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SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR []

27 October 1952

SUBJECT: Chronology of recent developments involving the LCPROWL
Apparat.

- 9 Sept. 1952:
1. Former LCPROWL Apparat member Hans Otto exposed the organization to Frankfurt Criminal Police.
 2. Police learned that Ehrhardt Peters, Vice Chairman of BDJ, directed the Apparat.
 3. Police also learned that the Apparat maintained a partisan warfare training school at Waldmichelbach where members were trained in the use of U.S. and Russian arms.
 4. Hesse Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz was informed of the existence of the Apparat.
- 13 Sept. 1952:
1. Darmstadt Criminal Police raided the homes of [] and Ehrhardt Peters.
 2. Seven Apparat members arrested.
 3. Police discovered written material confirming partisan warfare nature of the Apparat.
 4. Paul Lueth reported police were also searching for him.
- 14 Sept. 1952:
1. Three Apparat members arraigned before a magistrate on charges of carrying fictitious documentation.
 2. Arrestees told police that training site, arms and false documentation were furnished by an American civilian and that activity was financed through front firm "Saxer".
 3. German police interrogated Emil Peters, father of Ehrhardt.
 4. German police confiscated Saxer files.
 5. An arrestee stated that in April, 1952, an American led a party of Apparat members in an attempt to locate an arms cache.
 6. Otto John indicated he would have Hesse police drop case if a responsible American would furnish a written secret statement that project was being liquidated by interested Americans.

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- 15 Sept. 1952: 1. German newspaper carried story without mentioning names of individuals or organization.
- 16 Sept. 1952: 1. Otto John called on General Truscott and informed him of police raids.
2. John asked Truscott if he were interested in arrestees. Truscott replied that U.S. authorities had been interested but that the organization had been in process of liquidation for three months.
3. [redacted] and Peters retained in CIA safe houses.
- 18 Sept. 1952: 1. Home office directed German Mission to terminate all phases of LCPROWL.
2. German police searched Frankfurt offices of the BDJ and took several leaders into custody.
- 22 Sept. 1952: 1. In Teleconference home office repeated prior directive that all aspects of LCPROWL should be terminated.
2. German Mission reported termination of LCPROWL Apparat as of 1 September.
3. German Mission also stated that [redacted] certified that all compromising material had been returned to German Mission headquarters.
4. Teleconference closed without final decision regarding future of overt BDJ.
- 23 Sept. 1952: 1. [redacted] interrogated by Security Section of German Mission.
- 24 Sept. 1952: 1. [redacted] admitted personal dissatisfaction with higher echelon support of the Apparat and confessed he surreptitiously removed caching site information from a QKFENCE safe and gave details to Apparat leader Ehrhardt Peters.
- 25 Sept. 1952: 1. [redacted] received the Hessian Criminal Police report on LCPROWL Apparat from Otto John and Albert Radke.
2. Security Section of German Mission discovered five boxes of arms and ammunition stored in the basement of a HICOG apartment occupied by [redacted]'s sister.

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- 26 Sept. 1952:
1. German Mission requested permission to administer polygraph test to [redacted].
 2. Home Office requested information regarding current status of security of TPEMBER Apparat.
- 30 Sept. 1952:
1. [redacted] and three children departed Frankfurt for the U.S.
 2. Home Office advised German Mission that written statement of any kind should be avoided if possible.
 3. Truscott instructed [redacted] to inform John that the Apparat had been sponsored by the U.S. at a time when the German Government could not prepare for resistance activities.
 4. [redacted] was also to tell John that steps had been taken in May 1952 to terminate the organization.
 5. John informed [redacted] that Minister President Zinn of Hesse requested an audience with John that evening.
 6. Zinn received John in presence of senior Hesse police officers and related that Apparat investigation unmasked positive intelligence activities directed against the SPD. Zinn stated that an Apparat member confessed that black lists were assassination guides to be used in case of an emergency.
 7. John told Zinn there should be no publicity pending clarification of anti-SPD issue with U.S. authorities. John agreed to arrange a meeting between Truscott's representatives and Zinn on 2 October 1952.
- 1 Oct. 1952:
1. [redacted] and three children arrived in Washington, D.C.
 2. John advised [redacted] that the arrestees had been released but that Zinn had incriminating documents indicating anti-SPD activity by the LCPROWL Apparat.
 3. A meeting between John and Truscott was arranged for the morning of 2 October.
- 2 Oct. 1952:
1. John related the story of the Zinn meeting to Truscott and expressed the belief that Zinn would take a reasonable stand in spite of the fact that the information was already in the hands of the SPD Executive Committee.

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2. Truscott stated that anti-SPD activities were unauthorized and that responsible American officers had no knowledge of these endeavors, but that the U.S. would like to review the entire matter before reaching any conclusion.
 3. John suggested that Truscott's representatives accompany him to the 3 October meeting with Zinn, at which time a joint committee would be formed to review evidence against the LCPROWL Apparat and make recommendations for disposal of the case.
 4. [redacted], [redacted] and John met Zinn and a number of senior Hessian police officials. Zinn claimed American support of BDJ constituted undue interference in internal politics.
 5. Zinn charged SS background of BDJ members made it a matter of utmost irresponsibility to put weapons at their disposal.
 6. Zinn further charged BDJ with liquidation lists and dossiers on 79 leading SPD officials who were to be assassinated. He also claimed that the U.S. attempted to block the investigation involving Americans named [redacted], Tom and Al.
 7. Zinn demanded a joint U.S. - German commission to investigate the BDJ and fix responsibility for the anti-SPD pbt.
 8. If the U.S. cooperated, Zinn promised to localize the investigation. He recommended the BDJ problem be discussed with the SPD Executive Committee, Ollenhauer and Heine.
 9. The German Mission informed High Commissioner Donnelly and Samuel Reber of events in anticipation of Adenauer's call on Donnelly.
 10. John informed Lehr, Lenz, Lex and Globke of developments in the LCPROWL Apparat.
- 3 Oct. 1952:
1. Home Office authorized the German Mission to administer a polygraph test to [redacted] with his consent.
 2. Truscott requested Allen Dulles to come to Frankfurt for consultation and review of the LCPROWL developments.

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3. Zinn conferred with Adenauer and despite the latter's efforts, said he would make the matter public in a speech to the Hessian Landtag.
 4. Adenauer met later with Globke and directed him to convey a secret message to [redacted] Globke subsequently met [redacted] and [redacted], to whom he conveyed the Chancellor's suggestion that the Americans admit they had trained partisans for the defense of Germans and Americans, but that these units had been dissolved when other defense measures became adequate.
- 4 Oct. 1952:
1. Home Office directed German Mission to undertake high-level approach to Adenauer and Ollenhauer. Home Office also outlined policies and reaffirmed that speedy liquidation of the BDJ was essential.
 2. Truscott advised Reber that attempts had been made to contact Ollenhauer in an effort to request latter to restrict Zinn's speech.
 3. Reber suggested contacting Zinn first and then if Zinn refused, contacting Ollenhauer.
 4. Reber agreed with substance of Adenauer's earlier suggestion but asked to be consulted prior to the release of any official statement.
- 5 Oct. 1952:
1. Donnelly stated that he was aware of the gravity of the situation and grateful for the guidance received from the German Mission on the matter of the Chuikov note.
 2. Donnelly also informed that General Mathewson and Cecil Lyon would be oriented on LCPROWL Apparat developments as he had requested.
- 6 Oct. 1952:
1. Truscott directed [redacted] to discuss the Apparat matter with Ollenhauer on 7 October 1952.
 2. Ollenhauer indicated to [redacted] that he preferred not to discuss the subject for political reasons and requested that [redacted] meet with Heine instead.
- 7 Oct. 1952:
1. German Mission gave [redacted] polygraph test.

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2. [] met Heine and warned him that Zinn's proposed statement on the Apparat was undesirable at this time.
 3. Heine repeated that the knowledge of the Apparat was already too widely spread and that Zinn would have to make the statement before the Hesse Landtag, as planned. Heine added, however, that the matter should be contained as much as possible and that he would phone Zinn and make that point clear.
 4. [] informed Donnelly and Reber that Heine had phoned Zinn and told him that any statement must be kept within "reasonable bounds" and that "we must help our American friends as much as we can on this matter."
 5. Following a conference with Donnelly, Ollenhauer agreed to intercede with Zinn and request the latter to move cautiously.
 6. Ollenhauer also agreed to arrange a meeting between Zinn and Reber for the morning of 8 October and to direct Zinn to make no public statement until that time.
- 8 October 1952:
1. Dulles reviewed the BDJ situation with Truscott and his staff. Dulles and Truscott were in agreement as to immediate steps to be taken but the former recommended a careful review of the entire West German PP operations.
 2. Following a 90-minute meeting with Reber and [], Zinn apparently agreed to take a reasonable position on the Apparat and specifically to inform Reber of the text of his statement prior to the Landtag meeting that afternoon.
 3. Thirty minutes prior to his speech, Zinn passed a copy to [] as requested. The latter protested that the text was in violation of the morning agreement but Zinn proceeded to read an eleven page statement indicting the Apparat before the Landtag at 3:30:
 - a. Zinn charged that 100 Apparat members received partisan warfare training at Waldmichelbach; that the organization consisted of between 1,000 and 2,000 members, many of whom were former officers of the Air Force, Army or SS.

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- b. Zinn stated that confiscated material proved that the Apparat had considerable financial support.
- c. Zinn stated that the Apparat had a counter-intelligence section, which was assigned the task of establishing the identity of persons who were considered politically unreliable in case of Soviet invasion or were opposed to German contribution to the EDC or the Contractual Agreement.
- d. Zinn further charged that the Apparat counter-intelligence leader confessed that these men were to be "cold in case of X."
- e. Of the 95 dossiers confiscated only 15 dealt with KPD members, while 80 were leading SPD personalities.
- f. Zinn also said that another list was found containing the names of 120 leading SPD members along with reports of SPD activities and assemblies.

Zinn concluded with the statement that the High Commissioner had agreed to an investigation of the Apparat and would cooperate completely in the inquiry.

- 4. [] immediately proceeded to Bonn to assist Donnelly in drafting an appropriate statement.
- 5. High Commissioner Donnelly released a statement that the text of Zinn's speech was unknown to HICOG and that the U.S. never conducted intelligence or other activities directed against the SPD.
- 6. [] U.S. member of the joint investigating committee, received only selected documents such as the report of the interrogation of Emil Peters for his study.

9 Oct. 1952:

- 1. [] again discussed the situation with Donnelly and Reber in an attempt to promote a more detailed follow-up statement on the part of the High Commissioner.

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2. In Heidelberg Truscott briefed General Handy on the situation.
 3. Hans Otto, the first witness, appeared before the joint investigating committee.
 4. Following this meeting [] told [] to request a recess to permit study of available evidence since the U.S. participation was proving a farce in the absence of established rules of procedure.
- 10 Oct. 1952:
1. Truscott and [] discussed policy and reviewed the LCPROWL Apparat situation with Donnelly.
 2. Donnelly was again urged to make a clarifying statement but seemed reluctant to do so.
 3. The German Mission told the home office of its intention to brief De Luce of the AP and Middleton or Raymond of the New York Times.
 4. [] told [] that rules of procedure for the joint investigating committee were essential.
 5. [] informed Reber of this matter and the latter agreed to participate in a rules committee to be composed of Zinn, John, Reber and an OCA representative.
 6. [] approached John in an attempt to see if such a meeting could be arranged on John's initiative.
 7. Zinn indicated a willingness to make all evidence known if the Americans would make Apparat records and financial accountings available to the joint committee.
 8. Paul Lueth, BDJ chairman and principal agent for project LCPROWL, was arrested by the Frankfurt police on charges of practicing medicine without a proper license.
- 11 Oct. 1952:
1. QKFENCE case officers were instructed to limit all contacts with principal agents and the German Mission following a discovery that QKFENCE premises were under surveillance.
 2. Radke suggested to [] that the LCPROWL Apparat matter should be raised to the Federal level where the problem could be considered in an objective and reasonable atmosphere.

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3. Donnelly refused to make a further clarifying statement since he believed the moderate press had the upper hand.
4. The German Mission outlined the American strategy to be followed in the joint investigating commission:
 - a. American representative to admit American sponsorship but state that activity against the SPD was unauthorized and unknown to the U.S.; further that the Apparat had been discontinued as of 1 September.
 - b. The Committee must confine its activity to the plot against the SPD.
 - c. Neither American personnel nor records would be available to the committee but the U.S. would guarantee the answers to reasonable questions pertaining to the investigation.
 - d. All information made available to the committee must be treated as confidential and, therefore, no statements should be made until the committee issued a joint report.
5. C. Installed a committee meeting by stating that the request for American files was still being considered.
6. Truscott journeyed to Paris and briefed Ridgway on the situation.
7. German Mission informed by Chief, EE that in essence final tactics should be decided in Bonn but that the general line should follow idea that U.S. extended support to Germans who wished to defend their country against Soviet attack; that the U.S. action was justified at the time and that the U.S. had no knowledge of political activities or an anti-SPD plot by the LCPROWL Apparat.
8. Headquarters directed the German Mission to dismantle the QKFENCE operational station, to discuss the caching program with representatives of the Federal Republic and to reduce PP activity to a minimum during the period of crisis.

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12 Oct. 52:

1. Reber attempted to get principals together in order to draft procedures for the joint investigation committee.
2. Donnelly discussed the caching program with John, who was to inform the Chancellor of the essence of the matter.
3. Truscott and Reber discussed the terms of the LCPROWL Apparat investigation with John, who stated that Zinn had not lived up to the agreement which established the commission.

14 Oct. 52:

1. At his own request Lehr met Truscott and explained that the Apparat matter had been expanded all out of proportion by Zinn and the SPD for the purposes of embarrassing the coalition government and delaying or defeating the contractual agreement.
2. Adenauer directed his deputy, Dr. Egidi, to hold a press conference expressing this fact.
3. Lehr told Truscott that the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for internal security and that he, Lehr, would appreciate being informed of U.S. - controlled organizations in order to avoid further embarrassment to the Federal Government.
4. Truscott said that the U.S. was eager to cooperate with the German authorities as soon as the Federal Republic gained complete internal responsibility. Truscott added that one key problem was the lack of a specific German authority charged with cold war activities.
5. Lehr stated that his ministry was the proper agency for such discussions and then requested that he be informed regarding the arms caching program. Truscott gave Lehr the information and added that a complete report on this subject had previously been given to John.
6. Lehr assured Truscott that the Germans wished to cooperate to the fullest extent and that "our interests were identical."
7. Later Truscott discussed the matter with Reber, who was to brief Donnelly. Reber agreed that Donnelly should request the Chancellor to designate an appropriate cold war contact.

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8. The home office was requested to debrief [] regarding any discussions he might have conducted in the Apparat dealing with assassinations as a function of resistance organizations.
- 15 Oct. 1952: 1. The home office informed the German Mission that the Department of State would not volunteer any further information to the press [] .
- 16 Oct. 1952: 1. Zinn informed John that the terms of the committee of investigation would be set forth in a letter that he, Zinn, was expecting from Reber.
2. The home office recommended a new Ollenhauer approach designed to counter the recent unfavorable publicity.
3. The German Mission was authorized to reveal various PP projects illustrative of its anti-communist effort to Ollenhauer. Riddleberger concurred in this suggestion but stated the approach should be made by a CIA officer and not a member of HICOG.
4. [] admitted discussing assassination as a resistance function with the Apparat but claimed he authorized lists of KPD and SED personnel only.
5. [] stated the overt BDJ maintained its own black list of political enemies.
- 17 Oct. 1952: 1. Riddleberger advised Donnelly that the Federal Government should take the line that the BDJ matter emphasized the need for approval of the contractual agreements, after approval of which the occupation powers will no longer feel the necessity, or be able to undertake such clandestine programs.
- 19 Oct. 1952: 1. John informed [] that Zinn was agreeable to the U.S. proposed terms for the joint investigating committee with the one exception, to wit, Zinn demanded that [] appear before the joint committee.
2. Truscott informed Donnelly that he, Truscott, could not agree to any American officer appearing as a witness before the commission. Donnelly insisted that the German Mission agree to produce [] before the joint commission if this step was essential to the continuation of the committee's investigation.

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Donnelly requested the Director of Central Intelligence to issue guidance on this point.

4. Truscott cabled the Director that the appearance of American officers, especially [redacted], would have an adverse effect and aggravate the situation.
 5. In Bonn [redacted] prepared a letter to Zinn in conjunction with Donnelly and Reber; this letter to be shown to Adenauer on 22 October and sent to Zinn on 23 October.
- 20 Oct. 1952:
1. Wisner cabled Truscott that he agreed [redacted] should not appear as a joint committee witness and that Truscott would be informed at once if the DCI held views to the contrary.
 2. [redacted] reported great reluctance to use U.S. support of the SPD as even a veiled threat but that he, [redacted], was optimistic about the results of a scheduled meeting with Ollenhauer on 23 October.
 3. [redacted] reported that he did not believe Ollenhauer would make a statement to the effect that the SPD was convinced U.S. had acted in good faith in sponsoring the Apparat or that the U.S. had no knowledge of the Apparat's anti-SPD activity.
- 21 Oct. 1952:
1. Donnelly set forth a detailed background story concerning the Apparat to an AP representative, as [redacted] had requested from the outset.
 2. Donnelly discussed the BDJ problem with Adenauer, approving a statement that Adenauer might make on the BDJ to the effect that the U.S. had given support to the organization purely for defense and security purposes; that the U.S. never had any knowledge of its political activity; that the U.S. had previously withdrawn its support, and extended satisfactory promises to Adenauer regarding future cooperation.
- 22 Oct. 1952:
1. Riddleberger stated that he had no objection to the proposed statement by Adenauer.
 2. General Smith concurred in the opinion that [redacted] must not appear as a witness before the joint committee.
 3. Donnelly and Reber saw Adenauer and showed him a draft of a letter containing the terms with reference to the joint investigating committee. Donnelly agreed not

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to send this letter to Zinn until he had seen Lehr's Bundestag statement in response to five questions posed by the SPD.

4. Reber and [] drafted a statement for Adenauer's use in the Bundestag interpolation of 23 October.

- 23 October 1952:
1. The substance of Donnelly's 21 October statement received strong play in the German newspapers.
 2. Donnelly told Adenauer that the U.S. would not agree to the appearance of an American officer before the joint commission.
 3. Donnelly also told Adenauer that the U.S. would withdraw its support of the BDJ, to which Adenauer replied, "I am not interested in the BDJ."
 4. In response to Donnelly's direction [] suggested a few alterations in Lehr's pending statement. The latter accepted these suggestions without exception.
 5. Ollenhauer requested that Reber meet Zinn instead of utilizing a letter to clarify the apparent misunderstanding on the joint investigating committee. Debevoise, substituting for Reber, and [] met Zinn in order to discuss the terms of the German - American investigation commission.
 6. Zinn accepted the terms of the committee and at no time pressed for the testimony of any American.
 7. Zinn appeared friendly and cooperative but anxious to get the investigation underway as soon as possible.
 8. The Home Office suggested that the German Mission check with CIC for information on Zinn which conceivably might be used to a pply pressure on him.
 9. The Home Office directed the German Mission to conclude discussions with the German government on the caching program.
 10. The Home Office ([] []) requested an investigation to check the possibility that the LCPROWL Apparat expose might be a part of an SPD effort to embarrass U.S. agencies in Germany.

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11. I denied that he had discussed assassination with Apparat members as a means of disposing of Apparat enemies in peace time.
12. denied knowledge of physical coercion used by Apparat members in the Sallaba case. He also denied any knowledge of an Apparat instructor who was allegedly murdered.

24 October 52:

1. The SPD was unable to substantiate its charges in the Bundestag debate.
2. Bundestag passed a resolution requesting the government to keep the Bundestag Committee for the Protection of the Constitution informed of the progress of the joint investigating committee.
3. In a meeting with Donnelly, Zinn produced a memorandum allegedly prepared by , setting forth instructions to resistance groups that they should not take prisoners but should shoot captives instead.
4. Zinn said the document should be suppressed and it was the intention of the Department of State that said document should be destroyed.
5. Truscott advised the DD/P that he, Truscott, did not feel it necessary or wise to make a personal appearance before the joint investigating committee.

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