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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Letter to Editor, NY Tribune, from Anatolyi Golitsyn re "New Lies for Old"

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Information Management Staff

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

2 November 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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The attached letter to the Editor of the New York Tribune from Golitsyn re "New Lies For Old" is approved by the DO for release.

John F. Pereira
C/IMS

Attachment
As Stated Above

cc: PRB

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! November 1984

A Letter to the Editor of the New York Tribune

Sirs:

Lev Navrozov, in his articles published in the August 23rd and October 1, 1984 issues of the New York Tribune, made a number of malicious attacks and insinuations against me and my recent book, "New Lies For Old." In his articles, he questions the historic evidence which I produced and also my access to the KGB and its secrets. He stated that this evidence constituted my personal inventions and fantasies. I wish to assure you and your readers that my knowledge about the Central Committee's and KGB's preparations for the adoption of the new long range policy and the active role of the KGB in it, was available to me because I had witnessed these preparations while I was both a student at the KGB Institute and a senior officer of Soviet Intelligence at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. During the period 1957 - 1959, the KGB Institute was directed, by the Central Committee, to prepare numerous studies regarding the use of intelligence and security assets for inclusion in the strategies against the West. These studies were made available to the Institute students and were discussed at the conferences of the Institute. At that time, I read the secret report of Shelepin regarding the new political tasks of the KGB. The KGB Institute played a major role in the re-assessment of Stalin's political practices and the shift to a Leninist approach. While at KGB Headquarters during 1959 and 1960, I personally witnessed the KGB reorganization, its political reorientation, its practical preparation for strategic disinformation and its active role in the realization of the new strategies. During this same period, overt political consultations between party leaders occurred as well as many secret consultations between KGB officials and security chiefs of the bloc countries. I personally witnessed the formation of the Disinformation Department and monitored its beginning.

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Given this evidence, the substance of my book is not groundless fantasy as intimated by Mr. Navrozov, but instead an expose and a realistic description of the Communist Strategic Disinformation Program in action. This program, which was launched in 1958, has seriously damaged Western interests and greatly benefitted our Communist adversaries. It has further generated a great deal of confusion regarding Communist developments in the minds of Western analysts and how to deal with them. It has created a crisis in the West which is being successfully exploited by the Communist strategists. Mr. Navrozov has misinformed your readers by stating that my book is Soviet agitprop, i.e., propaganda. My book is concerned with Communist strategies and strategic disinformation, and is definitely not about propaganda. The book demonstrates that the Communists are presently determined to win the political struggle with the West, utilizing their strategies and strategic disinformation and not through Communist propaganda. Their strategic disinformation program has helped them in the successful realization of some of the Communist strategies and has created a critical situation because the West, albeit unwittingly, has helped in the realization of the Communist strategies. For example, it was Communist strategic disinformation which in the 1960's was responsible for the unilateral United States reduction in arms which resulted in the Soviet military superiority and the decline of the U.S. from its military superiority position.

I would like to point out yet other gross inaccuracies made by Mr. Navrozov in his articles. He equates Stalin and Shelepin practices in the use of Communist priests, writers and scientists. However, the practices cannot be equated. Stalin, as it is well known, imprisoned, exiled or shot scientists, writers and priests who failed to do his bidding, as evidenced by the death sentences for twenty Jewish writers during the period 1948 - 1952.

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Shelepin, in contrast, resorted to an active use of scientists, writers and priests in the Strategic Disinformation Program. It is in this context that one should examine the activist role of the academician SAKHAROV or the writer TWARDOUSKIY. Such an examination would explain why the omnipotent KGB tolerated the activist role of SAKHAROV up until 1980 and his long and uninterrupted contacts with prominent Western correspondents in Moscow, and why the KGB overlooked the mailing of letters and manuscripts by SAKHAROV to persons in the United States since 1968 and again recently from his place of exile. What was the purpose of injecting the letters of SAKHAROV in the American debate on the arms race and what effect did they have on the debate? An effective examination of SAKHAROV's pronouncements can be made only in terms of the Soviet military strategy, the SALT negotiations and strategic disinformation. It may be that such an examination would reveal that his pronouncements were actually designed by the Communist strategists to influence American policies, the SALT negotiations and the arms race debate. One should also ask the question whether SAKHAROV's pronouncements contributed to the emergence of the nuclear freeze debate in the United States. SAKHAROV, in his 1968 treatise, predicted that there would be an attack against the U.S. militarism at the beginning of the 1980's. I can understand why SAKHAROV was correct. Such an attack on U.S. militarism was attempted in recent times in Western Europe.

Another example of Mr. Navrozov's complete disregard for the facts can be cited. In my book, "New Lies For Old," I described how the KGB, under Shelepin, drawing on its experience in successfully manipulating its controlled political opposition against the West, as in the well known operation "Trust", decided to again use the KGB controlled opposition in the framework of their long range strategy. Such KGB designs provide an opportunity to analyze the dissident movement in the U.S.S.R. as a new "Trust". Mr. Navrozov tries to defend the dissident movement, completely ignoring past experiences and the new KGB design .

to manipulate the political opposition. I find this kind of attitude in a dissident as rather strange. Further, his boastful references in his articles concerning Soviet defense spending and his denigration of my views on Soviet military efforts in the last twenty years can only be characterized as ridiculous. My response to all of his criticisms is that "he does not know what he is talking about." In the 1960's, I warned the proper authorities that the U.S.S.R. was going to try to achieve military superiority, and also warned about the dangers of detente and the provision of U.S. credit and technology to the Communist countries. My warnings were meaningful because they were given ahead of time. Mr. Navrozov's articles, however, are all meaningless since they were given postfactum when the United States had already made erroneous decisions which led to the loss of their military superiority.

Mr. Navrozov's attacks on Mr. Angleton, Mr. Hackett, Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Mr. Robert Moss, the British S.I.S., this author and many other experts on disinformation are not only irresponsible, but rather pretentious. I characterize this overall attack as grossly irresponsible because such persons as Messrs. Angleton, de Borchgrave and Moss have raised and brought concern for the Communist disinformation issue and its impact on the United States to the attention of the nation and to the Western world. I find Mr. Navrozov's assertion that my book is useful to the KGB, as most shocking and malicious. I am firmly convinced that my book is the only realistic and timely presentation which not only exposes the success of the Communist Strategic Disinformation Program, but also permits one to view the Communist strategies in a new light. Further, the exposure in the book creates serious obstacles for further Communist strategic successes. My book has caught the Communist strategists, the KGB and their secret helpers red handed in mid stream of their preparation for a new strategic offensive in Europe.

I would like to make a summation of my impressions regarding Mr. Navrozov's articles. First, I seriously doubt that he has an in-depth knowledge about the KGB, and whether he is at all qualified when he categorically dismisses the potential of the Bloc Intelligence System, and particularly, the Strategic Disinformation Program as it is directed against the West. These are not minor issues since they involve the survival of the United States. I believe that Mr. Navrozov has the duty to inform the public what his qualifications are that make him an authority on the KGB and on strategic disinformation. His articles contain so many inaccuracies and a complete disregard for factual reporting that it appears that he does not comprehend the high responsibility that accompanies reporting in the Western world. His style is reminiscent of that of a fanatical reporter of a Communist provincial newspaper during the Stalin years. His insinuations and assertions indicate that he, himself, is under the spell of "Communist Disinformation," and that he is utterly confused by it. I feel that it would be useless to argue the issues with Mr. Navrozov since he is obviously hopelessly confused and has closed his mind to reason. Based on this, it appears that Mr. Navrozov is not a solution, but a part of the problem.

I am, however, concerned about the confusion which his articles may have generated in your readers and thus, would like to share with them some of my views on the interaction between Communist strategies and strategic disinformation. In my opinion, if one understands the Communist strategies, one will have an opportunity to detect, to understand, and to analyze concrete strategic disinformation operations, and to see how they serve the strategies. Let me dwell for a few moments on these concrete strategies and try to explain them, not in academic terms as I did in my book, but in simple pragmatic terms. There cannot be strategic disinformation in general. One must first grasp the concrete strategy and then

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determine what specific disinformation activities serve and contribute to the success of the strategy. First, for example, there is the long range Communist policy for developing mature socialist societies and for achieving world domination. This policy includes the military strategy of achieving the Communist Bloc's military superiority through political-diplomatic negotiations with the United States and through the receipt of Western military technology by the U.S.S.R. in the first phase, and by China in the second phase. If one grasps this strategy, one can better understand how its ultimate success is served by the disinformation regarding the Sino-Soviet split. Second, another Communist strategy is its economic strategy whereby they strive to develop their economic-technical foundation so that it is superior to that of the West. This is to be accomplished with the help of Western technology and with Western credit. It does not require much wisdom to see that the success of the second strategy is well served by the "Rumanian Independence Disinformation" and again by the Sino-Soviet Split Disinformation.

Third, the European strategy is aimed at breaking up the NATO alliance and at the withdrawal of the United States forces from Europe through the German reunification and European security. Taking this strategy into account, one can realize how well it may be served by Ceasescu's Independence Disinformation, by Honneker's rapprochement with Western Germany and by the coming introduction of false liberalization and the use of controlled opposition in Eastern Europe and in the U.S.S.R.

Fourth, another Communist ^{strategy,} (third world strategy) is aimed at the elimination of Western influence in this area and the achievement of a United Front with the developing countries through the support of Wars of Liberation, by active diplomacy and by the use of a variety of tactics on the part of individual Communist states instead of one tactic of a Communist monolith. If one takes this strategy into account, one can see that the Sino-Soviet

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Spilt Disinformation, in fact the duality of actions, and particularly, the disinformation of Tito's independence, served this strategy quite well. The late Tito almost succeeded in taking these countries away from the West through the so-called "Non-Aligned Movement."

A few words regarding the solution of the problem are required. Since Communist Strategic Disinformation Operations are a product of the Communist strategists, i.e., man made, the clinical analysis of their technology should be man made as well. In my view, this is a major task for Western governments and their intelligence and counter-intelligence services. Without a solution of this task, one cannot expect either an understanding of Communist strategic disinformation in the West or a viable Western policy toward the Communist world.

The conduct of Communist strategic disinformation operations and the confusion it generates are great obstacles for the successful functioning of genuine political opposition in the Communist countries and abroad. I have come to the conclusion that unless the political opposition to the Communist regimes realizes the true essence of strategic disinformation and its connection with their strategies, they will make grave mistakes since they may be exploited skillfully by the Communist strategists and they, unwittingly, may even serve the Communist strategists in achieving their goals.