# 4-63

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7

SECRET/NODIS MORI C05138157 (Outside System)

Dos, NSS, reviews completed.

Dos, NSS, reviews completed.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

25X1

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Gerard Smith Message on Separate ABM Agreement

As you anticipated yesterday, Gerard Smith, while reaffirming his objection to formal limit on ABM only, does not want to reject the Soviet proposals flatly (Tab B). He claims that the President may want to direct a review of our policy, and that an "instant" rejection would be unnecessarily rough and might prevent us from learning more of the Soviet proposals. He notes that the Soviets have urged us to at least leave the door open.

Smith has sent in the draft of a presentation (Tab C) which is a reply to the Soviet proposal, in very general terms. However, he and Parsons want to defer making a reply, while Allison and Nitze want to go ahead tomorrow, Friday.

There are some problems with the specific language in the speech and it should be gone over fairly carefully. For example, it opens with the statement that "We will carefully consider the Soviet presentation ... " It closes with an implication that we might proceed to discuss ABM separately, if we had a better idea of what offensive limits would follow.

In order to keep your channel from becoming entangled with the normal Backstopping committee, I have told Farley in the Backstopping context that I feel (1) Smith, as Chairman, should have discretion to defer his speech on ABM, (2) that we will want to make some changes in the presentation, and (3) that it was quite clear from Smith's existing instructions in NSDM 90 that we had to reject the Soviet proposal.

Unless you want me to do something different, I will stick to this position.

Over the weekend Smith will send in his recommendation on dealing with forward based aircraft by means of a "formula." We thus are being maneuvered into the position of either appearing favorable to a separate ABM, or if that is rejected by Washington, of having to be forthcoming on FBA on the grounds that if we do not we face a total and complete stalemate. The "formula" question is on the Verification Panel agenda.

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This leaves the	reply to Smith to be dealt with. I would pro	pose
that you take the posi	tion that the timing of Smith's speeches is mainly	
his business and that	you support him as chief of the delegation. That you	our
previous message stil	ll stands, i.e., that we must oppose a separate AB	M
agreement. That you	agree we do not want to make an 'instant' rejection	m,
and should hear what	the Soviets have to say privately and publicly. On	
	FBA, NCA definitions, etc., he will hear from you	•
after the Verification	Panel.	
A message to this eff	ect to Smith is at Tab A.	
RECOMMENDATIONS	S	
1. That I take the po	sition in backstopping meetings, etc., outlined abo	ve.
Approve	Disapprove	
2. That you send the	attached reply to Smith (Tab A).	

WH:mm

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SECRET/EYES ONLY

TO: Gerard Smith, Chief, US Salt Delegation, Helsinki

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

REF: SALT Helsinki 068

I agree that "instant" rejection is not necessary and think the timing of your speecheis up to you. On the substance, however, we will have to reject a separate agreement on ABM only, though whatever you learn of their ideas without implying serious intent to accept them, would, of course, be helpful. I think your best position would be that we will study their presentation, but that you have instructions to negotiate only a combined offensive and defensive package, and do not expect any change in these instructions during Helsinki. I seriously doubt that between now and a December 18 adjournment, we could conduct any thoughtful reappraisal of our position. Hopefully we will be able to clear up some other problems at the Verification Panel meeting.

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SECRET/EYES ONLY

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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S E C R E T 031336Z DEC 70 VIA

FM AMBASSADOR SMITH, SALTZRELSINKI IMMEDIATE 653

TO DR. HENRY KISSINGER, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

#### DEAR HENRY:

MY PERSONAL OBJECTION TO FORMAL LIMIT ON ABMS, WHILE OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS REMAIN UNCHECKED, STANDS; AND I THINK WE SHOULD IN GENERAL TERMS CONTINUE TO STRESS INTERRELATION OF DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS BUT NOT FLATLY REJECT SOVIET PROPOSAL. (IN VIEW OF LARGE STAKES HERE, PRESIDENT MAY WANT TO DIRECT A REVIEW OF OUR POLICY AGAINST ABM ONLY ARRANGEMENT AND WOULD NOTE THAT US/USER POSITIONS APPEAR TO HAVE SWITCHED 180 DEGREES SINCE MCNAMARA/JOHNSON/KOSYGIN MEETING IN 1957.)

IN ANY EVENT, I THINK AN "INSTANT" REJECTION WOULD BE UNNECESSARILY ROUGH ON A PROPOSAL WHICH SOVIETS APPARENTLY TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY AND NIGHT PREVENT US FROM LEARNING MORE ABOUT SOVIET DETAILED IDEAS FOR LIMITING ABMS. ON THIS CORE, YESTERDAY SOVIET OFFICIALS TOLD GARTHOFF/WEILER THAT DECEMBER 5TH SOVIET PRESENTATION RE ASM PROPOSAL WOULD NOT GIVE NUMBERS AND OTHER SPECIFICS, BUT THEY WERE AVAILABLE IF SEMENOV BELIEVED WE WOULD "CONSIDER" THEIR ASM PROPOSAL. THEY STRONGLY URGED THAT WE NOT REJECT THE PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND.

ALSO, BEFORE WE "OPPOSE" SOVIET PROPOSAL, I RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF LEVERAGING IT INTO SOME KIND OF OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE TACIT LIMITATION WHILE WE CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS FOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ALONG LINES OF AUGUST 4 PROPOSAL. IN THIS CONNECTION, LATEST INTELLIGENCE RE SOVIET ICBM CONSTRUCTION SEEMS RELEVANT.

SMITH

NOTE: AMBASSADOR SMITH REQUESTS TIME OF DELIVERY TO DR. KISSINGER. PLEASE ADVISE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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■ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27 : LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE 00 CIAE 00 7046 W

O 031200Z DEC 70 FM USDEL SALT III TO SECSTATE WASHDO INNEDIATE 641

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT 475

EXD IS/ SALT

SUBJECT: DRAFT STATEMENT ON ABM

ATTACHED IS DRAFT TEXT OF A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO SOVIET ABM-ONLY PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 1, WHICH ALL DELEGATES BELIEVE SHOULD AT SOME TIME BE GIVEN. SMITH AND PARSONS DO NOT, REPEAT NOT, BELIEVE THE STATEMENT SHOULD BE MADE UNTIL SOVIET PRESENTATION OF THEIR ABM PROPOSAL HAS BEEN COMPLETED. NIZE AND ALLISON BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE MADE ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4. WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE

DRAFT STATEMENT BY AMEASSADOR SMITH

- 1. WE WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE SOVIET PRESENTATION OF ITS PROPOSAL FOR A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES SOLELY FOR LIMITATIONS ON ABM DEFENSE IN THE AREA OF OUR RESPECTIVE NCAS.
- 2. IN YOUR DECEMBER 1. STATEMENT YOU PRESENTED THE RATIONALE WHICH MOTIVATED THE SOVIET SIDE TO PROPOSE SUCH A LIMITED AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD CONSTRAIN ONLY ABM DEFENSES. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I GAVE YOU SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON SOME OF THE POINTS YOU RAISED.
- 3. ON DECEMBER 1 YOU CITED THE U.S. STATEMENT OF JUNE 19.
  IN OUR STATEMENT OF JUNE 19 WE WERE REFERRING TO YOUR
  STATEMENT OF JUNE 12 IN WHICH YOU SAID, "IN MY VIEW WE ARE
  ALL AGREED THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES DEPLOYMENT OF
  STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE ARMAMENTS CAN BE A DESTABILIZING FACTOR
  AND THEREBY CREATE THE PRECONDITIONS FOR INCREASING THE DANGER

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PAGE 02 SALT I 00475 01 OF 02 031304Z

OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR." OUR REMARKS ON ABM ON THAT DATE WERE NOT PRESENTED IN THE SAME CONTEXT IN WHICH YOU HAVE PROPOSED AND ABM ONLY AGREEMENT. READING FURTHER IN THE U.S. JUNE 19 STATEMENT, YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE U.S 'DELEGATION SAID "BOTH SIDES HAVE EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY FOR LINKAGE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT. CONSISTENT WITH THIS POSITION THE U.S. HAS FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER LIMITING ABM DEPLOYMENTS TO SYSTEMS DESIGNED FOR NCA DEFENSE. AGAINST STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE MISSILES IN THE CONTEXT OF APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS." OUR VIEWS ON THIS INTERRELATIONSHIP REMAIN UNCHANGED. YOUR USE OF A PART OF THE U.S. STATEMENT PRESENTS AN ERRONEOUS PICTURE OF THE U.S. POSITION.

- 4. THE U.S. SIDE POINTS OUT ALSO THAT THE U.S. ABM SYSTEM CURRENTLY BEING DEPLOYED IS IN DEFENSE OF OUR STRATEGIC RETALIATORY CAPABILITY. WE DO NOT VIEW THIS CIRCUMSTANCE AS ONE WHICH INCREASES THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. ON THE CONTRARY, THESE DEPLOYMENTS WERE NECLESITATED BY THE CONTINUING BUILDUP OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC FORCES WHICH POSE A THREAT TO THE U.S. RETALIATORY CAPABILITY AND HENCE OUR SECURITY. IS IT LOGICAL TO AGREE TO LIMIT THOSE SYSTEMS WHICH ENHANCE OUR DETERRENT CAPABILITY WHILE LEAVING UNLIMITED THOSE WHICH
  - ARE MORE COMPLEX THAN DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT PROVE TO BE SO IN THE CONTEXT OF A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT. IT IS TRUE THAT THE AGGREGATE OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES IS COMPOSED OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS. EACH HAS UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES WHICH CREATE DIFFERENT CONCERNS. THE COMPLEXITIES WITHIN AND AMONG THESE SYSTEMS, HOWEVER, MAY NOT BE MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH THAN THE COMPLEXITIES OF LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, I.G., ABM LAUNCHERS AND INTERCEPTORS, RADARS, AND NECESSARY COROLLARIES SUCH AS THOSE AGAINST UPGRADING SAM'S TO ABM'S. WE HAVE PRESENTED A PROPOSAL WHICH WE FEEL ADEQUATELY DEALS WITH THE COMPLEXITIES IN BOTH AREAS.
  - 6. YOU HAVE SUGGESTED IN YOUR DECEMBER 1 STATEMENT THAT AN

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
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PAGE 23 SALT I 00475 01 OF 02 031304Z

INDEPENDENT SOLUTION OF THE ABM QUESTION WOULD BE ADVISABLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MOVING THE TALKS FORWARD. THE U.S. DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THERE IS ADEQUATE BASIS FOR MOVING THE TALKS FORWARD IN A MANNER WHICH REFLECTS THE IMPORTANT INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THE U.S. PROPOSAL OF AUGUST 4 PRESENTS A COMPLETE AND COMESIVE PROPOSITION FOR MEANINGFUL STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS: WE HAVE PUT FORWARD A DEFINITE PROPOSAL WITH SPECIFIC PROVISIONS. YOUR SIDE HAS NOT BEEN EQUALLY FORTHCOMING. WE HAVE YET TO RECEIVE FROM THE SOVIET DELEGATION A COMPLETE PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMAMENTS.

7. OLR ILLUSTRATIVE ELEMENTS PRESENTED IN HELSINKI LAST YEAR, THE TWO APPROACHES PRESENTED EARLY DUNING THE VIENNA PHASE, AND OUR AUGUST 4 PROPOSAL ALL CONTAINED PROVISIONS ON BOTH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THE SOVIET BASIC PROVISIONS PRESENTED IN VIEWNA AND YOUR PRESENTATIONS IN-HELSINKI THIS YEAR--UP TO DECEMBER 1, 1970--ALL TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE LINK AND THE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF SALT THE U.S. POSITION ON THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMAMENTS HAS BEEN WELL KNOWN. I QUOTE THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE TIME OF SIGNING THE NPT ON JULY 1, 1968 WHEN HE ANNOUNCED THAT: "AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNTIED STATES TO ENTER IN THE NEAREST FUTURE INTO DISCUSSIONS ON THE LIMITATION AND THE REDUCTION OF BOTH OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS OF DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES." AT THE OPENING OF SALT ON NOVEMBER 17, 1969, I READ A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO THE EFFECT THAT "WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS LIMITATIONS ON ALL OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND TO BEACH AGREEMENTS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE." SHITH

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PAGE 61 SALT I 00475 62 OF 02 231308Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC INNEDIATE 642

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT 475

E XD IS/ SALT

SUBJECT: DRAFT STATEMENT ON ABM

8. STATEMENTS WHICH WERE MADE IN HELSINKI A YEAR AGO REFLECT THE SIMILARITY IN THINKING OF OUR TWO DELEGATIONS ON THE IMPORTANT MATTER OF INTER-RELATIONSHIPS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. YOU MA. MINISTER, ON NOVEMBER 20, 1969, STATED THAT "THE TWO TYPES OF WEAPONS WERE SO CLOSELY INTERRELATED THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER ONE OF THEM WITHOUT CONSIDERING ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE OTHER. INDEED, IN PRESENT CONDITIONS EVEN OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEARONS MAY TO A CERTAIN EXTENT BE REGARDED ALSO AS DEFENSIVE IN AS MUCH AS THEY SERVE TO DETER THE OTHER SIDE FROM ATTACKING. AND VICE VERSA." AND I, ON NOVEMBER 4, 1969, STATED THAT "OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES INVOLVE INTERACTION BETWEEN WEAPON SYSTEMS. IN RAISING FOR DISCUSSION INDIVIDUAL WEAPON SYSTEMS, WE DO NOT SUGGEST TKAT NEGOTIATIONS BE CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF ATTEMPTING TO READ SEPARATE AGREEMENTS ON INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS. ON THE CONTRARY, WE THINK IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN ANY MEANINGFUL ARRANGEMENT TO DEAL WITH A COMBINATION OF INTERRELATED OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES.

9. ON DECEMBER 1, 1970 YOUR SIDE STATED IN PREVIEWING YOUR ABM-ONLY PROPOSAL THAT:

"IN THIS WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION MUST, OF COURSE, IN NO WAY SLOW DOWN THE CONSIDERATION OF OTHER QUESTIONS WITHIN THE

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
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PAGE 02 SALT I 00475 02 OF 02 031308Z

SCOPE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS".

WE NOTE THE INPORTANCE OF THAT PREMISE.

10. THE U.S. SIDE HAS ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN ITS PROPOSAL OF AUGUST 4, 1975 THE ONLY COMPLETE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY EITHER SIDE DURING OUR YEAR-LONG NEGOTIATIONS. WE CONTINUE TO ANTICIPATE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL, AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION AND FOR PROGRESS, PUT FORWARD A COMPLETE PROPOSAL OR RESPOND TO THE US PROPOSAL.



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