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ANGOLA WORKING
GROUP PAPER #71

20 OCT 1975

NSA review completed

REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA

At a meeting of the Working Group on 15 October 1975, the following points were covered:

1. Military Briefing


a. The UNITA forces have contained an MPLA drive led by armored vehicles toward Nova Lisboa. They stopped the MPLA at Cuma and forced them back beyond Quingenge.

b. The FNLA forces have cleared the road between Caxito and Carmona and have advanced to Sassalemba within about twenty miles of Luanda. The MPLA can be expected to try to counterattack, perhaps employing the Cuban military forces arriving in Angola.

c. The Soviets are reported to have airlifted large stocks of fuel to the Henrique de Carvalho airbase which is under MPLA control.


d. The MPLA successfully interrupted the water supply and cut off the electric power to Nova Lisboa during the week ending 4 October 1975.

e. The MPLA has sent 400 troops from Luanda to reinforce its garrison in Cabinda. The MPLA is aware of the separatist tendencies of the Cabindans, including some Cabindans in the MPLA ranks. The Portuguese are expected to evacuate their forces from Cabinda very soon.



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DOS, OSD, JCS, NSS
reviews completed.




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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
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
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h. Mobutu continues to display a commitment to an FNLA and UNITA victory. On 16 October 1975 he responded to an urgent appeal from Savimbi and sent six more Panther armored cars to each front -- FNLA and UNITA.

i. Mobutu also continues preparations in support of an effort by Cabindan separatists to try to get control of Cabinda.



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2. The group considered two draft papers previously circulated as Working Group Papers Nos. 62 and 63:

- a. Portuguese Arms in Angola; Prevention of Turnover to MPLA - (Working Group Paper No. 63)

The State representatives alluded to diplomatic efforts underway with the Portuguese Foreign Minister and

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President with which other members of the Working Group have been unaware. Suggestions to protest in Lisbon some recent Portuguese actions favorable to the MPLA (Working Group Paper No. 58) have been carried out. The State members did not believe that efforts to enlist other European governments or political parties in a campaign would be effective in dissuading the Government of Portugal from giving power to, turning over to, or otherwise helping the MPLA in Angola. It was agreed that State would send instructions on this subject to the Consul General in Luanda/

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b. South Africa - (Working Group Paper No. 62)

The group felt that purchases in the United States for delivery of war materiel to FNLA and UNITA, if financed even indirectly by South Africa, would represent:

(1) An unacceptable political hazard as revelations on the subject would do great political damage to the FNLA and UNITA.

(2) A possible legal issue because of our present embargo on arms for South Africa (Although these arms would ostensibly be bought by UNITA, FNLA or Zaire for delivery in Zaire).

(3) A security weakness [redacted] as the chance of publicity from leaks in Washington would be increased.

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c. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - (Working Group Paper No. 62)

The Saudis have shown some interest -- probably stimulated by Roland Walter "Tiny" Rowland of Lonrho, Ltd. -- in extending financial support to Savimbi. We might crystallize any tendencies toward such support by telling the Saudis we would buy arms in the U.S.A. for the Angolans with any money the Saudis might provide. There were some reservations among some members of the Working Group against engaging with the Saudis in such an endeavor:

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(1) Introducing of the Arab factor would complicate Zaire's improving relations with Israel.

(2) Working with the Saudis is frustratingly slow.

Other members felt the issue should be put as an option to the 40 Committee.

3. It was agreed that a paper would be prepared for the 40 Committee which:

a. Described the escalation in the deliveries of Soviet arms and the arrival of foreign military technicians and Cuban combat troops to help the MPLA.


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4. Other Policy Issues

a. FMS

The DOD/JCS representative distributed a draft message to Kinshasa regarding the FMS package to be put together by the field. It was recommended that the priorities in paragraph 5. d. of the draft message be changed to place the need for vehicles for the mechanized battalion ahead of equipment for a signals battalion (in view of the large amount of communications gear in our sea shipment). The DOD/JCS representative will be the point of coordination for this draft message.

b. REDEYE

 the MPLA have employed light aircraft to observe and to bomb UNITA units. Efforts to knock down such aircraft with machine-gun fire have not been successful. The UNITA and FNLA forces have asked for a light, mobile anti-aircraft weapon effective in defending small combat units against low-flying air attack.

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c. We anticipate growing pressure for a weapon such as the REDEYE missile. The DOD/JCS representatives believe it would be wrong to put the REDEYE in Angola now because:

(1) It is clearly traceable to the United States Government. Very few other countries have the weapon. (The Department of State and National Security Council Staff representatives share this view of the political sensitivity of the weapon.)

(2) Machine guns of .30 and .50 caliber should be able to provide adequate defense against the propeller-driven aircraft which the MPLA now has.

[Redacted]

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e. C-47

It was agreed that in view of the difficulties Mobutu felt he would have in supporting C-47 aircraft in Zaire, the DOD/JCS representative would notify the USAF that they need no longer hold C-47 aircraft in Udorn for possible use in this program.

f. APC

In addition to Zaire being able to acquire armored personnel carriers under FMS to replace Panhards lost in Angola,

[Redacted]

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5. Operational Developments

a. The FNLA and UNITA delegations to the UNGA have wound up their initial lobbying effort there, but the expected arrival of an MPLA delegation may require some further FNLA/UNITA effort in response. A copy of the FNLA "White Paper" and other propaganda material was displayed.

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b. The FNLA staged an air attack with a light plane and explosives which damaged the antenna and transmitter facilities of Radio Luanda. The MPLA was able to restore service with some delay and loss of effectiveness by using other facilities and equipment.

c. The FNLA has also begun a leaflet campaign in Luanda. The UNITA are using Zambian radio facilities to broadcast its version of the news and to appeal to Angolans not to fight for alien Communist leaders, etc.



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e. Approaches have been made to persuade the Brazilians and the French Governments to provide military advisors. (The Government of Brazil later replied that the government at the highest level had decided it could not permit Brazilian participation -- that Brazil could not take any risk whatsoever regarding the possible discovery of Brazilian participation in the Angolan situation due to foreign policy considerations.

f. Efforts are underway to influence governments represented in the OAU Reconciliation Committee to oppose MPLA claims to control Angola. The State representatives agreed to discuss the subject with the Afro-American Labor Center leadership to see what they could do in lobbying with foreign governments on this issue.

g. Funds in the amount of about \$400,000,000 annually are paid by Gulf Oil for exploitation of its Cabindan oil fields into a New York bank to the credit of the Bank of Angola. The next payment is due in December 1975. The MPLA effectively controls the Bank of Angola and has access to this money. The group recommended that steps be taken to examine the feasibility of legal action by the FNLA or UNITA to block MPLA access to such funds in the United States. (This is a delicate issue in view of the possible effect of any such action on future oil concessions in Cabinda.)

h. The State representatives reported preparation of a paper to consider various options open to the United

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States Government in the face of a likely claim by the MPLA on 11 November 1975 to be the legal government of Angola. Such a claim would probably be recognized by the Communist countries and some African countries such as Algeria, Somalia, Guinea and Gabon. Our Consulate General is accredited to Portugal, and the MPLA might try to force it out of Luanda if the United States did not recognize the MPLA-controlled regime in Luanda.

i. Among the options to be considered would be removal of our Consulate General prior to 11 November 1975 so as to permit us to avoid the recognition issue. Withdrawal of the Consulate General would, of course,

[REDACTED]

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j. The FNLA and UNITA are now considering a joint declaration of their claim to be the successors to the Portuguese regime. They may try to set up a government in Nova Lisboa in response to an MPLA declaration in Luanda.

k. It was agreed that the current FNLA and UNITA military offensives are critical. It was also agreed that efforts should be made to encourage a conservative consensus within the OAU on the issue of the successor regime to the Portuguese in Angola.

l. Note was taken of the reports of the arrival of Cuban combat troops. It was agreed that we would try to arouse opposition abroad to this escalation through direct diplomatic contacts and by publicity to be generated through covert means.

[REDACTED]


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