

*Angola*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

June 12 1975

OSD, DOS Reviews Completed.

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
TO: The Secretary

~~THROUGH: [Redacted]~~

FROM: AF - Nathaniel Davis

Angola - Courses of Action

The paper at Tab 1 addresses specific courses of action that the United States might take if it were to decide actively to involve itself in the Angolan situation in order to assure an outcome favorable to its interests.



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I would be delinquent in my responsibility to you if I did not say that my colleagues in this Bureau and I believe that the benefits to us of embarking on [Redacted] military assistance actions outlined in these papers would be far from commensurate with the risks involved.

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Attachments

- Tab 1 - Angola - Courses of Action.
- Tab 2 - Angola.

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ANGOLA

COURSES OF ACTION

This paper addresses specific courses of action which might be undertaken in the event that the United States were to decide that its active involvement in the Angolan situation would assure an outcome favorable to its interests. For purposes of this paper, Cabinda is considered an integral part of Angola proper.

The actions outlined below relate to the two complementary scenarios now unfolding in and with relation to Angola:

-- The increasing momentum and expanding geography of violence, which offers temptations and opportunities for growing involvement by outside, especially communist, powers, and

-- the shifting balance of forces within Angola, i.e., the strengthening of elements hostile to our interests (MPLA).

Our principal objectives would be to:

-- prevent a takeover by the MPLA, and thereby limit the influence of its backers--particularly the USSR--in Angola; and

-- promote the ascendancy of elements friendly to us (FNLA and UNITA).

Two sets of actions are proposed:

-- The first--Diplomatic/Political [redacted] [redacted]--would seek to limit the involvement of communist powers, thereby reducing the

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inflow of arms to and political support for the MPLA. If successful, these measures would preserve the currently favorable position of the FNLA and UNITA vis-a-vis the MPLA.

-- The second set of actions--Military Assistance--would be invoked gradually if the first were not succeeding, or if the FNLA and UNITA were suffering serious military reverses and assistance were demonstrably needed to redress the balance.

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end of the range of diplomatic/political actions shades into the set of military actions, and would come into play if and as diplomatic initiatives were beginning to break down. Military assistance proposed in this paper does not include the direct involvement of U.S. armed forces.

I. Diplomatic/Political

These actions would be aimed at

-- reducing the flow of Soviet and other communist (e.g., Yugoslav) arms to the MPLA;

-- preventing an increase in (or if possible reducing) communist political support for MPLA (e.g., both bilaterally and in international fora);

-- encouraging Portugal to make greater efforts to reduce the fighting in Angola and to treat the liberation movements impartially;

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-- enlisting the assistance, and supporting the efforts, of concerned African and other states to seek a political solution to the Angolan conflict.

There would, of course, be trade-offs involved. With regard to Angola itself, we would presumably have to limit the extent to which we and friendly nations (Zaire, Zambia) provided assistance to and support for FNLA and UNITA. We might have to consider seeking, either directly or through an intermediary, e.g., Zaire, Tanzania, PRC agreement to limit its assistance to FNLA as well. (And we would have to deal with the fact of North Korean training support for Zairian forces, which may include some training for the Cabindan independence movement, FLEC.) To accomplish this, we should be prepared to compensate, politically or otherwise, Portugal for an expanded effort and Zaire, and perhaps Zambia, for limiting their support. On a broader scale, we should be prepared to deal with the possibility that the Soviet Union and the PRC would demand concessions in areas of greater importance to us, and to them, than Angola.



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Although all actions are in escalating order of precedence, two or more could obviously be in progress at any one time.

-- Seek agreement with Portugal on the desirability of containing the conflict and of its playing a stronger--but impartial--role, including the maintenance of its full troop strength (24,000) at least until but preferably beyond the scheduled February 1976 withdrawal date. The Portuguese would, of course, be difficult to convince.

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-- Support current efforts by Zaire to assure Portugal's neutrality towards the three liberation groups and to enlist its cooperation in limiting arms flow into Angola.

-- Together with selected NATO and EEC countries, encourage Portugal to press the USSR, and other communist and third world countries (e.g., Yugoslavia, Algeria), to reduce their support of MPLA.

-- Encourage interested Africans (e.g., Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Tunisia--all of whom are FNLA and/or UNITA supporters), either individually or through the OAU, to seek Soviet reduction of its support to MPLA.

-- Concurrently request these African states to step down their support of FNLA and/or UNITA in proportion to proven reduction of support to MPLA.

-- Urge Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania and other directly interested African states to take the lead in developing an OAU consensus to seek to end foreign arms aid to the Angolan liberation movements, including by seeking to persuade Congo (Brazzaville) to cease being a transshipment point for Soviet arms.

-- Directly but privately request the USSR to reduce its support to MPLA, noting Zaire's consideration of reducing its support of FNLA and possibly offering to seek reduction of PRC support of FNLA concurrently and proportionately.

-- By public statements and speeches, background statements to news media, and other means, publicize our concern over the potentially disruptive international effects of foreign interference in Angola.

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-- Encourage public expressions of concern to the same effect by Congressional and other opinion leaders.

-- Publicly call on the USSR to assist in international efforts to restore peace in Angola.

-- Support or promote an African (and possibly Portuguese) initiative to request the UN Secretary General to call on all involved parties to refrain from actions endangering international peace and security.

-- Support or promote a UN Security Council call for a cease-fire and an embargo on arms shipments to Angola.

-- Support or promote an African (and possibly Portuguese) initiative for UN cease-fire observer teams and a small (3-5 man) peacekeeping mission to seek ways to reach peaceful accommodation.

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## II. Military Assistance

These actions range up to but do not include direct involvement by U.S. forces. The types and amounts of assistance provided would be intended to enable FNLA and UNITA each to hold their own against a major MPLA challenge.

-- Provide, or facilitate the provision of (e.g., through Zaire and Zambia), equipment and supplies (uniforms, transportation, food) to FNLA and UNITA.

-- Provide, or facilitate the provision of, arms and ammunition to FNLA and UNITA as necessary to make their armament comparable to MPLA's (e.g., bazookas, mortars, recoilless rifles, etc.).

-- Provide or facilitate the provision to FNLA and UNITA of heavier equipment than that in use by the MPLA (e.g., sophisticated infantry weapons, heavy mortars, light artillery, armored personnel carriers).

-- Provide a small team of qualified U.S. personnel to study and analyze, in cooperation with Roberto and Savimbi, other FNLA and UNITA military requirements, and to determine ways in which to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. military assistance.

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