17 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Bund Deutscher Jugend Apparat

Is office on 17 December 1952 $\label{eq:alpha} \mathcal{U}: \sqsubseteq$ l. A conference was held, in \sqsubseteq

between 1430 and 1600 hours on the Bund Deutscher Jugend Apparat project.

1.1E Present were Messrs. I I. Mr. Helms Afcopures notified garegners $oldsymbol{1}$ in detail on all aspects of the] briefed [

BDJ Apparat from the time of its inception to the present date. The briefing included a chronological account of the development of the Apparat project from August 1950 through the liquidation phase recently completed. It embraced a discussion of the many security violations which occurred during the course of the operation, the poor selection of the case officer, the inadequacy of the planning for the operation, the meager cover arrangements made, and the lack of supervision exercised over the project by L 3's superior, L I pointed out the shortcomings of [] for this important and responsible job, his past unsatisfactory record with the FE Division, and the unauthorized actions by [] which directly violated security (i.e. [unauthorized disclosure of Top Secret information to German civilians and his withholding of classified documents in his personal possession after having been directly ordered to turn in all such documents to the field station). In addition ☐ reviewed ☐)'s personal background, his relationship to the Apparat as Chief of the Frankfurt substation, his commission of certain acts having overtones of poor security, and his completely inadequate and ineffectual supervision of the operation.

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3. Five main points were then indicated by [

interest to the IR Staff in the conduct of its investigation. These were:

. The listing of the project 'tall' (continue)

A thorough study of the operational weaknesses of the project was

then in order to which will provide material to aid in avoiding mistakes in the future of the types made in this project.

> b. The extent to which the case officer, \(\simeg \) was responsible for the poor manner in which this project was run and bis directly security violation which accurace,

c. The extent to which 1 is responsible for failing to supervise this project and the extent to which he exercised poor judgment in related matters.

d. The extent to which others in EE were responsible for failing to provide guidance for this project.

e. The persons in EE and FE responsible for the transfer and assignment of an individual performing unsatisfactorily in one division of the Agency to a responsible job in another division.

 $oldsymbol{\mathcal{J}}$ pointed up the problems encountered in conducting this investigation by reason of vague statements and incomplete files, by the rapid turnover of personnel responsible for the project during the past 18 months, and by the lack of many documents bearing on the project which apparently are in the files of the field station. He stated that the present status of our investigation along the above lines is as follows:

 ${\tt a.}\ {\tt A}$ study of the operation itself has been completed and a report on the project has been prepared. The report will be submitted to DD/P within the next few days.

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b. L' 3's guilt in violating orders, his poor security
practices, etc. are admitted by him and a matter of record.
His employment with the Agency has, therefore, been terminated, as approved the DC1.
c. Conclusions and recommendations with respect to \Box
are awaiting coordination with \subset \supset of I&S. \subset \supset
has not yet completed his interrogation of L Jon matters apart
from the project itself.

d. The lack of supervision over the operation by the EE Division is pointed up in the report on the project. An attempt is being made to identify those directly responsible for failing to provide this guidance.

e. An attempt is also being made to determine those persons responsible for withholding derogatory information on Γ]'s performance with the FE Division, if in fact such information was withheld.

answered to his apparent satisfaction. He stated that IR was doing a "magnificent job" on this investigation, commented that he did not intend to get into the matter, and asked that copies of the IR reports on the various phases of the investigation be forwarded to him. \(\Gamma\) agreed to do so, and left with him, at \(\Gamma\) is request, the original copy of IR's memo for DD/P concerning the qualifications of \(\Gamma\) and his prior performance in the FE assignment.

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