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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: The Secretary
 Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
 Mr. Sisco
 Ambassador Davis
 Ambassador Vance
 Mr. Cutler, Country Director for Congalese Affairs
 WJ
 erry Bremer, Notetaker

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The Secretary:(Laughingly) Davis is just trying to build his record here on this.

Davis: No, I'm trying to affect your mind.

The Secretary: I find it interesting that the African Bureau which six months ago opposed [redacted] Roberto because he had minimum influence, now opposes it because the game is over and then if anyone would win, it would be Roberto.

25X1

Davis: I think it is now a fair analysis that it is over.

The Secretary: But during the past year, I asked repeatedly for an analysis of the situation, but AF said that no one would win so we should not be involved. Then they said if anyone would win, Roberto would.

You should realize that I will be facing everything you'll face ten times worse. Everyone else is covered. But it's hard to understand such a change of view. It is the same group which sabotaged my requests for answers by giving no answers or my requests for papers by sending me non-papers. How can they now come to me with the argument that it's over -- leaving aside the question of judgment. You may be right or wrong, but a group of professionals owed it to their leadership to put flags -- warnings -- of danger. If we do anything, I'll be the one in the hot seat. I'm trying to teach the Foreign Service to be for the national interest, which is what I'll do while I'm Secretary of State.

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A reasonable, patriotic, moral man can come to these conclusions but I don't see how a professional group could come to that position over a period of six months. If I were in the Foreign Service I would be very disturbed by it. I can run the foreign policy of this place without the Foreign Service if necessary. I suffered from the illusion that I could get some toughness in this building. Can you name any papers that demonstrated this?

Cutler: It goes back to the division within the bureau.

The Secretary: I understand that, but AF could have sent me papers saying some people think this is going badly and others disagree. Instead AF took a religious view. You knew for four months what was necessary in the papers and what was needed. This is a question you should ask yourselves as professionals. I know the choices and have made my own judgment. I may be wrong and for that I am responsible; but I'm concerned about how this state of affairs came to pass.

If Angola goes Communist, it will have an effect in Angola, in Zaire, and in Zambia, etc. These countries can only conclude that the US is no longer a factor in Southern Africa. We will pay for it for decades. It will affect their orientation. They will conclude that if the Soviets can put in massive aid and we cannot, it will mean the Soviets are the power factor that they have to deal with. But I cannot see how professionals could not bring to the attention of their leaders that there was a problem. It pre-dates you Nat by many months but coupled with Indochina, it is not a trivial thing which is happening in Southern Africa. I know others disagree. Joes does, I know. I could be wrong but this is not a proud institution.

On Angola, we will be giving the paper to the President tomorrow. I am almost certain that he'll approve the six million. The State view will be given to him unchanged and not summarized and he will get your papers on top, too. He will get the State view and the individual views too. My judgment is that he'll go ahead. Then what shall we do? Have you talked to Simon?

Ingersoll: His boys are all apprised of it and he'll go along. Lynn will not.

The Secretary: Yes he will.

Ingersoll: He wants a Presidential decision on the political basis since

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he can't support it on an economic basis.

The Secretary: We'll do it. Do a paper and show it to Lynn so that he can't say that his views have been doctored.

[redacted] on the economic side I'm 100% sure. 25X1
Do that paper by Friday.

Vance: I think it's urgent that I get back out there. Quite apart from the event in Tanzania.

The Secretary: Nat, how do you explain that Carter had an American present at the giving of the ransom.

Davis: It was a mistake.

The Secretary: Why didn't we know? Why didn't he tell us?

Davis: That was a mistake too.

The Secretary: Why was he not called back?

Ingersoll: You said to bring him back when the kidnapped Americans were all released.

The Secretary: Did anyone in Washington know that an American was present?

Davis: No.

The Secretary: It's a disgrace. You tell Mobutu for me that this was totally unauthorized. It will not be repeated and there will be disciplinary steps taken. I don't know what, just yet.

Vance: Walter and I will wait until you have the decisions.

The Secretary: The economic decision will speak for itself. Have we got an answer [redacted] on Kaunda's views yet? 25X1

Sisco: No. (Secretary makes phone call)

[redacted] 25X1

Is Russian participation there known? How come they don't ever pay a price for it?

Davis: There is a very real double standard.

The Secretary: Should we accept that?

Davis: There are ways to get at that.

The Secretary: How?

Davis: If we take the choice of not doing something we can be very effective with that in the African community.

The Secretary: Where? Zaire? Zambia?

Davis: The OAU meeting is on the 28th.

The Secretary: But what specific countries will be impressed? Will Zaire be impressed by our non-participation?

Davis: No.

Vance: Quite the opposite.

The Secretary: What about Zambia?

Davis: Yes, I think so.

The Secretary: I doubt it. What about Nyrere?

Davis: Yes.

The Secretary: Being impressed, what conclusions do they draw?

Davis: The Africans should begin to realize that they are responsible for their own destiny.

The Secretary: Suppose they realize their destiny is with the Eastern Europeans and then use the Chinese to balance it off?

Davis: They've been surprisingly successful in the past decade.

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The Secretary: That was before the Soviets made one of them win.

Davis: The fallout from the Berbera exercise was pretty good.

The Secretary: Well, I'm not in favor of going into Somalia. What are your thoughts?

Vance: I don't think the Africans will denounce the Soviets.

The Secretary: Will they denounce us?

Vance: Yes, they're already doing it.

The Secretary: The radicals will certainly do it, but what will the impact be on the moderates?

Vance: It will help with Mobutu. I think the Africans are not too much alike other countries and they respect a degree of strength and success.

Davis: Then we'd better succeed. How do we define success?

Vance: I would define success as avoiding Neto domination of Angola. Probably that's the best that can be done.

Davis: That could even conceivably be done by some overt effort. For example, we could get the Portuguese to appeal on the UN.

The Secretary: The Portuguese will not put it in against the Russians in the UN. The objective result of Portuguese actions will be to help Neto. Who in Portugal will oppose Neto and support Roberto?

Davis: They want to support Roberto.

The Secretary: I don't see a basis in Portugal from which someone would give an order to help the opponent of Neto when Continhuo is a big supporter of Neto. Is there any evidence that any Portuguese leader supports anyone but Neto?

Davis: The High Commissioner on the spot.

The Secretary: But he's not going to the UN. If Antunes goes to the UN, what will he ask?

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Davis: The only utility would be to try for a reduction of arms imports. It would have a wide support in Africa.

The Secretary: It would probably hit us more than the other side.

Davis: That's why we have to decide whether to enter the arms race there.

The Secretary: The arms race has been won by Neto. If we stop now we'd seal the victory of Neto.

Davis: If we enter the competition in arms we must have a hope of success.

Sisco: If the Portuguese move to the UN it will be only after they have a clear indication that they read the forces there in favor of Neto and then they will work to keep everyone else out.

The Secretary: We should not read the Portuguese taking the issue to the UN as encouraging. Six months ago maybe we should have done it. I was not gung ho for getting action but for getting a strategy. Now it would only be a way to legitimize the outcome.

Vance: Even though Neto's forces won in Luanda, the fact that the Portuguese still are the government until November will help -- if Roberto and Savimbi are helped.

The Secretary: Six months ago, Neto was the weakest of the three. Someone had to help him. Six months ago your papers were sneaky about Neto. They pay off on victory and not on losing in moderation.

If the President approves it, we will use the six million set aside for a concrete program but we need to know from him how to spend it, and what concretely will happen. Six million is not necessarily the end. You should come back with his proposal and also his views on how he will do it with Kuanda. I think Kaunda has to get a bit involved in this too.

Sisco: In terms of the scenario that's exactly the way; if he can pull Kaunda in all the better.

The Secretary: My judgment of Kaunda is different from that of AF's. I think he wants Savimbi to win. Certainly he does not want Neto to win. He is very influenced by power considerations though it's done in a missionary way that fits his background. However, I think he is one of the

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more hopeful phenomena in Africa. So I believe Kaunda would like it to happen. He'll judge the chances of success.

How would Mobutu communicate with Kaunda?

Cutler: They'll see each other at the OAU.

The Secretary: When is that?

Cutler: On the 28th.

The Secretary: All right. Then you can go back out there, come back here, and then go back out.

[REDACTED] We need his ideas on how to proceed and fast. 25X1

Sisco: Get to see what he has in mind.

[REDACTED] 25X1

The Secretary: I think it's essential.

Vance: They're prepared to do it.

The Secretary: I'm strongly in favor.

Ingersoll: We will need congressional consultations on the aid part.

The Secretary: What is the meaning?

Ingersoll: You know, on the aid loan of \$20 million.

The Secretary: You can tell him about what we have done.

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