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ANGOLA WORKING
GROUP PAPER #77

27 OCT 1975

REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA

At a meeting of the Working Group on 22 October 1975, the following points were covered:

1. Military Briefing

a. An FNLA attacking column of about 2,100 troops, including 900 Forces Armees du Zaire (FAZ) and 1,200 FNLA, is at Sassa Caria near Porto Quipiri preparing to attack Luanda. A UNITA column is working toward Benguela and Lobito. There are signs that the MPLA is worried about the security of Luanda, but they have in the last few months received large shipments of military materiel, including armored vehicles.

b. There are reports of several hundred Cuban military personnel in Angola. More intelligence is needed as to their precise numbers and military specialties, but there are reports putting the presence at as many as 1,200 to 1,900 newly-arrived Cubans in Angola proper, Cabinda, and across the border in the Congo. The introduction of Cuban troops may represent a new phase in the conflict. If Cuban combat units are introduced, military superiority may shift back in favor of the MPLA.

c. In the south, water and electricity services have been restored in Nova Lisboa, and the UNITA forces have made some advances toward Lobito and Benguela (to Quinjenje and just short of Norton de Matos -- see attached map).

d. There are now about 11,000 Portuguese troops left in Angola at Cabinda, Luanda, Dondo, Lobito and Mocamedes. The High Commissioner, Admiral Leonel Cardoso, and the Portuguese military commander, General Almendra,

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have declared to the American Consul General in Luanda their intention to destroy or evacuate the major items of Portuguese military equipment. The Luanda Consul General has reported, however, that the Portuguese are planning to leave twenty-five small ships and some "very old artillery pieces" behind.

(1) The Working Group noted favorably the Portuguese expression of intention to remove or destroy their equipment.

(2) The State representatives will follow up with requests to our missions in Lisbon and Luanda to continue to maintain pressure on the Portuguese on this issue, and specifically to try to get them to remove all ships and to render inoperative any artillery left behind.

2. Political

a. The State representatives distributed a draft paper discussing the issue of recognition and diplomatic representation in Angola after 11 November 1975.

b. If the MPLA claims to be the legal government of Angola and is recognized by the Communist and some "progressive" states, the FNLA and UNITA will be tempted to set up rival governments.

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c. The State representatives recommended that the United States Government avoid -- at least for the present -- encouraging the establishment of a separate FNLA-UNITA government. To do so might appear to bind us to recognize such a government, which we might prefer not to do.


d. One option to the United States would be to close its Consulate General in Luanda prior to 11 November 1975. This would avoid a situation in which the MPLA, in control of Luanda, could force us to leave if we did not accord them diplomatic recognition. On the other hand, the British, who closed their Consulate in July 1975, have shown indications that they now regard that action as overly hasty and would like to reopen.

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


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f. It was agreed to prepare the FNLA and UNITA leaders, as well as Presidents Mobutu and Kaunda, for the contingency in which the United States might try to maintain an official presence in Luanda after 11 November 1975.

g. The OAU Conciliation Committee has been touring Angola. The majority of the Committee has rejected the MPLA claim to control Angola [redacted]. The Algerian representative has been diligently promoting the MPLA cause. He has been supported by the Tanzanian and Moroccan delegates.

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
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k. It was agreed that the United States Government should try to influence African governments both against a hasty recognition and in favor of adopting an African consensus. Outside Africa the United States should quietly advocate caution about recognizing a minority political group which controls neither most of the people nor most of the territory.


l. The MPLA delegation to Washington, led by Saydi Mingas, was given an appointment at the Department of State at the level of the Deputy Director, AF/C, but they did not show up. They did keep appointments on Capital Hill.



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3. Military Aid

a. The U.S. Army training team sent to train the FAZ in the M-113 armored personnel carriers has not been fully utilized.



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b. As to ways of getting additional ~~APC's to Zaire~~ to make up for the losses of FAZ Panhard armored cars in Angola, it was agreed to explore two roads:

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(1) The early acquisition of APC's under the FMS program, which would require help from DOD/OASD/ISA to cut normal lead times. (This action could only follow approval of the continuing resolution authority.)

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(2) The purchase, perhaps offshore, for direct shipment to Zaire out of program funds, if these funds can be increased. (At present no funds are available, but a request will be sent to the 40 Committee.)

c. The advantages of the early shipment of at least some vehicles for purposes of training, impact, etc. were noted.

d. The first of the two Zairian C-130 aircraft being overhauled at Marietta, Georgia, has been flown to Zaire with an American crew paid for out of program funds.

e. The second aircraft is to be ready in early November 1975. The group felt that the normal inspections should be made, even if some might appear redundant. The Government of Zaire still owes Lockheed about \$150,000. State will follow up to be sure that the debt is paid in time to permit the aircraft to leave when ready.

f. The next move toward getting funds for the FY 1976 military assistance program to Zaire is for State/PM to try to get Congressional approval of the continuing resolution authority.

g. The State representatives requested an estimate as to how much the deployment of FAZ forces in Angola has cost Mobutu. A rough but conservative estimate of that cost is that Zaire is spending about U.S. \$400,000 more per month than if the troops were kept in Zaire (see attachment).

4. Oil

a. It was noted that Mobil Oil and foreign business interests in Zaire had combined forces to try to persuade South Africa to guarantee, to the tune of about \$30,000,000, the POL needs of Zaire over the next several months.

b. The South African Government did not want to extend the guarantee for political reasons. Zaire's collateral would be the future revenues from Gulf Oil Company's production soon to begin in Zaire and its diamond production. This might permit a guarantee by private banks in South Africa.

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c. Other difficulties have apparently arisen on the Mobil side, however, which State representatives will address.

d. A chief point is that Zaire is strapped for funds to buy oil now during a period before oil production within Zaire can be expected to offer relief.

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