutual intentions became more concrete.

Meanwhile we carefully orchestrated a succession of unilateral initiatives and positive statements. From mid-1969 onwards, we took a series of steps to relax trade and travel restrictions. They did not require a response from the Chinese; they were therefore neither dependent on Chinese reciprocity nor vulnerable to Chinese rejection. Individually these were not major steps, but cumulatively they etched the pattern more and more clearly. At the same time in official speeches and statements, such as my annual foreign policy reports, we mapped in increasingly sharp relief the road we were taking.

During the spring of 1971 the tempo accelerated in public and in private, with greater responsiveness from the Chinese. Peking's invitation to an American table tennis team to visit China in April was one among many public signals. Privately during that period we agreed that Dr. Kissinger should visit Peking from July 9 to July 11.

On that trip we opened the door. Dr. Kissinger held intensive discussions with Premier Chou En-lai, and agreement was reached that I would visit the People's Republic of China. In the brief joint announcement that I read on July 15 we stated that "the meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides."

In October, Dr. Kissinger returned to Peking to discuss the broad agenda for my visit and settle on the other major arrangements. The groundwork was thus laid for meetings at the highest levels.

The Journey to Peking

My trip to the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972 was the watershed in reestablishing Sino-American relations.

The carefully nurtured preparation held out the promise of a new direction; my meetings with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier

Chou En-lai firmly set our course. The Joint Communique at the end of my visit established the framework for progress; developments since then have accelerated the process of normalization.

Seldom have the leaders of two major countries met with such an opportunity to create a totally new relationship. It had taken two and a half years to cross the golf of isolation and reach the summit. At the same time, the very factors which had made this journey so complicated offered unusual opportunities. The absence of communication, while making initial contact complex to arrange, also gave us a clean slate to write upon. Factors such as geography and China's recent concentration on internal matters meant that we had few bilateral matters of contention, though we lined up often on different sides of third country or multilateral problems.

Accordingly, the agenda for our discussions could be general and our dialogue philosophical to a much greater extent than is normally possible between nations. Indeed, it was this context and these prospects that, in our view, called for a summit meeting. With the Soviet Union a meeting at the highest levels was required to give impetus to, and conclude, a broad range of concrete negotiations. With the People's Republic of China, on the other hand, such a meeting was needed to set an entirely new course. Only through direct discussions at the highest levels could we decisively bridge the gulf that had divided us, conduct discussions on a strategic plane, and launch a new process with authority.

The primary objective, then, of my talks with the Chinese leaders was not the reaching of concrete agreements but a sharing of fundamental perspectives on the world. First, we had to establish a joint perception of the shape of our future relationship and its place in the international order. We needed a mutual assessment of what was involved in the new process we were undertaking and of one another's reliability in carrying the process forward. If we could attain this type of mutual comprehension, agreements could and would flow naturally.

Last February I described our expectations as I set out on my journey:

"Both sides can be expected to state their principles and their views with complete frankness. We will each know clearly where the other stands on the issues that divide us. We will look for ways to begin reducing our differences. We will attempt to find some common ground on which to build a more constructive relationship.

"If we can accomplish these objectives, we will have made a solid beginning."

Our discussions ranged broadly and freely. Both sides set forth their views with candor, neither evading nor downgrading differences. We were able to fulfill the expectations I had set forth earlier.

On February 27, 1972 we issued a Joint Communique in Shangha that reflected this solid beginning. This document purposely was ver unorthodox. Communiques often use general language, stress agree ments, gloss over disputes, and use ambiguous formulas to bridge dif ferences.

The Chinese leaders and we thought that such an approach would be unworthy of our unique encounter and our discussions. To pretend that two nations, with such a long separation and such fundamental differences, suddenly were in harmony would have been neither honest nor credible. The use of general or compromise language to paper over disputes would have been subject to misinterpretation by others; and it ran the risk of subsequent conflicting interpretations by the two sides.

We decided instead to speak plainly. We echoed the frankness of our private talks in our public announcement. Each side forthrightly stated its world and regional views in the communique, and the lines of our ideology and foreign policy were clearly drawn.

Against this candid background, the areas where we could find agreement emerged with more authority. Our conversations made clear that in addition to genuine differences there were also broad principles of international relations to which we both subscribed. There was as well a joint determination to improve our relations both by accommodating our differences and developing concrete ties.

Accordingly, in the communique we agreed that despite differences in social systems and foreign policies, countries should conduct their relations on the basis of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis without the use or threat of force. We and the People's Republic of China agreed to apply these principles to our mutual relations.

With these international principles in mind we stated that:

"—progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

"—both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

"—neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

"—neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

"Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another

against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest."

These principles were of major significance. They demonstrated that despite our clear disagreements and our long separation we shared some fundamental attitudes toward international relations. They provided both a framework for our future relations and a yardstick by which to measure each other's performance.

With respect to the relationship of Taiwan to the mainland, the United States reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful solution of this question by the Chinese themselves. We based this view on the fact that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.

The communique then laid down the foundations for tangible improvements in our relations. These would allow us to move from the elimination of mistrust and the establishment of broad understandings to more concrete accomplishments:

—We agreed to facilitate bilateral exchanges in order to broaden the understanding between our peoples. Specific areas mentioned were science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism.

—We undertook to facilitate the progressive growth of trade between our countries. Both sides viewed economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit as being in the interests of our peoples.

—We decided to maintain contact through various channels, including sending a senior U.S. representative to Peking periodically to exchange views directly. This reflected a mutual desire to expand our communications.

—We also subsequently established a formal channel through our two embassies in Paris. This would institutionalize our contacts and facilitate exchanges, trade, and travel.

Major Advances in the Past Year

Since my visit to Peking the momentum of our relations has grown in all the fields covered by the Shanghai Communique.

As foreseen in the communique, Dr. Kissinger returned to Peking in June to review international issues with the Chinese and to stimulate progress in the various bilateral programs. Our embassies in Paris also facilitated the flow of groups and goods.

The growth of our bilateral trade has exceeded expectations. In 1971, U.S. imports from China totalled $4.9 million, while our exports were negligible. In 1972 we imported $32.3 million worth of goods and exported $60.2 million, an expansion of trade helped by the attendance

of more than 150 American businessmen at the spring and fall sessions of the Canton Export Commodities Fair. In 1973, two-way trade is likely to show substantial additional growth, and may well place the United States among China's five largest trading partners. To encourage this expansion of commercial relations, a National Council for U.S.-China Trade was formed in early 1973 by a distinguished group of private business executives. This organization will seek to promote the orderly development of bilateral trade through exchange of information and facilitation of contacts between Chinese and American manufacturers, exporters, and traders.

A substantial beginning was made in the development of exchanges between our two countries. A championship table tennis team from the People's Republic toured the United States in April 1972, in return for the visit of the American team which had played in Peking a year earlier. Groups of Chinese doctors and scientists visited their counterparts in this country during the fall, under the sponsorship of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China. And in December, the Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe performed in four major American cities in a visit facilitated by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

In turn, increasing numbers of Americans visited the People's Republic of China. The Majority and Minority leaders of the Senate were guests of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs in April 1972, as were the House leaders in June. A group of doctors from the National Medical Association and a delegation of computer scientists visited their counterparts in China in the summer and fall. Among the journalists who toured the People's Republic during the year was a delegation from the American Society of Newspaper Editors. And in the scholarly areas, groups of distinguished American economists and China specialists toured the country, as well as substantial numbers of individual scientists and scholars from various fields.

Thus there was a significant resumption of cultural, scientific, and scholarly contacts, and the public media began to inform our peoples about one another. Chinese and Americans were rebuilding historic bonds.

A solid foundation was therefore established before Dr. Kissinger returned to Peking in February of this year in the wake of the Vietnam peace settlement. The joint announcement after that trip pointed to major progress in our relations with the People's Republic of China:

—There were "earnest, frank, and constructive" talks in an "unconstrained atmosphere" with Chairman Mao, Premier Chou, and other Chinese officials.

—The two sides reaffirmed the principles of the Shanghai Communique and agreed to accelerate the normalization of relations.

—We agreed to broaden contacts in all fields, and establish a concrete program to expand trade and exchanges still further.

—We decided to settle in a comprehensive manner the long-standing issues of private U.S. claims against the Chinese government and blocked Chinese assets in the United States. Secretary of State Rogers and Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei reached agreement in principle on this issue a week later in Paris. Final settlement will open the way for further expansion of our bilateral commercial relations.

—Most importantly, we agreed that each country would establish a Liaison Office in the capital of the other. They will be functioning very shortly. Both sides have appointed senior representatives with long diplomatic experience. This major step both reflects—and will promote—the increase in our communications and bilateral programs. Practically, the offices will enable us to deal with each other directly in Washington and Peking. Symbolically, they underline the progress made to date and our joint intention to proceed on the path we have chosen. They represent a milestone in our developing relationship.

—The Chinese agreed to free the two American pilots captured during the Vietnam War. They also promised to review later the already shortened sentence of another American prisoner. The pilots were released on March 15, 1973, while the other American was released early on March 10, 1973.

We thus moved decisively from the conceptual to the concrete. What was theoretically desirable was increasingly being practiced. What was still partly tentative and experimental would now be reinforced and expanded. What was indirect could now be made direct.

Several factors contributed to this major advance in our relationship:

—Eighteen months of authoritative and wide-ranging discussions had made clear to each side the other's philosophy and principles. We both decided that our shared interests in bettering relations, outweighed our differences on specific questions. Where differences existed, we had found ways to accommodate them without sacrificing principles.

—Since the initial openings, the two sides had established considerable reliability in our dealings, both bilateral and multilateral.

—Implementation of the Shanghai Communique had proceeded satisfactorily, and it was agreed that new steps were required to

accelerate progress. Both we and the Chinese believed that it was important to institutionalize our new relationship.

—Finally, while most of these factors had been developing for many months, the Vietnam War had still inhibited our progress. With the achievement of a negotiated settlement, the major obstacle to improved relations was removed.

Our Future Course

In my first term we moved a long way with the People's Republic of China. Together we have revived our historic association, set a new direction, and launched a purposeful process.

We are resolved to continue on this course. We are under no illusions, however, that its development is inexorable. There will be a continuing need for meticulousness and reliability, for although we have come a remarkable distance, two decades of blanket hostility cannot be erased completely in two years. In any event, our ideologies and views of history will continue to differ profoundly. These differences, in turn, will be translated into opposing policies on some issues which will continue to require mutual restraint and accommodation. And over the longer term the inevitable changes in the world environment will continually inject new factors that could test our relationship.

We nevertheless remain basically confident that relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China will continue to develop in a positive direction. The driving force behind this process is not personalities, or atmosphere, or a sense of adventure, or transitory tactical benefits. Our two nations undertook this course in full knowledge of our differences. We chose to change our relationship because this served our fundamental national purposes.

America maintains its historic concern for an independent and peaceful China. We see in this prospect nothing inimical to our interests. Indeed, we consider it to be strongly in the interest of regional and world stability. China, in turn, has nothing to fear from America's strength. The broadening of diplomatic horizons has already paid dividends for us both and represents an enduring asset. Our past differences notwithstanding, we have many positive elements to draw upon—the traditional friendship of our two peoples, the cultural and scientific contributions we offer one another, the lack of any directly conflicting interests, and the commonly shared principles of international relations expressed in the Shanghai Communique.

This Administration will pursue the further improvement of relations with the People's Republic of China with dedication and care. The same

considerations that prompted us to begin this process four years ago motivate us now to continue it. And our guidelines remain constant:

—Our objective is to build a broader and steadier structure of peace.

—We seek the tangible dividends of a flourishing relationship between the Chinese and American peoples.

—Our relations will be based on equality and reciprocity.

—This process is not directed against any other country.

—We shall pursue our policy in close consultation with our friends.

Within this framework we will work increasingly to realize the perspectives that we and the Chinese envisioned at the close of the Shanghai Communique:

> "The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world."

United States Foreign Policy 1972

A Report of the Secretary of State

TOWARD A LESSENING OF TENSIONS

Although the reduction of tensions is not unique to East Asia, it is strikingly evident there—in peace settlements in Indochina; in the emergence of the P.R.C. into the world community and the establishment of ties with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand; in the talks begun between South and North Korea and the cessation of armed infiltration of the South by the North; in the interest being shown by Japan and the U.S.S.R. in working out a formal end to their hostilities in the Second World War; and in the effort of the Southeast Asian nations to establish long-term security for the region. Although tension persists on the Sino-Soviet border, the four major powers—China, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and the United States—whose interests uniquely come together in East Asia, have taken a number of steps to increase the atmosphere of détente. Although serious problems still remain among these nations, there are strong incentives for them to engage in peaceful competition rather than to resort to military confrontation.

A key element in easing tensions was the transformation of our relationship with Peking. The trip of President Nixon to China in February provided a unique demonstration that years of enmity and fear and longstanding divisive issues can be set aside while a search is made for areas where understanding and progress can be achieved. The Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972, issued at the end of this visit, established the basic framework of U.S.–P.R.C. relations and created a continuing means to discuss our mutual interests and the problems between our two nations. The establishment of liaison offices in our respective capitals will further significantly our movement toward normal relations.

The Agreement of January 27, 1973, to end the war in Vietnam will hopefully insure cessation of hostilities and reconciliation throughout all of Indochina. In the world context, it removes a major source of international ill will and friction. With the advent of peace, we will be able to turn our attention to reconstruction and rehabilitation. The United States has for some time been planning a program of postwar reconstruction to include all of the area—North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—and a number of states and international organizations have already expressed a desire to join in this work of healing.

On the Korean Peninsula, too, a hope for reduction of tensions now exists. After the almost two decades of military confrontation that followed the Korean war, South and North Korea jointly announced last July that they had begun to explore the development of

reasonable period of time. The United States and Japan also reaffirmed the commitments of both countries to initiate and support multilateral trade negotiations in 1973.

The February 1973 realignment of exchange rates—including a 10 percent devaluation of the U.S. dollar and a float of the Japanese yen—was a major step toward a restoration of international monetary equilibrium. The new rates, combined with further measures along the lines discussed by President Nixon and Prime Minister Tanaka in Hawaii, will, in time, have a favorable effect on the bilateral trade deficit. Strong measures must be taken since neither government can permit a relationship so vital to the peace and stability of East Asia to founder on economic problems.

Prime Minister Tanaka and President Nixon also reaffirmed the need for mutual understanding of the cultural, social, and other underlying factors in our relations. Noteworthy were the establishment in October of the Japan Foundation for International Cultural Exchange activities and the convening in June of the Sixth U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange.

Japan's growing economic strength has been accompanied by increased Japanese assistance to developing countries. Japanese official and private loans, grants, and investments were $1,824 million in 1970 and $2,138 million in 1971. Japan is endeavoring to improve the concessional terms of its foreign aid and is close to reaching its target of aid flows equal to 1 percent of its GNP. By 1975 it is predicted that Japan's aid to developing countries will be at least $4 billion.

In the scientific field, the 11-year-old Cooperative Science Program has so far involved more than 2,000 scientists from both nations. The two governments in 1972 sought to identify additional environmental problems for joint study and to strengthen existing cooperative projects on development of natural resources and medical science. Bilateral environmental cooperation was supplemented by multilateral projects such as the development of low pollution power systems and experimental safety vehicles.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

After more than two decades of hostility and estrangement, the United States is now engaged in an effort to normalize relations with the P.R.C. We do not expect all problems to vanish overnight, but we have devoted ourselves, with some success, to the correction of misperceptions on both sides and to the establishment of a productive relationship. Our efforts have not sacrificed the interests of any third country nor do they represent a weakening of existing U.S. commit-

ments. Rather they have had as their objective the creation of a stable peace in Asia in which the legitimate interests of all parties will be served.

In pursuing this objective, we will continue to avoid entanglement in disputes between the P.R.C. and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we are concerned when two nations as powerful as the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. engage in a quarrel that increases international tensions. It is our policy to work toward balanced improvement of relations with both.

The President's journey to Peking in February 1972 was a watershed in our relations with the P.R.C. The most significant result of the Peking summit was that we and the Chinese agreed on a set of principles of international conduct which will also govern our mutual relations; we also agreed that it is against the interests of both our countries for the Asian-Pacific region to be dominated by any one nation and that neither of us intends to seek such dominance. We thereby created a political framework founded on basic common interests within which we can begin to discuss common problems.

The Shanghai Communique, issued on February 28, at the end of the visit, is the basic charter of our new relationship. This document states our differences forthrightly but makes clear that differences in some areas need not be an obstacle to the improvement of relations and, hopefully, cooperation in others; and that we can move forward in our efforts to normalize relations without first resolving all issues between us.

As both a symbol and a means of improving relations, we and the Chinese agreed to encourage contacts and exchanges in a number of fields—science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism. From a modest beginning, these exchanges have gathered momentum throughout the year. Close to 2,000 Americans have traveled to the P.R.C. since April 1971, including Senate and House leaders, groups of journalists, scholars, doctors, scientists, Chinese-Americans, and students. In return, a Chinese table tennis team, physicians, scientists, zoo officials, and an acrobatics group have come to America. Communications have been opened not only between individuals but also between Chinese and American organizations, such as scientific and medical organizations, libraries, news services, and sports associations.

Improved trade relations, stressed in the Joint Communique, have promoted contacts with China by representatives of American firms ranging from small trading companies to some of the largest corporations in America, and an expansion of trade from less than $5 million in 1971 to $92.5 million in 1972. The normalization of trade relations has enabled American suppliers to compete in the international mar-

ket for China's orders, as, for example, the 700,000 tons of U.S. grain and cotton sold China and orders for 10 Boeing 707's and three earth satellite stations.

On the import side, over 40 Americans attended the spring 1972 export fair in Canton and close to 100 Americans attended the autumn fair. Imports reached an average of more than $3 million a month in 1972 and show prospects of growing. Further increases are expected to be slow, since Americans are late arrivals in the China market and certain impediments persist to trade on both sides. As part of the continuing effort to promote increased trade, however, the U.S. Government is taking action in concert with authorities of the People's Republic of China to eliminate bilateral problems such as U.S. private claims, frozen Chinese assets, and other remaining barriers.

While the Chinese and American people are exchanging ideas and commodities, the governments have maintained regular contact through their Embassies in Paris. In the United Nations, U.S. delegates have established a professional working relationship with the Chinese mission on multilateral issues. In October Secretary Rogers invited Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua to an informal dinner at his New York home, where they engaged in a cordial and wide-ranging discussion.

We agreed in February 1973 not only on a concrete program to expand trade and exchanges, but also to facilitate the process of normalization of relations and that each side will establish a liaison office in the capital of the other in the near future.

Despite these encouraging developments, we continue to have deeply divergent policies and approaches, which good will alone cannot erase. However, the first steps away from hostility toward cooperation have been taken. The potential for misunderstanding has been lessened.

We are now engaged in the less spectacular but no less important phase of building on the foundation of détente and mutual trust which was established over the past year. Expanded trade and cultural exchanges will feature prominently in this process, but our efforts will not be confined to these two areas. Our goal remains to move not merely from hostility to détente but from détente to cooperation. In pursuing this goal, we remain aware of the importance of our existing relationships with other nations and our commitments to old friends. Normal relations with China do not require us to sacrifice our ties with other nations. On the contrary, the interests of the United States and the cause of world peace require that we work to strengthen our relationships with all countries which are willing to develop a productive relationship with us.

The dramatic events of the past year have encouraged our hope that such a relationship is possible with the P.R.C. and that a sense of mutual trust can grow, even between countries with different ideologies.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The United States has long had a policy of friendship and cooperation with the Republic of China (R.O.C.). Our two governments have cooperated, and will continue to do so, in a wide spectrum of endeavors. This close friendship flourished in the past year, notwithstanding developments in our China policy which culminated in the President's February trip to Peking.

The Shanghai Communique, summarizing the visit, stated that the U.S. Government "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes."

The Shanghai Communique has left the ultimate resolution of the Taiwan problem in Chinese hands. Nevertheless, our treaty commitments with the R.O.C., including the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, remain in force. This Treaty recognizes that an armed attack against Taiwan and the Pescadores would obligate us to act in accordance with our constitutional processes to meet the common danger. Repeated assurances have been given to the R.O.C. that this commitment still stands. Secretary Rogers, addressing the SEATO Council in June 1972 said,

> ". . . our new relationships will not be achieved by sacrificing the interests of our friends. We obtained explicit recognition of this fact in the principles to which we subscribed with China and the Soviet Union."

It would be unrealistic, however, to say that the year 1972 was not a difficult one for the R.O.C. on the diplomatic front. The previous year had ended with the exclusion of the R.O.C. from participation in the United Nations. We continue to advocate, however, the representation of the interests of the people of Taiwan in agencies associated with the United Nations and in other international institutions.

We also support the continued participation of the R.O.C. in international meetings and seminars to which it can contribute the knowledge and expertise of a successful developing economy.

During the past year the economy of the island has been booming. Statistics for the year 1972 are well outside the normal range of expectations. The overall foreign trade of Taiwan rose 48 percent during the year, reaching a total value of $5.8 billion.[2] Taiwan's real GNP increased by almost 12 percent in 1972 over the 1971 level, giving the island one of the highest GNP growth rates in the world. Meanwhile, Taiwan's gold and foreign exchange reserves reached $1.5 billion at the end of 1972, an increase of more than $500 million during the year. Foreign confidence in Taiwan as an investment site continues strong.

Our exports to Taiwan increased by about 22 percent during 1972,[3] and export opportunities for American business should be exceptionally good in the next few years. During its Sixth Four-Year Economic Development Plan (1973–76), the R.O.C. intends to invest over $10 billion in industry, transportation, communications, and agriculture. In this period, its import needs are expected to shift toward capital goods, a field in which the United States is particularly competitive. We expect that favorable world monetary developments may also increase the competitiveness of U.S. products in the Taiwan market.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Since the Korean Armistice in 1953, our primary objective in the Korean peninsula has been to prevent a recurrence of violent conflict between North and South. To avoid the danger of miscalculation by the North, the United States has stationed its own forces in the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) and cooperated in building strong and self-reliant Korean defense forces.

With sustained U.S. support as a basis for self-confidence, the Korean Government in mid-1971 proposed direct talks between the Red Cross Associations of the North and South aimed at reuniting families divided by the Korean conflict. In September 1972 Red Cross delegations from the two sides met successively in Pyongyang and Seoul, the first such interchange in over 20 years.

A new and separate avenue of communication was opened when the Korean Government began secret discussions early in 1972 with high North Korean officials. These talks culminated in a joint an-

[2] Foreign exchange settlement statistics.
[3] U.S. Department of Commerce estimates.

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OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE BRIEFING ROOM

10:20 A.M. EST

MR. ZIEGLER: You have had a chance to read the communique. As Jerry mentioned to you, it is embargoed for transmission until 11:00 o'clock, Eastern Standard Time.

Dr. Kissinger left on the 7th of this month, and he has visited Thailand, Laos, the DRV and the PRC and Japan, and returned to the United States on the 20th of this month and is here to talk about his travels and to take some of your questions. He is on the record, of course.

DR. KISSINGER: I noticed that Ron has begun to speak with a German accent. (Laughter)

Ladies and gentlemen, I thought I would begin by making some remarks about my trip to the People's Republic of China, and then take some questions on that, including the communique, and then perhaps make a few additional comments to the briefing that Ron has already given you on the Hanoi communique.

To put this communique into perspective and to elbaorate on it for a bit, one should review the evolution of our China policy. When we first began our contacts with the People's Republic of China in 1969 through third parties, and in 1971 directly, the United States had not had any contact with the People's Republic in nearly 20 years; that is, no contact on a really substantial level.

Our early conversations were concerned primarily with building confidence, with explaining each other's position, with establishing channels of communication. Last year our achievements consisted of setting out directions and indicating the roads that might be traveled. After the end of the war in Vietnam, and in these discussions in Peking, we were able to begin to travel some of these roads, and to move from the attempt to eliminate the obstructions and the mistrust to some more concrete and positive achievements.

What happened in these meetings was really a continuation of possibilities that had been outlined during the President's visit and during the conversations between the President and Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou En-lai, except that now they took some more concrete form. As the communique points out, we reviewed the progress in Sino-American relations in great detail, and we reviewed the international situation in great detail.

MORE

We discussed the principles of the Shanghai Communique, particularly those that dealt with the desirability of normalization of relations, the desirability of reducing the danger of military conflict, the affirmation by both sides that neither would seek hegemony in the Pacific area, and each of them opposed the attempt of anyone else to achieve it, and that the relations between China and the United States would never be directed against any third country.

In that spirit, it was decided to accelerate the normalization of relations, to broaden contacts in all fields, and an initial concrete program for extending these contacts was developed.

Given this new range of contacts, it was decided that the existing channel in Paris was inadequate and that, therefore, each side would establish a liaison office in the capital of the other. This liaison office would handle trade as well as all other matters, except the strictly formal diplomatic aspects of the relationship, but it would cover the whole gamut of relationships. This liaison office will be established in the nearest future. Both sides will make proposals within the next few weeks to the other about their technical requirements, and henceforth it will be possible for the United States and the People's Republic of China to deal with each other in the capital of the other.

MORE

Now, in order to give some concrete expression to this desire for the normalization of relationships, it was agreed that a number of steps be taken.

First of all, the Chinese, as a sign of good will, have informed us that they would release, within the same time period as our withdrawal from Vietnam, the two military prisoners that they hold in China, Lt. Commander (Robert J.) Flynn and Major Philip (E.) Smith. They have been held in China since 1967, and 1965, respectively. They will be released within the next few weeks.

Prime Minister Chou En-lai also asked me to inform the President that the Chinese Penal Code provided for the periodic review of the sentences of prisoners and that this provision would be applied in the case of John Downey.

The Chinese Penal Code provides for commutation of sentences on the basis of good behavior. We have been told that the behavior of Mr. Downey has been exemplary and that his case would be reviewed in the second half of this year.

With respect to outstanding issues that have been discussed in other channels, it was agreed that the linked issue of United States private claims against the People's Republic of China and PRC blocked assets in the United States would be negotiated on a global basis in the immediate future. Discussions will begin on this subject between Secretary of State Rogers and the Chinese Foreign Minister next week when both are attending the International Conference on Vietnam in Paris, and we expect these negotiations to be concluded rapidly and in a comprehensive way and we are certain that both sides are approaching them in a constructive spirit and in an attitude consistent with our intention to accelerate the improvement of our relations.

With respect to increased exchanges between the two countries, the Chinese have agreed to invite, during this year, the Philadelphia Symphony by the fall of 1973, a medical group during the spring, scientific groups during the summer, a group of elementary and high school teachers, again during the summer, and increased visits by Congressmen and Senators, as well as athletic teams, an amateur basketball team and swimming and diving team.

The People's Republic has agreed to send to the United States the archeological exhibit from the Forbidden City, which will probably come here in 1974, a group of water conservation experts, insect hormone specialists, high energy physicists, and a gymnastic team.

When the liaison offices are established, possibility will exist for developing further contacts and accelerating this entire process.

MORE

The major point we want to make is this: Our contacts with the People's Republic of China have moved from hostility towards normalization. We both believe that it is essential for the peace of the world that the United States and the People's Republic of China act with a sense of responsibility in world affairs; that we are part of an international community in which all nations have a stake in preserving the peace, and that therefore, as the Shanghai communique has already said and as was reaffirmed once again, the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic is not directed against other nations, but is part of a pattern that the President has pursued of building a structure of peace in which all nations can participate and in which all nations have a stake.

It remains for me only to say that we were received with extraordinary courtesy and that the discussions were conducted in what was always described as an unconstrained atmosphere.

Now I will take your questions on China and after that a few comments on North Vietnam.

Q Did you come to any agreement with regard to Taiwan and U.S. troops there?

DR. KISSINGER: Inevitably the issue of Taiwan is one in which the People's Republic and we do not have the same perspective. The leaders of the People's Republic stated their view and we expressed our general commitments.

We, of course, continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The level of our troops on Taiwan is not the subject of negotiation, but will be governed by the general considerations of the Nixon Doctrine with respect to danger in the area. There exists no immediate plan for any withdrawal, but there will be a periodic review.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what will be the rank of the liaison office heads? Will they be Ambassadors?

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Lisagor has addressed me by my academic title, which is very impressive to me.

The formal title of the head of the liaison office will be Chief of the Liaison Office. And we are not giving any formal diplomatic rank on either side. As soon as the person is selected, which should be within a month, I think his stature will then determine it, but there will be no formal title other than the one I have given.

Q To what do you attribute the Chinese decision to send a permanent representative here in view of their previous refusal to have a permanent person any place where Taiwan is recognized?

MORE

DR. KISSINGER: The liaison office, of course, is not a formal diplomatic office, but I don't want to speculate on the motive of the Chinese decision.

Our policy had always been clear from our first contact. Certainly from the time that the President visited the People's Republic, he pointed out to Prime Minister Chou En-lai the types of American representation that would be available for establishment in Peking, which ranged from trade missions to various other possibilities, to the idea of a liaison office.

Why the Chinese leaders have decided at this particular moment to accept this and to establish an office of their own in Washington, I would not want to speculate on, except that it is certainly consistent with speeding up the process of normalization.

Q Was there any restriction or understanding on the size of the respective delegations?

DR. KISSINGER: No, but we expect it to be of moderate size at the beginning.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how about the exchange of journalists and opening of permanent bureaus in both countries?

DR. KISSINGER: This is one of the topics that will be discussed through the existing channel and then through the liaison office. The Chinese side has indicated that it would be willing to send some journalists over here and it is, of course, clearly understood that we want to increase our journalistic contacts in the People's Republic.

I think there is some understanding in principle with respect to that; the details of which have to be worked out.

Q What is the concrete program of expanding trade the communique refers to?

DR. KISSINGER: To begin with, there is already a reasonable amount of trade, much larger than any projection had foreseen two years ago. The initial step in a further expansion has to be the discussion of the two issues I have mentioned, namely the blocked assets and the private claims. When these two issues are resolved, which we expect to be fairly soon, then further steps can be taken.

Up to now, the trade has been essentially in private channels on the United States side and has proceeded more rapidly than anybody projected two or three years ago.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you see the liaison office as something, as far as you can go, in terms of permanent representation, short of diplomatic relations, or do you see something further down the road?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no further steps in mind. This is as far as we can go for the moment.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did you have a chance to discuss with the Chinese leaders the possibility of mutual restraints in sending military equipment to Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: Our view on the question of military equipment to Indochina is clear and we have made clear to all the countries with which we have talked the importance of tranquility in Indochina to the peace of the world, and Indochina was one of the subjects that was discussed in Peking.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell us something of the nature and the detail of your discussions with Chairman Mao?

DR. KISSINGER: I am debating whether to spend ten minutes saying "No," or just to say "No." (Laughter)

I will say two general things. One, I obviously cannot go into the details of the discussion. The atmosphere was cordial. Chairman Mao was in apparently good health and spoke with great animation for about two hours, and extended a personal message to the President, as the Chinese announcement made clear.

Q Dr. Kissinger, was there any discussion of a visit here by Chou En-lai or any other senior Chinese representatives in the future?

DR. KISSINGER: There was no discussion of this.

Q Were there any secret agreements made in view of the fact you are not discussing the Mao conversations?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the essential nature of what was discussed is contained in the communique and in my explanations. There were no secret agreements.

MORE

Q Was there a discussion of Prince Sihanouk and peace in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not want to go into any of the details, but the Indochina situation was discussed.

Q How do you assess the possibility of some kind of mutual arrangements with the Chinese to cut off the flow of arms into Indochina?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem isn't whether any formal arrangements can be made or should be made. The problem is whether the major countries now recognize that the agreement in Vietnam gives everybody an opportunity to return that area for the first time in a generation to a period of tranquility and to permit the peoples of Indochina an opportunity to work out their own fate without force and without outside pressure. And, if this is understood by all the major countries, then they can draw their own conclusions and act on the basis of their own considerations, rather than to attempt to codify this in a formal agreement.

Q To follow that up, do you think that the Chinese do, then, understand this as we do?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on the Chinese intentions, but I have the impression that the participants in this conference next week all have to recognize an obligation to make whatever contribution they can to peace in Indochina.

Q Could you give us an idea of the amounts of the private claims and the blocked assets?

DR. KISSINGER: The private claims are in the neighborhood of $250 million. The blocked assets are in the neighborhood of $78 million. But this may vary slightly because we are not sure we know either all the claims or all the blocked assets. But it is roughly correct.

Q In your conversations in Peking, did you exchange views on other parts of the world?

DR. KISSINGER: There was a general review of the world situation.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could we go on to the Hanoi matter?

DR. KISSINGER: I will take two more questions on China and we will go on to Hanoi.

Q Did the Chinese, at the working level, indicate any specific interest in either what they wanted to buy from the United States or what they thought they could sell to the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: I would be the most unlikely subject for such a conversation, because I couldn't respond in any intelligible way. But we will set up procedures for them to express such an interest to more qualified personnel.

MORE

Q Dr. Kissinger, why was the communique release delayed this long if it was worked out when you were in Peking? Why was it delayed until now?

DR. KISSINGER: To enable me to get back to the United States, to give us an opportunity to inform some other countries, and to proceed in an orderly, diplomatic manner.

Q Can we clear up whether the people in the liaison office will have diplomatic privileges or not?

DR. KISSINGER: The people in the liaison office will have diplomatic privileges and will have opportunity to communicate with their own governments by code.

Q Will the Chinese be allowed freedom of movement in the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: All of this will be worked out.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on the Hanoi communique, were any specific aid figures discussed with the North Vietnamese?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make a general comment about the visit to North Vietnam.

A great deal of the comment that I have seen since my return, and also while I was traveling, concerned the Economic Commission and the economic aid that is under discussion. Now, let me try to put this into perspective. Ron has already covered the details of the communique in his briefing. I can add very little to that.

The basic purpose of my visit to Hanoi was not to work out an economic aid program. The basic purpose of my visit to Hanoi was to establish contact with the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in order to see whether it would be possible to establish with it in Indochina something like the relationship that we have managed to establish with the People's Republic of China in Asia in general.

You have to consider that the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have spent almost all of their lives either in prison or conducting guerrilla wars or conducting international wars. At no time in their lives have they had an opportunity to participate in a normal, diplomatic relationship with other countries, or to concentrate on the peaceful evolution of their country and of their region.

Now, for whatever reason, they have indicated some interest in at least exploring the possibility of a more constructive relationship and of a more peaceful evolution. The greater part of my time in Hanoi was spent on discussing the implementation of the agreement, what forms normalization of relations might take.

You should look at the economic aid program not in terms of a handout, and not in terms of a program even of reconstruction alone, but as an attempt to enable the leaders of North Vietnam to work together with other countries, and particularly with Western countries, in a more constructive relationship, and to provide in this manner an incentive toward a more peaceful evolution.

MORE

The Economic Commission will be the first opportunity that the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have had to discuss something other than armistices or military arrangements with responsible Americans and therefore, the visit was part of an attempt to move from hostility toward normalization and we are asking for support for the idea of such a program, not on economic grounds and not even on humanitarian grounds primarily, but on the ground of attempting to build peace in Indochina and therefore to contribute to peace in the world.

Now, that means that the precise figures were not the principal issue at this particular moment.

Are there any other questions?

Q Doctor, in relation with Japan, two points: One point is what do you understand about Japan in context with America or China or Southeast Asia? This is one point.

The second point is what was the main subject of your discussion with the Japanese leaders?

DR. KISSINGER: Now, first of all, we have always believed that the friendship with Japan is an intregal part of our foreign policy. We are convinced that we can normalize our relations with the People's Republic of China without in any way impairing the close relationship that exists between the United States and Japan, and I might add, that we were under no pressure whatever from the People's Republic of China to loosen our friendly ties with Japan.

Secondly, with respect to Japan's role in Southeast Asia, I read with interest and occasionally astonishment, the speculations in the Japanese press about the complicated motivation that may agitate us.

As far as the United States is concerned, we welcome a responsible role by Japan in Southeast Asia. We have no objection whatever to any Japanese assistance program to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or to any other country of Indochina. Indeed, we believe that this would be a natural exercise of Japan's sense of responsibility for stability in Asia.

In no way do we consider ourselves competitors with Japan for the privilege of extending economic aid to any country of Southeast Asia.

What did I discuss with the leaders of Japan? Three days after leaving Tokyo there can be almost nothing left to reveal that is not already in the Japanese press. (Laughter). I will only say that we briefed our Japanese allies in some detail about the discussions that I had had in the various capitals, and we had very useful and very fruitful talks.

Q Do the Japanese have a more open press policy than the United States?

MORE

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to make any comparison, but they have a very open press policy. (Laughter)

Q - Why wasn't Japan invited to participate in the International Guaranteeing Conference?

DR. KISSINGER: Participants in the International Guaranteeing Conference were selected by agreement among the parties that negotiated the agreement. We had no objection to the participation of Japan, but we could not achieve unanimity about its membership in the Conference.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I wonder if you could comment on the Middle East situation, particularly after the incident in Sinai and prior to the visit here of Ismail.

DR. KISSINGER: I have been concentrating so, in the last few weeks, on Asian affairs, that I want to confine this briefing to my trip.

Q What is the nature of the commitment to North Vietnam to provide some kind of reconstruction aid? Is there a very firm commitment? Are they aware they may get nothing?

DR. KISSINGER: They are aware of our constitutional processes, although they have little experience with our legislative machinery. But Economic Commission will study the problem, we will then make recommendations, and it is obvious that the fate of whatever recommendations we made depends on a decision by Congress, and we have made every effort to explain the nature of our constitutional system.

Q On that same point, was the aid commitment a condition of the cease-fire agreement? There has been a debate developing here on this point.

DR. KISSINGER: No, it was always understood that the United States would not pay anything in the nature of reparations. It was always understood that except for expressing a general willingness to participate, the nature of our participation would be determined after the signature of the agreement.

Q A two-part question. You have not mentioned your discussions in Hanoi concerning journalistic, cultural, scientific or additional exchanges. Will the Economic Commission have in any way a preliminary role comparable to the liaison office in Peking, and secondly, could you tell us anything about your discussions in Hanoi concerning Laos and Cambodia and the prospect you see for the general completion of a peace agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: First, with respect to whether the Economic Commission will be a general clearing house similar to the liaison office that was established with the People's Republic of China. Primarily the Economic Commission will be concerned with the issues that have been assigned to it; that is to say, to study the economic relationship including the reconstruction problem, but not confined to the reconstruction problem, and perhaps the exchange of technical experts relevant to that problem.

Second, we have established or further elaborated already existing means of contact between the Democratic Republic and the United States and those will be used for these other issues similar to the way the Paris channel was used between the People's Republic of China and the United States in the period prior to the establishment of the liaison office. So one would have to say that the process of normalization vis-a-vis Hanoi is at about the stage it was vis-a-vis Peking a year ago.

Now, with respect to Laos and Cambodia. The United States has always taken the position that Article 20(b) of the agreement provides for the withdrawal of foreign troops from both Laos and Cambodia, and indeed, no other interpretation of the article is possible. We, therefore, have strongly favored -- and we had extensive discussions on this trip -- a final agreement in Laos and a settlement in Cambodia.

There now has been an agreement in Laos which was negotiated not by us, but by the Prime Minister of the Royal Laotian Government, Souvanna Phouma. This agreement essentially contains the practical provisions of the 1962 agreement with respect to political power and reflects the best judgment of the Royal Laotian Government about a free political evolution in their country. It provides for a cease-fire and for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. This leaves only Cambodia still lacking a formal arrangement.

As I pointed out before, the situation in Cambodia is complicated by the fact that there are three or four different groups rather than one homogenous opposition group to the government that we recognize in Phnom Penh.

We had extensive discussions at all our stops about the problem and we will work on a settlement in Cambodia with energy. We maintain that all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Cambodia.

Q How big a factor is the possibility of aid to Hanoi in persuading them not to break the cease-fire agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: I would prefer not to put it on this basis. The big issue is not whether they will break the cease-fire agreement, because that obviously involves many consequences. The big problem is whether Indochina can be moved from a condition of guerrilla war or even open warfare to a condition in which the energies of the peoples of that region are concentrated on constructive purposes.

If that objective can be achieved, if that process can start for a period of three to five years, then any decision to resume the conflict by any of the parties will have to be taken in an environment of peace and against the experience of the population in tasks with which they have become almost totally unfamiliar.

So this is not a kind of ransom which we are paying for a specific undertaking to maintain the peace, because there are other reasons why the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should want to [illegible]

investment in a structure of peace and in turning people whose whole experience has been with conflict, with guerrilla war, with hostility toward the outside world, into pursuits with which they are essentially unfamiliar, and this is our interest in the program and why we are willing to explore a program of reconstruction for all of Indochina.

Q Did you see Prince Sihanouk?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END (AT 11:03 A.M. EST.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

COMMUNIQUE

UNITED STATES - PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from February 15 to February 19, 1973. He was accompanied by Herbert G. Klein, Alfred Le S. Jenkins, Richard T. Kennedy, John H. Holdridge, Winston Lord, Jonathan T. Howe, Richard Solomon, and Peter W. Rodman.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung received Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger members of his party held wide-ranging conversations with Premier Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, and other Chinese officials. Mr. Jenkins held parallel talks on technical subjects with Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Wen-chin. All these talks were conducted in an unconstrained atmosphere and were earnest, frank and constructive.

The two sides reviewed the development of relations between the two countries in the year that has passed since President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China and other issues of mutual concern. They reaffirmed the principles of the Joint Communique issued at Shanghai in February 1972 and their joint commitment to bring about a normalization of relations. They held that the progress that has been made during this period is beneficial to the people of their two countries.

The two sides agreed that the time was appropriate for accelerating the normalization of relations. To this end, they undertook to broaden their contacts in all fields. They agreed on a concrete program of expanding trade as well as scientific, cultural and other exchanges.

To facilitate this process and to improve communications, it was agreed that in the near future each side will establish a liaison office in the capital of the other. Details will be worked out through existing channels.

The two sides agreed that normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and in the world.

Dr. Kissinger and his party expressed their deep appreciation for the warm hospitality extended to them.

# # #

GENERAL

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1973

Text of Secretary of State Kissinger's Address Before U.N. General Assembly

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Sept 24—Following is the text of the speech delivered here today by Secretary of State Kissinger:

I come before you today—confirmed in office but two days ago—as probably the world's most junior foreign minister. That President Nixon should ask me as my first official act to speak here for the United States reaffirms the importance that my country attaches to the values and ideals of the United Nations.

It would be idle to deny that the American people, like many others, have sometimes been disappointed because this organization has not been more successful in translating the hopes for universal peace of its architects into concrete accomplishments.

But despite our disappointments, my country remains committed to the goal of a world community. We will continue to work in this parliament of man to make it a reality.

Two centuries ago the philosopher Kant predicted that perpetual peace would come eventually—either as the creation of man's moral aspirations or as the consequence of physical necessity. What seemed utopian then looms as tomorrow's reality; soon there will be no alternative. Our only choice is whether the world envisaged in the Charter will come about as the result of our vision or of a catastrophe invited by our shortsightedness.

The United States has made its choice. My country seeks true peace, not simply an armistice. We strive for a world in which the rule of law governs and fundamental human rights are the birthright of all. Beyond the bilateral diplomacy, the pragmatic agreements and dramatic steps of recent years, we envisages a comprehensive, institutionalized peace encompassing all nations, large and small—a peace which this organization is uniquely situated to foster and to anchor in the hearts of men.

This will be the spirit of American foreign policy.

This attitude will guide our work in this organization.

We start from a bedrock of solid progress. Many of the crises that haunted past General Assemblies have been put behind us. Agreement has been reached on Berlin; there is a cease-fire in the Middle East; the Vietnam war has been ended. The rigid confrontation that has dominated international life and weakened this organization for a quarter of a century as been softened.

The United States and the Soviet Union have perceived a commonality of interest in avoiding nuclear holocaust and in establishing a broad web of constructive relationships. Talks on strategic arms limitation have already produced historic accords aimed at slowing the arms race and insuring strategic stability; we have, today, resumed negotiations on this subject. The positive results we hope for will enhance the security of all mankind.

Two decades of estrangement between the United States and the People's Republic of China has given way to constructive dialogue and productive exchanges. President Nixon has met with the leaders of that nation; we have agreed to a historic communiqué that honestly sets forth both our differences and our common principles; and we have each opened a liaison office in the capital of the other.

Many other countries have seized the initiative and contributed—in substance and spirit—to the relaxation of tensions. The nations of Europe and North America are engaged in a conference to further security and cooperation. The two German states have taken their place in this Assembly. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have begun to move toward a welcome reconciliation. North and South Korea are at last engaged in a dialogue which we hope will lead to a new era of peace and security between them.

Yet these achievements, solid as they are, have only made less precarious the dangers and divisions inherited from the postwar era. We have ended many of the confrontations of the cold war; yet, even in this room, the vocabulary of suspicion persists. Relaxation of tensions is justified by some as merely a tactical interlude before renewed struggle. Others suspect the emergence of a two-power condominium. And as tension between the two original blocs has eased, a third grouping increasingly assumes the characteristics of a bloc of its own — the alignment of the nonaligned.

Between Old and New

So the world is uneasily suspended between old slogans and new realities, between a view of peace as but a pause in an unending struggle and a vision of peace as a promise of global cooperation.

In 1946 James Byrnes, the first Secretary of State to address this Assembly, spoke of how the United Nations could help break down habits of thinking in national isolation and move toward "universal understanding and tolerance among all peoples."

The United States will never be satisfied with a world of uneasy truces, of offsetting blocs, of accommodations of convenience. We know that power can enforce a resigned passivity, but only a sense of justice can enlist consensus. We strive for a peace whose stability rests not merely on a balance of forces but on shared aspirations. We are convinced that a structure which ignores humane values will prove cold and empty and unfulfilling to most of mankind.

The United States deeply believes:

¶That justice cannot be confined by national frontiers.

¶That truth is universal, and not the peculiar possession of a single people or group or ideology.

¶That compassion and humanity must ennoble all our endeavors.

New Step Forward Urged

In this spirit we ask this Assembly to move with us from détente among the big powers to cooperation among all nations, from coexistence to community.

Our journey must begin with the world as it is and with the issues now before us. The United States will spare no effort to ease tensions further and to move toward greater stability.

We shall continue, in the spirit of the Shanghai communiqué, our search for a new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

We shall work to promote positive trends elsewhere in Asia. The uncertain peace in Indochina must be strengthened; the world community cannot afford, or permit, a relapse into war in that region.

We shall continue to pursue vigorously the building of constructive relations with the Soviet Union.

We shall strive to promote conciliation in Europe. In the negotiations beginning next month we shall seek a reduction of the military forces that have faced each other for so long across that divided continent.

We shall give new vigor to our policy of partnership in the Western Hemisphere.

We shall honor our pledge to promote self-determination, economic development and human dignity across the continent of Africa.

We shall press on with strategic arms limitation talks. We consider them crucial for security and stability in this period.

We shall search for solutions to the worldwide problem of conventional weapons, which drain our resources and fuel the fires of local conflict.

Fundamental Principles

In all these efforts the United States will be guided by fundamental principles:

We have no desire for domination. We will oppose—as we have consistently opposed throughout this century—any nation that chooses this path. We have not been asked to participate in a condominium; we would reject such an appeal if it were made.

We will ever abandon our allies or our friends. The strengthening of our traditional ties is essential foundation for the development of new relationships with old adversaries.

We will work for peace through the United Nations as well as through bilateral relationships.

We recognize our special obligation, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to assist in the search for just solutions in those parts of the world now torn by strife such as the Middle East. While we cannot substitute for the efforts of those most directly involved, we are prepared to use our influence to generate a spirit of accommodation and to urge the parties toward practical progress.

But progress on the traditional agenda is not enough. The more we succeed in solving political problems the more other and perhaps deeper challenges emerge. As the world grows more stable we must confront the question of the ends of detente. As the threat of war recedes

PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 34

of the

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

11:34 A.M. EDT
OCTOBER 3, 1973
WEDNESDAY

In the Briefing Room
At the White House
Washington, D.C.

THE PRESIDENT: Won't you be seated, ladies and gentlemen. I guess I should say all those who can find seats.

Dr. Kissinger, as you know from an announcement that I understand got out about 30 minutes ago from Peking, will visit Peking on October 26 to 29. This is part of the continuing dialogue between the People's Republic of China and the United States which began with my visit to China last year.

The subjects that will be discussed include those that have been discussed on previous occasions, trade, for example, where, it is interesting to note, that the amount of bilateral trade between the two countries, which was approximately $6 million in 1971, will be an estimated $800 million in 1973. Scientific and cultural exchanges will be a major subject for discussion and, of course, other matters of mutual concern to the two nations.

In addition, Dr. Kissinger has been invited by the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Ohira, to stop in Japan on his visit to the Far East. He will do so. The timing of that visit, however, has not yet been agreed upon and will be announced as soon as we hear from the Japanese.

Incidentally, I learned that 12 to 15 members of the press will be invited, if they desire to go, to go on the trip with the Secretary of State, and if you would put in your applications at the State Department, in this instance, I think that they will be honored in the order in which they are received.

Now, I will be glad to take question on other subjects, since I understand Mr. Warren has been rather busy with his briefings lately.

MORE

OVER

PEKING ANNOUNCES KISSINGER TO VISIT PRC 26-29 OCT

Peking NCNA in English 1500 GMT 3 Oct 73 B

[Text] Peking, October 3, 1973 (HSINHUA)--

Announcement

It has been agreed upon through consultations that Dr Henry A. Kissinger, United States secretary of state and assistant to the U.S. President for national security affairs, will visit the People's Republic of China from October 26 through October 29, 1973.

NCNA CORRESPONDENT: USSR ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSAL 'BIG FRAUD'

Peking NCNA in English 0719 GMT 4 Oct 73 B

[Text] Peking, October 4, 1973 (HSINHUA Correspondent)--The Soviet delegation to the 28th session of the UN General Assembly recently put forward a draft resolution on so-called "reduction of the military budgets," requesting the "permanent members of the UN Security Council to reduce their military budgets by 10 percent in the next fiscal year as compared with 1973" and to "use a part of the funds thus saved for providing assistance to developing countries." The Soviet delegation sanctimoniously proposed that the draft resolution be included in the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly as an "important and urgent item." It alleged that the adoption of this proposal by the General Assembly would mean an "important practical step toward slowing down the arms race" and boasted that this is the deep concern of the Soviet Union for the developing countries and so on and so forth.

This draft resolution of the Soviet revisionists is nothing new. In the 10 years when Khrushchev was in power, the Soviet revisionists repeatedly put forward similar proposals on "disarmament." In 1958, the Soviet Union formally proposed at the 13th session of the UN General Assembly that the four powers, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and France, cut their military expenditures by 10-15 percent to provide "assistance" to the underdeveloped countries. In 1962, the Soviet Union and the United States put forward a "joint declaration on turning the funds saved from disarmament to peaceful purpose." At "the meeting for general disarmament and world peace" in July of the same year, Khrushchev called for the turning of 8-10 percent of the total military spending throughout the world to provide "assistance to the newly established national states." In 1964, at the meeting of the 18-nation disarmament committee held in Geneva, the Soviet Union dished up a memorandum proposing that "agreement (be reached) among nations on the reduction of military budgets by 10-15 percent." In fact, the trick of cutting military expenditure was not an invention of Khrushchev. Way back in 1899 at a peace conference in the Hague, the foreign minister of tsarist Russia put forward a proposal for keeping the status quo of armed forces and military budgets for a term of 5 years. Besides, since the 1950's, some old-line imperialist countries have repeatedly dished up various kinds of proposals on the reduction of military expenditure. The recent disarmament proposal of the Soviet revisionists is merely old wine in a new bottle, a repetition of the sham disarmament trick played by Khrushchev and the old tsars.