

January 22, 1969

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: Walt Rostow

Henry:

Some such seven points as these could be stated on Saturday, since they do not, in themselves, settle certain issues of timing and sequence which may be the subject of debate within Washington and between Washington and Saigon. Nevertheless, there would be great advantage in some such Nixon-Lodge seven points:

-- First, because it would meet the general desire around the world that the new Administration say something positive on Saturday;

-- Second, as I have drafted these points over the telephone, the DMZ and Laos appear at the top and lay the basis for the doctrine and approach we discussed at lunch;

-- The points are so structured that they are consistent with the Kissinger article and would be regarded, therefore, as something contributed by the new Administration, even though, as we are both aware, the two-or three-track approach has long been common among all of us.

In short, I think it is possible to have, by Saturday, Nixon's Seven Points For a Peace Settlement even though, in fact, you are buying time for more homework and jamming the DMZ and Laos Accords in their face.

Attachment

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

(1/22/69)

We have now come to the critical phase in the search for peace. It is now the time to address the substantive issues.

As a first contribution to the earliest possible achievement of a stable peace in Southeast Asia, we propose the following seven principles.

First. The DMZ should be promptly and completely re-established as envisaged in the negotiations which led to the cessation of acts of force against the territory of North Vietnam. At the present time, the DMZ is not being fully respected as envisaged in those negotiations. Therefore, we propose that all military forces promptly withdraw from the demilitarized zone; that all military movements ^{in and} across the DMZ cease; and that all firing from within or across the DMZ should cease. It was earlier made clear that a failure to observe these provisions might interfere with the progress of substantive talks. Now that those talks have begun, we should, as first order business, re-establish the DMZ. This would be evidence to each other and to the world that we intend to honor the agreements into which we enter around this table and ^{it would} ~~toward~~ ^{even essential} constituting an important act of good faith.

Second. The Geneva Accords on Laos should be fully honored. ~~There are, as we all know, a variety of interpretations of the Geneva Accords of 1954. And governments have taken varying formal positions~~ with respect to the Geneva Accords of 1954. But there is no ambiguity ^{whatsoever} about the responsibility of various governments with respect to the Geneva

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Accords of 1962. The honoring of those Accords is, evidently, essential to peace in South Vietnam and in Southeast Asia as a whole. We propose, therefore, that we turn promptly to the re-establishment of the Geneva Accords of 1962.

Third. Mutual troop withdrawals. It is basic to the achievement of peace in Southeast Asia that the ^{military} forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam withdraw from South Vietnam as well as from Cambodia and Laos. This must include members of those forces who are now operating with the units of the Viet Cong. Since the presence of those forces beyond the borders of North Vietnam is the cause of the presence in South Vietnam of United States and other forces allied to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, we are prepared at the same time to discuss the implementation of the Manila Declaration of October 1966 as it bears on troop withdrawals. We believe it would be wise for us around this table promptly to prepare a schedule of troop withdrawals and their subsequent monitoring, looking to the total removal from South Vietnam and the two neighboring countries of forces that ought not to be there under the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

Fourth. Monitoring the agreements. It must be bluntly stated that the frontiers of Southeast Asia under the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 have been very inadequately monitored by the International Control Commission. This unfortunate result was not necessarily the fault of the three governments

which agreed to serve on the International Control Commission. The terms of the ICC arrangements did not permit the kind of effective monitoring of frontiers which stable peace in Southeast Asia requires. Too much blood has been spilled on all sides for us to repeat the errors of the past. We shall seek, therefore, effective means for monitoring the frontiers involved in a settlement of the Vietnam question. It is our hope that nations of Southeast Asia, including some nations which have not been directly or indirectly engaged in hostilities, will be prepared to play a part in assuring the stability of a settlement as it applies to the ~~prevention~~ ^{detected and reporting} of crossing of international frontiers with arms or men contrary to the provisions of the agreement.

Fifth. We would hope that men who can speak for those South Vietnamese who have been engaged in hostilities against the Government of the Republic of Vietnam would be prepared to meet with representatives of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam at the earliest possible time to achieve, in a spirit of reconciliation, an end of violence and a settlement of political differences on the basis of self-determination for all the people of South Vietnam and the rule of one-man, one-vote. This is evidently a matter for South Vietnamese to settle themselves and not an appropriate subject of negotiation around this table; but it is also clear that the earlier such an agreement can be reached by South Vietnamese the sooner stable peace in all its dimensions can be brought about.

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Sixth. We would hope that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would in the course of these negotiations be prepared to meet to discuss an amelioration of relations between the two parts of Vietnam looking towards unity when and if the people of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam express their wish to achieve that result. We would, of course, emphasize that this is not a matter for the Government of the United States, but for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Seventh. In the course of these negotiations the United States would be prepared to discuss with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam its hopes for rapid reconstruction of all of Southeast Asia from the ravages of war, including North Vietnam, and to receive the views of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on post-war reconstruction of the area and its future rapid development.

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