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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Termination of []

PROBLEM

Termination for cause of staff employee [] with appropriate safe guards for the security of covert operations.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

[] was dispatched to the German Mission, OPC, in February 1951 to take charge of Project Bund Deutsch Jugend Apparat, a paramilitary staybehind project of the type recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the supervision of this Project [] left actual control and power of decision to principal agent Otto Peters. Appropriate security precautions were not imposed by [] and specific security directives were either ignored or disobeyed. As a result of this and other attendant circumstances, full details of the Project became known to the German police with substantial documentary evidence obtained from Peters' or []'s quarters and from other places in Germany. Eventually the Project was exposed to the public press.

DISCUSSION

It is well documented in the Agency that [] was completely unfitted by education, background, training and general capabilities for any project bearing the type of responsibility as that to which he was assigned. Consequently, there is no indication of deliberate misfeasance in his failure properly to control the operation. There is, however, clear indication of willful disregard of security regulations in that [] kept highly classified papers outside the office in places where they could be and were subject to search and seizure. Further, although he had no official connection with Agency projects for caching arms, he obtained maps and information pertaining to such cachings and not only revealed caching sites to certain Germans involved in his Project but with certain of them attempted to locate some of the caches. This he admits he did completely without any authorization and without the knowledge of his superior or other Agency officials. He was relieved of all responsibility for the Bund Project in April 1952 and was directed to turn in all documentation related thereto and to have no further contact with the Germans involved. He stated he had complied with these instructions but it was then discovered that he had Project papers in his possession as demonstrated by

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400-6-96-2-207

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the fact that they were seized by the German police in a raid on his quarters. He has also admitted that he had further contact after April with the Germans involved. While these actions were deliberate, early assessments of his character by the Agency indicated that they were the type of action to be expected of this man were he to be left unsupervised in a position of responsibility.

CONCLUSION

While the original fault appears to lie in the assignment of this man to the type of Project involved, he not only lied deliberately to his superiors, he also displayed a lack of judgment, a disregard for instructions and an unsuitability for covert operations. These render him totally unfit for continued employment by this Agency.

ACTION BEING TAKEN

Steps have been initiated to impose disciplinary action on those Agency officials identifiable as having contributed to the assignment and use of [redacted] in an operational capacity, either with foreknowledge of his deficiencies or through failure to review his record prior to his assignment to such duties; and those who failed properly to supervise his activities in the field.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As [redacted] is a veteran with certain rights of appeal which would obtain in the event of a normal administrative termination, it is recommended:

1. That his termination be approved as being in the interests of the United States under the authority set forth in Section 102 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947;
2. That the procedures prescribed by Agency Regulation 20-9 be dispensed with in the light of the circumstances set forth above; and
3. That the Assistant Director, Personnel, in coordination with DD/P, General Counsel, and the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration/Inspection and Security take the necessary action to accomplish the termination at the earliest opportunity, to provide for the control of [redacted] in order to avoid further public revelation of operational information by him and to keep him available for future use by the Agency in the investigation of the Project in which he was involved.

LH:jm 9 Dec. 1952

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Deputy Director (Plans)