


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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE~~
(Outside System) MORI C05138076 Pgs 1-2

URGENT ACTION
December 14, 1970



DOS, NSS, reviews completed.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*
SUBJECT: Proposed Backchannel to Gerard Smith

Smith is having a private meeting with Semyonov on Tuesday, December 15. There is no indication what it will be about; it may possibly deal merely with procedural matters.

I gather that during the Leningrad trip, there was no opportunity for private talks and that consequently Semyonov and other Soviets did not pursue the intimations concerning tacit arrangements contained in SALT 508 and 510. (See my memorandum of December 11, Log 24275 at Tab B). It may therefore be possible that Semyonov will revert to this subject -- which so far has been touched on mostly by his subordinates -- to-morrow.

Since you had not acknowledged Smith's last backchannel to you (Tab C) in which he "voted" for a soft formula on FBS, you may wish this evening to send him the attached message very briefly explaining the rationale for his final, formal instructions and providing him with your guidance on the Soviet approaches concerning tacit arrangements. (I am assuming you agree with the views Wayne and I presented in Tab B).

RECOMMENDATION

That you urgently approve the attached backchannel to Smith and that it be sent by the Situation Room tonight, Monday, December 14.

Approve *HS* Disapprove _____

~~SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE~~

*sent 12/14
Send copy to
Hal Samford?*

SECRET/EYES ONLY

December 14, 1970

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FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

FOR: Ambassador Gerard Smith, SALT/Helsinki

You will have received the formulations regarding ABM-only and FBS that were decided on over the weekend. The basic consideration was to leave our position sufficiently flexible for the next round as well as for any approach the Soviets may elect to make during the recess. At the same time they could not of course be left in any doubt that their particular proposals were unacceptable. The formula on FBS contained in your 080 was of course taken into account.

I have read with interest the delegations' reports in SALT 508 and 510. We will want to give careful consideration to the significance of these approaches at an early stage after adjournment in terms of our intelligence regarding Soviet ICBM construction, the survivability study and other factors such as the situation in Moscow in this pre-Congress period. Best regards and bon voyage on your trip home.

SECRET/EYES ONLY