

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
Routing Slip

DCI  
MIA  
3/2/00

TO:	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI	X		
2	DDCI	X		
3	D/DCI/RM			
4	DD/NFA			
5	D/DCI/CT			
6	DD/A			
7	DD/O	X		
8	DD/S&T			
9	GC			
10	LC			
11	IG			
12	Compt			
13	D/PA			
14	D/EEO			
15	D/PPPM			
16	AO/DCI			
17	PB/NSC			
18	D/DCI/DDCI/ES	X		
19				
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SUSPENSE _____		Date _____		

Remarks:

Thomas B. Cormack

5/20/81

Executive Registry  
81-72142


19 May 1981

Dear Dan,

Here is a summary of CIA's role in the Iranian hostage crisis which I promised you last week. If the Vice President would like a further oral briefing, we would be glad to arrange it. (S)

I think this is important background for questions I will soon be raising with respect to resources and arrangements to rebuild and maintain the Agency's paramilitary capabilities which have been allowed to run down seriously, to the point where we can entirely lose significant capabilities. I am taking action on this with the resources at hand, but more will be needed. (S)


Yours,



William J. Casey

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USN (Ret.)  
Chief of Staff  
Office of the Vice President  
Room 272, Old EOB

Warning Notice—Intelligence  
Sources & Methods Involved



(b)(3)

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19 May 1981

Dear Dick,

In the long letter I wrote the President on 6 May about personnel changes and reorganization steps taken here, I said something regarding his being interested in hearing about how CIA [redacted] [redacted] George Bush asked for a briefing on this, and I am sending the enclosed account of the CIA role in the Iranian hostage affair to him. (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

The President's show of interest on what went on there, when I introduced [redacted] to him last Saturday, leads me to think that he too might want to read this account, so I am sending the enclosed to you. (S)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Also, I have launched a comprehensive effort here to identify, at an early stage, the danger of the kind of instability which proved so devastating in Iran and which so worries us in the few other countries which have a great deal of political significance. (S)

As part of this, I have called for a retrospective evaluation on how these factors of instability lost Iran and what might have been done about it at various stages. To do this well, we need access to work done last year on US-Iranian relations from 1941 through 1979. CIA contributed only on the intelligence side; the compilation and analysis was done at State. The results exist in only two copies, one in Secretary Haig's office and one at the NSC Staff. State currently is struggling with FOIA requests for the documents, but they have not been released within the US Government. The documents in question have no title but can be referred to as "all the summary papers on the US-Iran relationship since 1941." To enhance our own understanding, I would like to gain access to one set of those papers either from your shop or State, and I am asking you first. I hope you will either provide a set for us or give me guidance as to the best way to get them. (S)

Yours,

William J. Casey

Enclosure

The Honorable Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House


[redacted]

(b)(3)

CIA'S IRAN TASK FORCE  
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

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
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~~CIA played a role in the exfiltration of the six American diplomats hidden and cared for by the [redacted] in Tehran. By early December, CIA had started working on different strategies and scenarios for getting the six out of Iran and undertook several operational initiatives.~~ [redacted]

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(b)(6)

On 4 December, the State Department requested CIA to assume responsibility for the exfiltration of the six Americans from Iran. On 13 December, the CIA submitted an exfiltration plan to the State Department (Precht) for consideration. And on 17 December, in response to [redacted] pressure, CIA discussed the subject [redacted]. [redacted] mindful of our need for its communications and other support in Tehran, did not push for a decision and agreed that the six Americans could "stay put for the time being." By the end of the month, however, both the U.S. and [redacted] had become increasingly concerned that the presence of the Americans in the [redacted] would become known to Iranian authorities. An article by Kim King in the Ottawa journal on

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29 December on the subject of American diplomats who had avoided capture by the militants on 4 November gave added point to these concerns. Exfiltration planning went into high gear, and in early January it was decided that the Americans would leave Tehran by commercial air [redacted]

On 7 January, CIA officers Mendez [redacted] conferred with the [redacted] on cover and documentation requirements for the exfiltration [redacted]

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
[redacted] documentation, [redacted]

[redacted] was prepared by CIA and sent to Tehran [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

On 19 January, CIA officer Mendez proceeded to Tehran to brief the six Americans on their cover scenario and distribute to them the appropriate documents and pocket litter for their cover roles. On 28 January, Mendez led the six Americans through Mehrabad Airport without incident and they arrived in Zurich a few hours later.



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(b)(3)



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All portions of this memorandum are classified ~~SECRET~~.