

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Politics and the Arts—September 21, 1974, 50 cents

Unpardonable Offense

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The Mazurka

Since the imposition of the OAS sanctions against Castro in 1964, nine countries have resumed full diplomatic relations with Cuba. Mexico and Canada never broke them. Venezuela, which brought the initial complaint leading to the attempted OAS quarantine of the Castro government a decade ago, is on the verge of restoring relations. So are Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and the Bahamas. Panama, acting on its own initiative, sent a full diplomatic mission to Havana two weeks ago. Costa Rica's President Daniel Oduber was quoted by Agence France Presse recently as having served notice through his foreign minister, Gonzalo Facio, that if the OAS were not convened soon to deal with the issue of rescinding the 10-year-old sanctions against Cuba, "the mazurka is going to start. One by one, every Latin American government will recognize the Cuban regime." Secretary of State Kissinger heard the music during the last meeting of inter-American foreign ministers in April and understood its import. A subtle and carefully muted choreography of diplomatic exchange has been underway between Washington and Havana through a variety of intermediaries.

Any day now the Commission on US-Latin American Relations, headed by former OAS ambassador and Xerox board chairman Sol Linowitz, will issue a call for restoration of relations between Washington and Havana. The commission's roster of members is studded with financial, academic and governmental establishmentarians such as Linowitz; Elliot L. Richardson; former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer, now of Sears, Roebuck; Father Hesburgh of Notre Dame; Lee Hills, chairman of Knight Newspapers; William D. Rogers of Arnold and Porter, a former deputy coordinator of the Alliance for Progress and newly designated Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

President Ford on August 28 said that "if Cuba changes its policy toward us and toward its Latin neighbors we, of course, would exercise the option... to change our policy. But before we made any such change, we would certainly act in concert with the other members of the Organization of American States." But to put it baldly, the OAS is now a runaway organization on the Cuban issue. The question is not whether it will vote to lift the sanctions but *when* and *how*.

The scenario that has been tentatively worked out among the inter-American ministers in consultation with Kissinger calls for the immediate appointment of a five-country council of inquiry that will examine whether the conditions that gave rise to the 1964 OAS sanctions still exist: Is Cuba still trying to export its revolution from the Sierra Maestra to the Andes through subversion and guerilla war? The answer is

licity that each country must follow its own road to development and Cuba has determinedly pursued its own since 1968 when it abandoned the course of revolutionary proselytizing in Latin America.

Today the top men around Castro are technocrats, not guerillas. Cuba's goal is to turn itself into a revolutionary showcase rather than a haven for sundry liberation movements scattered through the hemisphere. There is a brisk traffic in trade delegations, education ministers, health officials and diplomats between Havana and the various Latin American capitals.

Détente with Cuba has become the prevailing inter-American reality. It excludes, at present, only the United States and a handful of military oligarchies such as Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile.

Lawrence Stern

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Exporting Revolution

New revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency was deeply involved in creating the climate for the bloody Chilean military coup d'état just a year ago — at least to the tune of over eight million dollars and the CIA only knows in what other ways — have set in motion a brand new Washington credibility game. It is no longer a question whether the administration as a whole may be lying about its covert foreign policies, which would be nothing new in this town, but whether CIA Director William E. Colby is a more credible witness than Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his deputies — or vice versa.

Extraordinary as it may sound, it is Colby who admits that the CIA spent the eight million dollars to help bring about the coup in Chile (it had spent three million dollars in 1960 to prevent an earlier Marxist victory in the elections), while Kissinger and the State Department stubbornly deny any American involvement. For nearly a year now Colby and Kissinger have been disagreeing on this point in separate appearances before congressional committees. An honest difference of opinion? Nobody familiar with the Washington policymaking apparatus is likely to accept such an explanation.

Both Kissinger and Colby are members of the top-secret "40 Committee" of the National Security Council. This is the five-man supreme intelligence body in the US government (the State and Defense Departments and the office of the chairman of the joint chiefs

of staff are the other agencies represented on it) which, according to Colby's testimony, approved in June and September, 1970, the covert operations against the regime of the late President Salvador Allende Gossens. Top intelligence sources say that Chile was one of the most important operations, aside from Indochina and ongoing overhead satellite reconnaissance over the Soviet Union and China, handled by the "40 Committee." They say the US involvement may have been even greater than suggested in Colby's secret testimony last April 22. In some still unclear manner, Americans may have played a role in paramilitary operations against Allende before the coup.

Inasmuch as Kissinger all along has been chairing the "40 Committee" in his capacity of special assistant to the President for national security affairs, it is highly improbable that he did not know what he had authorized. Besides it would have been his responsibility to obtain former President Nixon's final clearance. Colby, on the other hand, can hardly be accused of inventing an immensely damaging claim that the CIA was secretly financing Allende's right-wing foes and sabotaging his government. What, then, is the truth?

The first decision by the "40 Committee" to authorize the expenditure of \$400,000 to help Allende's opponents in the election was taken at a meeting presided over by Kissinger on June 27, 1970. This much was admitted by the CIA in hearings before a Senate subcommittee last year. Kissinger and Richard Helms, then CIA director, favored this move although the State Department (William P. Rogers was Secretary of State at the time) tended to oppose it. According to *The Washington Post* Kissinger remarked at the meeting that "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." Although the State Department said last week Kissinger did not remember making such a comment, the record shows that on July 24, 1970 he ordered the preparation of a National Security Council study memorandum on Chile. Known as NSSM-97, the study outlined a series of options for the administration in the event of Allende's victory. One of them was clandestine support for his opponents to help them overthrow the regime, just as the CIA helped Brazilian military and civilian groups to oust President João Goulart in 1964. Escalating the US intervention beyond No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/09/08 : LOC-HAK R-110-5-25-0 ce. that study also recommended damaging the Chilean economy through an international credit and financial squeeze.

After Allende won a majority but not a plurality in the September 4, 1970 elections, Kissinger and the "40 Committee" refocused on Chile. He told a group of editors at a background briefing in Chicago on September 16 that "it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins there is a good chance that he will

establish over a period of years some sort of Communist government." He said that if Allende was elected by the Chilean Congress in the October run-off, "massive problems" would arise for the United States and "pro-US forces in Latin America," and that communism might spread to Argentina, Brazil and Peru. Kissinger's sentiments about Allende were thus fairly clear when the "40 Committee" convened on September 18, 1970 to authorize \$850,000 in funds and "bribes" to get the Chilean Congress to elect Jorge Alessandri, the runner-up.

According to Colby's testimony last April 22, as disclosed by Rep. Michael Harrington, the "40 Committee" approved five million dollars for "destabilization" efforts in Chile between 1971 and 1973 as soon as it became known that Allende was the new President. Colby reportedly testified that 2.5 million dollars more was cleared by the "40 Committee" for covert actions in 1973.

The coup against Allende came on September 11, 1973. Within less than a month, Kissinger and Colby began contradicting each other before congressional committees. Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session on October 9, and in answer to a direct question by Sen. Gale McGee as to whether "the CIA was deeply involved at this time," Kissinger said: "The CIA had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I only put in that qualification in case some madman appears down there who, without instructions, talked to somebody. I have absolutely no reason to suppose it." The rest of his reply was deleted in the sanitized transcript.

Two days later, on October 11, before an executive session of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee Colby, in effect, admitted a considerable degree of CIA involvement in Chilean politics. He said that "we have had various relationships over the years in Chile with various groups. In some cases this was approved by the National Security Council and it has meant some assistance to them." He acknowledged that the CIA had penetrated most of the Chilean political parties and, in a general way, conceded that covert operations existed. "The presumption under which we conduct that type of operation," he said, "is that it is a covert operation and that the United States hand is not to show."

But it was in his April 22 testimony before the House that Colby in an amazingly candid manner gave away the story of the eight million dollars. Presumably unaware of Colby's testimony, several State Department officials continued in testimony in ensuing months to deny CIA involvement. The CIA's new policy under Colby is to answer fairly fully, while volunteering nothing, whatever questions are raised by congressional committees responsible for overseeing the intelligence community. Colby's view is that it is up to

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these committees to inform or not, other members of Congress. Colby seems to be turning into the most candid CIA director in a quarter of a century. The disclosure of Colby's testimony by Harrington thus had something of a bombshell effect on Kissinger's State Department. Its spokesman said that "we stand by" the denials made by past and present State Department officials before congressional committees.

The continuing question, aside from the matter of Colby vs. Kissinger credibility, is what else the United States perpetrated in Chile. At least one highly informed official had this to say: "Colby's testimony is only the tip of the iceberg."

Tad Szulc

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Star-crossed Tristar

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation is counting on the L-1011 Tristar jumbo jet to save it from bankruptcy. The new commercial airliner, which carries 250 to 400 passengers and is Lockheed's answer to the Boeing 747, is a comfortable, beautiful airplane. Lockheed is trying to sell 180 of the jets, worth about \$20 million apiece, as part of a deal it made last spring with Textron, Inc., under which Textron would pay \$85 million in return for 45 percent of Lockheed's common stock, and some of its preferred stock. So far 142 planes have been sold, including the seven planes All Nippon Airways, the Japanese carrier, bought last week. Lockheed has until the end of December to sell the remaining 38 Tristars. It has prospects in England, the Middle East and in Southeast Asia (US carriers with Tristars in their fleets include Eastern, TWA, Delta and Pacific-Southwest). If Lockheed is successful in unloading the aircraft in time, the US government will be released from its guarantee of \$250 million in loans to the ailing Lockheed Corporation.

The Tristar may save taxpayers' money and keep Lockheed's head above water, but there is something else at stake that concerns me; namely, the question of whether the L-1011 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/09/08 : LOC-HAK R-110-5-25-01

engines leaked oil and lost pressure. Lockheed has asked Rolls Royce, Ltd. to look into the problem. Rolls has sent a man to Tokyo to try to talk All Nippon into thinking that there is no reason to ground the planes. Lockheed says that as part of a routine "continuing improvement program" about half the engines on the 83 Tristars in service have been modified.

Acrophobes I know won't fly in any new aircraft until it has been in service without mishap for a few years. They recall the three crashes of Boeing 727s when they were first introduced. Pilots, in that case, weren't sufficiently familiar with the descent characteristics of the 727, and as a result took planes down short of runways, with disastrous consequences. There has been one L-1011 crash so far, in the Florida Everglades. It was ascribed to pilot error.

All Nippon, as I know from painful personal experience, is not the only airline flying the Tristar that has encountered engine trouble. Two weeks ago on a flight to San Juan, an Eastern Airlines L-1011 had a similar mishap. The tail engine lost oil pressure and had to be shut off in the air. The plane was scheduled to depart San Juan on its way to Baltimore but was delayed because Eastern's technicians were having problems isolating the source of the oil leak and pressure loss. (I know now from talking to an Eastern official that what was wrong was a "clogged oil scavenge filter screen.") Half an hour after the scheduled takeoff Eastern's customer service representative announced that the problem hadn't been corrected and that the plane was going to be taxied out onto a runway so that the engines could be raced. Mechanics were hoping that that would give them a clue to the source of the malfunction. Some minutes later the agent came back to his microphone to announce that the mechanics still didn't know what was wrong, but the pilot had concluded that he would nevertheless take the plane and its 250 passengers aloft. However he would not fly all the way to Baltimore, only as far as Miami—two and a half hours from San Juan over water—and then the passengers would be transferred to another plane. The scene at the San Juan airport was reminiscent of *The High and the Mighty*. We were being asked to trust our lives to a defective aircraft and a pilot who thought he could make it to Florida, though perhaps not to Baltimore. Eastern had no other planes in San Juan to substitute.

reviews the Kalb brothers' book on Secretary of State Kissinger