

Copy # 4 of 16 copies

ANGOLA WORKING
GROUP PAPER No. 84

REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA

3 NOV 1975

At a meeting of the Working Group on 30 October 1975, the following points were covered:

1. Military Briefing

a. President Mobutu is proceeding with plans to support with small units of his Forces Armees du Zaire (FAZ) an effort by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) to expel the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from Cabinda and to set up an independent Cabinda. (Subsequent to the meeting, a report was received to the effect that the FLEC attack would be postponed until 5 November to permit better preparation of the FLEC troops.)

b. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) troops are opposite Quinfangondo on the road from Caxito to Luanda and are also trying a flanking movement toward Catete.

c. A small unit of FAZ was defeated by the MPLA and forced back to Negage.

d. Mobutu has sent an additional FAZ unit (300 men) to Ambriz as a reserve force.

e. The FNLA/UNITA forces have captured Sa da Bandiera and Mocamedes.

f. On 1 November 1975 control of provincial capitals was divided among:

(1) MPLA (7)

- (a) Cabinda
- (b) Luanda
- (c) Salazar
- (d) Malanje
- (e) Henrique de Carvalho
- (f) Nova Redondo
- (g) Benguela

STAT

DOS, OSD, NSS Reviews Completed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

(2) UNITA (5)


- (a) Nova Lisboa
- (b) Silva Porto
- (c) Luso
- (d) Sa da Bandeira
- (e) Mocamedes (with FNLA)

(3) FNLA (3)

- (a) San Salvador do Congo
- (b) Carmona
- (c) Villa Serpa Pinto
- (d) Mocamedes (with UNITA)

2. Political Issues and Developments

a. The State representatives described an action memorandum to the Secretary of State recommending that the Consulate-General in Luanda be closed prior to 11 November 1975. The recommendation rests mainly on the Consul-General's reporting that the safety of American personnel in Luanda required such action.



25X1

b. In subsequent discussion, there emerged some sentiment in favor of trying to maintain the Consulate-General in Luanda--at least up to the very last moment before independence. In the brief interval remaining, it was suggested that State:

(1) Solicit the Consul-General's views as to how best maintain at least a skeleton presence in Luanda.

(2) Inquire as to the intentions of the Italians, Belgians, Germans, French and Brazilians as to their Consulates in Luanda and exert some influence as feasible.

(3) Examine ways of persuading the MPLA that it is not in their interest to harass American officials. Among points to be exploited

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY
2

SECRET
EYES ONLY

were the desire of MPLA for respectability, the need of the MPLA to demonstrate it can keep internal order, and the pending purchase by Angola of Boeing aircraft--which have been nearly completely paid for.



25X25X1

c. Following the receipt of the above information and in the light of the most recent information on the situation in Luanda, the Working Group is to prepare a recommendation on the issue insofar as it affects this current program.



25X25X1

e. The State representatives reported a Soviet demarche to Mobutu warning him against involvement in Angola. This demarche was apparently to the effect that the Soviets had information that the Government of Zaire is about to send troops into Angola "just as the problem of Angolans is being solved by the Angolans themselves". The Soviet note spoke of the "implications" of such an action and asked Mobutu not to "tarnish his image" as a progressive leader in the struggle against colonialism.

f. Mobutu's reaction has been to reject the Soviet demarche angrily as an unacceptable threat and to criticize the Soviets publicly. The net advantage in the exchange thus far appears to be with Mobutu.

g. The PRC is apparently disengaging from its support of the FNLA. It has removed the Chinese instructors with the FNLA--to Mobutu's displeasure.

SECRET
3
EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

h. There are signs of strain in the FNLA-UNITA alliance. The two groups do not get along well, and there is strong sentiment within each group against cooperation with the other.



25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

25X1

m. As to an invasion of Cabinda, the requirement to inform the 40 Committee in advance of any commitment of FAZ forces to Cabinda has been met by a memorandum of 25 October 1975 by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Chairman of the 40 Committee. The Working Group decided against recommending that steps be taken to dissuade Mobutu from this course.

SECRET
EYES ONLY
4

SECRET//NOFORN
EYES ONLY

25X1

25X1

3. Military

On FMS matters it was reported that DOD is close to approval to expend FY 1976 funds under the continuing resolution authority. State and DOD will coordinate a response to the Kinshasa Embassy comments on the message to them about a proposed FMS package. It may be possible to authorize some offshore procurement of armored personnel carriers in order to cut long lead times. It might also be possible to get a relatively few APC's from current production in the U.S.A. The matter of helicopters will be further explored.

4. Operational Issues and Developments

a. A draft paper for the 40 Committee was discussed. This paper requests funds for ammunition to replenish the 180-day reserve sent in our arms shipment which arrived in Zaire in September. The draft requested \$10,000,000 for costs of ammunition, transportation and airlift from Zaire to Angola, and of some additional weapons: 106mm recoilless rifles, 4.2 inch and 81mm mortars and armored cars--all of which have been extensively used in the fighting thus far.

b. The Working Group felt that this request was too low and that an option should be offered which would provide for greater ammunition stocks and for any likely escalation in arms deliveries by the Soviets.

Page Denied