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SSCI# 2014-1051



United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

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March 27, 2014

The Honorable John Brennan
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Director Brennan:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI” or “the Committee”) voted on March 13, 2014 to request responses from you to a number of questions related to the CIA’s search of the computer network at the CIA-leased facility where the Committee has been conducting its research for its Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

We are particularly interested in any search of the computers, hard drives, “shared drives,” and other parts of the computer system dedicated for use by the SSCI (hereafter “SSCI-dedicated computer system”).

As you know, Chairman Feinstein sent a similar list of twelve questions to you on January 23, 2014, following our meeting on January 15, but has not received a response. The full Committee now requests your prompt response to the following questions.

1. Who first suggested the search of the SSCI-dedicated computer system? Did you approve the search(es)? If not, who approved the action?
2. What was the specific purpose(s) of conducting such a search?
3. Did the CIA seek or receive legal guidance prior to the approval of the search, either from its own Office of General Counsel or from other parts of the U.S. Government? If so, did that legal guidance take into account the written understandings reached between the SSCI and CIA designed to protect the confidentiality of the Committee’s oversight activities—to include research and writing—on the SSCI-dedicated computer system?

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4. What was the legal basis for the search of the SSCI-dedicated computer system? Did the CIA seek and obtain prior legal authorization (e.g., a search warrant) to conduct the search(es)?
5. Was the search a one-time event, or were there multiple searches of the SSCI-dedicated computer system? Please specify for each search that was conducted: (1) the date and time that such search was initiated; (2) the physical location from which the search was conducted; (3) the parts of the computers, computer networks, drives, and SSCI-dedicated computer system that were searched; (4) the names and position titles of the individuals who conducted such search (please specify which of these individuals, if any, were government contractors); (5) the date and time that each search was terminated; and (6) the reason why such search was terminated.
6. What were the directions provided to the individuals who conducted the search(es) of the SSCI-dedicated computer system? How, specifically, were such searches conducted?
7. What materials on the SSCI-dedicated computer system were searched and reviewed by CIA personnel, CIA contractors, and, if applicable, any other federal government employees? Did such searches include internal communications between Committee staff or personal notes or other work-product of Committee staff? Was any process used to minimize the extent of the search of such sensitive "walled-off" materials?
8. Please explain how the search of the SSCI-dedicated computer system resulted in the discovery of material the "SSCI majority staff had accessed" on "the majority staff shared drive" as noted in your talking points from January 15, 2014. Was additional information obtained on the activities of staff at the facility? Has the CIA conducted any other electronic or other monitoring of the Committee majority or minority staff at the facility? If so, please describe the monitoring.
9. Has a CIA employee or contractor at any time physically entered the SSCI majority staff office space (which was secured by a combination lock) or the SSCI minority staff office space (which was secured by a door lock), where the Committee's network workstations, work-product, and other materials were located? If so, when did these entries occur and who entered the rooms? Were

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
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any hard copy documents in those rooms reviewed, searched, copied, or removed?


10. Did the CIA alter, copy, delete, or destroy any data from the SSCI-dedicated computer system? If so, what?
11. Does the CIA have in its possession any materials reviewed during any search of the SSCI-dedicated computer system? If so, who has custody of the records and materials?
12. Who, if anyone, outside of the CIA was aware of the possibility or plans to search the SSCI-dedicated computer system prior to the search occurring?
13. Who, if anyone, outside of the CIA, did the CIA consult or inform after the search(es) and before Chairman Feinstein's letter of January 23, 2014? Specifically, did CIA personnel inform the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the White House, or the President's Intelligence Advisory Board and its Intelligence Oversight Board, and if so, when?
14. What means did the CIA have for determining the location of the Panetta internal review documents other than by searching the SSCI-dedicated computer system? Please describe any such alternatives and whether any were considered or utilized in coordination with the search of the SSCI-dedicated computer system.

We appreciate your prompt answers to these important oversight questions.

Sincerely,



Dianne Feinstein
Chairman



Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman

cc: Members, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
The Honorable Jim Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
Ms. Kathryn Ruemmler, White House Counsel

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