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United States Senate

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SELECT COMMITTEE TO
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REVIEW STAFF

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 26, 1975

Mr. William E. Colby
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Colby:

On May 27 and June 2, the Senate Select Committee informed the Central Intelligence Agency of the Committee's plans for examining the field of foreign intelligence and the subject of covert action. In the area of the domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Select Committee intends to address a wide range of issues, including the domestic aspects of CIA's foreign operations. The Committee intends to approach the issues of the CIA's domestic activities with a broad perspective, realizing, as I am sure you agree, that the threats to United States security and the need to protect sources and methods of intelligence, as well as CIA installations and personnel, cross our national borders.

Basically, the subjects of investigation fall into the following five headings:

1. Counterintelligence activities at home and those counterintelligence activities abroad which involve American citizens, including activities undertaken pursuant to the Director's authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.
2. Foreign intelligence activities at home and those foreign intelligence activities abroad which involved American citizens.
3. The domestic operations of the CIA undertaken in support of activities abroad.

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4. Relationships between other organizations, public and private, and the CIA.
5. The use of CIA personnel, funds, or facilities for purposes unrelated to its intelligence missions.

Within these broad subjects of investigation, the Committee will examine "questionable activities" by the CIA. These activities are those where there exist, in the words of the agreed upon Outline for Inquiry Procedures, "specific allegations of Agency or Executive Branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred". The following categories are believed by the Committee to be among those in which questionable activities have taken place:

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In regard to each questionable activity chosen for study, the Select Committee will examine the nature of the activity and will attempt to evaluate the results. The Committee will also look at the CIA's authority to undertake the activity, the relationship between the activity and the CIA's missions, the internal mechanisms for initiation and review, and the external mechanisms for control of such activities.

Though the initial focus will be on the specific questionable activity, the Select Committee's inquiry is designed to reach fundamental issues which bear directly on the adequacy of the administrative organization and procedures of the CIA, and the legislation presently controlling the Agency. Among the major issues which the Committee will address are:

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1. What is the legal authority for CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States? What is the legal authority for CIA actions directed at U. S. citizens abroad? Should the authority be clarified or revised?
2. What limitations are placed on CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States by the Constitution and laws of the United States? What limitations are placed on CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities directed at U. S. citizens abroad by the Constitutions and laws of the United States? Should the limitations be clarified or revised?
3. What have been the purposes and aims of CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? How were these objectives set? Were they appropriate? Should they be modified?
4. What is the origin and purpose of the charge to the Director, Central Intelligence, to protect intelligence sources and methods? What actions have been taken pursuant to it? Were those actions appropriate? Should the charge be clarified or revised? Should the DCI be provided with additional authority in order to carry out the charge?
5. What is the origin and purpose of the prohibition on CIA in respect to police and law enforcement powers, and internal security functions? Has this prohibition interfered with the DCI's charge to protect intelligence sources and methods? To what extent has this prohibition interfered with other duties and missions of the CIA? Should the prohibition be clarified or revised?
6. What have been or are now the methods and techniques of intelligence gathering and counterintelligence operations used by the CIA in the United States or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? What is the legal authority

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for the use of each such technique? How was the use of each such technique authorized, reviewed, and controlled, internally and externally? What was the effectiveness of each such technique in achieving the missions of the CIA? Were any of these techniques used for any purpose other than one related to the CIA's lawful missions? Under what conditions and through what procedures should these methods and techniques be used in the future?

7. What kinds of files have been maintained on U. S. citizens and organizations? What information was retained and for what reasons? Under what conditions and through what procedures should such material be collected or retained?
8. What was the nature of the threats which triggered CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? What was the basis for the CIA's estimates of the threats?
9. How are the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the CIA within the U. S. or directed at U. S. citizens abroad organized and coordinated with other agencies of government? What have been the practices and procedures for liaison, exchange of information, joint operation and mutual support between the CIA and other governmental bodies? To what extent did CIA coordination and cooperation with other government agencies result in questionable activities by the CIA; to what extent did the failure to cooperate or coordinate activities result in questionable activities by the CIA? How did the cooperation or coordination of activities with other governmental agencies relate to the prohibition on the CIA's exercise of police and law enforcement powers or internal security functions? Should the procedures and practices involving other governmental agencies be clarified or revised?

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
10. Have governmental officials outside the CIA sought and obtained the CIA's assistance for political purposes or personal advantage? To what extent have private organizations or individuals enjoyed special treatment or influence because of their involvement with CIA activities or their knowledge of such activities? What measures have been or should be taken to ensure that the CIA is not misused in such ways?
11. What have been the procedures and mechanisms within the CIA for initiating, reviewing, reporting, and controlling CIA intelligence or counterintelligence activities within the U. S. or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? How might these procedures be improved? What are the procedures and mechanisms external to the CIA for oversight of the CIA's intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the U. S. or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? How might these mechanisms and procedures be improved?

The annexed notifications set forth requests for additional documents and the names of persons the Committee presently desires to interview. In some cases the occupant of a position is not known to the Committee and the Committee requests that the CIA provide the name of the individual. In any case, where the individual is no longer with the Agency, the Committee requests that the CIA provide the individual's last known address. Finally, the notifications indicate the names of the staff members who, in addition to the Committee's senior staff, will be working in these areas.

The Committee, in the course of the next few months, will undertake other subjects for investigation as its work proceeds and will notify you as appropriate.

We look forward to your cooperation in these matters.

Sincerely yours,


Frank Church
Chairman


John Tower
Vice Chairman

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ATTACHMENT I.

DOCUMENTS REQUESTED FOR STAFF REVIEW

This attachment lists files and other documentary materials which the Select Committee hereby requests be made available for staff review.

In the first instance, all of the specified material will be reviewed in unsanitized form by staff at CIA headquarters. The Committee will continue to select particular documents to be transmitted to the Committee's offices in Washington to be used in preparing for hearings and the Committee's report.

In order to expedite production of the requested materials we have indicated, where known to the Committee, offices within the CIA which would be appropriate starting points to search for the materials. This effort to expedite matters does not limit the CIA's responsibility to search for such materials throughout the Agency, using as appropriate, lists and indices of CIA projects and programs.

This request calls for "all files" of various programs or projects, and "all files" regarding particular incidents or entities. Requests for "all files" are intended by the Committee to include all subject, correspondence chronological

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and all other files or unfiled documentary materials in the office, or storage repositories, of the organizational unit which managed the program or project in question.

The requests also include all such files in the offices or storage repositories of the responsible Division Director, Office Director, and Directorate Deputy Director, in the DCI office, and in any other part of the Agency which had significant involvement or connection with the program.

Where the Committee requests "documents" or "documentary materials", those terms are defined as all correspondence, memoranda, notes, working papers, buck slips and routing slips, studies, reports, charts, films, tapes, and all other writings, printings, typings, or drafts, and copies or reproductions.

When files for a specific project or program are requested under the best known designation of that project or program, the request includes files of any earlier or later versions of that project. Thus, the request for

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Project MHCHAOS would also comprehend files for the antecedent [redacted] and [redacted] projects and for the subsequent

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[redacted]

When any files, portions thereof, or particular documentary materials are no longer available, the Committee

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requests that they be specified with an accompanying explanation of when and under what circumstances they were destroyed. If no information regarding their destruction is available, please specify the earliest time, and under what circumstances, CIA first became aware the items were missing.

We expect that staff representatives of the Committee and of CIA will expedite compliance with these requests, and indicate priorities for production through preliminary review of this notification and discussion of the files involved. It would also be helpful if CIA identifies those persons within each Directorate and Division or Office who are actually in charge of reviewing and assembling material, so that Committee staff can also discuss these requests with them and resolve rapidly any questions or difficulties which might arise.

We also expect that a good deal of this material will be readily available in view of the reviews already done by CIA in this area over the past two years. As soon as some portions of any requests are available for review, the Committee staff should be notified in order that they may begin their inspection while the remainder is being assembled.

- 4 -

Finally, it should be noted that this document request does not supersede any earlier requests for material in this area which are still outstanding. If CIA staff encounters overlap in responding to this and earlier requests, the Committee staff should be promptly notified.

FILES

The following files are requested. In order to expedite their location, the Committee has indicated offices which appear to be the best starting point for a search. This does not limit, nor supersede the general guideline that all files throughout the CIA relating to a project be procured. If projects herein identified are not CIA projects, but are identifiable as projects of other agencies with which CIA had some connection, the request is for all CIA files regarding such projects.

In the first instance, all of the specified material will be reviewed in unsanitized form by staff at CIA headquarters. The Committee will continue to select particular documents to be transmitted to the Committee's offices in Washington to be used in preparing for hearings and the Committee's report.

I. All files regarding the following projects, incidents or entities:

1.
- (b)(3) 2. SRPOINTER, HTLINGUAL, SRWESTPOINTER, and MKSOURDOUGH (SR and FE, CI and OS)
- (b)(3) 3. (including all files for and as well as any other files regarding the institution or operation of notional organizations by CIA or other organization for similar or related purposes [FE])
- (b)(1) 4. DESTRY (WE)
- (b)(3) 5. , and (WH)
6. MHCHAOS (CI, FE, FRD, OS) (b)(1)
7. (CI or OS) CFOPERS (b)(3)

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8. [Redacted]
9. [Redacted]

10. All files relating to CIA participation in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (CI)

11. [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

12. [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

13. [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

14. [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

15. All files, or other documents, including those prepared for the DCI or his assistants, regarding the New York Times article by Seymour Hersh of December 29, 1974.

16. [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

17. All files on International telephone link intercepts (FI/D, OC, TSD)

18. All Technical Services Division files regarding support of CONUS (domestic) intelligence operations by the Department of Defense

19. All files regarding the use of "false documentation" prepared or provided by CIA which involved its use for purposes other than identification, e.g., to discredit, harrass or otherwise affect adversely the person identified in the false documentation. This request covers such use of "false documentation" whether used by CIA or other agencies and whether such use was contemplated or authorized by CIA. The request does not include use of such documentation in foreign operations against non-U. S. citizens. (Cover Staff, TSD)

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20. All files regarding the testing of mind or behavior influencing drugs on unsuspecting subjects, and any records pertaining to the destruction of materials on the subject.

21. All indices regarding the testing of the effects of radiation, electric shock, harassment substances (1950-1975), as well as the testing of drugs on volunteers (1950-1975)

22. All TSD files regarding the [redacted] techniques of sabotage, surreptitious entry, electronic surveillance. (b)(3)

23. The following Office of Security projects or programs: (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
MERRIMAC [redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)
[redacted] BUTANE
SPYDER REDFACE I (and any subsequent REDFACE projects)
[redacted] CELOTEX I and CELOTEX II (b)(1)
MOCKINGBIRD [redacted] (b)(3)
TWO-FOLD

24. All files relating to the proposal, and subsequent efforts to modify or implement the program described as "PROJECT 1" in the Rockefeller Commission Report (p.137)

25. All files of the Security Research Staff Chief and all Chronological Files of the Security Research Staff (1967-1973)

26. Chronological files of Target analysis group, Special Activities Division (1967-1973)

(b)(3) 27. [redacted]

28. Chronological files Special Electronic Operations Branch and all files of the Chief of the Special Electronic Operations Branch, Special Programs Division, Office of Communications (1967-1973)

29. Chronological files, Chief of the Special Programs Division, Office of Communications (1967-1973)

30. [redacted] (OC) (b)(1)

31. [redacted] (OC) (b)(3)

32. [redacted] (OC) (b)(1)

33. ROSE (OC) (b)(1) (b)(3)

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- 34. Any additional files on any incidents of technical surveillance, technical penetration, surreptitious entry, breaking and entering, by the CIA directly or in cooperation with another organization, public or private.

Directorate for Intelligence

- 35. Domestic Contact Service file and Office of Legislative Counsel file on Spring 1972 meeting of Lee Freeman, Esq. and Vernon Sando, head of Chicago Office, DCS and any additional files on inquiry regarding such meeting by Senator Edward Kennedy
- 36. Domestic Contact Service file on collection of overseas telephone call slips [redacted] (b)(3)
- 37. DCS assessment of U.S. citizens suitability for assistance to or use by CIA

Office of General Counsel

(b)(3)

- 38. [redacted] and [redacted] (OGC, OF) 1960-1973. The request does not include documentation of particular financial transactions, actuarial studies or technical data on the investment program.

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Directorate for Science and Technology

(b)(3)

- 39. LONGSHAFT, [redacted]

- 40. [redacted]
- 41. [redacted]
- 42. [redacted]
- 43. [redacted]

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- 44. [redacted]
- 45. [redacted]
- 46. [redacted]
- 47. [redacted]

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II. All CIA files, including without limitation any 201, Office of Personnel, Office of Security or Executive Registry files, on the following individuals:

1.
2. (b)(3)
3. Robert Vesco
4. Juan Trippe (PanAm)
5. Harold Geneen (ITT)
6. Robert Peloquin (Intertel)
7. James O. Golden (formerly Intertel)
8. (b)(3)
9. John Roselli (or "John Ralston")
10. Santos Trafficante
11. Robert Merritt
12. G. Gordon Liddy
13. Howard Hunt
14. James McCord
15. Bernard Barker
16. Eugenio Martinez
17. Felipe De Diego
18.
19. Frank Fiorini (or Frank Sturgis) (b)(3)
20. (b)(3)
21. Max Gonzales
22. (b)(3)
23. Manuel Artime

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24. Daniel Ellsberg

25. Andrew St. George

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26. Jack Anderson (including without limitation Office of Security file or)

27. Justice William O. Douglas

28. Seymour Hersh

29. Neil Sheehan

30. Howard Hughes

31. Lee Pennington

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III.

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IV. All files regarding the following projects, incidents or entities discussed in the so-called "Family Jewels - 694 pages," the responses to Director Schlesinger's request for reports on questionable activities: [Page references in parentheses are to the pagination of the "694 pages" as received by the Select Committee from CIA.]

1. CIA contact of three persons involved with CIA field support group regarding the Watergate Special Prosecutor Task Force inquiry (p.52-53)
2. CIA payment of money to the Department of Justice (p.76)
3. Involvement of CIA through Identity 36 in labor organization internal dispute (Elder memorandum, p. 457 ff. Item 7)
4. Domestic Contact Service activity (deleted) (p.184, Item 11)
5. FBIS supply of translators to FBI for sensitive Washington Project (o.202)
6. Program which Carl Duckett wanted to "scrub down" before its inclusion in OTS response to DCI (p. 213)
7. TSD (OTS) program (deleted) (p. 215)
8. Projects or incidents involving TSD furnishing assistance, equipment or guidance to FBI (p.221 ff.)
9. Office of Research and Development microwave intercept test (b)(3)
[redacted] (p.238 ff. para. B)
10. Telephone intrusion study (p.238 ff. para. C)
11. Test of intercept system for [redacted] (b)(3)
[redacted] (b)(3)
12. Surveillance of Minneapolis and Kansas City (p. 256 ff. Item 6)
13. [redacted] (b)(3)

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14. [Redacted] (b)(3)

15. [Redacted] (b)(3)

16. [Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)
(b)(1)

17. [Redacted] (b)(3)

18. [Redacted] (b)(3)

19. [Redacted]

20. Provision of CIA funds to FBI (p.582) (b)(3)

21. [Redacted]

22. CIA furnishing of funds to defer the expenses of President Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia (pp 71-74)

23. CIA payment of funds to the Department of Justice (p.76)

24. [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

25. [Redacted]

26. [Redacted] (b)(3)

27. TSD provision of assistance to FBI (p.109-116)

28. Office of Security Special Support Operation (p.109-116)

29. Sensitive ORD Projects (p. 163-164)

[The above requests may involve some overlap among the items in the "Family Jewels" or between them and other elements of this request, which overlap the Committee is not now in a position to determine. Where that occurs, this overlap should simply be called to the attention of the Committee Staff.]

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IV. The following specific documents are also requested: (b)(3)

1. All documentation of the destruction of files on "49 personalities" which had been compiled by the Special Operations Group/CI

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All employee responses or memoranda of conversations with employees both from within and elsewhere in the CIA, and all other memoranda, notes, or other documents and materials used by in preparing any of the responses to DCI or used in preparing any related briefings of the DCI or his assistants.

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4. May 29, 1973 memorandum from Chief, Covert Intercept Branch, Division D, FI Staff to the Inspector General

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(b)(3)

5. All other responses by Division D to the request of Director Schlesinger for information on "questionable activities," including any "follow-up" responses to Director Schlesinger, Director Colby or the IG

All employee responses or memoranda of conversations with employees both from within Division D and elsewhere in CIA, and all other memoranda notes or other documents and materials used by Division D in preparing any of the responses to DCI or in preparing any related briefings of DCI or his assistants.

6. Western Hemisphere Division's list of Cuban refugee organizations in which CIA had interests (Page B-17, Tab 15 of CIA notebook on domestic activities prepared in response to Part IV of Committee March 12 document request.)

7. May 15, 1973 memorandum by Harry B. Fisher to DD M & S on "irregular activities."

8. All Inspector General memoranda to DCI regarding "questionable activities," "Family Jewels" or similar matters subsequent to the IG Report of May 21, 1973.

9.

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10. All correspondence, memoranda or other documents prepared within or received by CIA in connection with the 1965 order of President Johnson barring wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by federal personnel.
11. Appointment calendars of Richard Helms and Robert Cushman 1969-1973.
12. Reports by December 1971-January 1972 on meetings with Howard Hunt.

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II. CIA PERSONNEL TO BE INTERVIEWED OR DEPOSED

The following list indicates the CIA personnel the Committee has thus far decided to interview, or depose.* Where known, specific persons are identified. In all other cases, the position or program responsibility and pertinent years are provided so that CIA can identify the appropriate persons; if the person is no longer with the Agency, the Agency should provide the last known addresses.

A. Directorate of Operations

1. DDO AREA

William Nelson, Tom Karamessines, David Blee, Cord Meyer

Executive Assistant to DDO (1966-1972)

Director of Missions and Program Staff (inception - 1972)

2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFF

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Executive Assistant to CH/CI (1966-1972)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Special Operations Group:

. Richard Ober, Jason Horn

Deputy Chief (1967-1973)

Secretary to Chief and Deputy Chief

Branch Operations Officer

All "Case Officers"

* Individuals are listed under the office in which they worked during the period in question. Organizational entities are identified as they existed in those periods.

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CI Personnel handling Projects:

SRPOINTER
HTLINGUAL
SRWESTPOINTER
MKSOURDOUGH

3. OPERATIONS STAFF

Seymour Bolten

4. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STAFF

Chief and Deputy Chief/FI (1967-1973)

Division (of Staff) D:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Chief and Deputy Chief/D; Deputy for Plans and Policy/D (1967-1973)

5. CENTRAL COVER STAFF

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Chief and Deputy Chief (1965-1975)

Chief, [Redacted]

(b)(3)

6. COVERT ACTION STAFF

Chief and Deputy Chief (1965-1973)

7. FAR EAST DIVISION

Chief (1968)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Branch Chiefs and Project Officers for:

(a) [Redacted]

(b)(3)

if separate project officers);

(b) "PROJECT 1" as described by the Rockefeller Commission Report (p. 137);

(c) Mail opening involving Far East correspondence (1967-1973)

8. WESTERN EUROPE DIVISION

Officers involved in queries of stations on Robert Vesco and IOS matters and in communications to Swiss authorities regarding Vesco's detention

[Redacted]

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9. AFRICAN DIVISION

[Redacted]

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10. [Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted] John Shaffer, [Redacted] [Redacted]
Stanley Gaines, Robert T. Cassidy, [Redacted] Maurice Sovern,
John Markham, Lydia Kenney

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(b)(3)
(b)(3)

Chief (1964-1973)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Chief Commercial Management; Chief Commercial Operations
(1964-1971)

Base Chiefs [Redacted]

(1964-1973)

[Redacted]

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(b)(3), (3)

11. WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

William Broe, J. D. Esterline, Bruce Cheever,
Ted Shackley, Lawrence Sternfeld, Paul Holliwel

Chief and Deputy Chief/WH (1965-1973)

Chief, Cuban Operations (1965-1973)

Chief, Cuban Operations Group, Miami Operations Branch

Chief, Miami Station (JMWAVE) (1963 [Redacted])

[Redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

12. SOVIET BLOC DIVISION

[Redacted]

Project Officer and Branch Chief on SRPOINTER, HTLINGUAL

(b)(3)

13. TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION (now OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES, DDS&T)

Carl Duckett, John McMahon, Everett O'Neal, [Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Chief, Deputy Chief and Deputy Chief for Operations/TSD
(1965-1973)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

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TSD Officers in charge of training and in charge of technical assistance for:

(a) [Redacted] (b)(3)
(b) [Redacted] (1967-1973)

B. Directorate of Management and Services

1. OFFICE OF SECURITY

Charles Kane, [Redacted] Cecil Tighe,

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Project Officer in Office of Security and Project Officer at [Redacted] for PROJECT MERRIMAC: Office representatives involved in proposal of "PROJECT 1" referred to in the Rockefeller Commission Report (p. 137); Project Officer for PROJECT RESISTANCE.

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2. OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

Richard Scott, [Redacted]
[Redacted]
John Coffey, [Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

3. OFFICE OF FINANCE

Warren D. Magnuson, Thomas Yale

Director (1965-1975)

Director, Monetary Division (1965-1975)

Director, Proprietary Systems and Accounts Division (1965-1975)

C. Directorate of Intelligence

1. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Officers tasking other CIA offices for queries on Robert Vesco and IOS

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2. DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE

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[Redacted]

DCS Director;
Chief of New York Office, DCS (1967-1973)

D. Directorate of Science and Technology

Robert Chapman, Sayre Stevens, [Redacted], John McMahon

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E. DCI Area

1. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

John Warner
John K. Greaney

2. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

John Maury
George Carey

3. INSPECTOR GENERAL AND REVIEW STAFF

Donald Chamberlain, Scott Breckenridge, William Broe

4. OTHER

Seymour Bolten
John Clarke

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III.

The following staff members along with the senior staff of the Committee are presently working on this aspect of the Select Committee's inquiry:

Burton Wides
Michael Madigan
Elliot Maxwell
Howard Liebengood
Paul Wallach
Joseph diGenova
John Peterson

If other persons begin to work in this area, appropriate notification will take place.